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The human side of anti-COIN in Afghanistan
If you still don't get why population-centric COIN is a good idea, let the Guardian's Ghaith Abdul-Ahad's report from Kunduz enlighten you.
If you live in a country with troops in Afghanistan, you'll have seen the faces of your war dead. You'll probably read about their heroic deeds, and you might shed a tear when you hear their parents talk about their tragic loss. These images will have an effect on you. If you're British, there's a 41 percent chance you want Our Boys (to borrow the Sun's grammar) bought home.
The dead whose faces you won't have seen are the Afghan ones. But that doesn't mean they are any less mourned.
Abdul-Ahad met with relatives of those killed in the fuel tanker incident. This is the human side of the impersonal summation we normally hear when it comes to Afghan dead.
"He dropped his head on his palm that was resting on the table, and started banging his head against his white mottled hand. When he raised his head his eyes were red and tears were rolling down his cheek: "I couldn't find my son, so I took a piece of flesh with me home and I called it my son. I told my wife we had him, but I didn't let his children or anyone see. We buried the flesh as it if was my son."
If you feel that winning in Afghanistan means being more vicious than the bad guys, Abdul-Ahad's reporting might help you understand why Gen. McChystal is trying to limit civilian casualties... even to the point where it puts NATO soldiers at greater risk.
In a relatively stable part of the country, the last thing you need is to give the local population a really good reason to hate you.
Being against pop-centric
Being against pop-centric COIN (PC COIN) using western troops in Afghanistan does not mean you are for the use of indiscriminate air strikes. Adopting PC COIN does not means that NATO will stop using air strikes...perhaps fewer but then you should expect more replays of the recent Sirkanay ambush where a USMC/ ANA platoon was almost wiped out...perhaps because air and arty was denied because the target was a built up area.
The adoption of PC COIN will almost guarantee failure. It will double or treble the costs as well as US casualties and the public will become increasingly against the campaign. Luckily for the US, failure in Afghanistan will be forgotten very quickly and have no long term consequences.
My strategic recommendation is to reduce costs, vulnerability and spurs to Islamist recruitment by withdrawing major military forces from the region. Large scale military engagement in the Middle East and Central Asia is weakening the US and should be stopped. The US goal should be to halve it's military foot print in Afghanistan in two years and halve it again by the 2014 Afghan election and again by 2016.
My plan for Afghanistan this year would be to reduce overall costs while increasing funding of ANSF and development through NGOs:
a) stop any further escalation military and civilian.
b) stop trying to pacify remote anti-gov hotbeds such as the Pech Valley.
c) cull the FOBs and HQs of unnecessary troops, civilian employees and contractors. Stop creating anymore HQs
d) take 10% of the savings from a,b,and c and improve the quality of the existing ANSF: more helicopters, better gear, increased pay, serious retention bonuses, more commando training, and more intensive training for soldiers and policemen. Quality not quantity.
e) funnel development cash through existing international and Afghan NGOs instead of the "civilian surge".
If you still think
If you still think Pop-centric COIN is a good idea, perhaps the following will enlighten you:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a2hnXgrnlUQ&feature=channel
It shows the Marines marching to glorious, inevitable victory using COIN tactics.
I'm kidding, of course. It shows a small band of Marines in an isolated and vulnerable position taking casualties and making no noticeable progress of any kind towards any identifyable goal whatsoever. It shows the locals laughing at the Marines' ineffectiveness. It shows the young officer's frustration at being, in his words, "unable to get at the guy on the hilltop 700 meters away." It shows the Ana's utter ineptitude and uselessness after 8 years and billions of dollars worth of training and equipping by the best army on the planet.
Money quote: "These outposts are supposed to give the Americans control of the surrounding area. Clearly, it's not working."
You weep for our opponents. You have this luxury because you live in DC and are in no danger of having to fight under the high-minded restrictions you impose on everyone else. You see a video like the one I have attached and figure that the situation is subject to fixing with your 10,000 mile screwdriver and your post-WW2 French colonial tactics. You write maudlin, treacly, sympathetic op-eds about the sorrowful effect airstrikes have on our enemies and those who harbor them. Your tender liberal sympathies are bruised when something bad happens to the Taliban.
As for me, I will save my sympathy for the Marines.
If you still think
If you still think Pop-centric COIN is a good idea, perhaps the following will enlighten you:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a2hnXgrnlUQ&feature=channel
It shows the Marines marching to glorious, inevitable victory using the COIN tactics to which you ascribe.
I'm kidding, of course. It shows a small band of Marines in an isolated and vulnerable position taking casualties and making no noticeable progress of any kind towards any achieveable or useful goal whatsoever. It shows the locals laughing at the Marines' ineffectiveness. It shows the young officer's frustration at being, in his words, "unable to get at the guy on the hilltop 700 meters away." It shows the utter ineptitude of the ANA after 8 years and billions of dollars worth of training and equipping by the best army on the planet.
Money quote: "These outposts are supposed to give the Americans control of the surrounding area. Clearly, it's not working."
You weep for our opponents. You have this luxury because you live in DC and are in no danger of having to fight under the high-minded restrictions you impose on everyone else. You see a video like the one I have attached and figure that the situation is subject to fixing with your 10,000 mile screwdriver and your post-WW2 French colonial tactics. You write maudlin, treacly, sympathetic op-eds about the sorrowful effect airstrikes have on our enemies and those who harbor them. Your tender liberal sympathies are bruised when something bad happens to the Taliban.
As for me, I will save my sympathy for the Marines.
Interview with 'the man the
Interview with 'the man the Taliban have tried to kill 4 times', Inspector General Malik Naveed Khan, chief of police in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/8250751.stm
Hope stream not UK only
Really Londonstani (what M
Really Londonstani (what M Shannon said too) why do you always (along with Exum and other Coindinistas) assume that doing anything other than pop centric coin means the mass slaughtering (or at least you imply that) of civilians, or as a minimum as your post suggests the uncaring attitude toward civilian deaths by soldiers who are not of the Coin craze?
sheesh! Gosh darn it!
