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Petraeus on COIN, CT and Afghanistan
Petraeus in the Times of London.
Countering terrorists and extremism requires more than a conventional military approach. Military operations enable you to clear areas of extremist and insurgent elements, and to stop them from putting themselves back together. But the core of any counterinsurgency strategy must focus on the fact that the decisive terrain is the human terrain, not the high ground or river crossing.
Focusing on the population can, if done properly, improve security for local people and help to extend basic services. It can help to delegitimise the methods of the extremists — especially if you can contrast your ability and willingness to support and protect the population with the often horrific actions of extremist groups. Indeed, exposing their extremist ideologies, indiscriminate violence and oppressive practices can help people to realise that their lives are unlikely to be improved if under the control of such movements.
For the strategy to work, it is also necessary to find ways to identify reconcilable members of insurgent elements and to transform them into part of the solution. ...
General Stan McChrystal, the Commander of Nato’s International Security Assistance Force, who has spent most of his career since 9/11 leading the US’s most elite counterterrorist element, the Joint Special Operations Command, is employing a comprehensive, counterinsurgency campaign. He is the first to recognise not just the extraordinary capabilities but also the limitations of counterterrorism forces in Afghanistan.
Does anyone have his full remarks? (UPDATE: My readers rule.)
Did you mean
Did you mean this?
http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/news/news.cgi?id=749
Hi http://www.policyexchange.
Hi
http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/news/news.cgi?id=749
Were you looking after this?
Are you looking after
Are you looking after this?
http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/news/news.cgi?id=749
I hope this time it goes through :)
You guys rule, thanks.
You guys rule, thanks.When has a focus on the
When has a focus on the "population" using the military method of population centric counterinsurgency by a foreign, occupying power worked? When, by way of historical example, has it had the effects that General Petraeus thinks it has had and can have based on the comments he made in this speech?
A bit of preemption here:
*Malaya; nope, didn’t work as the mythology states
*Philippines in 1899-1902; nope, US didn’t even try it there
*El Salvador in the 1980; nope, US advisors dreamed of it working there but it didn’t
*French in Morocco in early 1900s; nope, Layautey talked like it did, but it was not what suppressed the rebellion
*French in Algeria 1954-1962; nope, the French lost that war and left (remember Clausewitz here and the purpose of military operations)
*Iraq 2007; nope, contrary to the Iraq Triumph mythology (of which is directly related to Malaya mythology) it didn't work there either regardless of propagated myths
*Vietnam 1968-1972; nope, Abrams was not the Galula reincarnate, in fact he often liked to refer to the B52s as his strategic mobile reserve
Possibility of it working in Afghanistan? nope, at least if a critical eye to history has anything to say about it, combined with a real view to the present.
gian
A lot has been made recently
A lot has been made recently in comments from US individuals and organisations of the need for cooperation and collective action. As the good general says: "In many ways, my remarks tonight naturally follow those of earlier lectures, for I will agree strongly with what those before me have proposed, that no problem can be viewed in isolation and that indeed many of the challenges that confront the United States and America’s military are connected to many of your challenges in the various organisations in the UK, and the same is true for our many other partners of course as well." In specific relation to the UK; will we have the money to do any cooperating in the coming years? I havent seen this point addressed by any of the political parties, but its an obvious question to be asked when officials are warning of belt tightening and "punching at our weight", re-balancing and Britain's new place in the world.if population centric
if population centric counterinsurgency has never worked historically, then when has conventional warfare amongst guerilla/insurgent forces and a population worked? definitely not in somalia...
PG: I has worked
PG:
I has worked historically, but not as described by the mythology by a foreign occupying power. Magsaysay in the Philippines made it work in the 1950s against the Huk rebellion, but then again that was his home country and his home army who did it. And remember, when I say population centric counterinsurgency I am talking specifically about how we understand it today as explained by its primary doctrinal document, FM 3-24.
