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The Obama Administration: MIA on Afghanistan?
So I was on the Newshour last night debating Afghanistan with a favorite of this blog and its readers, Andrew Bacevich. As readers of this blog know, I am uncomfortable when placed in the position of being expected to lustily defend the war. I think the war is in the nation's interests at the moment, sure, but I'm quick to add that my own thoughts are not wholly formed, I am open to dissenting views, and what views I do offer are accompanied by admissions of how difficult the mission is and a rather un-Abu-Muqawama-like degree of humility. (One of the things that turns me off to Bacevich's arguments on Afghanistan, for example, is how certain he is of his knowledge and opinions on the country, its peoples, its history and NATO operations there without, to my knowledge, having ever traveled to Central Asia. Rory Stewart, obviously, is another matter -- as is the wider Bacevich thesis
Woah. The only person who will defend this war? If this blogger is the only person in the nation's capital willing to defend the war, we have a big problem. I'm more used to hosting debates on Afghanistan than participating in them. I do not think it would surprise any reader of this blog, though, to note the speed with which the debate has shifted on the war in Afghanistan. What was, 12 months ago, "the good war" has now become, for paleoconservatives and progressives alike, a fool's errand. And the Obama Administration has thus far shown little energy for defending a policy and strategic goals (.pdf) they themselves arrived at just five months ago. I thought that once the president had settled on a policy and strategic aims, the rest of the administration would then go about executing that policy. That's the way it's supposed to work, right? Yet the policy debate seems to continue within the White House, with the Office of the Vice President apparently pushing for a much more limited approach than what was articulated in March by the president himself and following a lengthy policy review. No wonder, then, the uniformed military is getting nervous about the administration's support for their war. Either the White House has been too busy with health care, or they have failed to notice how quickly the debate has shifted under their feet (as with health care).
What needs to happen? Well, first off, I guess we should decide what we're trying to do in Afghanistan. (Again, when we set about reviewing ISAF operations in June and July, we thought this question had already been resolved in March.) Once that question is settled, the administration needs to go about defending and explaining their policy. Until then, it's understandable why everyone from voters in Peoria to Mullah Omar in Afghanistan (?) are confused as to what, exactly, U.S. policy is at the moment.
For anyone who wants it:
http://crfb.org/sites/default/files/imported/documents_1/LongTermOutlook...
CBO
The Long Term Budget Outlook
June 29, 2009
...
"Sources of Rising Deficits
Over the long-term, both spending and taxes are estimated to grow well beyond their
historical averages. Rising deficits are caused by spending growing considerably faster
than revenue. CBO's baseline scenario projects spending to more than double as a
percent of GDP over the next 75 years, while revenues increase by approximately 40
percent. Under the alternative scenario, spending would more than triple while
revenues would grow by around 20 percent.
Projected spending increases come mainly from the growth of Medicare and Medicaid,
and to a lesser extent Social Security. The Social Security program is projected to grow
from 4.8 percent to 6 percent of GDP over the next two decades, without much change in
the magnitude of its dedicated revenue source. Medicare and Medicaid, meanwhile, are
projected to grow from 5 percent of GDP today to 8.5 percent by 2030, over 12 percent
by 2050, and nearly 18 percent by the end of 75-year window.
All of this is compounded by the continued accumulation of debt, resulting in higher net
interest payments. Although a relatively small portion of our budget today at 1 percent
of GDP, interest on the debt would grow to consume 12 percent of GDP by 2080 under
CBO’s baseline scenario or 30 percent under its alternative scenario. Of course, even the
baseline scenario displayed below would be unlikely to occur, since investors and
lenders would not allow the United States to accumulate such high levels of debt. But
this projection represents the magnitude of the gap that must be closed."
Al-Zawahiri: Pakistan Heading Down "Path of Doom"
So, RWL, I guess you won't be joining my fan club anytime soon. Leaving aside your dyspeptic remarks, the reason I don't feel compelled to deliver an alternative approach to you is because our POVs are entirely different. It's your fundamental premise that the road to success in the "war on terror" runs through Afghanistan; I disagree. Afghanistan is at best a side show, something I've taken pains to point out, and the reason why I'm such a nay-sayer. I neither agree with the government's tack in Afghanistan nor do I believe in the efficacy of COIN as practiced by the U.S., so I'm not about to play the game of "how can we win the war on terror in Afghanistan"? We're not going to win the war on terror in Afghanistan. Or anywhere else for that matter.
Now, if you want to know how to have some success in Afghanistan, I'll share this not-so-original thought with you: Get off the Westphalian state ride when it comes to this poor nation, which really isn't. Reach an accord with the Taliban, buy 'em off. The problem you have with fighting them on behalf of the "government" is that they're committed; the "government" doesn't seem to be committed to much more than lining its own pocket. I guess we're never going to learn that installing and then backing the corrupt horse isn't always the best bet.
@Ensign: Thanks for explaining your remarks. Now I know where you're coming from, I understand you. FWIW, I don't particularly believe in that 5-6 percent of GDP for defense formula—I'd rather we specifically addressed world conditions and anticipated threats—but I know a lot of people whom I respect do. So I won't rag on you for advancing from that premise. The only thing I was trying to point out is that money is money. It is a fungible commodity, meaning that a dollar spent on defense is a dollar not available for domestic uses. And it works this other way, of course.
With a great deal of experience in these matters, I personally view the arbitrary percentage of GDP formula as the defense contractors' welfare program. I believe in a robust military, but I really have to wonder why it is incumbent upon us to outspend the rest of the world combined, especially with no clear peer competitor anywhere on the horizon. I think we spend way too much on defense, but then I also think we've become a bellicose and nasty nation in my lifetime, a change I don't think augurs well for the future. It seems we go out of our way to make enemies.
I'd fundamentally rather see a dollar spent on a senior citizen or a sick kid than on making war in the third world or on lining the pockets of third-world "allies."
I actually pretty much agree with everything you just said. If it was up to me we'd simultaneously slash our commitments, and our defense budget. Was just trying to put the defense budget in perspective, using the (admittedly shaky) metrics that are available. And raise a little bit of awareness about the entitlement crunch, which in my opinion is one of the biggest hurdles that this country faces. (And which no one wants to, or will likely seriously address.)
Cheers.
Bacevich cleaned your clock, Exum. Get used to it: you and the rest of the War Party don't have a leg to stand on.
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