Come on man, that shtick is getting a little old, and it is not supported by anything that I have ever said, other folks like Ward or Finel, or even CE Callwell for that matter.
In this regard, Londonstani, and Andrew to boot, a little intellectual sophistication on your part might be in order.
When will the Coin zealots get it through their head that proposing alternatives to population centric coin in Astan DOES NOT MEAN SCORCED EARTH, UNCARING ATTIDUDES OVER CIVILIAN DEATHS, OR THE MASS SLAUGHTERING OF CIVILIANS?
Until you people can come off of this harmful straw-man we will never get to a real, sophisticated, and valuable debate on strategy for Afghanistan.
gian
Londonstani, I believe that
Londonstani,
I believe that one of the requirements for COIN is that you treat neither the foreign population nor your own population as chess pieces because you can loose support from either side. I have often criticized this blog for its cavalier attitude towards its own side. The tone of this article is, "You grieve for your losses but not for the losses of others," when it should be, "by grieving for the losses of others you can save your own." Consider yourself unqualified for any postings to MI-7.
You know, when you go into a
You know, when you go into a country with the world's support and the support of the majority of the Afghan people, who don't like the Saudi-Pakistani-UAE sponsored Taliban any more than they liked the Soviets, and drive out the Taliban, and then run some shady reconstruction program that dumps millions into the pockets of cronies and contractors while doing nothing at all for the Afghan people, while also destroying farmer's livelihoods by ripping up opium crops, while your shady puppet government in Kabul is building McMansions with heroin proceeds - well, then you lose, you give up all your advantages, you turn the people against you, you create openings for violence which the most half-assed enemy can exploit - you're fucked.
So, what do you do? Here's what you do: you retreat to the major cities and abandon the countryside and quit exposing your troops to enemy fire in situations where they have almost no control or ability to respond without slaughtering dozens of civilians.
Then, your problem is how to keep the roads between major cities safe - and as this hijacking of a fuel tanker shows, that's not so easy. The Taliban also seem to understand PR operations - they probably knew a air strike was imminent, so they called in the villagers for "free fuel" in the hope that there would be a big slaughter - that seems to be a tactic they'd use.
What all this really shows is that the Bush-Cheney gang are children who should never have been allowed out of the sandbox.
Straw men: well, they're
Straw men: well, they're easier to argue against.
Now if you directed those anti scorched earth comments at me, there would be truth in it. Not that it's my current position, I say give Humanae Triage it's asked for time period of Dec 2010, and give the Pope the monks he needs to do it. If it doesn't make the progress they said it would/meet their own metrics, etc then hold a conclave and look to other means. My point all along is not to take any options off the table, given the stakes, and the harm already done to NYC, London, etc. How many plots may we wonder are being hatched next door even now? Do we need another Dresden in NY, DC, London before we start to get ruthless?
Crying farmer: Sorry. And what was the son doing outside at the scene of a robbery at 0200. Oh, and does this farmer grow poppies? If so, Hell can and should be his lot. And I predict will be.
I just can't seem to scrounge up much pity.
===========================
ROE and no Airstrikes: I think the pushback you are getting comes from the heart (see ARB and other comments). I think I would listen as carefully to such feedback as you do to Farmer Abu Poppy about what happens when you try and run war by remote control. It's not X-Box, and they don't know that at "______" Main.
You field and pick people you trust down to the E1/E3 level, get rid of the others, then let them run it.
Sounds like the 10K mile screwdriver, the Lawyers and the squeamish TOC Jockies are in full effect. It's a ridiculous way to try and fight, control terrain, control ...er...excuse me "protect" the civilian population. Hell, it's a silly way even to run a patrol. People will get fed up fast. I recall one instance where the TOC pukes denied a CPT in contact even Illumination rounds at night.
What's amusing is when these worthies finally do get some kind of testosterone flashback they always overcompensate and go too far the other way (excessive violence) --just like what probably happened to the Germans.
And given the logistics and frankly my own asthetics - listen to MShannon, Old Blue, yeah even me and clean up the GD Fkn FOBs. Must we really reinvent the wheel everywhere, every time?
O/T, but the UK press using
O/T, but the UK press using the figure of 2 million people marched to the Captiol yesterday to protest "The Agenda".
And AM's outta town? He's missing this? Wow.
@ Gian P Gentile Just as an
@ Gian P Gentile
Just as an outside observer of this debate for couple of years: your point sir is probably a very valid one. The tragic consequences of civilian casualties is immense (in both strategic/operational/tactical and human terms) regardless of how a mission is defined operationally. I also imagine this was probably appreciated beforehand by many. However it also became painfully clear to a lot of others on a very personal level through the awful experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. At least in the recent past, not as many US soldiers have had to personally deal with the consequences of civilian casualties to the extent that they have in Iraq and Afghanistan. That experience has to be profound. And obviously at the same time we've also seen a tremendous increase in interest in counterinsurgency theory too which also emphasizes the costs of civilian casualties. So perhaps the two are just overly associated together to the point where it is mistakenly assumed we can't take the exact same extreme precautions we have learned and apply them in other kinds of operations. To paraphrase (or butcher): population centric counterinsurgency theory generally suggests taking even more care to avoid civilian casualties than usual. It will probably always be a key idea behind population centric counterinsurgency theory. However it should probably be a general rule of thumb for almost ANY military operations today AND also far more so than it ever was in the recent past. So to think of it exclusively in terms of COIN vs Anti-COIN might not be entirely helpful now or for the future. I mean I've always thought that some of the classic and newer COIN propositions had some extremely valuable merits. However it would seem like a bad idea for anyone to strictly think of some of them as exclusively belonging to COIN. It is possible to appropriately apply a valuable lesson in different situations (of course what is "appropriate" is the real rub).
