Center for a New American Security

The most important lesson of the election is the actual powerlessness of the US with regard the Afghans. The US can safely be ignored by Karzai et al. What will Obama do? Cut off funding? Not expand ANSF? Stop development? Withdraw? After he said it was a necessary war how can he? Buying into the nonsense of pop-centric COIN doctrine has locked the US into a deteriorating situation attached to a corrupt government it cannot change (or are coup d'etats still in the CIA play book?)

Perhaps the US can "order" a runoff and hope the guys who stuffed the ballots this time stay home and risk losing their patronage jobs? Maybe Obama hopes the Taliban, who know where all the polling stations will be and have identified who works for the electoral commission, will allow a run off? And what if Abdullah wins because of a low turnout caused by the Taliban?

Did the supporters of escalation not see this coming? Do they expect the 2014 Afghan Presidential Election to be different and if so why? (I don't think Mullah Omar will be the Emir by then but I may be under estimating the ability of the US government to pooch things.) If the US is lucky there will be no three way civil war this fall. If they're lucky.

Question Mr. Exum, if your field of expertise is the science of counterinsurgency, then what are you doing giving strategic and political advice to policy makers? Shouldn't your role be limited to 'taking the hill' when ordered to do so? I see a contradiction between formulating a 'science' for counterinsurgency while exhibiting an unwillingness to apply it. Applying the science may either corroborate a set of theories, or debunk them. Are you playing it safe by arguing that we should leave Afghanistan, rather than put your theories to the test? Personal pacifism aside, if you are going to be in the well-compensated business of warfare strategy, then you should refrain from embroiling yourself in diplomatic strategy. Let the diplomatic, cultural and policy experts have their say. If given the order to fight, then we will see if your theories are applicable in a war. Afghanistan was shaped by history and geography to be an important arbitrer of how guerilla wars are fought. So let us see what all the fuss is about; whether counterinsurgency is a 'science' that follows modular calculations or a wishy-washy 21st century version of martial alchemy.

Andrew

No, the move to discussing strategy and policy was appropriate. Please stay with it. It's more relevant to the issue than the "science" of COIN, such as it is.

EMN

What is our strategy in Afghanistan?

Can anybody articulate it in a short 5-6 sentence paragraph?

thanks

gian

"Call me old-fashioned, but I like to categorize things. Very few can claim to be sages who have attained wisdom in all fields, so do you mind explaining your areas of authority so that we can focus on those entries, and ignore the rest?"

It's just a blog, innit?

Also, I seriousl need to stop reading the CNAS/Abu M -Inkspots -KOW - SWJ - Registan - et al AXIS OF BLOGS because it is getting kind of weird. Or, it's making me weird. I read the above and thought, briefly, that Two-Star Voodoo = SNLII, or something.

(You got some strange fans, Abu M.........)

"Exum: if counterinsurgency is not a 'science' then what sort of discipline is it? Literary? Fiction? Theoretical?"

Well the latter would be the obvious answer, but why don't we go with "no different than every other examination of military strategy". If you'd like a second opinion, knock yourself out...
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/about/contacts.cfm

"If this blog is to be about everything under the sun, then can you articulate an identity for it? Is it subject matter expertise; Middle Eastern/Central Asian, anthropological, historical, ..etc? Is it about Washington politics? Or dissent in the military ranks?"

How about a slow but steady move toward the ideas that we have to study war within the context of everything else. War, COIN being a smaller part of that, does not exist in isolation to the rest of the now globalized progression of trade, politics, media etc. Therefore for Exum and other blogs to move away from their initially stated but limited field of discussion, in this case COIN, makes perfect sense, and in fact rewards us all with an additional layer of debate.

If we want to talk about just taking the hill, that limits the debate to just that facet, and we'll never look at why the hill should be taken , or what we do with it after we take it.

Sayke: First, grow up. Second, I don't want to go back to Vietnam, hence this discussion. How to take a hill is a different question than 'Why are we taking hills in this country in the first place?' The military should not be in the business of sniping at and second-guessing our elected leaders and their expert advisers. The military should not be in the self-preserving business of steering a civilian debate away from giving the military its marching orders. Thirdly, grow up some more.

David: I've heard of mission-creep, but this is the first time that I am being exposed to duty-creep. Special Forces have the mindset of 'We can do everything', but they can't fly an F-16 or position a howitzer. There will always be a need to play to the strengths and specialized training of compartmentalized groups of soldiers. The idea that a 'scholar warrior', as Exum pegs himself, who can at once collect and analyze information, compare it to precedent, and then go blazing into the sun, sounds absurd to anyone who has been part of a large-scale military campaign. If the counterinsurgent wonks expect to be respected as proponents of a new way of fighting, then they should stick to what they know, rather than attempt to be country-specialists, public affairs pundits, and all things to all people. Arrogance is to expect that one man, one team, one school of thought, renders all others futile and useless. Which is why the reluctance of the counterinsurgents to put their 'scientific' theory into practice elicits scorn from those skeptical of their approach.