As to your point about conventional armies not using it but still defeating a rebellion. Well in that formulation, the examples are legion: the French in Morocco in the early 1900s; or read CE Callwell's classic "Small Wars" where he provides many more examples. But a point of clarification, by way of example, Callwell in no way thought that conventional armies could fight "conventionally" in these small wars. In fact his entire book was about how armies fighting these wars had to gain the initiative by learning and adapting to each situation. His book was a very, very irregular account of how armies ought to think about fighting small wars.
gian
From Laura Rozen's blog at
From Laura Rozen's blog at Politico:
UPDATE: Removed end of this post which my friend Andrew Exum thought implied he might have been involved in pushing the McChrystal assessment, which I did not in any way think or intend to imply and apologize for. He also thought the way I excerpted his post left out context that made him look like he was poking fun at colleagues, which I again did not intend to imply. My sincere apologies.
Definitely not in south
Definitely not in south Lebanon, either. Two times, even.
Exum, Hello and great blog.
Exum,
Hello and great blog. I've been lurking here for about a month now. I think this is the first time I've posted. I typically only post on SWJ. For those that don't know me, I'm an active duty Armor guy with a bunch of time in Iraq. I'd like to post of couple of thoughts/questions and that I've been asking recently and see what y'all think.
1. Strategy for A'stan does not have to be zero-sum. Throughout various debates, it seems like the only choices are either COIN or CT. I don't believe those are the only choices. There are numerous ways to engage in COIN. and many variant mixtures of a COIN/CT blend. My SF friends would contend a strictly FID operation would be suitable.
2. Given the additional resources, do we really think that we can make substantial gains in under two years? The Surge worked to decrease the level of violence in Iraq in a short period of time, but A'stan is not Iraq. From my vantage point, it would seem like it will take 8-10 years to achieve measureable gains.
3. What is our overall strategy against AQ? I've spent some time reading AQ's strategy. It seems like they view Iraq and A'stan as two opening battles in a much longer war. From my understanding, they are content to lose these battles in a strategy of exhaustion in the hopes to ultimately win the war.
I realize those are some weighted questions. I'd appreciate any thoughts/comments you or your readers have.
v/r
Mike
General Petraeus has
General Petraeus has identified that his mission (and the mission of those that will take his place for years to come) is to "transform" the portion of the world that he has been placed in charge of.
We require that this portion of the world be made more conducive to our needs and to those of the rapidly expanding global economy.
The old status quo, in which this portion of the world needed only to be kept as safe and as efficient as was needed to meet and service the needs of the First World; this old "paradigm of requirements" is no more.
Today, the new "paradigm of requirements" is that this region must be made echelons more safe and echelons more efficient; such that it might now be able to meet and service -- not only of the needs of the old First World -- but also the needs of the vastly expanding developing world (China, India, etc.).
Thus, the need for a "comprehensive, sustained, whole of government and multilateral" approach to meet and achieve this objective.
General Petraeus, in his AOR, has this portion of the "transform the Third World" mission.
Other American and partner commanders and officials -- in other areas of the world -- have a similar mission.
It is America's mission statement for the 21st Century.
Petreaus and crew are asking
Petreaus and crew are asking for billions to run an experiment in Afghanistan but to get the resources they have to pretend it's been run before with the results they want. This is why the term "classic counter-insurgency" is used. It's a deceptive phrase used to hide the lack of success of the French and US in COIN and to fool people into thinking that there is a magic formula known only to the enlightened (and of course the counter-insurgent to population ratios promise success if we get the numbers just right).
They also need to convince the people that the $300 or so billion NATO has spent here already is somehow "under resourced" and that nothing has been wasted and none of the new billions will be either. This will also partially absolve the army of blame when things do go south.
"Population-centric COIN"
"Population-centric COIN" would seem to one of the new ideas that is being fielded for trial in this new "transform the Third World" mission and objective.
For population-centric COIN to work, however, one would think that the vast majority of the population(s) in question would need to be exceptionally unhappy with their current arrangements and with their current way-of-life or -- for some other reason -- would be willing and able to transform so as to meet our needs and desires.
