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Kunduz: What It Means for NATO
Smart Afghanistan watchers -- like Joshua Foust and Gilles Dorronsoro -- have been worried about Kunduz Province, a province in northern Afghanistan with a signficant Pashtun population, for quite some time. And with reason. The security situation there has been deteriorating rapidly, endangering a larger region of the country that has been, for the most part, at peace. And because RC-North is under German command, a lack of aggressive German patrolling has -- depending on your perspective -- either worked to pacify the area through an understated pressence or has left big problems lurking underneath the surface undiscovered (à la Basra Province circa 2005-2007).
At approximately 0200 this morning, a German ISAF unit called in an F-15 strike on two fuel trucks believed to have been hijacked by the Taliban. Scores of insurgents and innocent civilians were killed. (RFE/RL; True Slant; Foust)
General McChrystal has promulgated new rules of engagement concerning the use of air power. His belief is that although the laws of land warfare and the Geneva Conventions allow you to do a lot on the field of battle -- such as bomb a compound in which the Taliban have taken refuge -- you can at once be technically and legally correct yet operationally stupid. Experience spent trying to kill his way out of the war in Afghanistan has shown him -- and this blogger, for that matter -- that killing civilians has a serious effect on your operational effectiveness in a conflict such as the one being fought in Afghanistan. So foremost in McChrystal's mind following this attack will be two questions:
- What happened to that guidance I issued? Was it followed? And if not, why?
- What does this event mean for ISAF's credibility on the ground? How does this affect the way we are perceived?
One question he is not asking now -- but may well be asking once the dust settles and an inquiry has been conducted -- concerns the consequences of leaving a deteriorating RC-North under the operational control of a military whose parliament limits the degree to which they can conduct operations. A friend of mine was recently at a conference in Europe where a German parliamentarian was touting the successes of the Bundeswehr in northern Afghanistan -- at the expense of the Dutch, Canadians, British, Australians and Americans fighting hard in eastern and southern Afghanistan. "Great," a smiling Dutch questioner asked, "perhaps you would now like to deploy your troops to the south and show us how it's done?" (Cue laughter from the audience.)
As with the British in southern Iraq between 2003 and 2007, everything -- the tactics, the operations, the mindset -- looks great while things are quiet. And the Germans in northern Afghanistan are quite happy with themselves and with their approach. But what if things start to turn south? What if things are going on underneath the radar where you do not have visibility because you don't have an enduring pressence with the population? And what if you need to ramp up your operations? The British ended up with egg on their faces when it took the Iraqi Army -- working alongside the U.S. military -- to crack down on the militias of Basra while the British Army sat in their bases. What does it means for the NATO/ISAF coalition in Afghanistan if Germany cannot or will not escalate operations in Kunduz (and Baghlan)?
I know that General McChrystal is waiting on the results of an investigation before he starts acting to clean up this mess, but it will be a real and early test of his command and of the alliance if he has to start cracking non-American skulls in the wake of this incident.
my understanding is that
my understanding is that after the taliban hijacked the trucks, they left them in the middle of the riverbed at 2:30 in the monring and invited the locals nearby to empty them... so anybody killed in the attack was there to loot the trucks. i'm sorry, but if you're looting a truck the taliban stole, i don't have a massive amount of sympathy. yes, they're poor, but stealing shit from the army is likely to get your ass kicked.
that's how i think the mccrystal needs to play this - "karzai, why are you defending the looters of trucks!?", etc...
Check out the lean mean
Check out the lean mean afghan army. This scares me.
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=416_1251754443
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=db4_1251858439
@sayke: Kind of like telling
@sayke:
Kind of like telling a rape victim she shouldn't have dressed that way...
It would be interesting to know wether or not the insurgents planned this one (to maximize civilian casualties in an area they are looking to make further gains) or wether they just got lucky. This is a huge PR victory for them no matter what. We'll see how Kunduz plays out, but you are spot on for calling out the German (government imposed) strategy. If they can avoid getting egg on their face, it will be because of sheer luck, not their strategy (which they privately admit). They are under huge public pressure (70% want pullout asap) which has prevent them from adjusting their strategy to the growing threat. If things heat up, they are in big trouble.
@sayke: Kind of like telling
@sayke:
Kind of like telling a rape victim she shouldn't have dressed that way...
