Center for a New American Security

As you feed on the scraps

As you feed on the scraps from the power table at CNAS, ask yourself whether your input helps or hurts our troops downrange. While you enjoy the air conditioned confines of your DC office, know that those you formerly served with are living like animals (your water is probably cooled by a refrigerator, not a wet sock).

Your expertise aids and comforts the enemy, not our troops. If the CNAS and Andrew Exum were advising FDR during World War II, the US would either have lost, or at best we would still be fighting the Germans and Japanese having destroyed the world's economy and killed hundreds of millions of people. What you and your think tank advocate only prolongs conflict as it doesn't do a DAMN THING to break the will of our enemies, or their ability to fight. And I know that you know that. My only question is: How much did it take to buy you off?

Do your country a favor and choke yourself.

Also, I'm amazed, in the

Also, I'm amazed, in the Charlie vs. Nagl thing at the Post, how no one -- whether Bacevich, your boss, or that AEI guy -- actually makes a case for or against. The discussion is entirely about means (even Bacevich's comes down to "it's too hard to be worth it"), not ends. The AEI guy says the ends are undefinable, but still worth fighting for. What? How is that a bases for a war?

The nation - it's citizens,

The nation - it's citizens, it's military, and the current administration and Congress - need to consider reinstating the draft.


Those who scoff are either unaware, unrealistic or both about the sustained, justified commitment we need to make in AFG.


If not conscription, then perhaps it's time for these fine organizations...


http://www.gocivilairpatrol.com/html/index.htm
http://goarmycadets.com/
http://www.seacadets.org/public/


...to be taken out of 503(c) status and realigned under the Pentagon. Augmenting or completely replacing JROTC.


As a veteran of OEF, I can proudly say we are the most professional volunteer force on earth. If the emphasis is to remain on volunteer, and conscription is polticially unsustainable, than a third option must be sought.


I am of the opinion that third option is a vast expansion of a mandatory JROTC-esque program that doesn't have to mandate service. However, it should mandate training while in school. The future force is then drawn from that pool.

Nagl doesn't explain where

Nagl doesn't explain where the troops or the cash will come from for his heavy foot print or how pushing more troops out to trip IEDs and get sniped will build the US public support needed for the long haul. His complaint about NA warlords wrecking the US plans in 2001 is laughable given that the main villain, Mohamad Fahim, is about to become the VPres.

As usual Bacevich asks the right questions but won't get answers until he talking to the next POTUS.

Simpson thinks the war's been under funded, which is quite amazing when you go to Bagram or KAF. Her extra resources will go to pay for more Fobbits, development & security corporation profits, DOS "experts" painfully out of their depth and of course lots of cash to pay for even more villas in Dubai, private militias and Taliban operations. The US couldn't deny training areas to insurgents in Kingman, Arizona let along Afghanistan. The "prevent training areas" goal is close to preposterous.

The remainder of the contributors seem to sense it's a doomed effort but want to press on for want of the courage to stop. They and Nagl seem sure that all would be well if only the Afghan government could be swapped out with some other as yet unidentified group of Afghan liberal technocrats. All also seem to think that the Taliban are capable of re-taking the government. I doubt it but exactly how would they do that with six Predators & a B-52 constantly over head supporting a heavily armed population that detests you?

Afghanistan is perhaps the country least amenable to foreign interference, least supportive of western democracy and human rights and most likely to produce guerrillas at the drop of a turban. It's time for the talking heads to listen to Bacevich (and now George Will) and get realistic. The quicker we convert this to an Afghan lead and prosecuted civil war with heavy financial aid and limited military support the sooner it will end well and at far less cost and were and tear on the military.

You know who is missing from

You know who is missing from this discussion? The President. In a very real sense.

When I started asking about strategy around here, a few weeks ago, it was a genuinely confused sort of questioning because I am not in the military, a political scientist or historian, in anyway an expert and only wanted to try and understand. As a citizen, cause, like, we are supposed to pay attention. Dorky, nerdy, pollyanna-ish, or whatever, but true.

So, now, this is really freaking me out. I thought I would ask, I would get some serious answers from the wonks and strategists around AM, and I'd be all - okay. I'm okay with that, I'm not of your political persuasion Mr. President, but if that is what the people on the ground say, and the military experts say, and you say, then okay. I support you, sir. Yes, I know this is CNAS and not the WH, but you all know what I mean.

fnord, are you around? Here is an answer to your other questions on the previous threads - about why it seems like people are freaking out when we are finally doing things correctly in Afghanistan. A new president, a newly proposed strategy, possible mission creep, electoral politics and silence and confusion and a tepid economy and everything! It feels kind of rudderless. Also, there are consequences to the non-stop bash everything about America approach toward the US we've seen the past 8-9 yrs. Here are some of the consequences - a crisis of confidence. Not so great, huh? Well, I'm sorry, this is very emotional when the last thing we need is more emotion.