Also I just finished Tom Ricks' "The Gamble". As an outsider, I am in no position to know what happened and I am personally not quick to judge. I've heard many brief grumbles on this blog and elsewhere of the book's accounts and views. I've never actually seen a full rebuttal either and I'm sure that has more to do with the fact that I missed it. Can you or someone else on this blog point me in the right direction? I'm not accusing or jumping to any conclusions because honestly who the f*&! am I to know. I don't mean to pour salt on old wounds. I was just hoping I could give as many people a fair shake as possible. It seemed like the very least I could do for anyone who has served our country.
@ Londonstani
Nice to have you back. Great article... er uh in the sense of great journalism. I agree too much of the Afghan side is glossed over or briefly touched on in the general coverage. Does anyone take seriously the people who suggest acting at least as brutally as the Taliban? Regardless I can still see the need to constantly keep down that rhetoric.
@ Elf
"ROE and no Airstrikes: I think the pushback you are getting comes from the heart (see ARB and other comments). I think I would listen as carefully to such feedback as you do to Farmer Abu Poppy about what happens when you try and run war by remote control. It's not X-Box, and they don't know that at "______" Main.
You field and pick people you trust down to the E1/E3 level, get rid of the others, then let them run it. "
Absolutely agree with that sentiment.
Ditto what Gentile said.
Ditto what Gentile said.
Ditto what Gentile said.
Ditto what Gentile said. Also elf.
"Your tender liberal
"Your tender liberal sympathies are bruised when something bad happens to the Taliban.
As for me, I will save my sympathy for the Marines."
I don't have sympathy for the marines. I have respect - they signed up for adventure, and they're getting it.
I don't have sympathy for the taliban - they are the enemy.
I do have sympathy for civilians who get killed, injured or displaced by war.
does this make me a liberal?
Sayeth another
Sayeth another chest-thumping proponent of American exceptionalism:
"As for me, I will save my sympathy for the Marines."
Fcuk the Marines. That's my response to your "sympathy". What business do young boys from the ghettos of Harlem, the barrios of San-Fran, and the slums of Appalachia have fighting, killing, uprooting, destroying, and dying(in record numbers) in a barren land 10,000 miles away, all in the hallowed name of Freedom, Democracy, and Human Rights ? Ever asked yourself that, friend ? Furthermore, what exactly does your cheap "sympathy" mean to Afghan villager picking out a charred arm and leg out of a heap of corpses to bury. Ah, I see. It's the 21st century answer to Westmoreland's: "We had to destroy the village in order to save it".
Well, friend, I don't know if you've been perusing the news lately, but there's been a whole lot more "dying" going on in the ranks of the Imperial occupiers than any killing(all killing by Nato forces is by definition, collateral, accidental, and justified, right ?)
Afghanistan is not called the graveyard of empires for nothing. Alexander the Great became Alexander the Impotent in the mountain passes of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union disintegrated into 16 states thanks to t
Let it be noted: I am an American. A proud and patriotic one. And I support the Taliban. My only regret is that thousands of young boys whose poverty will be exploited and recruited by the military will be the cannon fodder for the 2nd defeat of the militarty-industrial complex(the first was in Vietnam).
The Taliban and the Afghani people will win, are winning, and will emerge from the horrors of this war victorious and ever the stronger.
I thought we were in
I thought we were in Afghanistan for our security. At least, that's been the primary argument for however many years.
On a serious side, any national security 'cause' is in trouble when its advocates are reduced to arguing different degrees of humanitarianism. The patience in this country to spend lives and money for those sorts of open-ended causes is short indeed.
9/11 "Special" Issue of
9/11 "Special" Issue of English-language Jihadi Journal Released
@ "I am an American, and I
@ "I am an American, and I support the Taliban"
That's mutually exclusive. You could claim the exalted title of "Traitor" if you like.
I suppose this sort of non-sensical nonsense was fashionable where you went to school, but it's going out of style. You can't be a treasonous patriot. And no, it's not the highest form of patriotism.
But listen, if you feel so strongly about it: get on a plane and go fight for them! I'm sure they'd love to have ya....
And sleep face up on Thursdays. You'll see what I mean when they "break you in".
Well if you liked me getting
Well if you liked me getting ugly above, you'll love this...this Canadian wants Berlin 1945...
The Gathering Storm
Oh, Londonstani! Not to pile
Oh, Londonstani! Not to pile on, but this doesn't help, not one bit. Everyone can make this kind of emotional argument:
1. If we leave immediately, what about the innocent lives lost?
2. If we stay and don't do COIN, what about the innocent lives lost?
3. What if we stay and do COIN, what about the innocent lives lost?
No one knows the future. A lot of people, good people, are trying to figure out the best way to handle the situation in Afghanistan, because, after 8 years, that is what it is. A situation. We went to punish those who harmed us and to prevent such harm, again, as much as that is possible, and now the whole thing seems 'morphed', somehow.
The question posed by someone else, oh I can't remember now, from a particularly good SWJ thread was: what is the end state? A lot of the discomfort with the current COIN doctrine in Afghanistan, at least from my layperson viewpoint, is that talk of COIN vs. non COIN doesn't help me understand the endstate any better. Hence, the constant harping on strategy, I suppose.
Okay, I don't know what I'm saying here, except, yes, it is a strawman to present COIN skeptics as not caring about civilian casualities.
@ the fucking moron calling
@ the fucking moron calling himself "American Taliban".
You are first, a traitor. Secondly the two terms are mutually exclusive. Third You Obviously have no clue what you are talking about when you mention Marines. A United States Marine is held to the highest standards in the country. Mentally, Physically, emotionally, and the intelligence factor is also one of the most demanding.
