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Alternatives to Population-Centric COIN in Afghanistan
Credit goes to reader and enthusiastic supporter of all things counterinsurgency Michael Cohen for sending along this piece by the very serious and very smart Austin Long that escaped my view earlier this week. Austin makes a case for a counter-terror campaign in Afghanistan and, bless him, gets down to the specifics. The people who have actually led and executed counter-terror operations in Afghanistan -- Gens. Stan McChrystal, Mike Flynn, Scott Miller -- are the best people to explain why such campaigns will not work. In the words of Gen. McChrystal, “You can kill Taliban forever, because they are not a finite number.” And in my mind, these kinds of CT strategies ignore the political dimension even more egregiously than do most counterinsurgency strategies. But read it yourself and draw your own conclusions. You guys may think I'm so far down the road of counterinsurgency that I am not open to alternatives, but I really am. I'm just wary of those which are more conceptual than operational.
A few more things for the readership:
1. The leader in this week's Economist agrees with us imperialist war-mongers, so go direct some of your hate mail in their direction.
2. Easy on the Vietnam analogies, gang. There are a lot of good books on Vietnam, and what historical conclusion one draws from the war depends on which books one has read. (Of course, we have actual veterans of the war who read this blog, so they can probably skip the reading list.) Who do you read? Krepinevich
It's tough to discuss
It's tough to discuss strategy until there is consensus on what the objective is. Most proponents of COIN in A'Stan have more ambitious objectives for the country. Most others have less ambitious objectives. That is the real root of the disagreement. But I guess it's more fun to talk past each other because then you get to debate the theoretical pro's and con's of COIN, rather than the realities of what resources we have available and are willing to commit.
You all need to think
You all need to think outside the box. Forget *counter* insurgency strategy. Start thinking insurgency strategy without the *counter*. Let the Taliban have the country. Then we become them - instead of suicide bombers, we have cruise missles. We have drones. We have regular aircraft. We have special forces that can be inserted to reek havoc and then leave. Or stay and provide intelligence. Flip the tables on the taliban. I guarantee they are not as good at governing as they are at causing anarchy. Causing anarchy is much easier. Think they will govern the country hidden in a cave somewhere?
Well, this is true, but
Well, this is true, but proponents of COIN are merely going off the policy and strategic goals articulated by the president in March 2009.The problem I read about it
The problem I read about it is it first doesn't talk about how you actually change the momentum that the Taliban is gaining and stabilize the problems with the Afghan government? Second, how do you actually get that Human Intelligence he talks about needing for operations, if you can't protect those informants from retaliation? If to get to this point, we're first talking a more limited COIN strategy that focuses on stabilizing the core of the Afghan government, enabling and protecting the local government, as well as building up the security forces, then we're pulling back to this CT footprint, with the Afghans themselves expanding the oilspot at their own pace, I could see this as a final goal. But it seems to me we have to get something stable and functioning first, change the momentum, and then we can pull back. Just like in Iraq, we used COIN to stabilize the ethno-sectarian violence and legitimize the government, and now we're able to pull back to over-watch with the Iraqies taking the lead.
The other problem I see with the CT alone approach, is it seems to me that CT in the absence of COIN, almost always leads to colateral damage/civilian casualties (like what was happening in '06-'07), which alienates the population from you, denying further HUMINT cooperation for CT ops, leading to further bad intell and more colateral damage, which would eventually lead to us being asked to leave. The only real way to make CT work is to first separate the insurgents from the population, creating a security buffer between the two, and then carry out CT operations. Ideally that should be with Afghani troops not us, but we've got to first get there.
The real problem I don't hear being addressed is what is the political strategy moving forward? All the case studies on the Iraq surge that I have read have made it pretty clear that we started with a political strategy, and then used the military strategy to back it up. Well, in regards to Afganistan, no we're not going to get a strong central modern democracy. But we don't really need one to be successful. Why not focus on a decentralized and stable local goverance, with a loosely joined central gov? Impower and protect the local governors to deal with each region, without having to be beholden or wait on a central government, which can help mitigate the coruption at the top level. If we're not successful in all regions, we at least have some regions to build success upon and show as examples of what can work.
Lastly what is our Pashtun political strategy, and what exactly are we doing politically to seperate them from the Taliban/Al Queda groups? Just like the Sunni's were ultimately the key to stabilizing Iraq, it seems that a political strategy focused on Pashtun's ultimately will be what is needed to stabilize Afghanistan.
Sorry, my comment was
Sorry, my comment was directed at Schmedlap. I should have made that clear.Thank you Schmedlap for
Thank you Schmedlap for putting so succintly what I failed to do in my previous comments on a different thread!
*Didn't that whole Triage thing kind of get into it, though? What with the metrics and timelines and all?