It would be interesting to know wether or not the insurgents planned this one (to maximize civilian casualties in an area they are looking to make further gains) or wether they just got lucky. This is a huge PR victory for them no matter what. We'll see how Kunduz plays out, but you are spot on for calling out the German (government imposed) strategy. If they can avoid getting egg on their face, it will be because of sheer luck, not their strategy (which they privately admit). They are under huge public pressure (70% want pullout asap) which has prevent them from adjusting their strategy to the growing threat. If things heat up, they are in big trouble.
An anonymous "high ranking
An anonymous "high ranking German army officer" said in an interview with the newspaper Tagesspiegel a few days ago that the German government has to act soon or the German mission in the north will fail. He assumes that the Americans will act on their own if no action is taken immediately after the German parliamentary elections at the end of September. (Source: http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/international/afghanistan/Bundswehr-H...)
The Germans don't have to
The Germans don't have to aggressively patrol. Super embed in the ANA and ANP and let them aggressively patrol.
209th ANA Corps HQs is the second best in the ANA. Its 1st Brigade and its three combat line battalions is one of the best in the ANA. The 2nd Brigade and its three combat line battalions formed this year but could probably be pretty effective if an ISAF advisory battalion headquarters was super embedded in its brigade HQs, and if advisory ISAF companies were super embedded in its combat line battalions. 2nd Bde is responsible for Kunduz.
The German/Swedes/Norwegians/Hungarians in RC-North do not allow their OMLTs assigned to 209 ANA and ANP to redeploy nationally along with their ANSF units. Ditto with the Spanish/Italian/Lithuanians in RC West. This greatly reduces the flexibility and effectiveness of the ANSF. Lifting the caveat on OMLTs (if not "combat troops") would significantly aid the ANSF and GIRoA.
My view is that if Kunduz really is a problem, then overstrenght each battalion in 209th ANA by 50%. {assigned/authorized ratio = 150%.} Later add a 4th combat line battalions to the 2nd Bde, 209 ANA. (to my knowledge only the brigades in 201, 203 and 205 Corps are currently planned to get a "6th batttalion"=4th combat line battalion.)
Boy, that's a great comment,
Boy, that's a great comment, anan. But I suspect the 205 Corps in the south will continue to be the priority for manning in the near term.Father Muqawama (much nicer
Father Muqawama (much nicer sounding name than "Andrew" :LOL:):
As of right now, 205th ANA has 4 combat maneuver brigades with 16 combat line battalions. Each brigade has 4 combat line battalions right now. New ANA is not planned for 205 ANA in the near future based on all indications coming from CSTC-A and the ANA. Apparently the briefing that you, Cordesman, and company received confirmed this. Given the shortage of good mid grade and senior grade officers, I would suggest overstrenghtening each 205 ANA battalion versus adding a "7th battalion" or 5th combat line battalion to 205 ANA brigades. Several ANA advisors have suggested this. Manning battalions at 900 people versus 600 people (standard for the ANA) is not unusual. India's battalions typically have 900 people.
Maybe an exception could be made for 3-205 (Helmand) and 1-205 (Kandahar.) Since Helmand's 3rd Bde, 205 ANA, Brigadier Gen Ghori seems to be such a capable commander, maybe he could get a 5th combat battalion. With 150% strength in his forces and 5 combat battalions he should be able to with the Brits and Marines provide sufficient security for Helmand. {For the record, I think emphasizing Helmand is a mistake. I would have favored a smaller ink stain strategy. But then I favor transitioning all battlespace to the ANSF more quickly than you and McChrystal do.}
Abu Muqawama, I have spreadsheets on the ANA I could e-mail to you.
What it means? Well, one
What it means?
Well, one thing I think Afghanistan has indicated, is that our large alliance presence, while useful in the sense that we're desperately short of manpower as is and in need of internationalization due to Afghan xenophobia, also contributes to a tendency to push real problems to the back of our strategic minds, so to speak.
How does it do this? I see at least two ways.
1. We pass major responsibilities onto others, and let them worry about it (to the extent they do worry about it, considering many of our parterns' relative lack of commitment to the mission). This creates timebombs for the future. In some cases we actually give important responsibilities to alliance partners simply to keep them happy, having been handed a high profile prestige-heavy role. It makes sense insofar as alliance politics are concerned, but definitely not military strategy.