The WH needs to be out in front and lead, doesn't it? I dunno, I might be getting that all wrong, I got so many things wrong the past 8 yrs, like a lot of everyday folk! I don't care about R vs L at all, I just want us, the American US, to get it right. I also don't think it is such a freak out situation, I mean, for heaven's sake. It's not THAT terrible. How can it be? We have it in our power to right the economy, to set reasonable goals in Afghanistan, and pursue them. And call it a win, even (sorry Bernard Finel, I did enjoy reading your response to my questions, though!).

Yeah, when I'm busy my comments are the mother of all sentence fragment collections......so sue me :)

Joshua: >>I am merely

Joshua:

>>I am merely positing that strategic argument as part of a broader series on making (or breaking, as it may be) the case for Afghanistan.<<

But why would adding a bad argument to the debate benefit anyone? It just feels like you are so desperate to make the case that you are willing to throw anything that seems either marginally plausible or really scary on the scale to try to tip the balance.

How about we stick to straight-forward, well-reasoned, precisely-stated arguments instead? Don't the men and women we propose to send into harm's way deserve at least that?

--BF

Mostly agree with Bacavich

Mostly agree with Bacavich but dont think the fundamental question is whether the US should leave Afgahnistan or not. I think the problem is equating war and victory on the battlefeild against the Taliban as stabilization of Aghanistan. The overarching military slide of the US mission in Afghanistan itself is the main issue.The Obama adminstration is missing a grand strategy on AFG because of this escalating militarization of its mission which has lost sight of the real goal-stabilization of the war torn country.

The whole mission is under Gen. McCrystal's command. There is absolutely no civilian oversight of day to day management and political direction of the the mission. The US Amb. in Kabul although capable is still ex military. Therefore what you get, instead of grand strategies, is tactics or a heavy dose of COIN (military's attempt at playing politics).

Anyways the verdict is still out on whether the Taliban are insurgents or a resistance movement against foreign occupation. At least thats the veiw on our side of the border i.e. Pakistan. There has to be a qualitative and contextual difference in the Pakistani militarys war against the insurgents in Swat and FATA and the US/NATO's war against the Taliban inside AFG. Or the Sri lankan army aginst the LTTE for that matter. And if there is a difference then there is critical need to reconsisder such heavy reliance on COIN framework.

Certain issues with Foust

Certain issues with Foust analysis;

1. No eveidence that the Taliban post US withdrawl can actually ''retake" AFG. It took them years and total international apathy to extend control to the North the first time round. today the Northern alliance and the Tajiks far stronger thanks to Int. support. the Tajik dominance of the ANA isalso going to be an important factor.

2. Afghanistan has always been and will be a rentier state. Taliban depended on the Al Qaeda largess because they were shunned by the Int. community and found no other source of finanacial support. Withdrawl of US forces does not mean the US must disengege from Afghansitan and Pakistan for that matter. US must maintain its engagement with whoever is in power in Afghanistan. Continued intense engagement with Pakistan can help moderate Pakistan's regional policies.

3. As far as Pakistan is concerned the whole strategic calculas argument is a bit outdated and misplaced. Ahmed Rashid s regional approach on the issue of Pakistan's persistant support to the Taliban gives less credit to the Paksitani establishment for rational evaluation of the Taliban movements chances of longterm success in consolidating their position within Pushtun politics.

Wow, that's... kind of a

Wow, that's... kind of a balanced WaPo article. Three hawks for fighting forever, two pragmatists, and one guy who just doesn't see very far past his foxhole.

Nagl thinks we need to secure Afghanistan from al Qaeda, who's moved to Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, and Indonesia. Oh, and we need Afghanistan to support strikes into Pakistan, because that's been ever so popular to the Pakistani population. Has he realized that military power isn't going to lead to a stable Afghani government? Evidently not.

Bacevich offers the only sane observation here - why in the world are we thinking about starting over with the same failed Bush strategy - such that it is - thinking that a few thousand more troops will make a difference? It's still a lousy country that means nothing in the grand scope of things. If we pulled out tomorrow, it would not mean that we could not continue a campaign against AQ from other bases.

Simpson parrots Nagl - "we have to be there just because." And really - "Yes, but we've really only just begun." I submit that Charlie really needs to ask herself the same question that MGEN Petraeus did in 2003 - where does this end? And what cost are you prepared to accept? Wow. The lack of strategic context is perplexing, considering her occupation.