*What is our strategic endstate in Afghanistan (SWJ Council) http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6021
*So, this all goes back to the March document and the strategic objectives outlined therein, and the fact that we are reconsidering those objectives? I give up. I'm going back to reading TMZ.
Oh, oops, I take back my
Oh, oops, I take back my comments in another thread about the lack of specifics in the proliferating CT articles: that Austin Long article is good.
"First, this posture would require maintaining bases and personnel in Afghanistan. Three airfields would be sufficient: Bagram, north of Kabul, Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan, and ideally Kandahar, in the insurgency-ridden south of the country. This would enable forces to collect intelligence and rapidly target al Qaeda in the Pashtun regions where its allies would hold sway. Kandahar, in the heart of Taliban territory, might be untenable with a reduced U.S. presence, so an alternate airfield might be needed, potentially at Shindand, though this would not ideal." - from the Long article.
Interesting. How does the collecting of intelligence differ in this particular scenario? Ok, I really am going to quit commenting, now.
character of this debate is
character of this debate is going to change so much once Obama announces his decision, which I read is happening quite soon.
"The Bang Bang Club" is an
"The Bang Bang Club" is an awesome book, and Joao Silva is a badass.
Following the discussion of
Following the discussion of "Obama's War" over at Kings of War, I'd like to know not whether you think COIN is the best strategy (I agree it is), not whether we can afford it in terms of money, time, people (I doubt we can), but whether, even if Obama opts for COIN and McChrystal orders COIN, will we GET COIN on the ground?
Andrew, This is a problem of
Andrew,
This is a problem of mindsets. You say that a counter-terrorism strategy will not work against the Taliban. Well of course it won't - it's not intended to. It's intended to go after AQ which what the President identified as our primary threat. Your COIN operation spends 99% of the resources to go after the Taliban and the chimera of nation-building. If AQ is the focus, how much sense does that make? The point being is that a CT strategy does not begin with the assumption that Afghanistan must be turned into a friendly, whole, stable state. A CT strategy puts the priority on AQ and not a vain attempt to drain the central Asian swamp in an effort to turn Afghanistan into a stable nation. The best you're likely to get is something like Pakistan which, incidentally, isn't able to control its own territory and kill/capture/displace AQ! To think that Afghanistan, even if this nation-building enterprise is successful in a few decades, will be able to exercise state power inside its borders any better than Pakistan is wishful thinking. So the goal of preventing an AQ safe-haven in Afghanistan isn't likely even if COIN is successful.
Believe me, if I thought COIN would work, I would be on board with you. But I've studied Afghanistan for six years now and am convinced it simply will not work. And It's actually the COIN advocates that are ignoring the political dimension - the domestic US political dimension. You think the US population is going to spend another decade pouring blood and resources into Afghanistan? What about our allies? The reality that you need to acknowledge is that a CT strategy is sustainable over the long term and a pop-centric COIN strategy is not, even if that strategy could overcome the obstacles in Afghanistan that I've pointed out before and which you and the other pro-COIN folks haven't addressed in detail. Again, what are you going to do about the Pakistan safe-haven? What are you going to do about the government in Kabul? Without addressing the safe-have and without a legitimate, somewhat competent government in Kabul, COIN simply cannot succeed.
I think the McChrystal quote
I think the McChrystal quote is pretty irrelevant because a central tenet of arguing for a "CT strategy" is that the Taliban are really not that important. Their crime was harboring AQ and refusing to give them up post-9/11. How directly relevant is whoever runs Kandahar to the national security of the United States? The CT strategy would argue that we can let the Taliban do their thing and strike any threats as they appear in the region. Some would argue that we would lack the intelligence to do this, but from an open source perspective I don't know how much intelligence we'd be giving up by pulling back from places like Helmand and Kunar.
The advocates of a more robust strategy would argue that that's not fair by the Afghan people, which is true, but sorry to bring up the Vietnam analogy -- this argument was made before. As it turns out, continuing the war for all those years was a humanitarian disaster that killed millions of Vietnamese. And while the reprisals against those who fought on our side were horrific, it was the inevitable forestalled a few more years at great cost.
Gents, I think the blog has
Gents, I think the blog has been dead on that POTUS clearly laid out a COIN strategy in March -- also concur that advocates of CT don't have much in the way of recent history to stand on. Having been told that a "properly resourced" COIN campaign will require ~40K more troops, I've sensed the administration starting to alter the policy (end states) which strategy must achieve. Has anyone else noticed the recent "not all Taliban are bad" trial balloons floating around? Maybe I've missed something, but this sounds like a pretty dramatic departure from our past mantra that the Taliban are just as bad as AQ. Is this perhaps teeing up an opportunity for Obamma to split the difference?