2. The inflated sense of international solidarity creates a safety-in-numbers psychological dynamic. Urgency is dissipated throughout the coalition, similar to the buck-passing resources problem. The best example of this was the nonsense I often heard years ago that we would never fail in Afghanistan because "the credibility of NATO is on the line." As if the size of the consequences of something can preclude an event happening.
Fundamentally, we need to better calibrate our operations to the reality that alliances bring both costs and benefits, and there are circumstances where that extra nominal military contribution can actually be a net loss for our mission, considering the strings and confusions they come with.
Mind the irony. For yonks,
Mind the irony. For yonks, aggressive use of airpower by ISAF/OEF has been condemned in all but the most obscure parts of the german public ...
So now you want to ask em
So now you want to ask em for ID before you shoot em? That will succeed in killing a lot of people. Perhaps we should shoot with fake ammo too? Get in kick ass and get out!!! Our guys are fighting for obscure political agendas made by armchair generals in the US. Maybe you are comfortable with that? I'm not.
@Afghan Quest Blue cheers us
@Afghan Quest
Blue cheers us up
@ Visitor 641,
"So now you want to ask em for ID before you shoot em? That will succeed in killing a lot of people"
Yeah, well it worked fine in Iraq. Really. PID and all that....
anan, it was my impression
anan, it was my impression that 5 of the 8 new kandaks coming online would be going to either the 205 corps or Farah Province. Get with me offline: andrew.exum@kcl.ac.ukPersonally, I don't think
Personally, I don't think you really touch on what this means for NATO. I think this could be way bigger than McChrystal's close air support directive. Obviously, this is pure speculation, but consider this: there's a parliamentary election in 3 weeks (!!) and probably a slight shift towards the right in our government (if current polls are any indicator). In 2002, Chancellor Schröder was reelected largely due to his strong opposition to the Iraq War. His party, the Social Democrats, are currently in a grand coalition with the Christian Democrats of Chancellor Merkel. Thus far, four of the five parties in the Bundestag have been supportive of the ISAF mandate. Only the politically isolated far-left party (basically East Germany's ruling party SED under a new name) is opposing ISAF. Until now the issue of Afghanistan was carefully (and actually quite skillfully) avoided during the election campaign by these four major parties.
Now, with this being the state of affairs on September 3, and, as Andrew stated, a majority of at least two thirds of the people in opposition to our ISAF commitment, one has to wonder how this will affect the elections. Will the Social Democrats change their minds and start an anti-Afghanistan campaign, possibly even winning? At the moment, they're 12 percent behind the Christian Democrats, so there's a lot of ground to cover, but they used to be Germany's biggest party and are quite good at election campaigns, as they have demonstrated in '98, '02 and '05. There's a lot of voter potential. This could be their hook.
I mean, this is a huge deal for us. Last year was the first time ever (!!!) that Bundeswehr soldiers killed two civilians in a checkpoint incident. This year two (or three?) more were killed in similar incidents. But this could be as much as 40 civilians. If my gut feeling at the moment is correct, and I'm assuming that there were indeed large numbers of civilians present, this will bring down a sh*t storm like we have never seen. And nobody's going to care that it was Americans or Brits who dropped the bombs. Nobody's gonna care that this was tactically a good call that anybody in the same situation would have made. It's all about perception.
Equally, it's the perception of us pulling out that could be disastrous. Afghan fence sitters will have one more reason to believe that the insurgency is gonna outlast the West. Other small contributing nations might change their minds. And some people in your country may also see this as the shape of things to come for you.
Obviously we're gonna have to wait and see what happens. These are just some of my thoughts on this thing that I needed to get off my chest.
Al-Zawahiri: Pakistan
Al-Zawahiri: Pakistan Heading Down "Path of Doom"
Comment by Visitor on
Comment by Visitor on September 4, 2009 - 6:41pm
"So now you want to ask em for ID before you shoot em? That will succeed in killing a lot of people. Perhaps we should shoot with fake ammo too? Get in kick ass and get out!!! Our guys are fighting for obscure political agendas made by armchair generals in the US. Maybe you are comfortable with that? I'm not."
As opposed to fighting for.... what ? What the troops took a vote on ?
