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And you guys wonder why I admire Steve Biddle? Whereas I fire off 200-word blog posts, Steve doesn't so much as pour his cup of coffee in the morning without doing a thoughtful cost-benefit analysis. His testimony to the Senate last week was vintage stuff. He sketched out a case for the war in Afghanistan by starting with U.S. interests and then laying out the options, always acknowledging that the other side in the debate has a compelling argument too and that any course of action carries serious risks.
I know some of my friends opposed to this war are frustrated with me at the moment, but in all fairness, I'm frustrated with them too. No one can accuse me of glossing over the difficulties of the war in Afghanistan on this blog, but I have heard very few people make the case against the war while admitting that withdrawal might carry with it serious costs or that those who think the war is in the U.S. interest at the moment might have some evidence on their side as well. (And it's not an either/or debate, right? There might be operational choices other than COIN that safeguard U.S. interests. But those who would advocate those choices owe it to us to operationalize them and show us what they would look like on the ground as well as what risks they would run.)
Whatever decision is made on Afghanistan should be made in a careful and deliberate manner, with various sides making cases for courses of action based on interests, resources, risks and a clear-eyed understanding of both the environment in Afghanistan and Pakistan and U.S. and allied capabilities. That's what Steve does, with a healthy dollop of humility, and I have yet to hear this from the opposition. It's like the worst aspects of the Iraq War debate in both the run-up to the war in 2002 and 2003 and again when the decision was made to surge troops in 2006 and 2007. In the former, the administration and other supporters of the war effectively closed the door on a sober debate of the war's merits and risks, while in the latter, the left was so far committed against the war that it could not bring itself to acknowledge the way in which the war's dynamics had changed in 2006 and 2007 through factors such as the Awakening, the Baghdad Security Plan, the silent guns of Jaysh al-Mahdi, etc.
By all means, you can disagree with the conclusions at which Steve arrives in his testimony. But the process by which he reached his conclusions and the humility with which he holds them should both be lifted up as examples for all parties to follow.
I'm confused why Steven Biddle, no matter how smart he might be overall, is qualified to talk about the implications of US strategy (whatever it might be) in Afghanistan. Looking at his CV from the posted link, I don't see anything that betrays deep knowledge of Afghanistan. In this case, what does he know about the implications of what's going to happen in Afghanistan is the US takes this or that approach?
Biddle and the COIN crew know the US side of the equation. However, they don't know the other side of the equation -- the Afghanis, the Taliban, etc. They can talk about what the US wants to do, will do, but they can't tell us about the other side -- the Afghanis, the Taliban, and the regional arena the US is operating in. Isn't that kind of important for fighting a Counter-Insurgency?
The only one of the three e who recently testified before Congress has any claim to being called an "expert" on Afghanistan is Rory Stewart:
http://yglesias.thinkprogress.org/archives/2009/09/the-cat-and-the-tiger...
Good to hear that you are now pro-war, as a 'warrior scholar' should be. Now apply your alchemy of counterinsurgency, err, 'science' of counterinsurgency that is.
Page seven, paragraph three: "The Taliban, moreover, are far from a unified opposition group. In fact, to refer to the opposition in Afghanistan via a singular noun is in many ways a misnomer."
Frequency of mention of the phrase "The Taliban:" 24 times.
How exactly does a heterogeneous transnational movement of 10,000 professional fighters with little to no precision weaponry and motives ranging from hardline Islamic fundamentalism to pure, secular profit experience a "restoration" in Kabul and then proceed to invade Pakistan and topple their government? On what basis does Biddle inject principles of sovereign governance for not one but two states into the approach of "the Taliban" to the current strategic or tactical contexts? How many members of "the Taliban" have the interest, the ability and the will to participate in a total restoration of Taliban rule of Afghanistan and take over Pakistan, especially if the United States were to withdraw from the area?
Also, why is it automatically assumed that an offensive NATO presence in Afghanistan will make Pakistan more stable? Ten years ago, no one really cared, and a major Taliban presence in Afghanistan posed no particular threat to Pakistan; indeed, matters were far less strained at the time between all parties currently involved in the conflict. In reality, an aggressive foreign military presence prone for escalation seems the far more likely regional destabilizer than "the Taliban."