In other cases, in which the vast majority of the populations were satisfied with their current arrangments and way of wife -- or who were otherwise unwilling and/or unable to "transform" to meet our needs -- these cases would not seem to be conducive to "population-centric" COIN techniques. In such occassions, a much more confrontational and much more aggressive approach would seem to be needed to attempt to bring about about the required change.
Thus, the viability of population-centric COIN would seem to depend -- most significantly -- upon the wishes and will of the various Third World peoples -- and not so much upon our desires, wishes, will or abilities.
Sorry. Paragraph 3:
Sorry. Paragraph 3: "way-of-life" -- not -- "way-of-wife." Apologies.
Mike 1045: I, for one, would
Mike 1045: I, for one, would be interested in FID as a "third way" in Afghanistan. I wonder, though, if we still have a lot of work to do with the ANSF before that is possible, but I am open to hearing a smart SFer articulate what this would look like. Thanks for reading.Well, I'm not a smart SF'er,
Well, I'm not a smart SF'er, but I have spent nearly 3 years with them either in Iraq or grad school. First thing I learned is that every group has a different solution. 1st Group will use the Basilan model, 7th the Colombian model, 10th and 5th the Iraqi Special Forces model, and 3rd the A'stan commandos model.
A 3rd option would probably be more akin to SFA than FID primarily b/c SF has the option to select it's commandos. CF is forced to take regular dudes off the street. One criteria that must be determined is what role do we play. In y'alls current model, CF will clear unilaterally and dragging the A'stan military with them as we did in Iraq back in 2007-2008. This could prove costly for us. From what I understand, there are three options in FID/SFA
1. Advisor role (Indirect). Similar to MiTT concept. We advise the higher headquarters and help train staff-level stuff.
2. Combat FID: small group of advisors work with Indigenous Force (1 SF team with batallion). Advisors engage in combat.
3. Partnering: 1:1 relationship similar to what CF SFA units are doing now in A'stan. The problem with this approach is the CF tendacy to force mission accomplishment over Indig force going unilateral if necessary.
If we were willing to relax some of our risk level, we could try to expand a CAP program similar to the one Dr. Holt suggested in SWJ- 10 guys living in a village working with indigs and the local community.
On the civilian/governance side, we can look at Plan Colombia as a way. State advising gov't institutions on the rule of law, corruption, and legitimacy. Additionally, we would have to find ways to compensate for the lack of civilian surge. I'd suggest that we talk to guys like Greg Mortensen.
Overall, by limiting CF actions, we may have a better chance of success. It will take much longer, but it would require a smaller footprint and could prove much cheaper....Anyways, that's a start.
v/r
Mike
Well, I'm not a smart SF'er,
Well, I'm not a smart SF'er, but I have spent nearly 3 years with them either in Iraq or grad school. First thing I learned is that every group has a different solution. 1st Group will use the Basilan model, 7th the Colombian model, 10th and 5th the Iraqi Special Forces model, and 3rd the A'stan commandos model.
A 3rd option would probably be more akin to SFA than FID primarily b/c SF has the option to select it's commandos. CF is forced to take regular dudes off the street. One criteria that must be determined is what role do we play. In y'alls current model, CF will clear unilaterally and dragging the A'stan military with them as we did in Iraq back in 2007-2008. This could prove costly for us. From what I understand, there are three options in FID/SFA
1. Advisor role (Indirect). Similar to MiTT concept. We advise the higher headquarters and help train staff-level stuff.
2. Combat FID: small group of advisors work with Indigenous Force (1 SF team with batallion). Advisors engage in combat.
3. Partnering: 1:1 relationship similar to what CF SFA units are doing now in A'stan. The problem with this approach is the CF tendacy to force mission accomplishment over Indig force going unilateral if necessary.
If we were willing to relax some of our risk level, we could try to expand a CAP program similar to the one Dr. Holt suggested in SWJ- 10 guys living in a village working with indigs and the local community.