MarkH, I've been reading
MarkH, I've been reading about distinguishing Taliban for a couple years now: Nir Rosen's work is a good example (and I think Kilcullen agrees). It's not that "not all Taliban are bad," so much as not all are global-jihadis. All successful COIN operations involve cutting deals. And even putting them on the payroll: we paid the Cherokees $1000.00 a year back in the 1780s to keep peace in Tennessee; when they continued to attack we went on the offensive AND we quintupled the bribe in 1793.
AM, Understood, but I think
AM,
Understood, but I think the objective is now being re-evaluated because a COIN approach requires a "whole of government" effort that we simply do not have the capability to execute. Here's a graph of our resources available and here's a graph of our resources in A'Stan. Whole of government? More like whole of DoD.
If we had the capability to leverage a whole of government approach and if it could be argued that the more ambitious objectives in Afghanistan are reasonable, then the COIN approach would be a no-brainer. But Admiral Mullen articulated the problem with this back in February and I haven't heard one explanation to address the problem that he raised...
"Other Cabinet-level departments – State, Treasury, Commerce, Justice – have the proper expertise for "soft-power" missions and need to have personnel able to deploy to address these problems, Mullen said. "But in my opinion," he added, "we are a good decade away from creating a capability in our other departments."" - via DefenseLink.
Perhaps if organizations like State were a little less selective in recruiting and were able to expand the ranks of their Foreign Service then we might be able to put more than a few hundred State Department minions in Afghanistan and actually make a serious effort at a whole of gov't approach. I know former Army and Marine Officers with advanced degrees, experience in Iraq and/or Afghanistan and solid scores on the FSO exam who couldn't even get an interview and others who got an interview but weren't offered a job. This is ridiculous. These were guys who demonstrated the ability to transition on a daily basis between leading combat operations and facilitating dialogues between rival tribes in Iraq, but somehow they're not qualified to be FSO's because they don't have a diploma from Georgetown? Something is wrong.
Andrew, Just a couple of
Andrew,
Just a couple of thoughts...First, keep your head up and smile. Don't get too stuck taking the criticism of your plan personally. The whole problem set is extremely difficult and complex. There is no perfect solution, and I'm glad that the president is taking his time to determine the best (or least worst) strategy.
Second, GEN McChrystal stated, “You can kill Taliban forever, because they are not a finite number.”
OK, so 1 + 1 does not equal 3.
So, the only alternative is pop-Centric COIN. In other words, 1 + 1 must equal 4 if it does not equal 3. That is foolish reasoning, As I follow this debate as an outsider, I honestly think that most of the frustrations are caused because we narrow the options into COIN v/s CT.
Steve Coll wrote an excellent piece for Foreign Policy called "The Case for Humility in Afghanistan."
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/16/the_case_for_humility_i...
I'd recommend that everyone take a moment to read it.
v/r
Mike
Forgot to add this must
Forgot to add this must read.
"Go Big or Go Deep: an analysis of strategic options on Afghanistan"
LTC Daniel Davis, US Army
http://turcopolier.typepad.com/files/go-deep-_14-oct-09_.pdf
v/r
Mike
@Charlieford: Not surprised
@Charlieford: Not surprised that in more informed circles the nuances of Taliban vs. AQ are not new. However, until recently, I've never heard anything coming out of the White House (Bush or Obama) or Pentagon (Rumsfeld or Gates) purporting that there are Taliban we can live with, cut deals with, or accept as "accidental guerillas." I think there may be something to this, but it sounds like a new thread in the debate (at least in the mainstream media) that may eventually serve to down-scale our objectives. I'd love to hear your thoughts (or anyone else's) on this.
Austin Long's proposal
Austin Long's proposal sounds like half-assed COIN coupled with an enemy-centric approach. Protect a part of the population (mainly our "allies") with some SF dudes while a bunch of even more high-speed dudes run around killing bad dudes. Throw in some pilot dudes and call it a day. Why not pursue a fully resourced COIN campaign while these high-speed operator dudes do their thing? I recall someone commenting here a while ago that COIN doesn't necessarily exclude SF counter-terrorism, explaining that this is what was done in Iraq during the surge.
How sustainable are 'least
How sustainable are 'least worst' decisions? Do we (ISAF, NATO or most importantly, the US) really have the long term commitment and resources to implement a CI strategy when “We could do good things in Afghanistan for the next 100 years -- and fail”. What milestones will be used to judge non- failure? Would many Afghans bother voting in a run off and who could blame them if they didn't. One thing I do know is that Afghans are resilient and America has done the seemingly impossible before and proved the doom merchants wrong.
@Schmedlap, Your
@Schmedlap,
Your recommendation doesn't pass the common sense test. Meaning - it makes sense, and it would seem to be common sense to do exactly what you say...it's more of a common sense bar.
