Center for a New American Security

Wow! The IDF only scored a 4

Wow! The IDF only scored a 4 in motivation. Why has the IDF lost its secret sauce? If the Israelis have lost their secret sauce, is Israel a less useful ally for America? Should America diversify its alliances to other powers in lieu of Israel because other countries would prove more valuable allies? Some that America might consider anchoring its middle east policy around:
-New GoI
-Iran if Obama's outreach works
-Hezbollah if Obama's outreach to Iran works
-Lebanon
-Turkey

I have seen recent studies indicating that Israel's education system performance is slipping too. What is up with Israel?

in military doctrine and

in military doctrine and strategy Hizbullah received a 9 and the IDF a 5
in training and organization, Hizbullah received a 8 and the IDF 7

Surely this renders their opinions worthless.
Who anywhere believes that Hezbollah's strategy was basically perfect ? What was it, the weather that prevented them completely routing the Israeli invasion, protecting the state from widespread degradation, then pushing back with their own counter-invasion of Israel to carry out their stated military objectives ?
Likewise, what's the scale of training look like on the worldwide stage ? You've got your SAS/SEAL schools delivering in all manner of disciplines, then WhateverTF this non-armored, non-air supported, non-navy-deployed, non-artillery-fielding guerrilla army has got going on, then the rest of the planet's forces on various rungs below that ?
All I read here is senior IDF officers are not capable of objective assessments in enemy capabilities in engagements in which they performed.

Kilo, you are comparing

Kilo, you are comparing apples and oranges. The questions were not general but specific to one war and specific objectives. Hizballahs objective was to stop an invasion and they did that with a strategy that worked better than they expected. You think the invasion was not completely routed? Maybe, but the fact remains that at the end of the longest war in Israels history, they held on to a few square kilometeres of land and had complete control of no towns at all.
Protecting the state from air attack and a counter-invasion were not part of their stated military objectives (although I would watch carefull the next time Israel steps across the border.

Likewise the training. The question is training for that particular war. The SAS/SEAL schools deliver all manner of disciplines because their training is not based on defending one border with one known enemy. Saying that, I think you'd be surprised how multi-disciplined Hizbs trainig is.

And, out of interest, what is your assesment based on? Were you in South Lebanon in 06 or are you basing your assesments on what you saw on tv or read on the web. I can assure you, no website or tv station has even come close to describing what was happening on the ground that summer.

I'm reminded of Bill

I'm reminded of Bill Belichick's pregame press conferences, when he's asked about his next opponent. "They're a fantastic team," he'll say, "and they'll be a real challenge." Then he'll go on to single out a few of their best players, and some of their key strengths. The thing is, he says the same thing every week, whether he's talking about the Baltimore Ravens or the Detroit Lions.

The survey results are fascinating for a variety of reasons - but they're entirely worthless as a comparative assessment of the IDF and Hezbollah. First, the useful stuff. It's refreshing to see the IDF develop a healthy respect for its northern antagonist. Every review of the IDF's performance in the Second Lebanon War has stressed the ways in which a complacent, somewhat disdainful military establishment failed to assess the magnitude of the challenge or to properly plan or prepare. As the example of Belichick demonstrates, it always pays to overestimate the opposition. The assessments also point to the strengths and weaknesses of each party to the conflict. Hezbollah's lie in its training, motivation, and tactical command; the IDF's include its weaponry, technology, and some areas not covered in the JPost article (which focused on the sensational angle of Hezbollah outperforming the IDF), including tactical intelligence, combined arms operations, and of course, air power and remote targeting. The results are also useful as a reflection of the immense frustration of the IDF's officer corps.

Now, on to the survey's weaknesses. Some of the results are clearly distorted by frustration, including the notion that Hezbollah possessed superior intelligence or strategy. In point of fact, Hezbollah seems to have failed to anticipate the magnitude of the Israeli response it would provoke - a massive failure of both intelligence and strategy. The conflict played out on its own territory, which certainly aided its operational intelligence, but there was little indication that Hezbollah was able to track or target forces across the border - while the IDF was far more successful in accomplishing that. Does anyone really think that Hezbollah does a better job gathering intelligence on Israel, than the other way around? As for strategy, I think the post below this one nicely illustrates the broader strategic incoherence confronting Hezbollah. Then there's the question of motivation. As an assessment of 2006, the results seem fair. But that's because the IDF was invading as a temporary, suppressive measure, and Hezbollah's fighters were defending their native land. Flip that around; imagine a Hezbollah invasion of northern Israel, and the motivation problem suddenly disappears. (And if you can't imagine a Hezbollah invasion? Well, then you can safely discard the notion of Hezbollah's superiority.)

Hezbollah, after all, remains somewhere between a non-state militant organization and a full-fledged state military. It can't hold territory against the IDF, nor can it push the IDF off ground it wishes to seize. On the other hand, it excels at denying the IDF full control of the territory it takes, and at launching remote attacks despite suppressive fire. That's an impressive accomplishment, but it ain't parity by a longshot, much less superiority.

The survey results speak well of the IDF's prospects. The IDF, by most accounts, overestimated Hamas' capabilities in advance of Cast Lead, and overplanned for the assault. In consequence, the operation went remarkably smoothly. If it had done the same in 2006, the results might have been equally different on that front. So it's fair to use this survey as a gauge of the officer corps' frustration (high) and of its resolve to properly prepare for future conflicts (also high). But to suggest that Hezbollah is - in any of these categories - superior to the IDF? I don't think so.

Paging Stephen Walt and John

Paging Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer:

Sandman warned of two main catalysts for a possible lack of support. The first was what he called the decreasing influence the Jewish community had over the US government.

"This trend will continue to get worse, due to assimilation and the fast rise of other minorities such as the Hispanics, which amount to 30 million [people] today in the US," he wrote.

The second was a possible change in government and subsequent policy that "could leave Israel without an ally."

"... in training and

"... in training and organization, Hizbullah received a 8 and the IDF 7..."

What?! Outrageous!! There is no way that those numbers are right. Hizbullah is clearly a 6 and the IDF a 5.

8 and 7? Get out. Amateurs.