On the civilian/governance side, we can look at Plan Colombia as a way. State advising gov't institutions on the rule of law, corruption, and legitimacy. Additionally, we would have to find ways to compensate for the lack of civilian surge. I'd suggest that we talk to guys like Greg Mortensen.
Overall, by limiting CF actions, we may have a better chance of success. It will take much longer, but it would require a smaller footprint and could prove much cheaper....Anyways, that's a start.
v/r
Mike
Mike 1045: I, for one, would
Mike 1045: I, for one, would be interested in FID as a "third way" in Afghanistan. I wonder, though, if we still have a lot of work to do with the ANSF before that is possible, but I am open to hearing a smart SFer articulate what this would look like.
The terminology gets sort of confusing here, but what the U.S. military is currently doing in Afghanistan is FID. The military component of FID includes indirect support (security assistance, exchanges, exercises), direct support (civil-military operations, psyops, logistical support, intel sharing, direct military training to HN forces, and other things that would generally be considered enablers or force multipliers), and combat operations. We're doing all three (though mostly the latter two).
If what you mean is that you're curious about whether we could pursue a training and advisory-only mission (SFA-centric), I'd concur that we're probably not there yet: the ANSF aren't suitably numerous or capable to stabilize the security situation alone, considering that they've essentially been reconstituted from scratch over the last four to five years. A significant number of forces are going to have to be created out of thin air. You need a controlled environment, optimally, to do most of the low-end teaching and coaching parts of the SFA mission; you can't just partner up or send advisors out to embed for combat operations with kandaks that don't even know how to fire their weapons, or which end to point at the target.
There's a fair bit of reasonably secure territory on which to build and train new ANSF, of course, but there are questions about their sustainability without a significant coalition investment, and about the timeline: it may be too late, and the insurgency may have too much momentum, for the GIROA to suffer the necessary operational pause that would come from the removal of coalition ground troops and before the ANSF were large and capable enough to wage meaningful COIN operations alone.
I guess I should slightly modify what I said before: we're not there yet, security-wise, but that's probably not the most important point. The most important point is that there was a bit of a black hole in which Afghan capacity wasn't being created or developed with any sense of commitment or urgency, and U.S. forces weren't operating in sufficient numbers or in such a way as to prevent the insurgency from regrouping, gaining momentum and initiative. It's difficult to see how we would NOW make the transition from the FID mission in which we're currently engaged to the SFA/indirect support mission only, though this might've been viable if it had been the plan in 2002. If we're barely capable of combatting the insurgency effectively with 100K coalition troops in-country, it seems impossible for the ANSF to do so independent of us.
I think Gians post is right
I think Gians post is right on. It has never worked before and it will not work now.
The definition of stupidity is to repeat an action over and over while expecting the outcome to change when it never has before.
So are we stupid? or just plain ignorant? Perhaps insane?Or are we extending a war to aid the enemy.
Perhaps it has never worked
Perhaps it has never worked before because it has never been executed properly. Are there any long term (10+ years) counterinsurgency campaigns in recent history? Were any of them funded and resourced fully, as a proper counterinsurgency campaign should be? How many of these long term campaigns had the full support of the people, and not a gaggle of naysayers back home screaming for withdrawal timelines and budget cuts?
In other words, can you point to a counterinsurgency campaign that failed despite being executed "by the book"?
French in Algeria 1954-1962,
French in Algeria 1954-1962, that was eight years.
Vietnam STARTED with advisers and early coin doctrine with the Green Berets. I dare say that was also 8 or so years or more considering I know for sure we had em there in 62.
Or is the more important question this: Why 10 years? Or is the question "Do we want to become an "Empire" in reality? After 10 years+ of occupation I daresay that the natives might get a bit restless.
Do you want to make us the "enforcer" for the agenda of the UN?
I understand and totally agree with the notion that in today's world we must often fight "little" wars to prevent world war. Thats the natural evolution of a world with a weapon that can end all life on the planet in 20 minutes.
Is it our job though to make the world safe for "democracy" when we are not? Or is it indeed our job to make the world safe for freedom of choice?