Finally, if the state of affairs ever reached a point where "the Taliban" were poised to truly take over Pakistan and its nuclear weapons, does anyone believe this point would be reached in a matter of days, or in such a way that would totally preclude some other military intervention to prevent such a takeover? If we can't prevent 10,000 guys with Kalashnikovs and RPGs from taking over an entire nuclear-armed state with vastly greater numbers, far superior weaponry and strong allies (i.e. us), well, we have bigger problems than Biddle thinks.
But please, tell me again how "serious," "careful," "clear-eyed" and "deliberate" this testimony is.
Andrew:
You mention the question of a "decision" on how to proceed in Astan.
But realistically as this assessment frames the issues, how much leeway does the president really have when his senior general officer on the ground, and one overwatched by another who commands great respect and credibility, says that either we resource this fight correctly or we fail?
In this we see LBJ and the dilemma he faced in Vietnam in 1965, but the better positive analogy is DeGaulle in 61.
The other intriguing line of analysis in this assessment is the very forthright and blunt statements by the General that the ISAF doesn’t get population centric Coin; that theme permeates the entire report. But in the early months of the Surge I don’t recall General Petraeus coming out with such blunt statements of his Army in Iraq not getting Coin. Yes of course there were command guidance(s) issued prodding and coaxing, but nothing like this one in its severe criticism of Coin operations up to this point.
It seems that the Surge Triumph narrative with its trope of radical change (historically too with Briggs to Templer, Westmoreland to Abrams) between Casey and Petraeus has taken hold of the advisors who assisted in the writing of this report. So Tom Ricks questions the existence of the "narrative," eh? Well this assessment is filled with it and apparently the advisors who wrote it. That is to say that the confidence to the point of hubris of the Surge Triumph Narrative allows for this stinging critique of Coin operations by ISAF forces up to this point.
gian
Bart:
Your comment made me recall one of "The Best and the Brightest's" comments that none of them could have passed a semester's worth of Vietnamese history or culture.
That said, I think your post makes some intellectual leaps that may be hard to justify. For example, can one person be knowledgeable about everything, and would such a person necessarily be right in his (or her) conclusions anyways? Second, could one argue that one's knowledge provides one's biases? For example, one familiar with the history of Afghanistan might be predisposed to think that all empires that invade it find it to be their graveyard. However, there may be some reason why, indeed, "this time it's different." Similarly, one who has read or written FM 3-24 too many times may be overly predisposed to think that resolution of grievances is what leads to the termination of insurgency. However, there are reasons not all grievances and not all insurgencies are alike. No one can be an expert on everything, and those who are experts on something can be wrong on their given area of expertise. I see nothing wrong with having Biddle's opinion; he's a smart guy who possesses useful, relevant knowledge.
ADTS
Andrew,
Questions like these:
"How many members of "the Taliban" have the interest, the ability and the will to participate in a total restoration of Taliban rule of Afghanistan and take over Pakistan, especially if the United States were to withdraw from the area?"
1) Neither Biddle nor any of the COINdanistas can answer this question because virtually all of their knowledge on Afg comes from what's available in the English language media. They have no way of seriously gauging what Afghanis affiliated with the Taliban "want" or are "thinking."
2) It's amazing how the COINdanistas are more worried about the stability of Pakistan than the Pakistanis themselves. If Pakistan is as threatened as Biddle says, how come we don't here the Pakistanis saying the same thing? Do a bunch of white guys in DC really know the situation better than the Generals in the Pakistani Army who are not in any way afraid the Taliban might threaten Pakistan? Instead we read that Pakistan views the US presence in Afghanistan as the problem, not the solution.
3) I think if the COINdanistas actually went out and talked to some non-US military types their grasp of the situation would actually become much more nuanced. I suspect that very few of the COINdanistas talk to anyone but US military types. Very few seem to be in any contact with Afghani or Pakistani commentators. That's quite telling.