Why don't you move back to Afghanistan and support your brothers in arms and stop calling yourself a "patriotic American"? Or are you just too much of a coward?
The title:The human side of
The title:The human side of anti-COIN in Afghanistan. Implies that if you don't agree with COIN you are on the Taliban's side. Which is not true. Through your wonderful advice to CNAS you have simply made our best and brightest targets for these assholes, without the support of air-power, and without the ability to actually fight the enemy. What the fuck do you think the enemy will do? Perhaps run out on an open plain with a goddamn sign saying "I am a taliwhaker"?
No you damned fool, they will hide in the civilian populous where we can't touch em. I guess you missed the first day of unconventional warfare.
Why did I write 'situation'
Why did I write 'situation' in my last post? Yeah, I don't get it, either. Please disregard.
*American Taliban can't be serious, can he/she? It sounds like trolling to me....
Where in the world does Exum
Where in the world does Exum find substitutes that post crap like Londonistani? I can't wait to see Exum go down with the CNAS ship. Nothing you all do works, unless that is you are working for the bad guys. At least "American Taliban" is man enough to tell us whose side he is on. Exum PRETENDS to be working for the U.S., but proudly displays himself toasting the Hezbollah flag - not something any American veteran would EVER do.
Just curious, did you manage to pleasure Mugniyeh before he was killed, Andrew?
Exum's no Ranger... A rump
Exum's no Ranger... A rump ranger maybe... but not a Ranger. UNACCEPTABLE!
@ "I am an American, and I
@ "I am an American, and I support the Taliban"
"That's mutually exclusive. You could claim the exalted title of "Traitor" if you like."
Um, elf, while I *dont* support the "Taleban" (because they are a fascist bunch of misogynist 12th century bastards), I fail to see how seeing this war as a imperialist undertaking is "traitorous". Providing info, weapons and money to the enemy is traitorous. Saying that you think "the enemy" is right is not. This is further exemplified in the usual hateposts against Abu M for his lack of demonization of Hezbollah: Seeing the problem from a different side is not equal to treason.
And hey, Londonstani, while you been gone Ex made himself a celebrity ;-) He is now a frontlineman for the current COIN strategy, and so a lot of the posts here have become pro/contra instead of practical. Woohoo.
ooops, the above was me.
ooops, the above was me.
PS: Gentile, you write:
PS: Gentile, you write: "Really Londonstani (what M Shannon said too) why do you always (along with Exum and other Coindinistas) assume that doing anything other than pop centric coin means the mass slaughtering (or at least you imply that) of civilians, or as a minimum as your post suggests the uncaring attitude toward civilian deaths by soldiers who are not of the Coin craze?"
I would posit that you have become so involved in this debate that you see yourself in every argument. I read Londonstani to point his finger at the enemy-centric pov that the Blackfivers and other seem to still hold, where breaking the Will of the Enemy is seen as the way to sucess.
Fnord: It is really more
Fnord:
It is really more than just the "blackfivers" that you mention; really it is. In fact this notion that any alternative to population centric coin means a scorched earth approach in Astan underpins much of the Coin Crowd's thinking about things. Heck I could dig up older posts on this very blog and other mediums where people like Brian Burton et al were saying that you just cant do the "enemy centric" approach because that would mean invariably the mass killing of civilians to get at the insurgents. Moreover, the post implies that by its nature a population centric coin is easier on a civilian population. That assertion is just that, and does not necessarily hold up to historical scrutiny.
Fnord, it is about this whole construct of Pop Centric Coin that has been built up and still informs, I believe, muddled thinking on history and on current ops; which Londonstani's post was a good example.
thanks
gian
@ M Shannon- Have you been
@ M Shannon-
Have you been to the Pich Valley? My experiences there must be very different from yours (or from those that you've gotten word from). Even in villages like Kandigal, Bar Kanday, Dag, even down into the Korengal and up into Wanat, all notorious for being anti-GOA, was that the VAST majority of the population supported the government.
Further, I think your line of logic becomes a slippery slope. As we move away from living within villages, we pull to fewer and fewer FOBs (becoming MORE like post-WW2 French Colonial military methods than modern COIN is) with greater distances between them. We lose security of roads and routes, making every venture off the FOB a much more dangerous one. If you think the rise in IEDs has been exponential recently, wait until we try a disengaged strategy.
@ disgusted-
You mention that the enemy will hide in the civilian population where we can't touch them. First, I'll say that this is NOT a UW fight. We transitioned out of UW a long time ago. This is much more of a FID situation. Now, all of that aside--the whole point of COIN is that you CAN touch the civilian population. You touch them significantly more than you could without COIN. You engage on a daily basis, the locals. You know who the "enemy" is and can then conduct police actions against them.
Yes we do assume a greater immediate risk of engagement with the enemy. AND, that's our job in the military to assume that risk so that others don't have to. If we are to be effective, then we must accept risk. Plain and simple. You can't be safe and be effective, those are the mutually exclusive words in this dialogue.
Elf says: "Oh, and does this
Elf says: "Oh, and does this farmer grow poppies? If so, Hell can and should be his lot. And I predict will be."
Man, that's awful hard on the Tasmanians down in Australia...
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8118257.stm
"Australian wallabies are eating opium poppies and creating crop circles as they hop around "as high as a kite", a government official has said."
This is because Tasmania is the global center of legal opium production for the medical industry. You would think that the market would move to Afghanistan - buy up all the farmer's opium and send it off to Purdue Pharma for conversion into oxycontin and what not.
Or maybe we should just release some kangaroos in Afghanistan, and they'll deal with it?
"Australia supplies about 50% of the world's legally-grown opium used to make morphine and other painkillers.