"I know former Army and Marine Officers with advanced degrees, experience in Iraq and/or Afghanistan and solid scores on the FSO exam who couldn't even get an interview and others who got an interview but weren't offered a job. This is ridiculous. These were guys who demonstrated the ability to transition on a daily basis between leading combat operations and facilitating dialogues between rival tribes in Iraq, but somehow they're not qualified to be FSO's because they don't have a diploma from Georgetown? Something is wrong."
Yeah it's called we have true elites now, even though most of them can't accomplish shit except to network, feather their beds and line their pockets with the taxpayers money. I recommend Dr Guillotines patented cure all, but I've got issues. Not that it wouldn't work and satisfy on sooooo many levels. We'll make exceptions for Mil, Intel, LE and maybe some over at DoS. Some. Oh and if any of our privileged little elites actually joined the Fire Dept they walk as well.
All kidding aside, just get used to the Poison Ivy barring outside talent. They are quite aware they'd be thrown out and overthrown. It's all about ...them...and keeping their usurped sinecures.
And keeping everyone slim, pretty, non smoking and vaccous...those fat, smoking, burly peasants...
Be pretty or else
The above link has our wonderful, healthy Congress getting in bed with the insurance companies and our vacuous little urban intelligentsia to....make a matter of law every shitty worst ruthless practice of the insurance companies. Indeed, every nasty thing they accuse the insurance companies of...
Every Liberal accusation is a confession. Every fucking one.
@Visitor 244, "I recall
@Visitor 244,
"I recall someone commenting here a while ago that COIN doesn't necessarily exclude SF counter-terrorism, explaining that this is what was done in Iraq during the surge."
SHHHH!! No they did not. They went around in Halal Sharia Compliant Sheik Santa suits, slipping down chimneys to hand out presents, candy and candy camels to our smiling grateful new BFFs. Those were stockings not bombs buried roadside with care, just in case Sheik Secret Santas would soon drive by there (in their Reindeer drawn STRYKERS). SF means Superfriends, or Sheik Falalagga. Not what you think it means. And CT means Candy Treats. COIN means we pay them to be nice. Nothing bad happens. Just ask my sister, nieces and Mom. I've got them all properly schooled.
(OK Mom wasn't fooled).
“You can kill Taliban
“You can kill Taliban forever, because they are not a finite number."
A prime example of people's tendency to appeal to seemingly wise, but transparently false nonsense.
Recently our Sec. of State
Recently our Sec. of State says we need to deal with and make deals with the"Good" Taliban. While I agree that some are "Paycheck Taliban" that we may be able to deal with. I would ask her to put on a Burka for a year and then ask her to sit down with Taliban leaders and negotiate, lets see what her views are then.
"Flip the tables on the
"Flip the tables on the taliban. I guarantee they are not as good at governing as they are at causing anarchy. Causing anarchy is much easier. Think they will govern the country hidden in a cave somewhere?"
Otherwise known a true 'unconventional warfare' strategy - of which the Special Forces are supposed to be experts, as opposed to the direct action missions that can be carried out by much of the rest of the SOF.
But that means ditching the stability dogma that cropped up in the aftermath of 9-11 that it was instability in Afghanistan, rather than stability under the Taliban, which led to 9-11.
"Having been told that a
"Having been told that a "properly resourced" COIN campaign will require ~40K more troops, I've sensed the administration starting to alter the policy (end states) which strategy must achieve."
Speaking of which - 40k. How intellectually and politically convenient that number just about runs to the max of what our troop rotations could ever spare (assuming rapid draw-down in Iraq).
In reality, McCrystal doesn't have a clue how much it would require. Anymore than all of those prior who were so publicly positive and sure of their own calculations. It's a political number as much as it is an intellectually honest assessment of the situation. Remember when 90,000 ANA was the golden number? Oops, 240,000 it is. How about a few extra NATO battalions, think that'll do it? (That was the line two years ago.).
Could someone explain how
Could someone explain how you would protect an informant after he's dimed out the Taliban if he stays living in the same community? Just wondering because law enforcement can't protect witnesses from bikers or the mob here without relocating them.
A recent 'flip the tables on
A recent 'flip the tables on the Taliban' variant was recently floated by SF writer/futurist David Brin (not an authoritative source to be sure, but the parallel is perhaps of interest)
http://davidbrin.blogspot.com/2009/10/jiu-jitsu-in-afghanistan.html
A few more questions. If
A few more questions. If NATO withdraws to the population centers what will stop the Taliban parallel government from becoming even more pervasive in the rural areas where 80% of Afghans live?
Who will protect the supplies coming by road through Pakistan for the tens of thousands of new westerners in Afghanistan?
