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The Obama Administration: MIA on Afghanistan?
So I was on the Newshour last night debating Afghanistan with a favorite of this blog and its readers, Andrew Bacevich. As readers of this blog know, I am uncomfortable when placed in the position of being expected to lustily defend the war. I think the war is in the nation's interests at the moment, sure, but I'm quick to add that my own thoughts are not wholly formed, I am open to dissenting views, and what views I do offer are accompanied by admissions of how difficult the mission is and a rather un-Abu-Muqawama-like degree of humility. (One of the things that turns me off to Bacevich's arguments on Afghanistan, for example, is how certain he is of his knowledge and opinions on the country, its peoples, its history and NATO operations there without, to my knowledge, having ever traveled to Central Asia. Rory Stewart, obviously, is another matter -- as is the wider Bacevich thesis
Woah. The only person who will defend this war? If this blogger is the only person in the nation's capital willing to defend the war, we have a big problem. I'm more used to hosting debates on Afghanistan than participating in them. I do not think it would surprise any reader of this blog, though, to note the speed with which the debate has shifted on the war in Afghanistan. What was, 12 months ago, "the good war" has now become, for paleoconservatives and progressives alike, a fool's errand. And the Obama Administration has thus far shown little energy for defending a policy and strategic goals (.pdf) they themselves arrived at just five months ago. I thought that once the president had settled on a policy and strategic aims, the rest of the administration would then go about executing that policy. That's the way it's supposed to work, right? Yet the policy debate seems to continue within the White House, with the Office of the Vice President apparently pushing for a much more limited approach than what was articulated in March by the president himself and following a lengthy policy review. No wonder, then, the uniformed military is getting nervous about the administration's support for their war. Either the White House has been too busy with health care, or they have failed to notice how quickly the debate has shifted under their feet (as with health care).
What needs to happen? Well, first off, I guess we should decide what we're trying to do in Afghanistan. (Again, when we set about reviewing ISAF operations in June and July, we thought this question had already been resolved in March.) Once that question is settled, the administration needs to go about defending and explaining their policy. Until then, it's understandable why everyone from voters in Peoria to Mullah Omar in Afghanistan (?) are confused as to what, exactly, U.S. policy is at the moment.
"Gwen Ifill turned to me and
"Gwen Ifill turned to me and said, "Look, I understand you're not some fire-breathing hawk, but you're about the only person we can find in Washington to defend this war at the moment.""
Maybe this is because when people sit down and look at the different arguements they agree with Bacevich that, strategically, doing what CNAS wants the US to do is not worth doing. Or to quote Marc Lynch:
"The pro-escalation side probably has the better of the tactical argument, in terms of the best response once the U.S. decides upon the strategic necessity of combatting the Taliban "insurgency". But the anti-escalation side probably has the better of the strategic argument: U.S. vital interests in Afghanistan to justify the expense remain vague, the arguments made for the costs of "losing" the counter-insurgency war in Afghanistan are relatively far-fetched (please, no more "credibility of the West" or "flytrap" arguments), the critical "safe havens" argument suffers from the profound weakness of the availability of alternative safe havens all over the broader region, and the costs of waging such a war successfully aren't being taken sufficiently seriously."
This may be the case,
This may be the case, Visitor 2:11. My office mate noted that for the second time this summer, Bacevich and I were talking past one another. I was talking operations; he was talking interests.Not to Abu M: Switzerland is
Not to Abu M: Switzerland is not a mountainous kingdom ...
Did you wink at Ifill at the
Did you wink at Ifill at the beginning? Creepy-crawly.
What's wrong with some foot-dragging? Isn't that how are system of government works? Wasn't that the real 'mistake' of the Bush Administration -- not the wars or the policies, but the certitude and political strategy (seven years later, I still don't 'why' we invaded Iraq).
If this administration is wavering, why not see that as an opportunity for those in and out of uniform to vigorously debate the issues. Are we really so fragile that doubt cannot be tolerated much less pursued as a creative opportunity.
As a civilian, I get (though could never even begin to fully appreciate) a soldier's need for a clear strategy and well-defined tactics, but 'support and defend the Constitution' suggests to me a kind of tolerance for all the nonsense, inefficiency, and even perhaps tragedy implicit in the way our government works.
How many posts on this blog have detailed frustration with general officers going with the political flow on issues Iraq (2002-2006)?
I really don't get the handwringing over all of this, from your questions about weak administration policy to Gentile's harangues about COIN-group-think. All of you are doing what you should be doing, and it seems to me to be both necessary and proper, not only in spite of, but very much because of the horrible costs.
Can't we be grown ups for a few years? And haven't some of you guys very much earned that responsibility?
MoonofA: Yeah, hahaha, that
MoonofA: Yeah, hahaha, that was a cringe-worthy moment when I watched the video this morning."One of the things that
"One of the things that turns me off to Bacevich's arguments on Afghanistan, for example, is how certain he is of his knowledge and opinions on the country, its peoples, its history and NATO operations there without, to my knowledge, having ever traveled to Central Asia"
And what would traveling to Central Asia do to inform any strategic discussion? Max Boot and Michael O'Hanlon have been to Afghanistan, and I wouldn't give a plugged nickel for their opinions. We haven't fired a nuclear missile or used a chemical or biological warfare agent in the open for decades, should we ignore all advice from scientists and military analysts who work in the area of NBC warfare?
I prefer military analysts who can talk to national strategy based on years of experience and examination of historical cases, rather than journalists familiar with military lingo/tactics who travel to the battlegrounds and report on how great our troops are. When you say that we need to secure Afghanistan from trans-national terrorist groups, do you really think they are going to be shut down? The idea for 9/11 came to KSM in the Phillipines, the planning was done in Germany, the training was done in the United States. Even if you get your operational goals accomplished, you haven't been successful at the strategy, which is Bacevich's point. Instead, you're hundreds of billions out of cash and tens of thousands of wounded and dead soldiers' families will be wondering why there were so many supporters of continuing the escalation in Afghanistan.
"Well, first off, I guess we should decide what we're trying to do in Afghanistan." Yeah... you think? Eight years in, and maybe we ought to figure out what we're trying to do? And as Dr. Bacevich says, the second part of the question is "is there something better that we could be addressing?" Mexican drug wars, Pacific theater concerns, Burma's generals, African state wars, etc etc.