Douglas - "well, I reckon we might as well fight there until the Kabul govt grows up." That's a strategy? Ahhhhh.... no.

Johnson offers the only truism in this collection: "If the goal is to build a stable, "democratic" regime in Kabul, we will almost certainly fail." He doesn't offer a way out, but at least he's clear-eyed about it.

Pletka wants so badly to prove that a neo-con approach to delivering democracy through power that it hurts her. You can tell with that strained voice in her submission. I'll bet she stole some of her lines from Baghdad Bob's speeches in May 2003.

Seriously, check out this CBAS report by Andrew Krepinevich and Barry Watts titled "Regaining Strategic Competence." And then pass it on to the CNAS and AEI fellows. They really need to read it and learn from the masters.

Nagl: "America has vital

Nagl: "America has vital national security interests in Afghanistan that make fighting there necessary."

Simpson: "The war is worth fighting, and it's worth fighting well."

Douglas: "An American withdrawal from Afghanistan now is not a move towards peace, but one that all but guarantees much greater instability and bloodshed in central and south Asia, which, let's face it, will inevitably draw us back into the region and on even less hospitable terms."

"We can succeed in Afghanistan, but we need a strategy that is village-based and represents decentralized, bottom-up nation building based on traditional Afghan tribal leadership and legitimacy."

"Nonetheless, Afghanistan has both strategic and moral value to the United States."

Ya'll are long on platitudes and assertions but remarkably short on evidence. Is this the best you can do? I'd like Nagl to actually, you know, define our national security interests in Afghanistan and how a 10-year or so program teaching soldiers and Marines how to make nice with the locals will aid in deterring terrorist attacks on the U.S. It would be really neat if any of these learned folks could take the time to explain what happens when a small, highly resourceful adversary with already established networks in several other countries simply decides to do its thing in one of them. It would also be keen to learn how U.S. interests in Pakistan and elsewhere in the region will be served by a never-ending money pit in AStan. Might also be worthwhile to take a look at the impact on the troops themselves and what the recommended open-ended major commitment will do to the status of U.S. military forces. Ain't seen any of that.

I'll make an assertion here and now: America has vital national security interests in the United States and they're not being addressed.

Comment by Bernard Finel on

Comment by Bernard Finel on September 1, 2009 - 1:43pm
>>I am merely positing that strategic argument as part of a broader series on making (or breaking, as it may be) the case for Afghanistan.<<

"But why would adding a bad argument to the debate benefit anyone? It just feels like you are so desperate to make the case that you are willing to throw anything that seems either marginally plausible or really scary on the scale to try to tip the balance."

Clown, did you not notice that he's examining cases for and against, which generally requires you to mention what those arguments may consist of ?
Even without recognising this, you're suggesting what exactly in response ? That when the interest to be examined is regional instability that (a) this wouldn't involve the threat of war between India and Pakistan, or that (b) war between those countries that have developed nuclear weapons specifically for that purpose, wouldn't involve those nuclear weapons ? Fantastic.

"It just feels like you are so desperate..."
...for attention, you'll write any old shit while directing people to your blog.

"Anyways the verdict is

"Anyways the verdict is still out on whether the Taliban are insurgents or a resistance movement against foreign occupation. At least thats the veiw on our side of the border i.e. Pakistan."

You could remove the Taliban, utterly varied collection of discontents and ideologues that it is, and you'd still be stuck with the mother of all politically fragmented states that is Afghanistan. It's a broken country that makes Kosovo, itself 10 years later still an internationally policed welfare state perpetually on the verge of internal conflagration, look like Lichtenstein.

Long-term plans in Afghanistan are worthless. In the best case, we'll have adopted a perpetually broken country. In the worst case, our beating around the bushes in the South and East will cause even more local demagogues to begin running against the Americans (it's already happening), and spread the insurgency beyond the Pashtun areas. Speaking of which, what do you think is happening in all those areas that we've largely stripped of troops to saturate the South and East? How hard do you think the international contingents, i.e. the Italians in the West and Germans in the North, are actually patrolling?

Well, it could be worse. They could just pick up and leave. Probably will begin to in the next one or two years. Then you'll see the house of cards that is NATO really fold.

Best bet is to prepare for a short stay and do as much damage to the more internationally-minded elements of the insurgency in the meantime.

Especially considering that

Especially considering that eight years in, we've got somewhere between 50,000-90,000 (it's difficult to know, considering the amount of corruption, ghost-fighters, and desertions) Afghan National Army, of mixed quality. And our current, belatedly increased, goal is now 250,000. Why 250,000? Who the hell knows. It probably seemed good, just like 90,000 did a few years ago. And hell, they could be the National Police, so why quibble?