"The one interesting bit that I found recently in one of my briefs on the poppy industry was that we have a problem with wallabies entering poppy fields, getting as high as a kite and going around in circles," Lara Giddings told the hearing.
"Then they crash," she added. "We see crop circles in the poppy industry from wallabies that are high."
Fnord, what you and all of
Fnord, what you and all of the other COINdinistas, POP-centric or otherwise, fail to acknowledge is that there is a great deal of disagreement regarding the efficacy of the POP-centric approach, or of COIN itself, in Afghanistan, or, for that matter, anywhere else. Many of those who disagree with you, Exum, this fellow Londonstani and the many other COINdinistas out there do so from a foundation of significant military experience and do so, not because they aren't aware of the terrorist threat, but because they believe your approach to fail the risks versus gains test. Just why in the world are you people so confident that you're right? What basis do you have for your beliefs?
Through use of verbiage such as, "I would posit that you have become so involved in this debate that you see yourself in every argument," which you directed to Colonel Gentile, you poison the well by implying that Gentile doesn't have a valid basis for his argument. One could just as easily direct such a statement towards you and many others who feel the same as you do, with the difference being that unless you've hidden it very well, your depth of knowledge regarding the U.S. and its military doctrine, capabilities, etc., does not approach that of Gentile's. Frankly, your tone was snotty and dismissive. Such tones are all too prevalent within the COIN community, which acts as if it's reinvented warfare and is too important to be bothered by traditional military concerns.
Colonel Gentile has never proposed a scorched earth approach, or, "going Roman," as some of us like to say. Enemy centric does not mean that. What he has been saying from the beginning of this debate is that neither the U.S. political system nor its military is well-suited for COIN, especially this POP-centric approach. We aren't trained for it and our nation doesn't have the patience for it. What the U.S. military does do better than anyone else is "close with the enemy and destroy him." This is what we do. We are not peacekeepers, nor are we nation builders. I suggest that if you want Afghanistan rebuilt, you work in your own nation and within other European nations to get some support for such an approach. I will tell you right now that the fatal flaw in this grand new scheme of POP-centric COIN is that you Euros don't see fit to participate in significant numbers, choosing instead to ride on the U.S.'s coat tails. The way it works in the U.S. is that the American people will tire of bearing the burden for everyone. We can't afford it, either in blood or treasure. If you and this Londonstani think it's so important to do this, I'd advise you to stop haranguing U.S. military officers and start working on your own people.
I frankly think placing all of the eggs in the Afghanistan basket is an unwise approach. Defeat of the Taliban will not equate to security from terrorism. From an American-centric security standpoint, I do not care whether the Taliban rules Afghanistan or not. I do care if the Taliban poses a threat to the U.S., but I believe that can be addressed through measures short of large-scale military commitment for many years. IMO, conducting military operations in support of a corrupt third-world government—especially when such operations are conducted against people who want to run that country—is a stupid idea, particularly when there is a safe haven for the insurgents or rebels in a neighboring nation. I also believe my opinion is shared by millions of Americans. Many of us are very well aware that terrorist organizations—AQ and others—are small, well resourced and highly mobile; they are certainly not inclined to serve as targets wherever we would like to engage them.
COIN warfare may never be a good idea for the U.S. POP-centric COIN warfare is an even worse idea. We Americans do not have the staying power for such a lengthy exercise, and, as noted, our military is not oriented towards such warfare. In fact—and this is something that Colonel Gentile has long warned against—there is a considerable body of evidence that our military capabilities have already suffered greatly as a result of these unneeded expeditionary wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. You COINdinistas apparently do not care about the fate of the U.S. military, but I do. I've already been through one expeditionary war in my lifetime and I served in the hollow Army that followed that. Our nation and Western Europe were vulnerable for several years. I don't want to see that again, which is a major reason why I disagree with the COINdinistas. Our military is intended to defend the U.S., not rebuild third-world countries. One shudders to think what the U.S. Army will look like in five years, given current trends. I also wonder what will happen to recruiting once our economy improves. Americans are not imperialists and I believe most young Americans will opt out of living in third-world shitholes forever.
"Muddled thinking on history and on current ops..." Colonel Gentile was being kind.
@Publius- " You COINdinistas
@Publius-
" You COINdinistas apparently do not care about the fate of the U.S. military, but I do."
That's an unnecessary and false ad hominem attack.
I think you bring up several good points about stretching the military. I do think, however, that we need to relook at what the threats we face are. Moving away from air-land battle as the world transitions into 4GW is necessarily a good thing. We're due for a QDR, but my guess is that the threats that we'll be found to likely face in the next 15-20 years are going to be non-technilogically advanced threats. Therefore, we need to continue to train for operations that rely on SOF, small-scale/low-intensity operations, and COIN. We're not staring the USSR down across the Fulda Gap--and we won't be in a similar position for the foreseeable future.
Not conducting COIN in Afghanistan prevents us from further learning how to face these future threats. Then (since we seem to like to discuss history), we'll be in a position, not entirely unfamiliar to America, where we are caught off-guard by emerging threats and tomorrow's war.
There's another aspect to
There's another aspect to the false argument Col Gentile exposes - that is, in COIN no one gets hurt. I know no one here is making that claim, and I'm certain that we will strive hard to respond in the aftermath of each and every incident wherein despite our best efforts others were (or reportedly were) caught in the cross fire. Perhaps such reports will become increasingly rare.
Good book review by Andrew Exum in the Washington Post
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/11/AR200909...
He explains how mistakes made at the operational and tactical levels can actually happen, independent of the strategic and political. He doesn't directly point out how shifting that blame upward - no matter how tenuous the connection - is one way to deliver a best-seller (or just a "hot story" - even if an NFL player or someone else with a recognizable name is not involved), but that should be obvious. After all, it's been common practice for years.