I didn't say that one can be an expert on everything. But if one testifies as an expert in front of Congress on why the US should fight the war in Afghanistan, then its my right to ask what that person's credentials are.
If you say there is a strong link between the security of Afghanistan and Pakistan then isn't it fair for us to ask what are one's qualifications to make this statement? Especially since the Pakistanis aren't making this link the way Biddle does? Since Afghanistan scholars like Rory Stewart and Mariam Abu Zehab aren't saying the same thing, in fact are saying the exact opposite?
An additional question: Hamid Karzai, the election, and the fundamental political issues of Afghanistan are barely touched upon, and rather poorly at that, in Biddle's testimony - "Widely reported" electorical fraud could "reduce" Karzai's "perceived legitimacy" if he wins, and Karzai has "complex" interests beyond defined American interests.
I think I would phrase that somewhat differently, maybe something like:
"Thoroughly pervasive election rigging by the ruling government has permamently destroyed the viability of a competent and effective multiethnic, Karzai-led national government, especially as corruption has become totally endemic and government ties to drug trafficking are impossible to deny. American support of Karzai will be perceived as propping up a corrupt, ineffective and unpopular government, yet if the U.S. government were to reject Karzai and he maintained power, ISAF and diplomatic leadership would be in the very uncomfortable position of having to 'cooperate' with an unfriendly government with strategic interests increasingly disparate from those of ISAF, in complete contravention to FM 3-24."
A clearer estimate of the true cost of the campaign would put the debate into better perspective. Although the incremental costs may be in the $ 34-44 billion per year range before significant escalation the full costs (pensions, health care, equipment replacement and interest) may be six- seven times greater.
Counter-insurgencies should be broken down into Indigenous Lead and Foreign Lead as well as pre and post WW 2. The success of post war foreign lead COIN is considerably less than 50-50 and is almost batting .000 in medium sized countries (the ones that soak up cash and troops).
I think the clearing of the SWAT valley indicates that the Pakistanis have more than enough power and will to deal with the Taliban when they decide to do so. The stabilization of Pakistan as a rationale for the Afghan campaign is becoming common because the Taliban are clearly not a direct threat to the west, AQ doesn't need Afghanistan and a new bogey man is required.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aTafZRecy2k
@M Shannon: Your last point is an important one, particularly pursuant to the ones I've been making and in opposition to Biddle's claims. He says in his testimony that the Pakistani campaign against "the Taliban" is not going well, but at a minimum it's clear that the success of their campaign is directly correlated with how motivated they are to establish their own sovereign security against "the Taliban" ("when they decide to do so," as you rightly note) and that the state of affairs ebbs and flows with this desire (or lack thereof). In light of this pattern, it would seem that justification for an American presence on the basis of assuring Pakistan's security is unsupported by the evidence.
Andrew Kaplun,
I take your point and mostly agree that Karzai has just served us a supersized sh*t sandwhich, however your re-write is fatalistic. I'm no Afghan expert, but it seems clear that Democracy is a long way off. Game over? Not at all. Let me ask you this: had Karzai lost, how would that have changed the perception of the US as "propping up a corrupt, ineffective, and unpopular government?"
Were there saintly candidates that, were they elected, would have ushered in a new age of responsible, legitimate, and effective governance in Afghanistan?
Ok, so Karzai seems to be the sad sack we're going to carry for a while, does that mean that all hopes of reform are off? Well, I'll grant that government legitimacy is not remotely probable. Effective governance, however, could still result. Less corrupt government could still result.
I'm quite certain that you'll think I'm hopelessly naive, but I think the logic of your argument is unproven. Yes, I know. I've been watching what's been happening in Afghanistan for the past eight years. That still doesn't mean we are destined to fail. There are options available that would not preclude Karzai as president but that COULD result in effective governance that adequately addresses corruption. Think, for example, if we were to embrace the Mayor of Kabul mentality, ourselves. Let's build bottom-up. Or, more likely, focus on the district (or provincial) level and starve the central government of resources, save the ANA and ANFP.