French in Algeria 1954-1962,
French in Algeria 1954-1962, that was eight years.
Vietnam STARTED with advisers and early coin doctrine with the Green Berets. I dare say that was also 8 or so years or more considering I know for sure we had em there in 62.
Or is the more important question this: Why 10 years? Or is the question "Do we want to become an "Empire" in reality? After 10 years+ of occupation I daresay that the natives might get a bit restless.
Do you want to make us the "enforcer" for the agenda of the UN?
I understand and totally agree with the notion that in today's world we must often fight "little" wars to prevent world war. Thats the natural evolution of a world with a weapon that can end all life on the planet in 20 minutes.
Is it our job though to make the world safe for "democracy" when we are not? Or is it indeed our job to make the world safe for freedom of choice?
How about Sri Lankan COIN
How about Sri Lankan COIN against the LTTE. Indian COIN in Kashmir. To a much lesser degree Indian COIN against Assam. Chinese COIN in Tibet. Mongol Moghul empire COIN against the Marathas. Iraqi/MNF COIN recently? Phillipino successful COIN. Thai mostly successful COIN. There are many examples of COIN, most of them successes.
PETRAEUS: "For the strategy
PETRAEUS: "For the strategy to work, it is also necessary to find ways to identify reconcilable members of insurgent elements and to transform them into part of the solution"
That sounds nice. So where will we find the "moderate" members of the Taliban that are a little iffy on the whole concept of killing those who don't convert to Islam? It seems as if our definition of solution and theirs are too entirely different solutions. Why is it everyone is avoiding the truth? They cannot be part of the solution unless they abandon their jihad, and that will not happen, no matter how much hope and change we can muster.
"Despite the best troops and
"Despite the best troops and equipment, we haven't won a f-ing war since the 1940's and now all of a sudden we will win because what-we found the holy grail?" Huh? What country are you talking about?
"*El Salvador in the 1980;
"*El Salvador in the 1980; nope, US advisors dreamed of it working there but it didn’t"
This is news.
@ Bill on September 23, 2009
@ Bill on September 23, 2009 - 11:46am
""For population-centric COIN to work, however, one would think that the vast majority of the population(s) in question would need to be exceptionally unhappy with their current arrangements and with their current way-of-life or -- for some other reason -- would be willing and able to transform so as to meet our needs and desires.""
Well, in most instances, this bar is already hurdled by the security situation. The insurgent generally isn't taking the suggestive leaflet path to power and the population is sufferring as a result. Afg population has the security situation front and center of their polled concerns and that's the key component of the POPCOIN (ba-boom-ching) theory.
Second factor there, which is probably far more significant in the long-term, is economic. As we've seen there on the micro level. and much more well documented in Iraq, you don't need to hate anyone or anything to plant an IED if it pays better than a week doing any other work. Same for your more nefarious operations which put you in league/tolerance with insurgents such as smuggling (oil/heroin). These proliferate and perpetuate support networks and funding for insurgents where economic conditions (also lack of rule of law) make other options less lucrative/existent. On the macro level, stable government which can deliver functioning institutions, infrastructure, rule of law etc which in turn can deliver an environment where improvements in economic conditions are possible is the nexus of their/our interests you're looking for.
I was meaning to tie all this together at the end, but I'm actually quite drunk and forgotten what my point was. I might have made it already, but I will find out in the morning.
@Visitor on September 23,
@Visitor on September 23, 2009 - 11:20pm
""PETRAEUS: "For the strategy to work, it is also necessary to find ways to identify reconcilable members of insurgent elements and to transform them into part of the solution"""
""That sounds nice. So where will we find the "moderate" members of the Taliban that are a little iffy on the whole concept of killing those who don't convert to Islam?""
You find them in the phenomenally large gap between his description of "insurgent elements" and your description of hard-line religious fundamentalist Taliban.
Seriously, do you not remember Iraq ? When describing every insurgent as al Qaeda didn't matter right up until the point where the tiny minority that was al Qaeda got bent over by the overwhelming majority that wasn't ? There was a lesson there about the value of reconcilables and accurately identifying who the insurgency is.