Publius: Snotty and
Publius: Snotty and dismissive? If so, apologies. I was trying to point out that my reading of Londonstanis text wasnt the same as Col. Gentiles. Col. Gentile saw it as a argument against all opponents of pop-cent COIN, while I read it as a comment to the more violence enamoured factions of the mil-blogosphere, wich have proposed variants of scorched earth now and then. If that statement needs to be made, I perfectly respect Col Gentiles honesty and humanity.
Having said that, I have still to see a consequence-analysis put forward by the opponents of COIN as to what would happen if NATO pulls out rapidly at this point. You are right that I dont know the US Army like most of you folks do, but Im not sure it would be exactly good for morale if the order came to cut and run tomorrow. You speak of a hollow army post Vietnam, how would it look if you have to evac Kandahar as the natives close in? I know some would see it as an act of treason to all the locals that "we" have promised our protection. And I still fail to see how letting Taleban conquer Kandahar will weaken the memetic idea that AQ is turning into. Or how the ensuing refugee-stream back into the camps in Pakistan will help that country. In short, what I still find missing from the colonels (and your) argument is an alternative o-plan. If that is snotty and dismissive, so be it. With all due respect.
"Not conducting COIN in
"Not conducting COIN in Afghanistan prevents us from further learning how to face these future threats. Then (since we seem to like to discuss history), we'll be in a position, not entirely unfamiliar to America, where we are caught off-guard by emerging threats and tomorrow's war."
So, Afghanistan as training ground for perceived future military operations?
I don't know what makes
I don't know what makes Exum's book review "good" Greyhawk. 3 minutes I won't be able to get back.
Exum hypocritically joined in on the same Bush administration attacks that he criticized the author for doing. And as he admitted, he didn't come to his defense of the military, which true to form, I have never seen him write anything supportive of the military (unless he is benefiting politically). This is the guy who bragged about generals being the people he shoved in trash cans during high school. Only somebody who himself spent some time upside down in trashcans would think to write something like that.
I will say this - he didn't brag endlessly about his Ivy League college, or call himself an "Alpha-male" but he did find a way to plug his going away plaque from his men into a book review?
But I bet it's entirely possible that Exum, the guy who writes his own book reviews, made his own plaque. And I bet there are a few Rangers and 10th Mountain troopers who would like to shove this puke in a trash can.
@ disgusted- You mention
@ disgusted-
You mention that the enemy will hide in the civilian population where we can't touch them. First, I'll say that this is NOT a UW fight. We transitioned out of UW a long time ago. This is much more of a FID situation. Now, all of that aside--the whole point of COIN is that you CAN touch the civilian population. You touch them significantly more than you could without COIN. You engage on a daily basis, the locals. You know who the "enemy" is and can then conduct police actions against them.
Yes we do assume a greater immediate risk of engagement with the enemy. AND, that's our job in the military to assume that risk so that others don't have to. If we are to be effective, then we must accept risk. Plain and simple. You can't be safe and be effective, those are the mutually exclusive words in this dialogue.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ I personally have spent time in firefights, I have seen the results, I have caused the results. War is never pretty. I agree that we take the risks no one else is willing to thats our job. "ours is not to question why......." All that aside the United States Military is not designed for, nor were they ever intended to serve as "policemen". The continued effort in Afghanistan is a waste of military materiel, money, men, and lives. In my day, when a team was in a firefight, we could call in Air support, or Arty without fear of being refused for "political reasons".
Our Marines, and Soldiers signed up to be just those things Marines or Soldiers. NOT "policemen" for Afghanistan.
@visitor- I don't think that
@visitor-
I don't think that should be a primary motivation for staying in Afghanistan, but I think changing the strategy would not only be detrimental to the mission in Afghanistan but also to future missions.
Andy
@Capt Monkey: From the
@Capt Monkey: From the "whose ox is gored" school, I obviously don't include active duty service members in my "unnecessary and false ad hominem attack." However the real problem I have with feeling too bad about my comment is my utter conviction that all too often if one scratches a COINdinista, one finds a NeoCon lurking in the shadows. And, frankly, I've never seen a NeoCon who gives a damn about the military personnel they so gleefully move about in their real-world game of Risk. As to others, well, I'll let them look inward. I won't retract my comments; too many people unfortunately seem to fit the bill.
Also for Capt Monkey: You do realize that FID was never intended to be carried out by line troops and those not specifically trained for such duties? That the spirit of FID is defeated by attempting to practice it with large troop formations that do the work instead of training the host nation troops to do it? That a reasonably stable host nation government and cohesive populace that at least recognizes a national government is pretty nice to have?
Finally, Capt Monkey, I'm glad you've got a pipeline into the next QDR and are confident that "small wars" is the wave of the future. Does this mean we can count on a massive reduction in future defense budgets now that we'll not have to worry about any peer adversaries? Hate to say it, but I'm not so sanguine; I'll bet you the next QDR is an exercise in bet hedging and that there'll be slowdown in capital spending. While I'm on the subject, what makes you confident that the American people will tolerate any more of these kinds of wars in the future? I'm afraid this may be your last shot. And it may not last so long as you apparently would like for training purposes.
@Fnord: Sigh. Ain't my job to come up with a big old grand counter-strategy. I'm saying use existing intelligence and SOF assets wisely and avoid large-scale commitment of conventional forces. I've always wondered why use of an already very good capability that costs a fraction of conventional forces is such anathema for all of you people. The existing capability, also, BTW, could be improved considerably, again for dimes on dollars. So I'd say it's your job to defend the massive commitment you want, taking particular note to apprise us of the contribution Norway and other European nations are going to make. Blood and money, please. And if you're going with the sunk cost argument, please don't bother. Been there, done that. And don't tell me we owe Afghanistan anything. We owe them nothing other than our good will.