AFAIK, the political idea is to win. When you're an occupying military needing to secure the support of the population in order to succeed sometime this side of 2100 and you know that public support for killing you jumps to around half in areas where airstrikes/artillery occur, the question of whether more or less restraint is necessary in carrying out these attacks becomes rather easy to answer.
Seriously, either you're worried about getting a lot of Americans killed or you're not. If you are, what would you prefer to a national poll of Afghanis which says "we will support killing lots of you if...." ?
Likewise....... "So foremost
Likewise.......
"So foremost in McChrystal's mind following this attack will be two questions:
2. What does this event mean for ISAF's credibility on the ground? How does this affect the way we are perceived?"
.....you'd hope he's not wondering this as though it's unknown to him.
There has been an assumption
There has been an assumption that foreign forces will strictly obey McCrystal's commands. My experience is that an order from a higher HQ commanded by a foreigner is the starting point for a discussion. Normally if you didn't like the order given by a Brit or a Dutchman you simply agreed it was a great idea but you needed to run it by you national authority. You then told your folks that you would like to be ordered to ignore the order you had just been given by the foreigner. You then told the Brit etc. that you had no choice but to not comply with his direction, were very sorry, your national authority just didn't get it and would he like to come by for the BBQ on Thursday night.
And of this is why unity of command is so important and the troop contribution of most of the coalition in Afghanistan is a waste and we'd be better off if they went home (but left 10% of their incremental costs behind to build ANSF).
Shannon, I don't agree. I
Shannon, I don't agree. I do, however, think that the foreign troops should either join CSTC-A, which is severely undermanned, or super embed with the ANSF and redeploy nationally with them as necessary.
The operational ISAF forces (those not involved in ANSF force generation and training) would then include:
-ANA
-one ISAF advisory division headquarters super-embedded with General Staff Chief of Operations, Lieutenant General Shir Mohammad Karimi
- 6 ISAF brigade advisory headquarters super embedded in each ANA Corps/Division HQs
- 1 ISAF advisory battalion HQs super embedded in each ANA brigade HQs
- 1 ISAF advisory company super embedded in each ANA battalion and so on.
-ANP
- one ISAF advisory division headquarters super-embedded with the MoI's operational HQs
- one ISAF advisory brigade HQs super embedded with the ANCOP operational HQs
- one ISAF advisory battalion HQs super embedded with each ANCOP brigade HQs (4 HQs in total)
- one ISAF advisory company super embedded with each ANCOP battalion (20 in total)
- one ISAF advisory brigade, battalion, or company super embedded with each provincial ANP (Helmand and Kandahar would need one advisory brigade each. I think Kunar and Kabul provincial ANP could probably soon survive with one advisory battalion. Most of the 34 provinces would only need an advisory company.)
- one ISAF advisory brigade super embedded with the Afghan border police (ABP)
The ANA and ANP are badly short of advisors, especially given that McChrystal is planning a major expansion of both services. By far the greatest unmet need in Afghanistan at present is ANP mentors, followed by ANP trainers. Might sending "trainers and mentors" for the ANSF versus "combat troops" be an easier political sell for ISAF contributors? I would think so.
Shannon, have you noticed that the Canadian police advisors actually live with the ANP (even thought they are in unsafe Kandahar); while most ISAF police advisors (most Brits and Americans) commute to work? The Canadians have a lot to teach the rest of us.
Shannon, can I ask if you are a vet, and if you work for an Afghan NGO in Nuristan? You seem remarkably well informed.
Anan: I appreciate the
Anan: I appreciate the thought you put into your plan but I'm not sure what you mean by super embedded.
I worry about the assumption that any randomly selected NATO officer or NCO is up to the advisory mission. In my experience most aren't keen on living with Afghans day in and day out and many are locked into their "system". Wasn't this the rationale for assigning USSF the FID mission as it was thought it took a soldier devoted to working with indigenous forces to properly execute the mission? At the same time I'm not totally sold on SF building an army...a rifle company yes but they seem to have little interest in the entire package to make an army- 3rd and 4th line CSS etc.
I'm not sure about the Canadian example. Things aren't going well in Kandahar City and the Canadians shut down and destroyed three rural police stations in the recent past.