There are problems with this approach, certainly, but I would like to point out that the "our goose is cooked" mentality is premature. We can, easily and with great wastage of life and resources, continue losing and ultimately fail or retreat. That, however, is not a foregone conclusion.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=83DRVDzuPTE&feature=related
@Timoteowork: I can see where you're coming from, but my point is that if we're all more or less starting from the assumptions of FM 3-24 (alignment of interests and cooperation between the COIN foreign forces and the friendly host government and such) and debates on those sort of issues, the government must be viewed as being, above all else, legitimate. If we continue to prop up Karzai, we're stuck with a government that is not only corrupt and ineffective but illegitimate as well. Given the choice between corrupt, ineffective and illegitimate or just corrupt and ineffective, I'll choose the latter - at least we wouldn't be seen as usurping the political will of Afghanistan.
I would like to add one more parameter to Biddles two: That of keeping our brand-value. We have promised the afghans heaven, and delivered pretty much shit. In the new netwerked world, that resonates if we dont redeem it a wee bit before we leave. Even a immedieate drawdownplan would involve two years of work.
How to say: I think the new direction is the first glimmer of hope in a long while. Abu M, looking forward to reports from the south of the blue line. Kool Aid is free.
Thanks for your feedback. I understand your basis for the argument, but in my time there and in the more recent accounts I've read, there is a persistent theme about the absence of government. So I would put effectiveness above legitimacy. I know that's not in-line with FM 3-24, but it's my current thinking on prioritization of missions. The chaos and capriciousness that rules the countryside is, I suspect, a key failing that we are failing to rectify. I often hear the refrain in reporting that Afghans would like the Taliban back, because during their rule there was quick justice and stability. I doubt the sincerity of the statement, but not the sentiment behind it.
By my calculations, we'll win more support by establishing rule of law and a government presence (particularly the ANFP) than by fretting over legitimacy. Can the US/NATO do ANYthing about the latter? I don't think so. But we can help a farmer get goods to market safely without fear of illegal roadblocks and the graft required to get through them.
If nothing else, we can agree that the corruption problem is a priority.
Oops, that last one (@Andrew Kaplun 4:28) was, of course, me. Here I am arguing the importance of effectiveness and yet I'm posting as the mayor of Flusterville. Apologies
@timoteowork: Agreed wholeheartedly. Regardless of who ends up running the government, economic development on a micro level within each region of Afghanistan is critical to our success there. We need to move as many of our resources as possible away from the central government and get them down to the 'human' level. Unfortunately, I feel like that sort of priority is small potatoes in the broader scheme of things, for both ISAF and the Afghan government (particularly the Afghan government). I suppose my fear is that we are stuck with Karzai regardless, when the bullsh*t he dealt us gave us ample cause to re-evaluate our tactical priorities and strategic vision for the entire region.
Karzai isn't just feeding us the shit sandwich. We gave him the shit sandwich when we created the expectations of a capable, democratic government in a country as socially stratified and devastated as Afghanistan. And then mau-maued him, not only due to his flaws (many of which are understandable considering the country he's heading), but also in large part to shift the blame from the Washington foreign policy and political apparachniks - and thereby damaging the person who had become the only national figure in the immediate run-up to the election. And in favor of an untested Tajik no less (the latest hail-mary golden boy).
Social science sausage meets complex reality. Complex reality wins.
Since you have Hezbollah's newspaper (al akhbar) at the top of your links, you might as well throw up a link to their TV station (al manar) to be consistent.
On honeymoon so not really engaging but in response tho this...
"I'm no Afghan expert, but it seems clear that Democracy is a long way off. Game over? Not at all."
I say here here, with all due respect the American road to democracy started with a scrappy insurgency and some pretty crappy events along the way (slavery and civil war anyone). Time is the principle factor in establishing a secure stable democracy., Its not shake and bake it is going to take time.
I find the commentary here smart enough to know that I am in the company of smart men and women, smarter than the average quick fix obsessed instant results pundits out there.
Now back to the pool.