"No wonder, then, the
"No wonder, then, the uniformed military is getting nervous about the administration's support for their war."
Seems to me you kind of said it all in this sentence, Exum. You and your CNAS crowd, along with the other pro-war folks, view this as the MILITARY's war. So does the military. This just shows how far off base all of you folks have gotten, probably as a result of the striking passivity within Bush Administration circles when dealing with military blunders. The military doesn't own the wars in this country, not yet, anyway. The people own the wars. The military's job is give honest answers when asked the questions and to then execute whatever strategy the peoples' elected representatives in the two branches agree upon. The military's job description emphatically does not include game playing with elected representatives or playing footsies with the press.
Confused has it right about how the process should work. Joe Biden also knows, as evidenced by his remarks about the lack of domestic support for your and the military's grand schemes.
The pro-war faction, to include much of the military, might be able to help its cause considerably if it were able to advance cogent arguments for the significant commitments so blithely proposed. As matters stand, and especially given the track record of the defense establishment of late, rushing in with a major new commitment seems just about the last thing any president with regard for the opinions of his fellow countrymen should do. I'm not surprised at the military's uncaring attitudes about Americans' opinions—saw the same thing in Vietnam and it's what the military does—but I am very surprised that a lobbying organization such as CNAS, which wishes to influence political opinion, so casually shrugs off the major reservations held by the American people.
Someday you will learn that as our Founders warned, the military is dangerous and needs to firmly controlled. You may also learn that 4-star generals don't always have the answers. In fact, they usually do not. Most Americans know this intuitively; it's only the inside-the-beltway crowd and the America-firster jingoists who need reminding periodically.
To Publius calm down. Abu M
To Publius calm down. Abu M is a military analyst and it is his job to provide a militaristic,in the sense that it focuses on the military itself, answer for Afghanistan. For him, the war is being conducted in a direction that he thinks allows it ot be successful, and it is a war whcih his commander in chief has claimed in necessary. IT IS the military's job to take the commander's in chief's strategic goals and implement thrin the best way possible to achieve success. Bacevich is questioning thhe point of the sucess, while Abu M and the COIN folks are saying we see success, that is all that they need to speek to. Abu M I think the reason peoplr interview you is becuase you can see success and articulate why being succesful helps the US , even though it is not your job, that is why you are being called pro-war. Perhaps they should interview Biddle more if they only want someone to speak to, WHY we need to be sucessfull in afghanistan.
Center for a New American
Center for a New American Security
Gwen's comments highlight something at a higher level which has plagued the Pentagon for the past few years. When it comes to DoD’s massive efforts to export security and stability, we’ve been asking more and more "who's driving this bus?" If you believe what Bob Woodward and George Packard wrote about the run up to OIF and OEF, Rumsfeld snatched away from the NSC and State Department much of the post war re-construction policy and authority, and gave it to Douglas Feith's OSD-Policy shop. Even before Rumsfeld lost interest in the Long War (again, believing Bob Woodward), the 5 sided building should not be driving the bus when it comes to determining how/where/to what extent we use the military to further U.S. interests, and it sure should not be driving the bus when it comes to leveraging the rest of the government to achieve the President’s national security goals.
For the past few days this blog has highlighted the same problem at a higher level -- our grand strategy in Afghanistan. Telling us that our “core goal” is to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan” is an extremely broad a mandate to hand to un-elected generals. Andrew Krepinevich recently wrote in Strategy for the Long Haul “As a practical matter, strategy is about making insightful choices of courses of action likely to achieve one’s ultimate goals despite resource constraints, political considerations, bureaucratic resistance, …” Bacevich is essentially arguing the “…despite resource constraints” part, which Gen. McChrystal is correct to ignore. His job is to win, or to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda….” Adjudicating resource constraints are manifestly not the job of an officer devising a theater level strategy – he should (and did) devise a strategy that will prevail, and in doing so leaves the decisions about resource constraints and bureaucratic resistance where they rightfully belong – in Washington.
This blog reported on National Security Advisor Jim Jones’ trip to Afghanistan in June, when he carried the message to the Generals in the field that new troop requites would not necessarily be granted. It is time for Jim Jones to stand up and tell us what the President’s strategy is – and how it will be executed (and resourced) given the “resource constraints, political considerations, and bureaucratic resistance” Krepinevich tells us are constituent in strategy.
AM, Here's the option they
AM,
Here's the option they are juggling....Astan being shut out slowly and abandoned. It's a nice sop to the left for losing health care.
Welcome to DC.
Keep the faith. Getting back up is up to you.
BTW - if you need cheering up....FOX is interviewing Dr Jack Kervorkian (DR Death) on his opinion of the "Death Panels" on Health Care.
Me the Comedian - thinks it hiliarious.
Jason, Well Said. "One of
Jason,
Well Said.
"One of the things that turns me off to Bacevich's arguments on Afghanistan, for example, is how certain he is of his knowledge and opinions on the country, its peoples, its history and NATO operations there without, to my knowledge, having ever traveled to Central Asia"
"And what would traveling to Central Asia do to inform any strategic discussion? Max Boot and Michael O'Hanlon have been to Afghanistan, and I wouldn't give a plugged nickel for their opinions. We haven't fired a nuclear missile or used a chemical or biological warfare agent in the open for decades, should we ignore all advice from scientists and military analysts who work in the area of NBC warfare?
I prefer military analysts who can talk to national strategy based on years of experience and examination of historical cases, rather than journalists familiar with military lingo/tactics who travel to the battlegrounds and report on how great our troops are."
So from what we've said, it
So from what we've said, it seems like the disconnect here is that the "pro-war" group are focused more intently on the "how" of conducting operations in Afghanistan, i.e. pop-centric COIN, development, etc. while the "anti-war" group is focused more closely on the "why", i.e. how Afghanistan fits into the broader strategic picture relative to the US' long-term goals and aspirations. This makes sense to me; the pro-war side wants to show that the war can be won (thus negating the most common anti-war argument that the war cannot be won because we're fighting in "the Graveyard of Empires!") and the anti-war side wants to bypass that argument altogether (just in case you do show that the war can, in fact, be won) by showing that the war should not be fought because it would be ruinously costly/would be too long/would tie our hands elsewhere/is being fought over the most worthless nation on earth.