I'm also not in favor of mentoring as it absolves the mentors of a lot of responsibility. Command is what is needed such as you have in the campaign forces. I've seen too many mentors only occasionally visiting their Afghan colleagues and I've never seen a police mentor on the street in eastern region.
M Shannon: Just a
M Shannon:
Just a correction: no rural police stations have been shut down recently in Kandahar Province that I'm aware of. A couple ANA patrol bases, like the one in Mushan, have been. The Canadian press has trouble with the distinction, particularly since some locations (Mushan again) have been taken over by the ANA from (unmentored) ANP when things heat up.
Flit
So how long do you armchair
So how long do you armchair generals plan to keep our troops in Afghanistan? Till your pet theory is finally accepted by the politicians who have never served in a conflict? (never-mind in the uniform) Or just until our country is too afraid to ever fight Islam again due to the fact we have to fight them with both hands tied behind our back to avoid "offending" European and Islamic sensibilities? Lousy things happen in war thats a fact. By the way there is no such thing as a "civilized war" or did you miss that in the first grade?
One thing that we've been
One thing that we've been quiet on -- with good reason -- are the huge improvements in American S2 shops since 2001. Question: are ISAF S2's up to par?
Don't bitch about ROE
Don't bitch about ROE violations unless you've had to live under them.** I don't know what kind of nonsense ROE is going on in ASTAN or not, but if it's anything like what we had in Iraq - God help them.
**And I don't think AM did.
And further - if it's "Shoot and we Prosecute" then let's get them out of there, and take our chances with London, Glasglow, and America's fate.
[Dying Marine AP foto context]
The citizens of our nations elect these gutless politicians, who allow the lawyers and the loons to set the agenda. That and allowing the media to run amok.
So today, in honor of the lawyers and the reporter, journalist scum who infest us I say I rescind my never again, whatever it takes position. Nonsense. America, you're bored, you're tired of your jaded reality, you crave "change".
Well, we know just the people.
You've also indicated you want America to "be like the rest of the world". I thought that was insane. But ya know what? We know people who can make that happen, too.
Time for you to meet them (again). Funny, I get the feeling it is almost time.
Bruce R: I'm sure I read a
Bruce R: I'm sure I read a LTC Patrick in the G&M quoted as saying three police stations were shut down because of security concerns and were being destroyed to prevent the Taliban from using them. I believe Patrick is the G-3 of the Canadian Task Force.
@M Shannon: (Apologies in
@M Shannon:
(Apologies in advance for the pedantry implicit in this reply; it's a for-the-record thing.)
All 3 stations being referred to there were, in fact, ANA. I still have their grid coordinates in the margins of my notebook. Two closed down before I left in April and the third shortly after. I imagine we don't bother to aggressively correct this sort of thing in our press in part because precise details of ANSF orbat are for us to know and our adversaries to figure out.
LCol Patrick and I worked in close proximity for my last couple months in country. In our nomenclature, he's the current task force Chief of Operations (ChOps), vice the G-3 (who would report to him). Cheers.
Flit
Pretty good read from a
Pretty good read from a journalist on the ground - in German, though.
http://www.faz.net/s/RubDDBDABB9457A437BAA85A49C26FB23A0/Doc~E0B260CD7D7...
The part I found most interesting:
Most locals are not happy about the whole thing, but think that it was the thiefs own fault.
This includes a father who forbade his son to go there to get fuel ("this is a war zone; I know what could happen") - the son went anyway and was injured (but will live).
The deaths weren't announced in the local mosque, because the families were ashamed of being outed as thiefs.
I'm not sure wether the author got the timeline rights, though ...
Additional link in case the first one is removed:
http://www.faz.net/s/RubDDBDABB9457A437BAA85A49C26FB23A0/Doc~E0B260CD7D7...
Perhaps the very system put
Perhaps the very system put in place to reduce casualties caused the civilian casualties? When the truck was first pinged there were no villagers there. After the talibs went looking for a tractor and the locals lined up to fill their diesel containers. Ping to Bang time was eaten up by either getting the right bomb load or approval stages. Perhaps the Germans who first called up the strike, the people who reviewed the hit and matched it to the new rules and the pilot who dropped the bombs lived in three different time frames.
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Nobody's gonna care that this
Nobody's gonna care that this was tactically a good call that anybody in the same situation would have made. It's all about perception.free advertising|hearing aid manufacturers
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