250% increase in a few years. Eh, no big deal. We'll handle a good deal of it over to ISAF. And never mind the Afghan logistics.

Bernard, I'd really love to

Bernard, I'd really love to see the "careful consideration," since your treatment seemed really close to "dismissing them out of hand." Your blog doesn't help that case, nor does accusing me of not "manning up" to admit I made a "stupid argument" really make you sound in command of the facts.

I must be missing your background in South Asia studies that warrants such blustery dismissal. Got any papers, any good research on the topic I should read before daring to open my mouth again?

Grrr. 1- Packing up =

Grrr.

1- Packing up = Afghanistan turns back into a giant power-base-cum-funding-source (opium) for the jihadis. No thanks.

2- Winding down our presence to a Kabul-Bagram stronghold with 50K men and adequate material to hold it forever, and using it as a base to sow swift death from above upon the benighted (the Pat Lang position, as far as I can tell): you really want to have a cold hard look at the effects of "drone policy" in Pakistan, as well as on the global Muslim population. That's basically confirming the conspiracy theories that the jihadis use for recruitment: they paint us as evil invaders killing innocent muslims by the hundreds to impose our will upon the ummah, and what do we do? Well, just that. Tactically efficient, perhaps, strategically disastrous, certainly.

3- So yeah, we really have to sweat it out and stabilise (i.e. restore order and security in) the whole damn country. "Imposing democracy" is only used as a strawman by opponents - nobody's seriously aiming to implant a stable Western democracy there. What we're after (and what we simply can't get away from) is to install a regime that is strong and stable enough to prevent any kind of hostile organisation from taking root there again, ever. Without killing too many random people, and emphasising repeatedly that killing random muslims is precisely what the bad guys do, not us.

Oh, and we really need to get some US officials to put on some face time on Geo News or something - abandoning the media space to the bad guys has been a disaster. Right now, the average Pakistani sees the US pretty much as the Jihadis want them to see us, and worryingly, this also applies to educated middle-class types who have no sympathy for the Taliban. To the eyes of the overhwelming majority, we are the bad guys. That can be changed.

The question of whether we need to do that has a simple answer, namely, "Yes". All other options end up in guaranteed disaster, so we need to go on with the one that has at least a slim chance not to. The real question is, how do we do that with a reasonable chance of success. That's what people ought to "debate" about.

Bernard, you turned my

Bernard, you turned my argument into a straw man, then accused me of dishonesty, then when I tried to clarify, demanded a I "man up" and admit I was wrong.

Sorry, that's not something I care to engage with.

From your original post --

From your original post -- the not demanding I "man up." :

"Prevent is an awfully strong word, isn’t it? The case is stronger if you cast it as an either-or situation. Either we remain in Afghanistan OR a nuclear war occurs in South Asia. Now, as a matter of fact, if that were the choice, one could make a compelling case for an international response... So, in the very strongest version of the argument, the case is flawed, but not impossible to make. But the strongest version of the argument is also the most dishonest. Realistically, we’re talking about “reducing” (at best) the risk of nuclear war rather than preventing it."

You're changing what I argue and then you call it dishonest. I have no problem with debating the merits of my argument -- and there is a lot to debate, because I at least recognize there aren't air-tight arguments in this debate -- but if you're going to put words in my mouth and then accuse me of dishonesty I won't engage with it.

kilo: A few points. My

kilo: A few points. My comments are not disabled on my blog. I love comments. I'd kill for the kind of discussion AM generates. I agree with all your points about India's concerns. BUT my argument is that nothing we do in Afghanistan can affect attacks that come from Pakistan. Both the Mumbai attacks and the 2001 Parliament attack (which I consider to be even more dangerous), were launched from Pakistan, not Afghanistan. I wish we had a way to control attacks out of Pakistan, but we don't. And I just don't see how our presence in Afghanistan reduces the capacity of LeT to launch attacks from Pakistani territory. Help me out here. I am clearly missing a key element in the argument, but I am missing it honestly.

Joshua: Okay, I apologize. I was trying to be generous. So you want me to address the argument that by being in Afghanistan we can "prevent" a nuclear war in South Asia rather than "reduce" the risk? Yes, you're right. I did just dismiss the "prevent" claim out of hand, and instead I tried to deal with a version of the argument that at least struck me as plausible. So, I guess, I need help here too. How will fixing Afghanistan "prevent" a nuclear war in South Asia? Because, again, I may be missing something, but I am missing it honestly. I don't see how it is possible to construct an argument around the word "prevent" if you mean it literally.