While both sides are focusing on their own strongest points, they put up pretty lame (as I see them) arguments for their weaker ones. Pro-war people address Afghanistan's strategic value with "terrorists in control of Afghanistan would be bad", and "Leaving Afghanistan would make us look like chumps". While the anti-war people tend to stonewall the tactical side with broad pronouncements like "Afghanistan is the Graveyard of Empires!" and "The Afghan people's hearts cannot be won because they don't have any", neither of which are true.
It seems to me that if we withdrew from Afghanistan, we would probably be able to manage the fallout, whatever that might be. On the other hand, calling a war "unwinnable" before you really even begin to fight makes no sense either. In the end, what we have is the pro-war crowd providing insufficient justification for staying in Afghanistan and the anti-war crowd providing insufficient justification for leaving.
To win, one side needs to step up; either the anti-war bloc needs to show that we cannot possibly succeed in Afghanistan (without resorting to a cliche) or the pro-war bloc needs to prove that there's a compelling reason to fight and win (without resorting to a cliche).
Does anyone believe "that
Does anyone believe "that Russia and China are collaborating to slowly push the United States out of Central Asia?" (Francis Fukuyama)
And if so, does this have some (unspoken) bearing on why we wish/need to stay in Afghanistan?
I'm sorry, I think I've been
I'm sorry, I think I've been sucked into the global policy debate on my first question but what about this: Anti-American terror groups aren't going to come anywhere close to breaking into our leading causes of death any time soon (http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/FASTATS/lcod.htm) unless they get some WMDs so - Is the best use of our resources to continue with plans in Afghanistan? (I think I stole the question from Bacevich and inserted a link to the cdc.org....)
Question 2 might be halfway within the lines: I never hear about which other countries are involved in Afghanistan. Who else is there and how much would a multi-national coalition lighten the U.S. load? Is Obama making some calls?
Well done. That is one of
Well done. That is one of the better 10 min discussions I've seen on the issue. I tend to agree with you on the tactical level, but when it comes for the political support for the mission (which is almost just as necessary imho) I am quite pessimistic. A majority of Americans now oppose the war, and the support level in other NATO countries is abysmal. In my discussions with regular folks (non-mil/academic) they are way out of their league when it comes to Afghanistan (I've been following it for 9 years and don't pretend to understand fully). It is just so complicated that it is impossible to understand what is going on from 10 min news stories (10 min is generous). The news is reduced to blurbs on 3 issues- insurgent attacks, womens rights and the Afghan govt. I'm going out on a limb here, but the average American supports the mission because A. they feel it is necessary to prevent further terrorism B. protect women's rights C. give democracy to Afghans. The mission has been sold to the public too simply, and a simple message (A,B,C or a combination) is easily corrupted especially when money, lives, and time are being lost. Support for the mission drops with every news story about the Afghan govt corruption, women's rights story, or sucessful suicide attack. I think that public support will limit POTUS ability to adapt and respond to the changing environment, insurgent support will increase and an insurrection will force the withdrawl of NATO troops in the Pashtun regions (very far out on that limb now). The next 12 months will decide the fate of the mission (in terms of public support and hence overall). At least nobody is giving these guys Stingers though (I'm a rotorhead).
To Visitor at 5.11 pm--a
To Visitor at 5.11 pm--a number of anti war people such as myself have been making the argument that we need to be out of Afghanistan because we as a nation simply can't afford: 1) nation building abroad before nation building at home and 2) propping up the American Imperial Enterprise while leaving this country to fall further into political, economic, social, and cultural dysfunction. What's more important, empire or the nation? We can't have both, and it's clear that the pursuit of the former has severely damaged the latter. We have to jettison empire for our own survival.
Right now, the health care debate, not to mention increasing unemployment, severe decline in income of people who are still employed or manage to find employment, mortgage foreclosures, deteriorating infrastructure, decline in the quality and quantity of natural resources, etc., makes this dysfunction at home clear enough.
I'm not sure why arguing from the deleterious impact of the war on the American people and nation is not good enough for the debate.
EMN
I don't understand why this
I don't understand why this is all so hard.
Andrew Exum et al have been saying consistently, the war in Af/Pak is being fought the wrong way. If it is fought the 'right way' it can be won, or at least not lost.
Many 'antiwar' arguments go along the lines of 'we can't win, so we need to get out'. So Ex gets hauled in to say, we can win actually, and then gets panned here when he tries to answer the next question 'why are we trying to win at all'. He has been at pains to stress the difference between his professional (COIN) and personal (strategy) opinions.
Damn right the Obama administration is MIA on this. It sucks. As does the fact that yet another VP is fucking up military strategy (this time from the other end of the spectrum)
The best argument i can see for staying is that promises were made to yet another nation that they would not be abandoned to the dogs by the USA. If you care about such promises then stay, if you don't then leave.
One might think however that America has broken so many of those promises in the past that one more probably won't matter.
I reckon give them the 18months, then see where we are.
The Commander in Chief on
The Commander in Chief on the campaign trail had no problem knowing what to do.
The Obama Doctrine
http://www.mudvillegazette.com/032531.html#more
The Commander in Chief had no problem sending more troops in harms way. And today I read that one of his advisers says "my own thoughts are not wholly formed." Capt. Ex it is not my place to tell you to grow a pair but would you please tell the President and his staff to Grow a Pair.
You better than this civilian know that our most treasured assets are in harms way while "leaders" sit on the fence. Please serve them, and all of you need to "Grow a Pair!"
Andrew, You may be missing
Andrew,
You may be missing the big picture. M4 is presenting his "plan" (both the public one and private one) and CINC Obama will comment on the plan after he reviews it. Just because the media wants churn and the pundits didn't get juicy consulting contracts to say "no, no, not like that" doesn't mean we are losing or winning. It just means a) we are smart enough to reassess our goals, b) the media likes to throw rocks and c) shit happens while responsible adults do due diligence. :)
I say go wider on your view of the war because we actually won the war by bringing the taliban to a surrender in late 2001 and then proceeded to round up the talib commanders and ship them to Gitmo. Then we refused to federalize their country even though the Hindu Kush, regional power centers and ethnic structure would have dictated otherwise and we still can't seem to get State and DoD to play nice together.