How much will the escalation cost? It's reported that the decision in March to go with COIN was made without regards to cost so I wonder if a new cost estimate would still result in the decision to go with COIN ( although policing & nation building is a more accurate term).
"You can kill Taliban
"You can kill Taliban forever, because they are not a finite number."
This is a true statement- but my piece is predicated on the goal of "disrupt, dismantle, defeat Al Qaeda" not "defeat the Taliban and bring stable democracy to Afghanistan." If the latter is the goal, then the posture I outline is not gonna get you there. Heck, my posture will only get you "disrupt and dismantle AQ" not defeat; but then even a stable Afghanistan that appeared by magic tomorrow would not "defeat" AQ either. Also, the posture I outline is pretty operationally specific- I mean, no, I did not do the ARFORGEN and TPFDL for it but c'mon what do you want in a blog post? If someone in OSD Policy wants to give me a basement room at the Pentagon, a couple of O6s (got two in mind already...), and a couple of O4s (got two in mind here too...) I can crank all that stuff out. There are also limits to what one can be specific about at the unclassified level, particularly on SOF and intelligence collection.
For what it's worth, the blog post is one of a series of posts drawing from a longer piece (for which I am trying to find a home) that outlines how we get to this posture (it will take a while) and why I think it will work (in the sense of disrupt and dismantle AQ). Inshallah these future posts will address some of the questions, particularly on the political dimension. I appreciate you posting the link to my piece even if we disagree- this is how strategy should be developed: via debate of specifics rather than arm-waving.
Jobs for Afghans White Paper
Jobs for Afghans White Paper On Stabilizing Afghanistan through a Cash-for-Work Initiative:
http://jobsforafghans.org/WhitePaper.pdf
Not an alternative, but it may take an Afghan Marshall Plan.
MikeF thanks for the
MikeF thanks for the heads-up on Coll. Always appreciate reading him.
MarkH, of course one doesn't hear much about this. The Bush deal with the Sunnis wasn't advertised by the administration, just as they kept the fact that they paid Saddam's generals not to fight.
The people don't get it: they think in moral terms. (Not that that's wrong.) But the way wars are fought is on strategic terms. Paying and cutting deals with people you yesterday labeled "EVIL" doesn't wash in the streets. But that's how it's done, that's how it's always been done, and the folks at the top were never unaware.
What was allowing Lee et al to just go home--after initiating a war that was the equivalent of 200 September 11ths--but a bribe to not engage in guerrilla war?
Visitor at 4:25 McChrystal knows whereof he speaks. AS YOU KILL, YOU CREATE.
AM, waiting for an answer to my original question. It's a serious one, not offered in hostility. Can we get the troops on the ground to cooperate in grad-school war, or is it simply expecting too much?
Krepenivich's and Nagl's
Krepenivich's and Nagl's books on Vietnam are not histories but works of political science that use models and theories of organizational change to draw conclusions about the American Army and the Vietnam War. Both of their works have been seriously challenged by scholarly historians (Carl Hack, Andrew Birtle, Dale Andrade et al) Sorley's thesis is based on a deeply flawed methodology that relies primarily on interviews that took place many years after the war was concluded.
I suggest to you that you stop looking to Vietnam for "lessons" since history doesn’t work that way. But since you ask which histories you should be reading start with the work that still commands the field as a general military history of the war which is George Herring's "The Longest War." The Army Green Book Series are excellent. Birtle's second volume on Coin doctrine has multiple chapters on Vietnam. You may also wish to look at Mark Moyar's book "Triumph Forsaken" on the early years and Jim Willbanks "Abandoning Vietnam" on the latter years. There is a new essay just out in the new issue of the Journal of Military History on pacification and the Washington Green operation in 69. This essay essentially argues that paccificaion didnt work which again is another serious scholarly challenge to the Kprep/Nagl/Sorley line of argument. Finally there is a new scholarly book out on the Cambodia invasion in which the author argues that Abrams main focus during it and leading up to it was not so much paccification per say but on cutting North Vietnam's logistic lines into he south.
But for Afghanistan Vietnam may not even be the best case to be reading about and instead a better focus would be on the British Empire from 1850 to 1902. Or Degaulle and the French in Algeria provides more insights for the current admininstration and its current challenges in Astan than Vietnam.
gian
Charlieford: you said
Charlieford:
you said this:
"AM, waiting for an answer to my original question. It's a serious one, not offered in hostility. Can we get the troops on the ground to cooperate in grad-school war, or is it simply expecting too much?"
Might I ask if from your above quote what you mean when you say that Astan is the "graduate" level of war, what then might be the undergraduate level? Von Paulus at Stalingrad in 43? The 90th Division in the Hedgerows in 44?
gian
Gian, point taken, and no
Gian, point taken, and no disrespect.
