Abu Muqawama retains its autonomy and the views and beliefs expressed within the blog do not reflect those of CNAS.
Pages 2-1 (9) to 2-22 (30) of this .pdf. This was written with about a dozen talented and good-natured co-authors (and the world's most intense lead author) who put up with my smart-assery -- often in enclosed spaces -- for a whole month. I look forward to both your judgment of our efforts and the effect it has on the policy debate in Washington and the allied capitals.
AM:
To what extent are these documents (or, at least, this one) composed with an eye to what audiences, e.g., Gates, Obama, Congress, the American public, etc., etc.?
ADTS
The report has a section titled "New Operational Culture: Population Centric Coin."
Well that about says it, the matrix is in place. For better or worse, population centric coin is our consummation in the American Army. Of course the General follows the section title with the usual Coin bludgeoning statement that this is our culture of Coin but the big bad pesky conventionally minded army only wanting to fight Fulda in the Korrengal is doing better but still doesn’t get it. You see, this bludgeon has to be there and the notion that the Army still doesn’t fully embrace and get Coin either also has to be there because one of the pillars of the matrix is learning and adapting toward better population centric counterinsurgency. Another pillar of the matrix is the notion that Coin is something radical and revolutionary but traditionally has been suppressed by the big-bad bogey man army. This has become a powerful trope that must be in place in all statements, faux strategies, and proclamations of coin.
Face it Andrew, you have won, the Army is now a Coin Army. This may be the right thing for Astan, it may be the right focus for the Army for the next 30 years, I don’t think so, but I may be wrong. But at least Dear Father, acknowledge that Coin now rules the American Army. To do anything else would be disingenuous on your part.
As I have said before, you are the Establishment. You may want to look at replacing the arabic word Muqawama for the Arabic word for establishment.
gian
Partnership verbage has great specificity (ANSF, ANA, ANP, etc.). Civilian political/economic partnership verbage names only Afgan government (GIRoA). The difference in echelon inherent in the verbage demonstrates the weakness of this document. Why not just write, "Economics and politics require goal. We choose to punt."
Some politics in this document, of course. No mention of economic support hinderances such as ISAF contractor corruption and conducting counter-narcotics with only lukewarm support for job creation. Real job creation, meaning real farming/industry supported by product distribtion networks, banking support, and other commercial infastructure on a large scale.
Minister Wardak -- our nonpartisan reviewer of American strategy!
BBC comment on document here: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8266072.stm
Is COIN ever compared with community policing strategies or efforts to disrupt and dismantle gangs in highly violent inner-city environments in the developed world? I'm often struck by the basic tenants of COIN again laid out in this document and certain similarities in the challenges and social landscape, especially in the lack of credible government and security structures in both environments and the role corruption, lack of political will and resources to effectively combat insurgents and organized, socially embedded gangs. While not discounting the radically different situations in terms of outside actors and complex role of clan and tribal structures absent in US urban environments (although you could argue these are present to some extent in transnational organized crime which often supplies narcotics), are there some practical lessons that can be shared here?
I won't preach the gloom and doom that Gian has but I don't see anything particularly new here. It's COIN 101, that's clear, with some specifics on the players, but it still comes down to execution. How do you expect to get Karzai's government to be seen as a legitimate power, how do you get the local security forces to go legit, how do you get the civilians into country to improve civil-military issues, and how do you reform ISAF to be both bigger and better at what they were supposed to be doing all these years? Oh and how do you do this in 12-18 months before the American public just revolts and says "enough is enough already."
Maybe this is what Clausewitz meant when he said "War is very simple, but in War the simplest things become very difficult."
gian - you're right. this is the new SOP. how quickly the army will adapt, though, remains to be seen. btw, once you made clear that you wanted to see the obama team present a grand geopolitical strategy and not just an afpak one, your complaints about them not having a strategy make more sense.
what would you like such a grand strategy to look like?
After an initial read, I'm wondering if AM has a framed and signed copy somewhere in his his place? As the Col says, he's won (for this particular war). And probably not a moment too soon.