Comment by anan on September
Comment by anan on September 24, 2009 - 1:55am
""Despite the best troops and equipment, we haven't won a f-ing war since the 1940's and now all of a sudden we will win because what-we found the holy grail?""
"Huh? What country are you talking about?"
To be fair, maybe he thinks your Grenada/Nicaragua types don't count.
I mean we just lost the Ashes. Sure we'll beat Zimbabwe and New Zealand when we play them, but cmon.
The lecture is now up on
The lecture is now up on YouTube in four parts, the first part of which is here:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PxvJsMV6cBw
Dave Livingston
Kilo, have you visited South
Kilo, have you visited South Korea lately? That was a big victory for the good guys. South Korea is a rich and successful country with a high quality military.
Did the US military lose in Iraq in 1991? In 2003-2008? I would argue that the US military did a good job training the IA and IP.
Kilo: Even if you were
Kilo: Even if you were "quite drunk," your points seem to be well made. Let me see if I get them right:
a. At the stage where there is an insurgency (chaos, warfare, loss of services), stabilizing the security situation is the matter of primary importance to the population. It really does not matter who provides this security and stability (for example: a foreign regime holding up a otherwise defunct local government -- or the insurgents); nor does it matter very much what must be forfeited (for example: foreign government demands concessions re: culture, custom, way-of-life, resources, freedom, pride) in order to achieve a more secure and stable environment. Thus, what matters most to the population is only who looks like they can provide security and stability quickest and most effectively.
b. Likewise, it really does not matter very much what must be given up (see forfeiture examples at "a" above) -- in picking a side in an insurgent conflict -- so much as it matters who looks like they might best be able to improve the population's short and long-term economic situation.
Thus, in your described scenerio, it would seem that the things that must be given up (again see examples at "a" above) are matters of little importance to a population who has been hit with an insurgency -- and only those things that might be gained (better security and better pay) are what counts and determines who the population rallies behind.
Is this how insurgencies (with foreign involvement) actually work? Or do we see, from a review of the historical record, that the things that often must be given up in such a scenerio (culture, custom, way-of-life, resources, freedom, pride) actually play a much larger role in decisions made by these populations?
Gulliver- you stated "The
Gulliver- you stated
"The terminology gets sort of confusing here, but what the U.S. military is currently doing in Afghanistan is FID. The military component of FID includes indirect support (security assistance, exchanges, exercises), direct support (civil-military operations, psyops, logistical support, intel sharing, direct military training to HN forces, and other things that would generally be considered enablers or force multipliers), and combat operations. We're doing all three (though mostly the latter two)."
Many would disagree with your assertion. Indirect support in security assistance does not necessarily mean that we unilateraly clear for the host nation. In the end, A'stan will be decided by the A'stan populace through self-determination not our intervention. It's not about us. What I'm suggesting as an alternative is a smaller footprint that focuses on helping the HN not doing it for them.
v/r
Mike
Mike -- Many would disagree
Mike -- Many would disagree with your assertion.
Which assertion?
Indirect support in security assistance does not necessarily mean that we unilateraly clear for the host nation.
I'm not sure I understand what you mean by "unilaterally clear." If you mean it as in American forces executing the "clear" phase of "clear, hold, and build," then that is precisely NOT "indirect support," but rather "combat operations."
When I use the term "security assistance" as an indirect support mission in FID, I'm using specific terminology with a specific definition: SA is the provision of training and equipment to HN SF through foreign military sales and so on.
In the end, A'stan will be decided by the A'stan populace through self-determination not our intervention. It's not about us. What I'm suggesting as an alternative is a smaller footprint that focuses on helping the HN not doing it for them.
I absolutely agree with you here, and I understand what you're suggesting. Like I noted before, I think that the vocabulary involved in all of this is sort of confusing, what with the unclear intersections of COIN, SFA, SA, NA, SC, FID, UW, IW, etc. I do agree that there are viable small-footprint alternatives, I just think that it's going to be difficult to implement them at this stage in the game.