My father was in WWII, and I have no interest in dissing his--and the millions of others--bravery and devotion.
As I'm sure you know, I was quoting Kilcullen--not about Afghanistan, but about COIN. (I know you've got yourdifferences with the COINdinistas, and we need not go over that ground again. Rightly or wrongly, that's what McChrystal's proposing, so that's what we're debating the merits of.)
Maybe it is, maybe it isn't, grad-school war. But let's not haggle over terminology. Call it what you want: "sociologically- and culturally-complicated war"? "war-lite"? "armed humanitarianism"? I don't care.
There's an invidious distinction embedded in most of the terms we use to distinguish COIN from conventional warfare, and maybe that's something folk should be more sensitive to.
There was nothing in the world dumber, in my opinion, than Burnside's or Lee's assaults at Fredericksburg and Gettysburg, but that's hardly a reflection on the men they ordered to those slaughters.
And we shouldn't dismiss the brilliance of the many officers who have fought conventional battles brilliantly because that's what was required in that situation.
From the Coll piece: "The
From the Coll piece:
"The second (compelling US interest in the Afghanistan conflict) is the pursuit of a South and Central Asian region that is at least stable enought to ensure that Pakistan does not fail ...."
What I do not think we understand -- and actually fail to acknowledge -- is that it was, and is, our presence in Afghanistan that is the root cause of the current instability in Pakistan.
More American (et. al.) boots on the ground in Afghanistan is likely to further undermine Pakistan and guarantee its (Pakistan's) failure.
In the discussions of COIN vs. CT, etc., I think this reality (more boots on the ground in Afghanistan may = complete failure of Pakistan and massive South and Central Asian instability) must be much more weight.
perhaps Burmese Days by
perhaps Burmese Days by George Orwell should be added to the reading lists.
Doesn't India have anything
Doesn't India have anything to do with Pakistan's instability?
@Diablotakahe, Adding
@Diablotakahe,
Adding Burmese Days - why? It's full of lessons, beginning with the corrupt judge at the beginning who takes bribes from both sides and decides the case based on law alone.
But why add that, exactly? I'm intrigued...
Orwell fan from early in life.
Visitor at 6:51pm has an
Visitor at 6:51pm has an important point, to wit:
The crux of the issue today would seem to be: Will Pakistan -- and its neighbors -- tolerate an armed nation/state-building and societal transformation enterprise in their own backyard (Afghanistan); when the perceived ultimate goal of this project is to:
a. Wean the Afghans (and others) away from many aspects of their current way of life and
b. Cause the Afghans (et. al.) to adopt and become dependent upon a way of life that is more compatible with the needs of the United States and the world economy.
Could this be the unstated problem/question that we are really dealing with when we (and they) discuss/debate such matters as COIN v. CT?
For example:
a. In this instance (Afghanistan-Pakistan), COIN is specifically linked to nation/state-building and societal transformation. Thus, this approach, by its very nature, directly threatens the way of life of the Afghans and, by extension, the way of life of many people in the region.
b. CT, on the other hand, would not seem to have this broad "immediately threatening the way-of-life" requirement and feature.
This distinction, one would think, is (or should be) a critical consideration of the United States. It certainly must be a / the central consideration of the people in the region.
Elf - I think you know by
Elf -
I think you know by now that I support giving the COIN approach a try, and my reasons.
However one issue I have is that the exercise looks a lot like the pacification of a new colony by an imperial power.
Lets say it all works out - does Afghanistan in 10 years look like Burmese Days, with 1 cop from ISAF in each village?
Colonel Gentile: "I suggest
Colonel Gentile:
"I suggest to you that you stop looking to Vietnam for "lessons" since history doesn’t work that way."
How can one avoid doing otherwise? From where else but the past do we draw our lessons for the present? Isn't what you're really arguing that Vietnam supplies the wrong lessons for a variety of reasons (e.g., its alleged historiography - cf Krepinevich and Nagl, or its inappropriate *dissimilarities* to our current COIN campaigns)?
Are we at loggerheads over how history "works," or simply at how it is being "used" in this case?
ADTS
PS - Incidentally, since you might want to read Yuen Foong Khong's "Analogies at War," about the decision to intervene (or not) in the Korean and Vietnam wars.
PPS - I fully concur that Nagl's work can be characterized as political science. However, while Krepinevich's institutional affiliation was government at Harvard rather than history, it always struck me as atheoretical (to the point that I wondered how he got it past his advisors). I don't have it missing, but is there a model or theory that you can specify with which he grapples (rather than simply the historical claim that the Army was unprepared for COIN prior to and during the Vietnam War).