Biddle's testimony only seems convincing to you Ex, because he is preaching to the choir. Beneath all of his protestations of a careful cost/benefit analysis and his talk about this being a close call, this is just the same weak argument he published in the "American Interest" last month. I mean, he still has his ridiculous fear mongering on the terrorist threat without any apparent thought about how precisely terrorist groups plan and execute attacks. He kept in his silly homily about "doing no harm" vis-a-vis Pakistan, again without even beginning to think through the issue in a coherent manner. And he still has his weak apples to oranges comparisons of past COIN campaigns to put an optimistic gloss on our efforts.
Biddle IS a smart and talented defense analyst... which is why it is so damn frustrating that he keeps making arguments that barely pass the giggle test.
Exum states,
"There might be operational choices other than COIN that safeguard U.S. interests. But those who would advocate those choices owe it to us to operationalize them and show us what they would look like on the ground as well as what risks they would run."
There might be choices other than COIN? Wow, it seems a bit late in the game to be asserting that. The MDMP and COA development has already occurred. Why weren't alternatives (other than CT) considered then? Shouldn't there have been alternative COA's? And shouldn't some staff officers in Afghanistan have been responsible for putting forth a recommendation on how to operationalize them?
The frustration at COIN being the course of action is that it does not appear to have been the result of serious deliberation. It appears to have been a foregone conclusion before the reassessment even began. Invite a bunch of "COIN experts" to help out in a reassessment and - surprise, surprise - the recommended COA is... COIN! I bet nobody saw that coming. Perhaps the COIN advocates could enlighten us as to how their idea will be operationalized, rather than just routinely asserting that other COA's won't work.
Note that most of the criticism of the COIN plan is that there is no coherent strategy that it fits in and there was no serious deliberation. In other words, the frustration is not so much with the plan. The frustration is that there is no coherent plan.
"Note that most of the criticism of the COIN plan is that there is no coherent strategy that it fits in and there was no serious deliberation. In other words, the frustration is not so much with the plan. The frustration is that there is no coherent plan."
I'm a bit confused by that, Schmedlap? I've seen you ask at SWJ on other threads, 'what else was considered besides COIN and CT'; is this what you are trying to say, again? Sorry, I'm slow. It takes awhile for things to sink in.
Listening to the testimony on the 'three Afghanistan strategies' was, well, uh, instructive. I posted this at Inkspots immediately after listening to the hearing, because I found the focus on Pakistan, now, confusing:
Listening to the "Three strategies for Afghanisan," hearing yesterday, it seemed to me that Drs. Nagl, Biddle, and Rory Stewart all made some level of assertion. Granted, the nature of the hearing was such that they couldn't flesh out their answers, so it's not to fault anyone, and, to be fair, all three had plenty of known unknowns discussed. I think. It's all very confusing:
1. We make plans to withdraw and pursue a more pure CT operation - has some risk in relation to Pakistan.
2. We pursue Triage and make plans to withdraw after some benchmarks are met - has some risk in relation to Pakistan.
3. We source a much more robust COIN - has some risk in relation to Pakistan.
Why, now, is Pakistan the main rationale for our Strategy? And the reason to triple aid to Pakistan in the manner of the Kerry-Lugar bill (I think I've got that right, correct me if not, someone!) Is it that we now have a more dire situation because we've pushed Al Q into Pakistan, so that we worry more, at this moment, about Pakistan? Because the subcontinent has been unstable since the Partition, and will remain so, until that essential birth-trauma is dealt with. Somehow, I think I won't be happy with the standard DC think tankery solutions to India and Pakistan...
Okay, so now I want to ask all of you about counterterrorism and physical space. I've heard those of you who argue for a ligher foot print in Afghanistan that many places may be used as safe havens. But, if I put my Al Q hat on, I think to myself: I want to be in Pakistan, I want to be in places close to Pakistan because I can tap into the knowledge of sympathetics, tap into the military knowledge, scientific knowledge, you name it. Not all safe havens are created equal, are they? I'd want the knowledge and the contacts, if I were Al Q.