Finally, I think supporters of COIN in Afghanistan should be made to explain to us skeptics just where Afghanistan lies on an imaginary Westphalian nation scale. And then explain why the answer doesn't matter.
@ g.d, The poppies in Astan
@ g.d,
The poppies in Astan are going into children's arms all over the world, not being used for medicine. As I'm sure you know.....
@Publius, A.Q may have terrorist tentacles or affilated groups, is very flexible and quite the traveling men of terror... but most of what I've read about them indicates that real estate is very important to them, Afghanistan under the Taliban was key to them because it was a just state under Sharia. It's very, very important to their core reasons for waging jihad to have their own just Caliphate/Sharia ruled state. That' s also why they keep declaring Islamic States of Iraq, why they kept fighting there even when it became hopeless. Why they want Afghanistan, why the Talib in Pakistan (TTP) think Pakistan is the prize. Oh, the nukes in Pakistan too.
So if it's so important to them, denying it in force, keeping them focused on their own backyard, sucking them in and bleeding them to death (as we did in Iraq), and keeping them off balance looking for drones in the sky is worthy of support. Consider we are still defending our homeland. Also that it's not that easy to mount operations in NYC or London when you're losing 80% of your Tier 2 leadership and on the run. Also a lot of the talent has been killed, commo's a bitch, the wars are draining them of money and blood as well.
It's never gonna be pretty. It just has to work at some acceptable level, even mediocre.
Is f*ckn fish eggs for
Is f*ckn fish eggs for snobby cocktail parties on the West Side or DC.
Not fare for men in the field.
I'd listen to the rather angry posters here (not me) who feel backstabbed. What we went thru with ROE and the sapping of will, morale, and the leadership being afraid to send us out in 06-07 was nonsense.
"Because I don't want to go to jail"
Most of us are willing to risk life and limb. Asking us to risk liberty as well is moral cowardice, and disloyal to the soldiers, the unit, the mission, and the country.
But it keeps the lawyers busy.
@ Fnord, re: "I have still
@ Fnord, re: "I have still to see a consequence-analysis put forward by the opponents of COIN as to what would happen if NATO pulls out rapidly at this point."
I'm not an opponent of COIN, but you've certainly got me thinking. In broad terms I believe certain things could be anticipated. Among them, "peace" and "a region engulfed in flames" - both of which have their proponents who I find unconvincing. In fact, I don't anticipate precipitous withdrawal in the first place, but as a thought exercise I offer the following:
One - no more reports of Afghan suffering caused by NATO action (as in the Guardian piece).
Two - reports of Afghan suffering caused by our invasion and subsequent withdrawal (and demands to "do something").
Three - a new "battlefield" opening somewhere else. My impression of certain elements within certain communities is that they desire to fight us. As to what form(s) that campaign may take were we to absent ourselves from any of the current conflict zones, your guess is as good as mine. The real central front of what we used to call the war on terror is - we now know - everywhere from the halls of government and financial institutions to deep within the heart of every citizen of Earth. We must remain vigilant and prepared for swift and appropriate response.
Three sub-a - should that new battlefield prove to be one wherein large numbers of conventional troops are required, it will take a hella good motivational speech (one that translates well into the various remaining NATO languages) to rouse the boys just back from A'stan. Henry V had a good one, perhaps "once more into the breach" will suffice.
Three sub-b - if that doesn't happen, we can certainly devote a larger portion of our military budgets to areas many feel are being neglected under current circumstances. I would specify, but it's easier to gain support for the "anything but this" argument; everyone gets to imagine their own personal neglected item.
I could be wrong on all counts. For instance, regarding item two a news "blackout" seems equally likely, reports of rainbows and butterflies less so - with other outcomes along the scale suggested thereby.
But the truly bloodthirsty (regardless of religion, national origin, skin color, etc) could derive many gains from a withdrawal from Afghanistan, all of which I see as more likely than any outcome desired by those of more pure motive calling for the same.
@ Fnord, re: "I have still
@ Fnord, re: "I have still to see a consequence-analysis put forward by the opponents of COIN as to what would happen if NATO pulls out rapidly at this point."
Dude, that's half the point.
We can barely predict what's happening in the country election by election, let alone the region. And this is the place people want to park an American army for a decade, on the long hope that somehow an responsible Afghan national conscience will emerge to be guided to the future by our best and the brightest.
I don't know what will come out of Afghanistan in the absence of a nation-building mission, and neither do you. And neither do you know what's going to come out of that decades investment. Well, actually, we do know some - a good deal of energy, money, and blood wasted for uncertain payoff.
The difference between much of the anti-nation building crew and the pro-nation building crew? (COIN isn't even an accurate term, because we're talking something even bigger here.) The former is often willing to admit their ignorance. And, because they aren't providing some sort of easy 'solve all the problems' solution like 'build a stable, responsible Afghan state that can support itself and purge the country of Al Qaeda ... and oh yeah, urge Pakistan the same way.', this is held as a strike against them. Well, the other guys are promising big, but they're in even less of a position to actually deliver, absent an extraordinary great degree of luck.
It isn't "leave" or "go big". There's plenty in between, with much less inherent risk.
The nation-building Afghanistan this is held against them.
Comment by disgusted on
Comment by disgusted on September 14, 2009 - 4:08pm
@ disgusted-
You mention that the enemy will hide in the civilian population where we can't touch them. First, I'll say that this is NOT a UW fight. We transitioned out of UW a long time ago. This is much more of a FID situation. Now, all of that aside--the whole point of COIN is that you CAN touch the civilian population. You touch them significantly more than you could without COIN. You engage on a daily basis, the locals. You know who the "enemy" is and can then conduct police actions against them.