I think Austin Long has made
I think Austin Long has made a valuable contribution here. I've long found the COINdinista insistence on having those favoring a CT approach provide concrete alternatives kind of humerous inasmuch as I've yet to see any real COIN approach. Other, that is, than pouring tons of troops and money into Afghanistan and snuggling up to the locals. Seriously, I am struck by how little the COINdinistas, not Exum or other outsiders, but the real guys, you know, Petraeus, McChrystal, et al, have to offer, at least in public, in support of their demand for an amazing amount of resources. If they're not giving the president anything more than "open the Treasury and trust us," well, it's no wonder Mr. Obama might be having second thoughts about his (IMO) ill-chosen words back in March. It's always seemed to me that if there was anywhere near a tie in the two approaches in expected mission efficacy, namely the security of the U.S.—and not that of Afghanistan, BTW—between CT and COIN, then the nod should go to CT as being far less of a drain on the national treasury and the military. CT should be the default choice.
I like Andy's comments. I've liked every comment Andy has made about Afghanistan; I believe those six years he's spent studying the place have served him well. I'm particularly struck by his very common-sensical drawing of a line between the Taliban and AQ. Exactly who is it that made the Taliban one-and-the-same? Could it have been the COIN community? Nah. They know the difference. Or do they? Well, from the perspective of a lot of people in the government they are not one-and-the-same, which kind of tells me that if your COIN approach assumes they are, maybe you should rethink your approach. Maybe you should start thinking of the Taliban, not as terrorists against the U.S.—because they're not—but more as brutal blackguards who want to run things in their AO. The Taliban has committed no act of terrorism against the U.S. The Taliban (or any other insurgent, for that matter) may well be very bad people who routinely commit terrorist acts against their own people, but so long as they don't do it against MY people, it may be a matter of sorrow for humankind, but I'm not sure it should be viewed as an existential threat to MY country.
I say, let's focus on true threats to the U.S. AQ is definitely a threat and I'm hard pressed to understand why so many people in and out of government are so willing to take their eye off the ball by trying to invent a new government in a nation with a history of governments that can't be trusted. No one has yet convinced me that sacrificing my tax dollars and my soldiers in order to perpetuate a man such as Karzai in power will yield any positive results; I doubt they ever will. I'm not naive. It's understood that the U.S. will need to maintain a significant presence in Af-Pak for the long-term and that serious considerations will have to be made to various unsavory characters throughout the region. That's OK and that's why Long's outline is so welcome. And to the nay-sayers, note his caveat about what can be discussed openly about intelligence and SOF capabilities. And let's also note that a lot of people couldn't discuss these topics in any forum—specifically because they're not cleared for them. We should keep our own limitations in mind here.
Exum solicits inputs re Vietnam. I hope he's read Halberstam and Sheehan. Sure, their excellent works address the war, but they're really more about human nature and the effects of this type of war on the major power that goes all in. It's not a pretty picture. It's about corruption of institutions and processes. A lot of us went through that, both in Vietnam and later, picking up the pieces in a shattered Army. Today our nation is already in deep trouble on a number of fronts; it does not need to deal with a corrupted and broken military as well as continued major flows of blood and treasure. But if this train so many are so eager to board is allowed to leave the station, that will be the end result, with an added bonus of a even more cynical and divided citizenry.
COINdinistas, I think Mr. Obama is going to refuse to play your game. He's has to think of the entire nation, which means he's thinking well beyond military issues. Good for him. The last thing in the world we need is to have the military having any sort of voice in national strategy. Obama will temporize—he's a politician, after all—but if I were a betting man, I'd be putting my money on Austin Long and on those experienced intel and SOF folks. You may see a "long war," but it's not going to be what you wanted.
Publius, I'm too lazy to
Publius, I'm too lazy to write anything approaching your essay, but I'll give you a "Hear, hear" that's worth $0.02.
Austin Long, again, a weak, lazy post that's worth $0.02, but congratulations on putting meat on the bones of a concept that's bandied around but rarely discussed or conceptualized in concrete terms. Your post is great.
ADTS
To Visitor 6:51 "What I do
To Visitor 6:51
"What I do not think we understand -- and actually fail to acknowledge -- is that it was, and is, our presence in Afghanistan that is the root cause of the current instability in Pakistan."
You don't think that allowing an ISI-backed Taliban regime in Afghanistan would destabilize Pakistan?
After many shots of liquid
After many shots of liquid courage and a hang-over to consider it, I defined the game....
Here's what we're dealing with mathematically speaking...
A crazy game of Texas Hold 'Em Poker with ten players. As usual, you can't see the opponents cards nor effect the dealer; however, in this game, everyone is allowed to hide their pot so you never know if you're the playing from a short stack, in the middle, or the leader.