So, here is my question for Bernard Finel, or Gulliver, or the others who will know more than me about this topic: how do you get good enought intelligence to do CT? How much of a physical foot print do you need? I suppose this is a vastly difficult question with many answers. And, do drones, if they hurt a standard COIN operation, help in CT because of the way you get into the mental space of Al Q? I mean, if you have to move around and you never know who is going to be around, and who might be working with who, it gets in your head, right? Sorry, this is very garbled :)
Argh, that was really garbled!
Shorter and hopefully clearer Madhu:
What I meant is: if not all safe havens are created equal, is that an argument for a heavier foot print in Afghanistan to be near Pakistan, because our options are limited within Pakistan?
Mahdu,
Yeah, that's part of it. Granted, I'm just a pseudonym on the internet - and an insignificant one at that - so I don't feel entitled to anyone sacrificing 3 seconds of their day to answer that question, but damn. I phrased it as a yes or no question on my own blog and had 150 unique visitors who spent at least one minute on that entry and I couldn't even get a yes or no out of them. I mean, what is the big mystery? Did we consider anything other than COIN or CT? If not, why? If so, what? Anything other than withdrawing? And if no other alternatives were considered, then why is the onus on "we naysayers" to explain how a third COA would be implemented? Isn't a more logical question to demand to know why no other alternative other than COIN or CT was considered? If no other COA was considered, that seems outrageously irresponsible and reinforces the perception that this "strategic reassessment" was a foregone conclusion before it ever began; just an adventure vacation for a bunch of "COIN experts" to justify and legitimize their recommendation for a COIN approach to Afghanistan.
But the bulk of it boils down to what Col Gentile has been harping on. He keeps pointing out the disconnect in our strategy. The response to his argument is always a) silence b) recasting his argument as a strawman and then knocking it down - or - c) demanding that he single-handedly devise an alternative strategy in his spare time.
I read all over here how many of you appologize for those who have killed my freinds and family, Spit on my religion, and said convert or we will kill you in many horible and nasty ways and it makes me sick. As far as I'm concerned they are the enemy, and we should neither apologize nor simpithize with them.
Somalia's Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen Pledge Allegiance to Bin Laden in New Video, & Show Rapid Media Evolution
Why is anyone surprised that think tank specialists in war are pushing for, more war? This is what they do:
http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/?source=rss&aim=/opinion/greenwal...
I would urge people to go beyond the prepared statements and listen to the responses to questions from the committee before deciding upon the sobriety or otherwise of Mr Biddle.
Toward the end of the hearing he repeatedly cites the need for continued "control" of the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan - in order to deny safe haven. He also seems to believe that in order to get some - not all - of the more moderate Taliban (a catch-all name he himself rejects) to lay down their arms will be to fight them to a "long, grinding stalemate".
By the end we see both Biddle and Nagl becoming ever more emotional with Stewart seeming frustratedly incredulous.
http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2009/hrg090916p.html
I don't see why doing the exact same thing thing we tried before in Afghanistan, which only worked temporarily in Iraq (admit it Andrew), would yield any different results.
Biddle gives a bunch of reasons for trying, but nothing that would lead any sentient being to harbor a particle of belief that we could "succeed", w/e that means.
Afghanistan is neither a strategic or tactical imperative for the US and the cost/viablity is a cat game.
Like Dr. Kilcullen said, we have a moral obligation......we should be talking about how best to discharge that obligation.
If I was in charge I would start by giving a million dollars to the Peerzada brothers.
Be subversive, be opportunistic.
Fight a meme war, not a blood, bullets, and treasure war.
Besides....we can't afford those anymore.
I don't see why doing the exact same thing in Afghanistan that we tried before, which only worked temporarily in Iraq (admit it Andrew), would yield any different results.
Biddle gives a bunch of reasons for trying, but nothing that would lead any sentient being to harbor a particle of belief that we could "succeed", w/e that means.
Afghanistan is neither a strategic or tactical imperative for the US and the cost/viablity is a cat game.
Like Dr. Kilcullen said, we have a moral obligation......we should be talking about how best to discharge that obligation.
If I was in charge I would start by giving a million dollars to the Peerzada brothers.
Be subversive, be opportunistic.
Fight a meme war, not a blood, bullets, and treasure war.
Besides....we can't afford those anymore.