Two-Star Voodoo - i note you did not explain why you were making shit up about COIN supposedly being called a "science". chera? =) further, both the military and the civilians on the ground are fairly well-positioned to inform their fellow citizens as to what's likely to work and what isn't (short- and longer-term), and as such have an obligation to participate in the debate. if that involves explaining to people about why we're doing what we're doing and how that ties into the way we're doing it, then cool.

and what in the name of all that's good and holy do you have against collecting, analysing, and comparing information to precedent!? or do you just think that people on the ground shouldn't be doing it? do you oppose cross-disciplinary scholarship, or prefer to see the US without country specialists, or are you just trying to shape the debate to some end you've already decided upon, or what? make some damn sense, grandpa =D

Since I'm unfamiliar with the relevant Scriptures and have not myself taken Holy Orders, not sure I can distinguish the monophysites from the monothelites here.

But let me wade into this dispute without taking a doctrinall position.

Speaking as a layman, it seems to me that Exum has a very valid point.

If the basic stratetgic/political thinking is defective, tactics are unlikely to turn a bad policy into success.
If one or more of the basic elements for success is lacking, superb tactical execution is not going to result in a miracle.

Rather than just salute and attempt to execute a flawed strategy, shouldn't the military leader step forward an offer his candid assessment about prospects to the civilian leadership? Not dictate policy but advise.

And to do that doesn't he need to have some concept of the larger strategic picture?

Exum, here's another vote for sticking with strategy and policy. I think you'll find it more rewarding, especially if you go a little farther afield than the current U.S. DoD.

Gian Gentile: There's a fellow named Krulak out there who might be able to help you out with that little strategy thingie you want help with.

"even though it is quite clear that this number has as much universal applicability as the Lancaster equations."

To what are you referring when you say "it is quite clear..."?

Just wondering...

Thanks
ADTS

Getting back to the subject of the post, AM, can I suggest you leave "cohering" your thoughts until the UN electoral commission has finished its work there? If you get past the customary emphasis on alarmism in the graud report, you will find that the UN commission seems to have a fair idea of what it is doing. The UN election monitors are very experienced at third world elections. If Kazai's win turns out to be fraudulent, we are sure to hear about it from them.
At the moment, however, it appears that despite the evidence of widespread faked ballots in some provinces, that may not affect Kazai's (genuine) majority?

Sayke:

Thanks for the link to the Interagency Group "white paper." If you had actually read it then it should have been clear to you that it is NOT a strategy but a simple smorgasbord of policy objectives for Afghanistan.

Strategy must of course take into account policy objectives but what makes Strategy different, if done properly, is its ability to prioritize, consider military alternatives to accomplish policy goals, and to allocate limited resources. Where in this document to you see Strategy at work and being applied.

I still look for our Strategy in Afghanistan beyond a list of goals and hopes and catchy population centric coin maxims.

Califax has a list of things to do, which when rolled up spells nation building. If that is the case in Afghanistan and nation building (aka population centric coin) is the prefered military method to achieve policy goals then I ask again where the Strategy that links military operations to policy goals is.

No Sayke, I still don’t see it.

gian

Two Star Voodoo:

COIN is emic field anthropology with occasional firefights.

Does that make you feel better?

SMG/ADTS:

Here is a simple historical example of grand strategy that makes a choice based on limited national resources and implicitly links that choice to policy: World War II and the American Grand Strategy of Germany First, Japan second, in priority.

Another historical example might be the British Strategy (I am using the latter evolution of that Strategy by early spring 1777) to defeat the colonists in 1777 and end the rebellion. It involved using four armies working on exterior lines to gain control of the Hudson/Champlain river system and the isolation of New England from the middle colonies combined with a major thrust by General Howe to seize the rebel capital of Philadelphia. The intended result would be the isolation of New England, if need be the possible destruction of the continental army, the gaining of more territory under British control and the psychological effect of making the rebels believe that they could not win the war thereby bringing about their submission to the King.

In the above example of the British note that there was no discussion as a matter of strategy of how to move operationally Burgoyne’s Army from Canada down to Albany, or how Clinton as he moved up from New York City would attack tactically the fortifications at Fort Montgomery along the Hudson.

So why when we currently talk strategy in Afghanistan we seem to always drop down to statements of population centric coin tactics and methods? How would it have sounded in july 1944 if Ike in giving strategic guidance would have talked only about how infantry squads should attack German 88 positions in the hedgerows?

I believe that I could write a short paragraph that would construct a strategy for our current operational approach of population centric coin today in Astan today that has coherence and logic. But it would involve terms like generational struggle, exhaustion of the enemy, acceptance for an extended period of lacking of the initiative, and a requirement to higher headquarters to provide much more resources for the many years ahead.

Legacy of Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi in Iraq