This game sucks...
v/r
Mike
I agree that Austin Long has
I agree that Austin Long has put some meat on the bone, but his proposal is really just a strawman of force numbers. It lacks an appreciation of the environment we'd be operating in, a couple of years into his CT approach.
If we were to reduce force levels below where we were even in 2004, how many of the following are likely? And how would they impact feasibility of a small CT footprint?
- At least half of the ANA and ANP dissolved. Even if we somehow managed to keep paying them, there would be little incentive for ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras to fight the good fight in the Pashtun areas
- Taliban governance and military control of much of the south and east
- LOCs interdicted to a degree never imagined (okay, with a force level of 13,000 we could supply ourselves by air, but the Taliban would control the roads - and therefore commerce, markets, and the population)
- Population in South and East flipping fully to the Taliban: no longer any reason or freedom to even sit on the fence
- More than a few executions of our current friends to deter intelligence or other cooperation
- Greatly intensified indirect fire attacks on our handful of remaining bases
- QRF capacities reduced to a few light forces
- Full re-arming by the former militias of the North
- Spiralling of lethal aid and other assistance from external patrons to their traditional clients: India, Iran, Pakistan
- Ethnic civil war
- Kabul possibly still a non-Taliban enclave, if funded and supplied by the West.
Assuming the residual CT force could somehow detect and distinguish AQ cells in an environment of such chaos and hostility, it's worth reflecting on what effect they could really have, and for how long. In some ways, isolated, unwelcome CT with meagre QRF and air support in the middle of complex hostilities sounds a bit like Moghadishu magnified many times. There would be mistakes and there would be disasters. Would there be enough wins?
For a somewhat more robust proposal, see "Afghanistan: How Much Is Enough?" published on IISS by Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson. Interestingly, they too set out to focus on CT, but as they consider at least some of the likely consequences, they add in political and military support to GIRoA, and support to some ANSF. The result ends up something like COIN Lite. Worth the read.
I read the Austin Long blog
I read the Austin Long blog post. Really, this is one of the better recommendations that runs counter to COIN? Let’s ignore for a second that it completely disregards the president’s defined stratagem and goals for Afghanistan.
To think that (were we to pull back into 3 mega FOBs) we would have any HUMINT gathering ability in the areas where the Taliban are strong is so far removed from the realm of reality that I had to literally step back from my computer. Explain to me how we will properly inflict long-lasting damage/denial of sanctuary to Al Qaeda in Afghanistan if we lack HUMINT. They aren’t exactly a wired society. Let’s also pretend that the trigger puller force isn’t bogged down in the FOBs, and has total freedom of movement (highly dubious, but said for the sake of argument).
This willful negligence staggers me. The Taliban, with a greatly removed ISAF presence, are going to be both empowered and heartened. You think they are going to calm down when we remove ourselves to three bases? No, they are going to do what any sensible insurgent would do in this situation: drive the blade in for the kill. Would it be at all difficult to stage daily rocket and mortar attacks on these super FOBs? Those tier-1 units are going to find themselves so far removed from the local population that they might as well dress as Martians, and are going to wind up pulling security rather than gaining the initiative.
I foresee, if we were to follow Mr. Long’s advice, a slow spiral of decay by which a large part of Afghanistan is torn asunder by an empowered Taliban delirious with excitement and healthy from continued support from Pakistan, and a rapid spiral downwards in terms of our ability to gather reliable, actionable intelligence.
How are we to keep these mega FOBs supplied? By road? Hahahahaha. I would be shocked if a single road to a mega FOB, save for maybe in the North of Afghanistan, would be passable.
Khe Sahn, here we come.
I also read Mr. Cohen’s own article (the one he supplied in the other thread) and found it to be lacking in any concrete means of direction.
Personally, I kind of want to see us out of Afghanistan as soon as possible. Bacevich is quite right when he says that Afghanistan is hardly worth American blood and treasure. But that doesn’t change the fact that the US military has its hands tied due to the orders from the civilian overseers, and that the best strategy to fit those proposed goals needs to be found.
I must say that this was a
I must say that this was a damn good article, with which I found myself in agreement: http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/01/from_coin_to_containment
It was proposed as an alternative to COIN by Mr. Cohen. Again, it did not give any clear operational recommendations, but I agree with the central tenets of the post. Caveat: we had this same degree of negativity, if not more, regarding Iraq pre-surge, and it has now become a relatively stable area from which we can withdraw and not appear disgraced (as things currently stand).
AndyS @ 12:34 AM, Thank you
AndyS @ 12:34 AM,
Thank you very much for your post (I'm pretty sure it contained a degree of clarity that mine didn't). I did NOT read your post before I wrote mine, and yet we echoed many of the same concerns.
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