As i said in early 2002, Pakistan is where the region's stability will begin or end and right now the media, pundits and govt is not paying attention to the monster we created in the 80's We are now fighting the people we created then and somehow the new beltway pundits don't get it. If you spend some time along the border or up in the hills there is no clear difference between the Russians (who were there to prop up a weak, centralized govt, modernize ideology and rebuild the country) and the Americans (who are there to.....you get the point)
So when we define the "war" and "winning" why not spread that timeline and battlefield to include the 80's and Pakistan/Kashmir/India nexus of jihad? Then we can truly come to grips with what the "war" is and why we must be there. We (and the Saudis) created the Frankenstein of Maoist jihad and we must kill it.
9/11 is not when the war started...December 24, 1979 may be a better date to remember. It took the Russians 6 years to build up their Afghan Security forces (300K afghans or so) and then begin to wind down operations. We have been in Afghanistan for almost 8 years and are just starting to sort out what exactly we are doing there. The idea of the muj holding the moral high ground has been warped by looking through too narrow a construction hoarding. Afghans are completely capable of governing themselves, being divisive and united in purpose and our outmoded concept of a Kabul centric, pashtun dominated Afghanistan plays right into the hands of the ISI's big picture for the region.
Michael Scheuer. Hamid Gul and Milt Bearden will teach us more about the region than all of the neo experts combined. Many of whom view the Afghan struggle for independence from outside meddling through the warped moral lens of Iraq.
In any case you need to add www.afpax.com to your list of resources and I enjoy your comments.
RYP
I think Ex's point that the
I think Ex's point that the Iraq war diverted resources and focus form Afghanistan is valid and something that needs to be remembered.
A costly diversion in both blood and treasure on the part of your previous administration has meant that the very troops that could have been most effective in engaging in a COIN pop centric engagement, SOF and JSOC were diverted to hunting down a pack of cards.
EMN - you have a very valid point, and as much as I feel that the US has an obligation to better the world and to export is military as the body guard of a globalized system that reconnects countries to a functioning group of nation states, I understand the weariness that can accompany this. This is why I like Barnett's idea of US as Leviathan, with a solid block of allies on back up as administrators. That's not to say the US stands alone on sole mil to mil engagements, but you have the fire power to topple any regime. What is lacking is a clear understanding of how to build the peace. And for that you need allies, allies like Europe that were, again during Iraq, cast aside over petty 'if you ain't with us you're against us' rhetoric on the part of Bush/Cheney.
So get to work on re-building alliances, If the Chinese want Afghanistan's copper they need to pull road block details with boys from NYC.
And a bunch of multi national peacekeepers does dilute the perception of white infidel invaders
@ Visitor 3:40 PM. Thank
@ Visitor 3:40 PM.
Thank you for advising me to calm down and for providing a lecture on former captain Exum's responsibilities, which, according to you, do not include the "whys" of warfare.
I'm sure you'll understand why I'm not so sure Exum would agree with you and why I don't accept that any American—even a member of the military—should ever blind him or herself to the "whys" inherent in warfare. Well, maybe you don't understand, based on your comments. I wish you did.
What you're really saying is that Exum and his crowd are advancing a particular POV without regard to the implications for the nation. If this is true, shame on them for being so short-sighted. I'd also note that neither Exum nor Nagl, et al, is a currently serving officer. They don't have the constraints that active officers have, although I note with interest that there are many active officers who are willing to state that they're far less confident in the party line than are Exum, et al.
For the record, we should not lose sight of the unfortunate reality that, even as they say they ignore issues of grand strategy and become grumpy when it's suggested that this is a fatal flaw in their work, none of these tactical "experts" has yet advanced a compelling argument. From McChrystal on down, they're all over the map, flitting from (vaguely defined) "vital national interests" to "preventing nuclear holocaust" to "serving as a bulwark against the spread of terrorism" to "ensuring India and Pakistan do not go to war" to "bringing peace, justice and the American way to the benighted people of the Middle East." They're arrogant and cocksure and they don't even bring a good tactical argument to the table. All of us were brought up to be killers. Now we're going to become humanitarians and nation builders, with bad guys somehow magically coming around to join the cause.
What we're talking about here is a Manhatten Project, fraught with the same risk, just as costly, but with people nowhere near as smart in charge. I'm not ready to see another trillion dollars of my money go down the drain. They've already managed to do that in Iraq. I say, show me more than you have so far. Until then, I'm with EMN, "not sure why arguing from the deleterious impact of the war on the American people and nation is not good enough for the debate."
Is it ethical for the White
Is it ethical for the White House to mimic GOP booster-ism when dealing with senior military when it has well founded doubts about the efficacy of the effort for our National Security? Were the Bushies ethical in downgrading Afghanistan after al Qaida escaped to the caves of Pakistan and unethical in starting war with Iraq? Where does courage lie when the core issue is not being addressed? How is long term competence to be evaluated?
Visitor at 5:11pm nails it
Visitor at 5:11pm nails it right on the head: "While both sides are focusing on their own strongest points, they put up pretty lame (as I see them) arguments for their weaker ones"
The debate itself has become a war of attrition!! How will one side break through the trenches and prevail? I doubt either will...anytime soon. I think the blog's readership has convinced itself that figuring out grand strategy is not the military's problem, and that the citizenry (via elected officials) need to decide where our priorities/interests lie. Unfortunately I don't think the citizenry (or its elected officials) really care. Sure, there are a few defense policy oriented members of Congress, but by-and-large, both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue are overwhelmed with health care and the economy. From a bureaucratic/institutional standpoint, maintaining the status quo (an under-resourced COIN campaign) is far easier than packing up completely (on one hand) or adequately resourcing with sufficient troop levels (on the other hand). The public does not want to be confronted with the logical conclusion of Bacevich's arguments (cut and run) any more than they want to see troop levels hit 100K (I don't know whose argument to call that, but it needs paternity outside a think tank if we are going to adopt it).
I don't see how this debate breaks out of the trenches. Fortunately for all of us, many said the same thing about Iraq in the spring of 2006 when things really took a turn for the worse...a lot can change when this gov't decides to adequately resource a conflict (both materially and intellectually).