I'm conficted about this, because I don't think that the potential gains (w/r/t U.S. interests) that could be secured by escalation are significant enough to balance the required commitment and expenditure, but I'm not at all convinced that a shift to a light footprint model would secure the objectives that the President has set forth. (If the coalition force isn't capable of attaining its objectives right now, why should we believe that a majority-Afghan force with U.S. enablers would be able to do so? Obviously the objectives would have to be limited in turn.) I do think that we can make significant contributions to regional stability by shifting a significant share our FID efforts to Pakistan (if that country will accept such assistance).
Gulliver- the assertion that
Gulliver- the assertion that I was refering to was "we are conducting FID."
I'm just as conflicted as you. I don't care for the politics. I just want us to find the best (or least bad solution). I know I'm new here to exum's blog, but it may be time for a beer summit!! We could probably settle all the differences in person with some brews and less finger pointing.
v/r
Mike
Gulliver- the assertion that
Gulliver- the assertion that I was refering to was "we are conducting FID."
I don't think it's really debatable (not that it matters, because like I said before, I think this is about semantics). The definition of FID, according to JP 1-02:
Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.
So it's technically FID. It's also a foreign intervention, and a COIN campaign under international mandate. But, unavoidably, it's FID.
@ Bill "Is this how
@ Bill
"Is this how insurgencies (with foreign involvement) actually work? Or do we see, from a review of the historical record, that the things that often must be given up in such a scenerio (culture, custom, way-of-life, resources, freedom, pride) actually play a much larger role in decisions made by these populations?"
I wouldn't say that that's how they work, more that this just the environment in which many exist in and therefor that's what you're dealing with. These are common, major motivating factors for the population. The promise of better security and an improved standard of living is what the counter-insurgency forces can deliver to the population by denying a takeover of the state by a lesser standard of ruler. In saying that, I'm a big believer in the concept that if you didn't suck at this and had the popular support of the people because of it, you'd be the government, not the insurgent.
I don't really see giving up culture as relevant/necessary, although the host government being supported could actually do this in practice. You could see Communism there in the 1980s or even democracy installed there now as pretty alien concepts (the former being far more invasive on society). You've also got any number of oppressive regimes where this level of control over the population leads to insurgencies to remove it, but I don't see the COIN campaign itself as necessitating any change in customs/culture.
If we leave aside anything that constitutes a crime as recognised by the wider international community (heroin production, abusing women, smuggling, banditry, piracy, etc) which I don't particularly think you get to claim needs/warrants protecting (or more to the point, fk you, you criminal), I don't really see a lot of need for cultural practices to be eroded by a COIN campaign. I really can't think of what they would be, other than the type of governance that is in place. Then again, your problem there is really the overthrow of your king/whatever in the first place to be replaced with the government now in place fighting insurgents, so again it's not really a COIN related issue.
Comment by anan on September
Comment by anan on September 24, 2009 - 11:11am
"Kilo, have you visited South Korea lately? That was a big victory for the good guys."
Really, I thought it was declared a draw. What, with that 50 year ceasefire still being in effect and all.
"Did the US military lose in Iraq in 1991? In 2003-2008?"
No, but I'd argue they didn't win anything. In any event it was a joke.
Kilo, the legacy of the
Kilo, the legacy of the 1950-1953 is that South Korea is a rich successful free democracy with a kick ass military. South Korea made a massive contribution to the Vietnam war and repaid her blood debt to America as many South Koreans called it. This is more than enough of a victory by my book.
I would also regard the success at building the IA and IP as a major succes of the US military. What we are remembered for is less what we do in a particular region at a given point of history than what we leave behind. Leaving behind successful institutions, let along a successful country, is victory.
Another victory is Japan's success in recent decades. Another is Thailand, Germany and Italy's success in recent decades. So is Taiwan's/Singapore's/Malaysia's success (didn't come to a shooting war in these cases, but it significantly benefited America.) Many Singaporeans still argue that America "WON" the Vietnam war because of how it benfited Singapore. Thailand's success is another part of the Vietnam war that worked.