That said, why the emphasis on how this MUST be accomplished in 12 months? The parts (to which we have unclassified access) say "failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) -- while Afghan security capacity matures -- risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible."
Why? Why is the "near-term" limited to 12? What is preventing us from resetting, as necessary, in one year and to cointinue moving towards our objectives? Page 1-4 has a portion labled "Unique Moment in Time" but other than saying the Afghans are "frustrated" (duh!) it offers not one concrete assessment as to how some combination of factors will make this war almost entirely unwinable if we do not turn things around in 12 months. Maybe there is more we are not allowed to read, and there is certainly, absolutely a need to act quickly, but other than the implied build up of a national lactic acid of despair, fear and disappointment, I don't read anything more, and I'm left to think again its domestic political concerns that ultimately drive the depth and extent of our current effort. It's been asked before what might be a failing of COIN, and while it may take into account domestic politics, it seems to have a very difficult time accounting for their effects.
But I will say this, kudos for releasing this to all of us. An excellent insight for those who choose to read it. Gracias.
Whether or not the Pope gets his additional troops is the real signal on whether they mean to back him and the COIN plan (Triage or whatever) or whether it's a long goodbye of some kind.
So far the current POTUS's track record of standing his ground is.not.good.
If we can throw Czech, Poland (on the way of throwing NATO) under the bus, negotiate directly with N. Korea (yes, that's caving in), pull missile defense, give away something for nothing to Putin, and ignore Chavez as he ponders becoming the next nuclear rogue state...oh, and did we mention Iran? And telling the Israeli's they can't build new apartments in buildings they paid for with cash, legally (that's the "settlements"), while meanwhile the Arabs are buying property all over Galilee with Saudi cash...
Then we can pull the rug out from under this. It's a nice sop to the left for losing on health care. Especially since they've been nakedly warning him in the press that he'd better pull out.
Missing ol stubborn stick to his guns Texan yet?
Of course, I could be wrong. Maybe this is where he plans to make the stand.
Because that would be a first. Normally - by which I mean his actual record, he prefers the Chicago way ( get along with and make a deal with anyone no matter what they've done) and also throw cash and bones at core Dem constiuencies to get re-elected (which is what got him there)..well, maybe ISAF and NATO are right to just hunker in the bunker and wait for it to fail.
Meanwhile, the Pope's leaked encyclical in WAPO tells me we still can't get away from Force Protection cult, and forgot already how to run a detention center properly. Wow.
@DM, last year I attended a COIN Center leaders' seminar in which officers were repeatedly asked to think like Kansas City cops trying to tackle a gang problem.
DM:
Read Slapout9 or Jedburgh's comments (particularly the former) on SmallWarsJournal sometimes.
Sayke: COL Gentile has come close (perhaps as close as an officer can come?) to saying he could, if he wanted, fashion a strategy statement for Afghanistan. Or perhaps he has said he *could* fashion a strategy statement (I think "generational struggle" was one of its components), and has simply chosen not to "publish" one.
ADTS
The one issue I dont understand in the whole US COIN debate, is the point that emphasis on one technique of warfare will lead to a total inability to do another. Sure, some fine honed skills may be a bit atrophied, but you dont forget everything you know just because you learn something new...
Face it Andrew, you have won, the Army is now a Coin Army.
I'm sorry, but -- with all due respect -- this is utter nonsense.
If this is a COIN Army, why are we short of trained helicopter pilots?
If this is a COIN Army, why do we lack personnel trained in languages and cultures? (And why are there so few FAO generals?)
If this is a COIN Army, why are intelligence operations still driven by kinetic targeting?
If this is a COIN Army, why are there no dedicated, purpose-trained advisory personnel?
If this is a COIN Army, why are so many field-grade officers still ignorant of the rudiments of COIN doctrine?
If this is a COIN Army, why is there still no institutionalized training, units, or operational/procedural mechanism for providing ministerial-level governance mentoring?
If this is a COIN Army, why does force protection still get pride of place in the operating mentality of combat arms unit leaders?
If this is a COIN Army, why is the default operational approach still FOB-centric?
If this is a COIN Army, why do heavy brigades make up 40% of active Army combat brigades?