"To Visitor at 5.11 pm--a
"To Visitor at 5.11 pm--a number of anti war people such as myself have been making the argument that we need to be out of Afghanistan because we as a nation simply can't afford: 1) nation building abroad before nation building at home and 2) propping up the American Imperial Enterprise while leaving this country to fall further into political, economic, social, and cultural dysfunction."
This, while (probably justfully) indicative of most people's priorities (home over abroad), completely reverses the reality of the U.S. financial problems. The bulk of the deficit, and the bulk of the deficit coming down the pipe in the future (60+ trillion even before the latest financial problems/welfare program), is in domestic spending - specifically the entitlement programs Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security. Defense spending, even in the midst of two words, is still relatively modest for the post-World War II period, and could probably be sustained indefinitely.
It isn't foreign expenditures that are bankrupting us, it is domestic expenditures.
...And that's coming from someone who's generally a non-interventionist.
Are commenters here
Are commenters here deliberately missing the point:
If Obama determined his strategy in March, where is he leading on that strategy? Obama is the one who says this is vital, argue the war with him!!!
Except there is no argument, because the 0 is too busy socializing the country to care about his strategery.
"And the Obama
"And the Obama Administration has thus far shown little energy for defending a policy and strategic goals (.pdf) they themselves arrived at just five months ago."
I think this overstates the rational thought that truly went in to the initial decision to expand our effort in Afghanistan. It was more emotional and political (as in domestic politics) in nature than the result of careful deliberation. With the built in pressure of years of political mau-mauing on Afghanistan and issue of unconditional support to brass policies. And the surge, with its extraordinarily simplified public reputation, as a convenient model. Throw in the headwind of the usual 'new Administration confidence' ("we're not going to screw everything up like that last group of idiots did!"), and that initial decision was pretty predictable. Same goes for the buyer's remorse. (We're going to have to use that much political capital on what? For how long? For what chances of payoff?)
Guess that should be
Guess that should be "tailwind of a new Administration..."
Well, I'm clearly not a pilot.
mockmook, "If Obama
mockmook, "If Obama determined his strategy in March, where is he leading on that strategy?"
He can't even accomplish that. He's outsourcing leadership in every program that he's attempting from stimulus to healthcare to the show trials. Everyone voted for him for a number of reasons but no one, evidently, voted for him because he was a leader. If they did, it was an empty vote.
As a former military man I am sickened by this debate in the middle of a war. The troops should be brought home and reminded that all wars are lost at home.
The words of Samuel Adams,
"If ye love wealth better than liberty,
the tranquility of servitude
better than the animating contest of freedom,
go home from us in peace.
We ask not your counsels or your arms.
Crouch down and lick the hands which feed you.
May your chains set lightly upon you,
and may posterity forget that you were our countrymen."
Bacevich may not have been
Bacevich may not have been to Afghanistan but I'm sure that a visit would harden his belief in the futility of this effort. The more you know about Afghanistan the more pessimistic you should be.
There are really only two levels of war. Tactics: the activities to defeat the enemy on the battlefield and Strategy: the activities taken to strengthen your country or weaken its opponents. Strategy is always more important than tactics and is based overwhelmingly on building and maintaining economic power: industrial capacity, technology, natural resources and cash. Debt is a detractor from economic power. Debt is currently the main US strategic problem.
How will the US be stronger after another five or ten years of escalation in Afghanistan? The campaign is being funded with money borrowed abroad and if the pro-escalation factions get their way the cost is set to double or perhaps even triple. The long term costs are close to $ 1 trillion as it stands now. The pro-escalation faction's hope seems to be that the escalation will lead to "victory" and a quick draw down of forces. I don't think there is any evidence indicating that the Taliban will be defeated in the medium term (McCrystal's sensible attempt to reduce civilian casualties matched by reduced Taliban and increased security force casualties) and in fact most indicators point to the escalation as being designed to continue a stalemate rather than forge victory. A "victory" in the long term, given what it will cost, is impossible.
On the "tactical" side the pro-escalation forces assume that there are thousands of government "experts" eager to come here and charge off into the wilderness to civilize Afghans and thousands of NATO soldiers capable of training ANSF. I doubt either is the case. The pro-escalation folks have also not addressed the increased threat to LOCs a doubling of forces will entail
What purpose does
What purpose does Afghanistan serve, except as a buffer between Russia/Iran and the rest of the world? Oh, sure, there are some savages squatting there, but what exactly are they doing, other than squatting? Oh. Yes. Housing for AQ and the Taliban. Oh, and raw opium.
Would we not be well served to simply nuke the entire place, and sow the ruins with anthrax?
The people there are savages, who contribute nothing to the world economy except terrorism and drugs. Who needs them, exactly?
They may be unfortunately thrown under the bus of history, but they brought it on themselves.
If Afghanistan were turned into toxic waste, the buffer between Iran/Russia would still exist, but AQ and the Taliban would no longer be able to use it.
Suits me just fine.
Nuke 'em 'til they glow, then use them as landing lights to get some return on the investment.
it took a whole 29 comments
it took a whole 29 comments until the 'nuke em til they glow' camp spoke up.
makes me sick, no matter how many times i read it.
many people on this planet feel the same way about you.
"The best argument i can see
"The best argument i can see for staying is that promises were made to yet another nation that they would not be abandoned to the dogs by the USA. If you care about such promises then stay, if you don't then leave. "
Not exactly. It's more than 40 governments - all those NATO partners and others that got into Afghanistan were promised that the US would stay as long as needed. Get out now, and you can forget any kind of multilateral mission for the next 10 years ( unless Russia attacks Poland or so).
I remember how pissed I was when Clinton (pressured by Republicans in congress) called off the Somalia mission after the "Black Hawk down" incident and my company was told we would not head down there; the American troops we wer supposed to support where chickening out as the mission was not longer "in the US interest" any longer (look at Somalia today - think the situation there is in the American interest??). But Somalia was pretty unimprotant on the domestic political level in Europe, so the outrage was muted (except for the people directly involved). Afghanistan would be a completely different matter ...
The best answer why we need to be in Afghanistan I read so far was written by two leftist Canadians:
Why Are We In Afghanistan? - May 6, 2008 by Terry Glavin and Stan Persky
Well, there are, as you point out, at least two related questions to begin with here. It’s necessary to answer the “Why are we in Afghanistan?” question before we can sensibly approach the question “Should we be in Afghanistan?” And you’re right, it does help to consider the broader, philosophical question “What should we do?” as a kind of extension of the ethical question “What should I do?”
http://dooneyscafe.com/archives/552
(ignore the 7 introductory paragraphs ...)