Kilo: Your points seem to
Kilo: Your points seem to indicate that:
a. If a richer, more powerful foreign entity overthrew a local government and replaced it with a foreign-backed government regime (thereby causing an insurgency to develop),
b. And if the indigenous populations saw that this foreign-backed government regime could provided better short and long-term security and financial rewards,
c. Then these populations should be expected to (with little regard to what might be required of them in exchange) consistently go over to the foreign-backed government's side.
I do not believe that this is the way these things always work out.
I believe that, when faced with a situation in which they must choose between:
a. The loss of culture, custom, way-of-life, resources, freedom, pride and control (as is often required in foreign-based "state-building" and "societal transformation" schemes) and
b. The potential gain of better security and better pay,
Then these indigenous populations will quite frequently -- and instead of making such an extreme sacrifice (which to them may appear to be a Faustain bargain) -- join with the insurgency to rid themselves of the foreign presence instead.
In such circumstances, the indigenous people often come to see the foreginer, and his intervention, as the actual source and reason for their loss of security and stability, and the reason for their precarious position and loss of financial livelihood.
Kilo: Does this "rejection" scenerio also -- or more often than not -- occur in these insurgency situations (those having significant foreign involvement and significant "foreign" requirements)?
The historical record does
The historical record does not support your thesis. See here.
Ok, comment software is
Ok, comment software is going nutso. That was actually me, and my comment started out with "Bill -- ..." Strange.
Comment by Bill on September
Comment by Bill on September 25, 2009 - 11:27am
""Kilo: Your points seem to indicate that:
a. If a richer, more powerful foreign entity overthrew a local government and replaced it with a foreign-backed government regime (thereby causing an insurgency to develop),""
No, that's got nothing to do with my point. I was actually just trying to come up with a scenario that related to yours. As I said, if your local government got overthrown and that's a problem for your culture then that's a problem for your culture. Whether a COIN campaign follows or the circus comes to town, you still lost your government. Hence there is no relationship.
""Then these indigenous populations will quite frequently -- and instead of making such an extreme sacrifice (which to them may appear to be a Faustain bargain) -- join with the insurgency to rid themselves of the foreign presence instead.""
If you want to talk about loss of culture/etc and don't like my example, state your own. Describe what "extreme sacrifice" you are referring to, otherwise this entire discussion is pointless. Use Iraq and Afghanistan in your examples.
""In such circumstances, the indigenous people often come to see the foreginer, and his intervention, as the actual source and reason for their loss of security and stability, and the reason for their precarious position and loss of financial livelihood.""
Do they. I can't really comment on this other than to say this doesn't appear to be an issue in Afg. There may certainly also be considerations relevant to Naval deployments and loss access to international air travel, but these too would be bridges to cross when we come to them..... in a different country.
""Kilo: Does this "rejection" scenerio also -- or more often than not -- occur in these insurgency situations (those having significant foreign involvement and significant "foreign" requirements)?""
Well it has to occur in all scenarios, as per the dictionary definition. If you have an insurgency that nobody sides with/tolerates because it doesn't favour their interests, they you just have some guys with guns. You have a crime problem. Foreign involvement is predicated on the insurgency situation being bad enough to warrant foreign involvement. At the point where forces of a foreign power need to enter the country to prevent the overthrow of the govt, there needs to already be indigenous support for the insurgents or an incredibly weak state.
That said, I don't know what the relevance of your question is. Whether the population rejects/not the presence of foreign forces would be entirely dependent on dozens of factors in play in that one country and no other. There is no scorecard that matters. If nobody has ever rejected the assistance of foreign forces and I institute a nationwide nut-kicking campaign in Afghanistan, they gonna stick with me if I show them some history books, doubled-over as they are ? So what is the point of this ?
Kilo and Gulliver: Thanks,
Kilo and Gulliver:
Thanks, guys, for this information.
I am off now to do my required reading (Kalyvas, et. al.)
Best. Bill.
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