Gian, what do you make of this article in the Post about Obama's hesitant reaction to the report? Are you glad he has not taken the red pill (or is it the blue)?
"When Obama announced his strategy in March, there were few specifics fleshing out his broad goals, and the military was left to interpret how to implement them. As they struggle over how to adjust to changing reality on the ground, some in the administration have begun to fault McChrystal for taking the policy beyond where Obama intended, with no easy exit.
But Obama's deliberative pace -- he has held only one meeting of his top national security advisers to discuss McChrystal's report so far -- is a source of growing consternation within the military. "Either accept the assessment or correct it, or let's have a discussion," one Pentagon official said. "Will you read it and tell us what you think?" Within the military, this official said, "there is a frustration. A significant frustration. A serious frustration.""
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/20/AR200909...
I have long seen this to be much more politically dangerous than the military and Gen. McChrystal ever imagined. The artificial timeline that Boondoggle is amazed by is much tighter in my opinion. In the tightest, and I would argue best, reading of the political situation it is a huge gamble -- on the order of the original Surge -- to even commit these troops in the first place.
Remember the Petraeus quote from when he was meeting about the Surge with Bush? Bush said he "was willing to double down on Iraq," Petraeus responded "Mr. President, with all due respect, this would be all-in."
A good post for this blog might be 'Is the Surge in Afg. a bigger or smaller risk than the Surge in Iraq -- answer must include military and political considerations.'
Here's Glenn Greenwald's take on the review:
http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2009/09/21/iran/index.html
It's the Chicago Way. I'd bet money on it. Just not my life.
You guys to include most of the commentators are living in a magic bubble. He's gonna bolt. And he probably should, given who he is. LBJ was sized up correctly by Ho Chi Minh. Who the Commander is matters.
What Commander, in particular from the Asian school of warfare, would look at the Apologia Americana issuing endlessly from SOTUS (Salesman Of The United States) and not know they can take this guy? Chavez punked him out. On TV!
BTW - the WaPo article...the hesitation from DC, the lack of clear instructions...(Bush and Rumsfeld were decisive even when wrong), being left hanging in space, the "don't mention more troops...yet"....uhhh, errr...
Oh, so Vintage Clinton! I am thinking Bosnia...(what does the UN say)..
Africa (Rwandan Relief) ..OK. We're going In!! Uh, everbody about face...this looks too hard.
Hysterical. Schadenfreude here..I admit it. Guilty.
And Fnord is now the Right Wing!!
One wonders if McKiernan and McChrystal knew the old joke about the three envelopes, with the blame game representing the first envelope. Reorganization would logically follow down the road. Key question: at what point might McChrystal prepare his own three envelopes?
Comparing Gian Gentile's input with that of Gulliver, one is struck with the impression that we're seeing a battle for the soul of the Army. Both Gentile and Gulliver are right, Gentile in understanding that heavy hitters within the institution—Petraeus, et al—have bought into COIN as the new wave, but Gulliver in understanding that there is much internal resistance to the type of Army that logically unfolds from following the COINdinista vision. I've always been in Gentile's camp—I don't believe the type of Army the COINdinistas want, an imperialist, colonialist Army IMO, is consonant with our Founders' vision for the nation—but, depending on how the NCA comes down, it may be time to actually consider a bifurcation of the Army.
ISTM the Petraeus/McChrystal/CNAS/COIN camp essentially wants a foreign legion. I don't agree with this—I believe it's fundamentally against our values—but if the politicians in charge decide that the nation is going to do these sorts of things for the long haul, I'd then suggest considering a military architecture with a Petraeus or McChrystal as field marshal of a fenced-off American Raj force that does not draw resources from a greater Army focused on defense of the nation. Oh, but isn't Afghanistan about the defense of the nation? Well, few seem willing to go out on that limb. Even Biddle, whom Exum cites admiringly as someone who supports the Afghanistan adventure, won't go so far as to say Afghanistan represents an existential threat. Strangely, no COINdinista will ever say Afghanistan is an existential threat. The closest they come is a weak argument that goes something like, "But, but, what if Al Qaeda gets their hands on Pakistan's nukes? Curiously, the COINdinistas can't go into Pakistan, plus Pakistan is not so worried. The arguments about how the AQ-Pakistan nexus is so critical is pretty weak, especially if we recall WMDs in Iraq. I don't think there is a legitimate argument for having a heavy troop footprint in Afghanistan—to prop up a corrupt government and protect poppy growers?—but if that's how it unfolds, I'd like to see the Army and Marine Corps protected a little more.