P.S. To all these "VISITORS": Is it too hard for you to make up a name for purposes of this thread? It really becomes quite difficult to follow the line of argument when there's 4 different visitors arguing 6 different things ...
"The Obama Administration
"The Obama Administration has thus far shown little energy for defending a policy and strategic goals (.pdf) they themselves arrived at just five months ago"
I can't believe this is surprising to you. It is pretty obvious that Obama's left wing perspective sees US use of force as wrong. The enemies in Afghanisatn and Pakistan see this and know that if the war in Afganistan gets tough Obama will bail. That is the default future right now.
I'm constantly amused by the
I'm constantly amused by the "anti-war side" pushing for the "pro-war side's" strategy.
Where, exactly, has the "anti-war side" put forward a strategy themselves? I've seen hand wringing about the lack of a strategy from the COIN side but nothing (or at least nothing worthwhile) from theirs. The usual garbage put forward? Here's an example:
A number of anti war people such as myself have been making the argument that we need to be out of Afghanistan because we as a nation simply can't afford: 1) nation building abroad before nation building at home and 2) propping up the American Imperial Enterprise while leaving this country to fall further into political, economic, social, and cultural dysfunction. What's more important, empire or the nation? We can't have both, and it's clear that the pursuit of the former has severely damaged the latter. We have to jettison empire for our own survival.
If you tell me you are able to detect even a whiff of strategy in that post I'll tell you that you're full of it.
So, "anti-war" crowd, let's hear it. Abu M and his have made their attempt at clarifying their strategy for a more secure world-- let's hear yours.
RWL- I am not Anti-War I am
RWL- I am not Anti-War I am anti-war without defined executable Goal. How do you have a strategy without a goal? Al Queda attacked the US, Bin Laden says he did it, I believe him. Bush said in simple terms he wanted Bin Laden dead or alive along with the commanders. I support this Goal. What the strategy is I have no problem leaving in the hands of more qualified people as long as there is a clear goal.
The new goal of this Administration seems a little more Vague:
disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda.
Here is where I need more clarification, maybe this is enough information for you to develop a strategy along with all others with knowledge of implementation of war strategies.
But then I read on this site:
"Yet the policy debate seems to continue within the White House"
Then I read from Ex that:
"my own thoughts are not wholly formed."
Could it be that the Goal is not clear? If the Goal is not clear how do you come up with a clear strategy? This sites spends lots of time talking about strategy but when "thoughts are not wholly formed" from an intelligent person as Ex, could he be struggling with the goal and not strategy?
I know from a business perspective if you do not set clear goals you increase the possibility of failure. Failure in business seldom causes death of your fellow countrymen. Failure in war most likely always causes unneeded death of your fellow countrymen. I have issues when unclear goals in business are set. I have huge issues when unclear goals in war are set.
Sanmon, I think the
Sanmon,
I think the overarching goal for all parties involved (with a few notable exceptions) is the safety and security of the United States (and I should have wrote that instead of "world"). The point of contention involves how we arrive at that goal and the importance Afghanistan plays in that journey. To this point the "pro-war side" (and, as you've pointed out, this type of label is wholly inadequate in describing the beliefs of those it is applied to-- but hey, I'm working with what I have) has been pressured to expand upon their beliefs and describe the strategic importance of Afghanistan. This essentially represents the challenge of justifying nation-building as a strategic endeavor, and people are rightfully being taken to task if they cannot ably and intelligently state their case.
What is lacking, however, are the critics' own justifications for avoiding nation-building as a strategic endeavor. More often than not their only support comes from the "blood and treasure" routine, and you'll hopefully forgive me if I believe such arguments lack even half the thought of those put forward by their opposites. Mr. Bacevich, who is about 100x more intelligent than this humble poster (as if that needs to be stated aloud), is an incredibly effective critic of those who wish to remain in Afghanistan. Where he fails is in putting forward a strategy that expounds on how leaving Afghanistan will actually lead to our safety and security.
The truth is that neither side has put forward many compelling arguments. Both seem to be saying, "We'll continue to do what we've done before-- only this time, it will be better!" That may work for Snapple, but when it comes to protecting little RWL's it isn't going to make the grade.
IF the its somehow important
IF the its somehow important NOT to have the region go up in smoke, then the US either has to "win the war" OR, so skillfully manage a withdrawal that they do not leave chaos behind. Most of the withdrawal options being discussed do not seem to assure the second. Most of the people wanting to win do not seem to have a convincing plan for the first. There is no easy way out any more and no easy way to win. Whatever option is chosen, success will be hard. In the end, it comes down to whether the United States is capable of carrying off ANY option well or not? If not, then a badly managed withdrawal or a badly managed "slog on for now" will both lead to reinvigoration of the jihadi project. BUT, the first victims of that reinvigorated project will be the other infidels in the region and those in Afghanistan and Pakistan who became too close to the infidels. So maybe the US should say F-you and leave? Let the locals sort it out. Which then brings us to whether the US should care what happens after it leaves? Is the US the policeman of the world? Leftists would say NO (they would also say that things will get better with the US out of the way, but that may or may not be the case). What is the correct answer to that question?Comments?
RWL or anyone, My question
RWL or anyone,
My question is: does this administration have a clear goal to build a clear strategy on?
I say NO.
This report did not set clear goals, it complicated the goals:
White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on
U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan
There is nothing about withdrawal in this Policy Objective so I do not see that to be part of the conversation. When you ad Nation Building to the equation to the extent this policy states no wonder our military cannot come up with a clear strategy. I would think we would have to revamp our Military Collages so that nation building would be over half of the cirriculum if this duty falls on them.
Omar, I am having difficulty
Omar, I am having difficulty understanding your reasoning. The principle question is whether the GIRoA, and the NDS/ANA/ANP that are loyal to it are worth supporting or not in their war against the Quetta Shura Taliban, Haqqani, Hekmatyur, and their allies ("Punjabi Taliban," Chechens, and extremists from Uzbekistan in the case of Haqqani, Uighars and extremist Sunni Arabs for some "Taliban.")