The case against warring in Afghanistan in three words:
Graveyard of empires.
To expand on this theme:
Ghengis Khan failed, Alexander the Great failed, recently the British and the Russians failed.
Any questions?
I have to confess to not having read through the entirety of the Posts here but have reached the saturation point with regard to dubious assertions with regard to the threat Afghan instability poses to Pakistan. I've been an admirer of Biddle's for sometime - just as I am of Kilcullen and the Kagan's- but the notion that we need to remain in Afghanistan in order to stabilize Pakistan borders on the absurd -- at least to those of us that have lived in and worked on Pakistan for awhile. The instability in Pakistan is directly attributable to our presence in Afghanistan. That doesn't necessarily mean we shouldn't still do Astan but we shouldn't do so to prevent a Pakistani collapse. Pakistan’s militants, the presence of which is hardly new, did not turn on the Pakistani state until the Bush Administration placed enormous pressure on the Musharaff government. The Paks deployed to the FATA right after 9/11 but the resistance was confined there. Only with increased U.S. pressure, and I’m not saying it was wrong to do so, did the militants begin to attack the settled areas. The stated purpose of this was to punish the Pak government and its people for supporting the American efforts in Afghanistan (the former did so, the latter not so much but is lost on the bad guys). I’m skipping a lot of detail but you can map this out pretty clearly.
Biddle's argument, which mirrors his piece in the July/Aug edition of the American Interest, rests on a twofold premise the most important of which is the Pakistan argument. If preserving the Pakistani state is the compelling reason for remaining in Afghanistan then it is time to come home because our presence, in particular in such large numbers, is inherently destabilizing.
Couple of other points on Pak :
- The Pakistani state has always harbored radicals. Nothing new to you but how Fred Kagan (I know consider the Kagans, Biddle and probably Kilcullen and Nagl –caveted cause I’ve not read anything written by them offering the Astan threat to Pak argument- to be developing a strawman) can so skillfully recount the history of the Soviet experience (see late August Weekly Standard piece) and then so badly mischaracterize the risks to Pakistan (see WSJ on Sept 5). The rapacity of Pakistan’s leadership is not new – it is enduring feature of a feudal state and while new media may have heightened the aspirations of the impoverished I think a tipping point is far off. I lived there for nearly five months last year and have to say Iraq it is not. Not a vacation spot either but collapse, as Kilcullen has inexplicably offered is a very long way off. Muddling through in the ugly probability.
- On the State collapse theme and the risk of loose nukes. The latter has always been a concern and something that must be planned for (in a thinking the Unthinkable kind of way) but folks should be aware of just how much the Pak government has done to secure their Nukes. General Kidwai has been to the States many times and briefed Pak security protocols to a degree that almost no other country in the world has done. He has also done this for the Dip community in IBAD as well as for the media. Can’t say more than that but there’s plenty out there at the unclass level to support this. And yes, I saw the Gregory piece in the CTC’s Sentinel but see Shuja Nawaz’s comprehensive rebuttal. Additionally the Pakhtun are not monolithic in Pakistan nor is the Deobandi sect. Most Pakistanis are Barelvi, a syncretic Sufi influenced sect of Islam. Pakistanis are not inherently radical and the Pashtun’s are less powerful than the Sunni’s were in Iraq. True, Pakistanis don’t have the U.S. military protecting it but the PAKMIL’s inability to effectively execute a COIN does not mean it can’t protect the state from overthrow by a small, if also lethal, band of insurgents and terrorists.
- By making Pakistan so central to our efforts in Astan we increase their leverage over us and consequently the tax we have to pay has increased exponentially in terms of assistance. Pakistan is of strategic importance but watch as the price tag for security assistance (FMF, PCF, CSF) begins to approach $2BN per year. At what point does this begin to raise expectations for Pak performance beyond the achievable? At what point does this aid begin to destabilize our relations with India (the big strategy interest) And at what point does this create further dependencies ?
- We need to understand the Pak view of the world. Stability in Astan is not in their interests. Stability in the FATA is. Keeping Astan in play to one degree or another is directly correlated to the state of play in Astan. This has obvious implications for India.