In his assessment, McChrystal discusses the need for troops to be sensitive to indigenous personnel, language skilled, etc., etc., etc. I agree with all of this, but I don't see how it's achieved by constantly rotating personnel from various and sundry tactical units in and out. I say, "you want a foreign legion, be honest enough to say so, and present the case for signing troops up for the duration." You want a "generational commitment," convince the NCA and find the troops to sign up for that. Otherwise, if we choose to commit in the way McChrystal wants and don't do something about the deleterious effect of the constant roiling of the entire ground force, we're going to end up with an Army that knows all about eating soup with a knife, but little about modern kinetic warfare. The field artillery is already dead. How does armor look these days? What happens to the Army when the economy improves? Who will sign up for a career of shuttling between Fort Hood and Afghanistan? And even if you get the bodies, are they the ones you need?
And then we hear of veiled threats from McChrystal that he might resign (which of course means retire, with full pay) if he doesn't get his way. And there is the matter of the leaks. Mullen is flannel mouthing publicly. But Gates isn't talking. This looks like a military move to box the president in. We've seen what happens when we put the military in charge of strategy—not pretty at all—so ITSM these guys are not playing it smart at all, especially since they have little credibility. Apparently, the military heavy hitters are miffed that Obama wants to do his own fact finding; he won't take their word for everything. He wants to hear from State. He wants to hear from the intelligence community. And, most importantly, he wants to hear from the American people. Smart on Obama's part, IMO. He knows what happened to Lyndon Johnson. Maybe he'll even come up with a national strateg as a result.
"Who's to say we need more troops?" this official said. "McChrystal is not responsible for assessing how we're doing against al-Qaeda."
Exactly.
Obama has only met once with the joint chiefs? Well that tells the story right there. Obama has no business as a "commander". Perhaps his agenda is something other than military. Who knows. I will say this any commander that cripples his men by refusing supportive fire, interlocking fields of fire, air support, and sucks up to "NEW ROE" mandated by who? Why the fuck do you people support those asinine decisions? Why do you support a failed strategy?
Why do you continue to allow our men to die for nothing other than political points with the UN while bankrupting us as a whole? We won the war a while back. When we tried to kiss taliban ass to make peace we started losing.
Turn us loose and let us do our jobs. When the job is done let us go home. Let the fucking taliban rebuild their own country. Maybe if we stop changing their diapers they will figure out fucking with the US Marines is a bad decision.
Maybe they will discover that "terrorism" (their first option) is a bad one. That "war" (their second option) is a worse one. and "politics" their third option is the best one to affect change. WITHIN THEIR OWN FUCKING COUNTRY!!!!!!
NOT OURS
Or do you have a problem with that? I welcome any and all dissenting opinions, as well as those who agree with common sense.
elf - "Missing ol stubborn stick to his guns Texan yet? " no. because its not his stubbornness i remember, its his recklessness.
Publius - "I say, "you want a foreign legion, be honest enough to say so, and present the case for signing troops up for the duration." You want a "generational commitment," convince the NCA and find the troops to sign up for that." Hear hear. This is exactly right. This is exactly what has been missing for the last decade or so. If we'd been told to buy war bonds rather than go shopping, we might not be in the current mess
Gulliver - totally agree - Did I miss the lightening phase where suddenly the competencies were built, the military transformed?
Fnord - This is the bit I don't get either. I thought the US military was supposed to be good at mutating and surviving.
And now tonight. Drones, drones and more drones is the (possible) Whitehouse response.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32952295/ns/world_news-south_and_central_asi...
COIN crowd care to respond since they argued for fewer of these just months ago?
I'm not sure I recollect the argument as being for fewer drones. My recollection was that the argument was for fewer civilians being killed by them.