I think that the answer is yes, because:
1) distracts extremists from attacking elsewhere, even if it takes the GIRoA over a decade to win;
2) it is insurance against the unlikely event that Pakistan further destabilizes;
3) the Afghan people and GIRoA/ANSF are more determined to resist extremists than America or almost any other country in the world is;
4) I have confidence that the GIRoA and the NDS/ANA/ANP that are loyal to it will probably win provided they get global support
Do you agree or disagree with the above. If you agree, then the question becomes how to support the GIRoA and its ANSF. Some options are for the international community to:
1) give the GIRoA hundreds of billions of dollars in grants over decades, but don't send civilian advisers or military trainers
2) give the GIRoA hundreds of billions of dollars in grants over decades, and a long term surge of tens of thousands of civilian advisers, but don't send military trainers
3) give the GIRoA hundreds of billions of dollars in grants over decades, and a long term surge of tens of thousands of civilian advisers, and tens of thousands of military trainers, embedded advisors, special forces and ANSF combat enablers
4) give the GIRoA hundreds of billions of dollars in grants over decades, and a long term surge of tens of thousands of civilian advisers, and advisory division, brigade and battalion headquarters super embedded in the ANSF command structure.
5) McChrystal/Exum's strategy of partnered ISAF/ANSF operations over the next 18 months and completing the transition to ANSF overwatch within two years.
Where does "policemen" come in? The UN has repeatedly unanimously encouraged nations to contribute to ISAF. The elected GIRoA has requested ISAF and UN help. The locals can't "sort it out" since many nonAfghans are involved in Afghanistan. It also isn't the "US carrying out " any option, but of America collectively with other countries significantly assisting the GIRoA/ANSF or not. American interests are served even if it takes the GIRoA/ANSF over a decade to win this war. One concern I have with McChrystal coming out with a strategy for victory is that this strategy should be one he collaboratively writes and communicates with the elected GIRoA and the commanding generals of the ANSF. {Andrew Exum, is this happening behind the scenes?} Otherwise, will the ANA and ANP be motivated to carry out McChrystal's population centric COIN policies, or will they carry out a strategy that doesn't fully complement McChrystal's?
Try Ashley Tellis. He
Try Ashley Tellis. He actually knows something about strategy in addition to tactics. Should I write the NewsHour too?
I think the part I find most
I think the part I find most baffling about this debate, both in this thread and in general, is the fact that AQ is a symptom of an Ideology. You can play "whack a mole" with drones and hellfires or commit yourself to population centric COIN in Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen all you want but ultimately you're not doing anything to combat what causes the problem in the first place.
For the record I'm personally not sure that anything can be done on that count other than back off and let their co-religionists deal with it, much like they did in Iraq after AQ managed to alienate even the Sunnis with their behaviour, but there seems to be a rather major perceptual gap in both the last administration and this one on what the problem really is.
"not sure that anything can
"not sure that anything can be done on that count other than back off and let their co-religionists deal with it, much like they did in Iraq after AQ managed to alienate even the Sunnis with their behaviour"
This is already happening almost everywhere. Why shouldn't America and the international community support the Afghans and Pakistanis in dealing with the extremists? If the Afghans defeat the extremists . . . it would significantly delegitimatize and deflate them in the minds of the Ummah. Ditto with Pakistan. This is a major argument in favor of supporting the GIRoA and its ANSF. It is also an argument for why the world should give economic grants to Pakistan conditioned on difficult Pakistani reforms.
The fact that Iraqis defeated Al Qaeda linked networks on Iraqi soil significantly damaged the global popularity of AQ linked extremist networks. This is one reason to believe the same would happen if extremist groups were defeated elsewhere.
Tom F has a point. The whack
Tom F has a point. The whack a mole strategy is great when employed against the actual leadership of AQ and affiliates. But arrayed against the ideology of AQ, (and with the reductions in AQ C&C cadre it’s the third tier ideology, or the idea of AQ that is really most dangerous), whack a mole does little.
You cannot kill and idea with Hellfire missiles regardless of how well aimed they are. As much as I support the kinetics of the anti-AQ strategies, I don’t hear enough about solving root causes. If one of the stated aims of to reduce the efficiently of AQ, then we need to work more toward solving the question of why they had/have so much support.
@ RWL. You want the
@ RWL. You want the "anti-war" people to provide their strategy for fighting a war in which they don't believe. It seems you believe we're all lemmings—pro-and anti alike—so those of us who don't wish to go directly off the cliff are somehow bound to find another way to go off it. I won't play that game with you and that's why I won't come up with a strategy for "dealing" with Afghanistan. I'm not anti-war by any means, but I, and many others believe that the route to US security from terrorism does not lead through Afghanistan alone. As is pointed out by Tom F, one wonders just how it is that our nation has allowed itself to be put into the box that is Afghanistan=AQ/terrorists.
Like Tom F, I've long been baffled by all of you who somehow believe that you'll find your peace, security and harmony of all things if we somehow "win" in Afghanistan. The world isn't that simple and the terrorists won't cooperate by playing your game. You guys are all about knocking off the Taliban and "saving" Afghanistan from them. You know what the Taliban is in that part of the world? A political party. Yes, they did once give succor to AQ. But they got their heads handed to them. Some of us think they might be receptive to the proverbial offer they can't refuse. Why is there so much resistance now in the nation to the proposed major expansion into this squishy feel-good COIN stuff? Well, it's because Americans don't give a shit about Afghanis. They don't give a shit if their rulers are backward religious thugs who won't allow women any rights and who are just downright nasty. Americans give a shit about America and they're beginning to doubt everything they've been told for the past eight years about all of these wonderful wars being fought in their behalf. Iraq was a lie and a whole lot of people now believe Afghanistan is a lie. Frankly, you pro-war guys don't have a great track record. After a trillion dollars, 5K or so American lives and God-knows how many foreign lives, you still don't have bin Laden and AQ is still frightening little children at night.
Credibility is the problem Obama, Gates, McChrystal, Exum and every other pro-war person has. It's hard to escape the feeling that it's all just "security theater," which is what many security experts term what that wonderful TSA is doing in the nation's airports. What is TSA going to do if something explodes in checked luggage that couldn't be scanned because the money for the machines was spent on shaking people down for butter knives and making them take their shoes off? What is the defense establishment going to do if the next terrorist attack comes overland through the sieve we laughingly call the US-Mexican border? Go fight insurgents in Texas or California?