A final point about the Biddle testimony. It seems odd to me that Biddle’s views (from the American Interest piece to his testimony on the 16th) don’t seem to have changed much. That’s interesting and calls to question whether analytic impediments are emerging amongst those that have fought so hard to elevate COIN within the foreign policy community. As an OIF vet I am grateful for this but am wary of the one-size fits all approach.
I’ve personally not made my mind up about the merits of Astan but if the logic for staying includes helping the Paks avoid collapse well , that better not constitute the core of the argument. Off to watch the Biddle, Nagl, Stewart testimony – thanks to rabi'a al-Adiwyya for the link.
Great, great comment, Mike U.
I've never entirely understood the Pakistan rationale, either. All the players in SA have different ideas (and agendas) about whether a stable Afghanistan is in their own best interest. Even if we have a successful counterinsurgency, and help to set up a stable legitimate government, well, this will play out differently for the different actors in SA, wont it? India might be happy to have closer ties to Afghanistan and the subsequent loss of strategic depth for Pakistan. Which, means what, exaclty, if you are Pakistan? I 'd be uneasy, if I were Pakistan about such close ties. It's still an unstable situation, isn't it?
"By making Pakistan so central to our efforts in Astan we increase their leverage over us and consequently the tax we have to pay has increased exponentially in terms of assistance. Pakistan is of strategic importance but watch as the price tag for security assistance (FMF, PCF, CSF) begins to approach $2BN per year. At what point does this begin to raise expectations for Pak performance beyond the achievable? At what point does this aid begin to destabilize our relations with India (the big strategy interest) And at what point does this create further dependencies" - Mike U
Yes. We keep increasing aid to Pakistan, whatever happens in SA. How to keep track of that aid? Quite a lot of it ends up where we don't want it to end up. I don't think I'm being all paranoid because of my ethnic background, that's just pretty much where the data as such takes you, but, well, it's a just tough part of the world. Everyone is gaming everyone else. Why shouldn't they? The national interests differ.
paradactor
Are you trying to say that there is some sort of paranormal reason to not fight in Afganistan. Please don't waist your time on hokie religions and ancient weapons. next thing you know you'll be telling us about how we need mars's sword to win there lol.
Why is everyone kissing ass? Don't you know that that is what got the US into the mess that they are in? And further more why are you apologizing to people who want to kill Innocent Americans? For what?? Because they love freedom and you don't? You people make me sick. Just the fact that it states in the Quran that Jews are Pigs and Christians are apes and should be killed wherever they are found makes me want to give you a taste of your own medicine.
Graveyard of Empires?
See this post:
http://committeeofpublicsafety.wordpress.com/2009/09/11/afghanistan-the-...
Plenty of people have successfully conquered Afghanistan.
Any argument from historical inevitability adds nothing to the analysis.
Graveyard of Empires?
See this post:
http://committeeofpublicsafety.wordpress.com/2009/09/11/afghanistan-the-...
Plenty of people have successfully conquered Afghanistan.
Any argument from historical inevitability adds nothing to the analysis.
The last thing we want is for groups such as the Taliban obtaining nukes. Which is why the US must stabilize the region and why we are in Afghanistan in the first place. The infidels will be on Arab lands as long as it takes to neutralize the threat. If you don't like that you can kiss my ass.
Right on tiny. What you overeducated underdiciplined idiots don't understand is that there is now a hole left in the Middle East, or mabe a better term is a vacuas wound. We need to make sure that what fills that in is not things like the talliban, hezbulah, or al' quiada. So go get a craanial rectum ectemy and see the real story.
Maddog i couldn't agree with you and Tiny more. Radical Islam has brought the fight to American soil and we are simply returning the favor. Is seems that if we can keep those who seek to destroy us busy on their turf it makes it particularly chalenging to pull off another attack.. I guess hokie religions and ancient weapons won't work the way you once thought they would. Pakistan and India's nuclear arsenal must be secured to prevent radical Islam from obtaining a single weapon that can destroy an entire city. This is why the infidels are on Arab soil.
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