Still seems a pretty valid argument.
Reckless? He took a long time to make a decision -- over 18 mos after 9/11 (yes, it was the trigger) before we went into Iraq. Fire Rumsfeld? Long time. Get rid of the Old Guard? Months for his staff to make the case for the surge. With him moving behind the scenes with AEI, etc.
But when he made a decision, he stuck to it.
Don't worry, unless there's some kind of sudden weird flash of manhood, the salesman won't be reckless. Or stick by it if he is, or make a decision that has a tough wartime downside. HE'S A FUCKING SALESMAN.
Nope. It's the long Goodbye to the Hegemony. Not that I'm a big fan. The end was never going to be pretty.
World, you will miss Pax Americana. Especially when you get Pax Sino...meet the new Cop, Officer Han.
Can't wait till the SLA gets the Paki's spun up, and the Chinese send in proxies, or maybe even their own boys. If they need to even...it will be a short story.
Get ready for RIF! The war is over. Finally. Now muster out.
@Publius - who is the Army going to defend us from if not these guys? Mexican Drug Lords? Town Hall meetings?
You are right though. Were we to continue like this, we need two Army's.
Don't worry. We won't.
We are about to make the shift from Great Britain to the United Kingdom.
Obama has had more addresses to a joint session of Congress than meeting with the Joint Chiefs? That's SAD.
As to what abu Muqawama did over the summer: I figured it was three monthsof being the LOVE SOCK FOR THE PASDARAN! or at least it would appear that way considering AM's propensity to support them at every turn.
I see I have no takers. Not even from Gulliver , Gentile, or Elf. Whats up there? Do I have to have a membership to a club to get a response or is this still America?
@Abu Muqawama -- To you, this assessment, and this war, have become more about yourself than about Afghanistan or U.S. foreign policy. You have officially become the central figure in your narrative of the war.
You also seem to be the only one from the strategic assessment group who needs to continue reminding everyone that you were indeed part of the group.
abu sharmouta - isn't that what a blog is all about ? narrating a narrative from your own perspective?
@disgusted
America used to make sense. America used to win wars... Now we have self-serving assclowns like Andrew Exum who use our soldiers and Marines as tools to further their political careers. This isn't America anymore.
Thanks for the buddy f**k Exum
@ abu sharmouta and diablotakahe -
I think of the different 'COIN- oriented blogs' as complementary - so that you have a personal and sometimes informal blog such as Abu M, which helps to draw in the casual observer or layperson, and the more formal blogs such as Kings of War (an academic blog by academics) and a sort of peer reviewed journal-like forum such as SWJ. I think that the PROCESS of blogging, or commenting, is something that is missed if you look at one site as static, as if it were simply a paper reference. Look at the commenting community that has been created, that breaks and forms, that travels to different sites, and leads to, well, who knows what intellectual seeds are planted? The entire process from reading the links, posts, comments, moving on to different intellectual internet spaces from this space, is meaningful. Or can be, if you want it to be. I remain grateful, as a layperson, for the education. I can't just read War 2.0, you know? I need to talk and test things out. People learn differently, I suppose.
@ Gulliver and gian p. gentile -
Are the both of you talking past each other, a bit? At the topmost levels, the intellectual doctrines are being set in COIN, but it hasn't filtered down to all levels, because how can you turn an entire institution on a dime? Isn't time and permeability of doctrine (am I using the correct words) the operative here? That's how it seems to an outsider looking at this debate, well, from the outside.
@ Publius -
"Both Gentile and Gulliver are right, Gentile in understanding that heavy hitters within the institution—Petraeus, et al—have bought into COIN as the new wave, but Gulliver in understanding that there is much internal resistance to the type of Army that logically unfolds from following the COINdinista vision."
I sort of thought the same, not that there is internal resistance, but things take time. And, if doctrines are being 'set' in COIN in a sort of matrix, how do you now switch an institutions thinking and doctrine to different tasks, such as CT (well, Yahoo NEWS is afire with how it's going to be CT, now, instead of COIN. Good grief, what a scrum in D.C. What a mess, is this what inexperience gets you, or is it just normal for messiness to occur in such big decisions?)