Yes we do assume a greater immediate risk of engagement with the enemy. AND, that's our job in the military to assume that risk so that others don't have to. If we are to be effective, then we must accept risk. Plain and simple. You can't be safe and be effective, those are the mutually exclusive words in this dialogue.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ I personally have spent time in firefights, I have seen the results, I have caused the results. War is never pretty. I agree that we take the risks no one else is willing to thats our job. "ours is not to question why......." All that aside the United States Military is not designed for, nor were they ever intended to serve as "policemen". The continued effort in Afghanistan is a waste of military materiel, money, men, and lives. In my day, when a team was in a firefight, we could call in Air support, or Arty without fear of being refused for "political reasons".
Our Marines, and Soldiers signed up to be just those things Marines or Soldiers. NOT "policemen" for Afghanistan.
I want a response to that Capt. Monkey. Or anyone else who feels able to respond.
Perhaps when discussing
Perhaps when discussing possible doctrines for use in Afghanistan we should stopping using the term population centric COIN and call it policing. Imagining the difficulty and futility of policing a population you can't talk to on top of the fact that everyone knows you'll be leaving soon, may be easier to understand. And then if we still think NATO Policing is a workable policy we can do the math on the numbers of NATO forces needed, the duration required and the cost and then go back to square one.
Prediction: This realization won't hit the Oval Office until about 18 months from now at the point the NATO allies start to pull out and the US voter has had more than enough. Since we will be close to the start of the next US presidential election cycle nothing will be done until a) Obama loses to a truly conservative or left wing anti-war opponent (highly unlikely. If he loses it will be to another product of the system) or b) the next Afghan election goes better than the current one and the President can use it as an excuse to leave.
@Publius- You're right, FID
@Publius-
You're right, FID is designed to be conducted by a small force embedded within the host nation's military. Security Force Assistance is "big army's" (and the other services') attempt at replicating that. You're also most likely correct about the QDR hedging our bets against a myriad of types of threats. SOF is stretched thinly (SFODAs have increased in AfPak by more than 1000% since 2001) and so we began augmenting them with ETTs and conventional forces. Collectively, we have created much of the mess that we're currently in. Maybe training more SOF forces than can suppliment the current FID/SFA forces there now, is the way to go. I dunno.
@disgusted-
I also agree that the original purpose of the armed forces has not been to "police." If, however, it makes us safer--which I think COIN does--then it's worth asking them to do. Also, I think that you neglect one very important thing about the American fighting men (and women). That is to say, they are very adaptable. They have proven to us time and again that they can change, adapt, and overcome anything we throw at them (trench warfare in WWI, island warfare in WWII, mountain and cold-weather in Korea, jungle warfare in Vietnam, desert warfare in Iraq, peacekeeping/peace enforcement in the balkans, and God-only-knows in the future). Asking them to stretch and develop as the very face of warfare changes is a must.
And most importantly, I absolutely agree about the ability to get CAS and fire support. I and many of my soldiers probably wouldn't be walking around now, without those things. And there has to be a method to employ them better. What if we limit CAS to aircraft designed for it (A-10s instead of F-16s and B-1s)? What if we train units on how to discriminately apply their relative combat power, more appropriately? I don't think cutting CAS and FS off is at all the answer. Agree with you on that.
@ Elf "Sounds like the 10K
@ Elf
"Sounds like the 10K mile screwdriver, the Lawyers and the squeamish TOC Jockies are in full effect. It's a ridiculous way to try and fight, control terrain, control ...er...excuse me "protect" the civilian population."
Er... except the "protect the civilian population" part when it comes to airstrikes was a principle that wasn't just referenced from military theory. Have we forgotten the part where the most decisive result airstrikes deliver is the effect on the number of civilians who support killing US troops ? Now I don't say that lightly, but it was a jump from the low 20%s to the high 40%s. That's willingly moving your own arse into game-losing territory even if there were *no* other factors against you.
"ROE and no Airstrikes: I think the pushback you are getting comes from the heart (see ARB and other comments). I think I would listen as carefully to such feedback as you do to Farmer Abu Poppy about what happens when you try and run war by remote control.""
Why's that ? Why shouldn't you instead dismiss it out of hand for the exact same reason ?
What well reasoned, well borne out, evidenced changes to tactics, effecting all troops in theatre, wouldn't someone speaking from the heart consider less worthy than the saving of those 4 particular marines ? What does "speaking from the heart" translate to when discussing theatre-wide policy decisions other than "lack of objectivity" ?
BTW... this assessment doesn't change whether these dead children's photographs accompany the argument, so why don't we forgo the emotional angle. As I said, it really doesn't contribute anything other than a lack of reasoning.
"We can barely predict
"We can barely predict what's happening in the country election by election"
Isn't the outcome of elections being a forgone conclusion the one Afg problem we have found a solution for ?
Albeit one that nobody wants to acknowledge. I haven't bothered reading any official word on the election. Are we still pretending that recounting the forged ballots is a meaningful gesture ?
Publius: What the U.S.
Query for all those who believe "What the U.S. military does do better than anyone else is "close with the enemy and destroy him." Don't Israel and the LTTE do that "better"?
http://eipcp.net/transversal/0507/weizman/en.
[...] "If the answer is “yes,” then the “inverse geometry” that turns the city “inside out,” shuffling its private and public spaces, and that turns the idea of a “Palestinian State” outside in, would bring about consequences for military operations that go beyond physical and social destruction and force us to reflect upon the “conceptual destruction” of political categories that they imply." Eyal Weizman, Walking through Walls
What are the differences between the previous version of the American Way of War, as understood by Col. Gentile and others, and that of Israel or the Tamil National Army?
It would seem that a wariness of the slippery slope that leads to genocide differentiates the previous version of the American Way of War, as understood by Col. Gentile and others, from that of Israel or the Tamil National Army. Is that too simplistic an understanding?
Margaret: "Don't Israel and
Margaret: "Don't Israel and the LTTE do that "better"?"
No.
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