During the 1964 presidential campaign, Lyndon Johnson vowed he wouldn't send American boys to die fighting a war Asian boys should be fighting. Lyndon Johnson lied and he lost a presidency and a reputation. A whole lot of "boys" and their families lost a lot more. The pro-war crowd is lucky that (1) there is no draft; and, (2) the small standing regular force has had comparatively few casualties in these wars of choice. Otherwise there would be no debate. Frankly, in my experience, COIN is a sucker bet if you happen to be an American GI, and the only thing that will save you from your own government and from "sophisticated" and well-meaning interventionists is public opinion.
@ Ensign. You say: "This, while (probably justfully) indicative of most people's priorities (home over abroad), completely reverses the reality of the U.S. financial problems. The bulk of the deficit, and the bulk of the deficit coming down the pipe in the future (60+ trillion even before the latest financial problems/welfare program), is in domestic spending - specifically the entitlement programs Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security. Defense spending, even in the midst of two words, is still relatively modest for the post-World War II period, and could probably be sustained indefinitely.
"It isn't foreign expenditures that are bankrupting us, it is domestic expenditures."
Ensign, I'll let you figure out on your own just why this is such a ludicrous argument.
This is the best bar none
This is the best bar none post I have seen here in the land of stroke exum.
The words of Samuel Adams,
"If ye love wealth better than liberty,
the tranquility of servitude
better than the animating contest of freedom,
go home from us in peace.
We ask not your counsels or your arms.
Crouch down and lick the hands which feed you.
May your chains set lightly upon you,
and may posterity forget that you were our countrymen."
Well chosen visitor. My complements and respect, one old soldier to another,
Well done
ANAN, I agree almost one
ANAN,
I agree almost one hundred percent with you. My questions were meant to clarify my thoughts and those of others: There is really NO good withdrawal option that I can see. The alternatives are getting the job done, or suffering a very humiliating and painful defeat.
A lot of the leftish vocabulary (world policeman, etc) is used without the moral connotations usually attached to it...
Interesting discussion. A
Interesting discussion. A couple of points:
1) The one who really should be making the speech about the Whys and Hows seems to me to be Robert Gates. As much as pundits like to call Afghanistan Obamas war, he is the real owner of it and the architect behind it, together with the generals Petraeus and McChrystal. The Obama admin seems to work in teams, and Gates seems to be the top dog of their military team. In addition, a speech by him would avoid the auto-response of the birthers/screamers in the republican party.
2) Tom F, you write: "For the record I'm personally not sure that anything can be done on that count other than back off and let their co-religionists deal with it, much like they did in Iraq after AQ managed to alienate even the Sunnis with their behaviour, but there seems to be a rather major perceptual gap in both the last administration and this one on what the problem really is." And this is exactly true, and seems to me to be the key validating concept in COINs approach to anti-terror, that of providing a better alternative. Much of Talebans rise came from a reaction to the corruption of the warlords, our current allies. Unless we can raise the level of service offered to normal afghans above the level offered by the various groups of Talebs, they will retain legitimacy. Once that legitimacy is taken away by undermining their propaganda through real actions, the idea is that they will be marginalized. Will it work? Fck knows.
3) I have yet to see any "anti-war"/"Cut n Run" proponents detailing any evac plans. How long time would it take for the US to abandon the area, if the decision was made today? How would the various NGOs be evaced? How would you deal with the subsequent refugee problem swarming into Pakistan, so fueling the already existing unrest in the northern areas? In other words, how would such a plan be carried out? How would it play out politically if the president were to go on television and tell the Afghans all them promises were unfortunately no longer valid, so sorry?
4) Fully agree that China should have been tried brought on board a long time ago. Anyone care to explain to me why this is impossible?
Publius, You want the
Publius,
You want the "anti-war" people to provide their strategy for fighting a war in which they don't believe.
Wrong. Read my posts more carefully and try again.
It seems you believe we're all lemmings—pro-and anti alike—so those of us who don't wish to go directly off the cliff are somehow bound to find another way to go off it.
Like "lemmings...off the cliff"? Get over yourself. Expecting you to be able to provide a coherent strategy to address the risks to America when you are calling for the same from your opponents hardly turns you into a lemming. At the worst it expects you to have an intelligent alternative to what you're attacking. If that's too much to ask I suggest you avoid blogs such as this and stick to the places where you can whine about being a rodent-sized version of Jesus to the acclaim of your fellow posters.
"Ensign, I'll let you figure
"Ensign, I'll let you figure out on your own just why this is such a ludicrous argument."
There's nothing ludicrous about it. Perhaps you just don't like the implications.
In 1950, for a benchmark, defense spending was 80% of the federal government's budget. From 1950 to 1980, it was never less than around 5-6% of GDP (with spikes to 10-15% during the Korean and Vietnam Wars). Today, counting war supplementals, it is about 6-7% of national GDP, and 20% of Federal spending. Total federal spending is about 30% of GDP. Federal spending is itself, of course, only a portion of total government spending in the country (state government expenditures, which are even more domestic in nature, have been expanding significantly in the past few decades). 6-7% of national GDP (and that's counting the temporary supplimentals) is probably sustainable, as it has been for the last 50+ years.
Without supplimentals, the CBO's future projections are defense will fall to below 3% of GDP, to account for the massive expansions in domestic spending that are going to take place. By 2045 Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security will, by themselves, account for about 30% of GDP, or the entire budget as it exists today, while still rising.
All of those projections are likely optimistic, but it is still clear that it is domestic spending that out of control and bankrupting us, not defense, which over the long-term has stagnated and then declined as a proportion of GDP and government expenditures.
"Ensign, I'll let you figure
"Ensign, I'll let you figure out on your own just why this is such a ludicrous argument."
For some reason I had a brainfart, which actually weakens the statistical case for the argument.
In 1950, for a benchmark, defense spending was 80% of the federal government's budget. From 1950 to 1990, it was never less than around 5-6% of GDP (with spikes to 10-15% during the Korean and Vietnam Wars).
During the 1990s, defense spending was between 3 and 4% of GDP - which is close to the 4-5% that we'd be spending absent the supplimentals), and more than we're projected to pay in the upcoming decades.
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