Just to clarify, the WaPo article I cited says "has held only one meeting of his top national security advisers to discuss McChrystal's report so far" which presumably means that he has met with his National Security Council once in the past few weeks since the McChrystal report became finalized. That's not how many NSC meetings he's had and it doesn't reference anything about the Joint Chiefs.
Reading is fundamental.
How hard will this administration fight for what is needed in Afghanistan? Will it go after the likes of Andrew Sullivan and the Democratic congress on this issue? Will President Obama use his rhetorical and organizational skills to rally people to get behind what needs to be done in the region? It will be we did the best we could, it's all Bush's fault and lets pack up our shit and go home.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125350906414427191.html#mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDD...
@ diablotakahe
In fact, it would be in our best interests, and those of the Pakistani people, to declare a moratorium on drone strikes into Pakistan.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/opinion/17exum.html?ref=opinion
Not some, all.
And from Ex's and Fick's paper Triage under the section "Direct Counterterrorism in Pakistan: The Case Against Drones."
Despite these advantages, the costs of drone attacks against non-al Qaeda targets inside Pakistan outweigh the benefits and they are, on balance, harmful to U.S. and allied interests.
The United States should instead focus on isolating extremists from the communities in which they live. Drone strikes accomplish the opposite, alienating the population from their own government and from the coalition, while playing to the propaganda of the terrorists who manipulate them.
If I were Carnac opening an envelope it would say: "What is domestic politically limited window of 12 months COIN implementation in Afghanistan, with a token addition of troops, followed by a reduction to a counterterror mission driven by intel, drones and the occasional direct action."
The Coinistas may have helped "win" the fight to bring COIN to the battlefield, but they're meeting the immovable object: Congress. Specifically the left of the Democratic party. Who would have thought health care for the uninsured would have anything to do with Afghanistan a year ago?
"Face it Andrew, you have won"
Finally, the bickering can end !
There will be dancing in the streets.
You know I think there's something to these declassified memos. Like some subliminal psy-ops voodoo at work.
Okay, we've been forced to declassify something we don't want you to read, but that doesn't mean we can't release it as a dodgy, blocky, poorly aligned copy which will make you stop reading it anyway.
Comment by Visitor on September 22, 2009 - 7:11am
""How hard will this administration fight for what is needed in Afghanistan? Will it go after the likes of Andrew Sullivan...""
That's an exceedingly bizarre question. Can I suggest you look into the health care debate where this kind of nonsense doesn't stand out so much.
Comment by abu sharmouta on September 21, 2009 - 9:32pm
"You have officially become the central figure in your narrative of the war."
What was the alternative, you clown ? And you're basing this on what, from reading his own blog ?
Oh man, you wouldn't believe how much Bill Clinton material there is in Bill Clinton's autobiography. It's like the whole is written from his perspective.
Visitor 711 has it right. That's exactly what SOUTUS is going to do....declare an honorable withdrawal. And frankly given his character, it's the moral and practical thing to to, if your not a fighter, don't fight.
Then blame Bush. Then have some nice CIA show trials, and of course we can always hang some more junior enlisted, burn some contractors at the stake, and when blaming Bush falls flat we can always villify the Pope. Soon to be Anti-Pope. Oh, and of course we can blame CNAS for doing studies and offering ideas.
@COL Gentile - shouldn't you be directing these questions to your Salesman in Chief? AM is a 31 year old soldier cum scholar whose busting his butt to try and make this work, or offer a solution. Same with CNAS. I don't accept that the RAND Corporation was responsible for the Vietnam debacle.
As for the Pope, he is doing what the Generals in Vietnam should have done, and what the Generals in Iraq should have done, he's telling the truth. As has AM all along.
Sometimes I feel that President Obama is like the Kevin Bacon character (Chip Diller) at the end of Animal House jumping up and down screaming "all is well" with total chaos around him.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2009/09/mcchrystal_...
""http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2009/09/mcchrystal_...""
Some people: "the McCrystal I know will probably resign if he doesn't get his troops"
Roggio: "McCrystal has threatened to resign"
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