Center for a New American Security

I interrupt my blogging hiatus to bring you the following report.

Christopher Buckley, one of my favorite authors, read Matthew Hoh's letter and is now calling for us to withdraw from Afghanistan. All fine and good. But he chooses an unfortunate historical analogy:

Reading [Matthew Hoh's] letter, I thought of the famous exchange between the Confederate soldier and his Yankee captor.

 

Why do you hate us so, Johnny Reb?

 

Because this is our land, and you’re on it.

Ah, yes, I remember the Great Southern War for Independence. How the Union Army, fearing quagmire, realized its errors and so wisely withdrew from the newly declared Confederate States of America... uh, hold on... what?! Maybe Christopher Buckley has read different histories of the U.S. Civil War than I have, but I think the Union Army ended up sacrificing a couple hundred thousand dead to affirm federal supremacy, preserve the union and end slavery. I'm not saying Afghanistan is in the same ballpark or even in the same sport in terms of importance, but we can all agree Buckley would have been wiser to have stuck with the tried-and-true Vietnam analogies on this one.

I'll be away from the blog today.

Seriously, the president and the secretary deserve some credit for this:

When the Obama administration proposed canceling a host of expensive weapons systems last spring, some of the military industry’s allies in Congress assumed, as they had in the past, that they would have the final say.

 

But as the president signed a $680 billion military policy bill on Wednesday, it was clear that he had succeeded in paring back nearly all of the programs and setting a tone of greater restraint than the Pentagon had seen in many years.

 

Now the question is whether Mr. Obama can sustain that push next year, when the midterm elections are likely to make Congress more resistant to further cuts and job losses.

 

White House officials say Mr. Obama took advantage of a rare political moment to break through one of Washington’s most powerful lobbies and trim more weapons systems than any president had in decades.

 

Rahm Emanuel, the White House chief of staff, said Wednesday that the plan was to threaten a veto over a prominent program — in this case, the F-22 fighter jet — “to show we were willing to expend political capital and could win on something that people thought we could not.”

 

Once the Senate voted in July to stop buying F-22s, Mr. Emanuel said in an interview, that success “reverberated down” to help sustain billions of dollars of cuts in Army modernization, missile defense and other programs.

 

Mr. Emanuel said the strategy emerged when the defense secretary, Robert M. Gates, told Mr. Obama they needed to “shake up sacred cows and be seen as taking on fights.”

 

Military analysts said Mr. Gates, a holdover from the Bush administration, also aimed at the most bloated programs. And Senator John McCain of Arizona, the former Republican presidential candidate, who has criticized the Pentagon’s cost overruns, provided Mr. Obama with political cover to make the cuts without being seen as soft on the military.

This means we can spend the money we're saving on making other government departments and agencies more useful, perhaps. Or pay off our Chinese creditors.

Yesterday, I wrote the following in an op-ed which ran in the Daily Beast:

The Obama adminstration has, I believe, some leverage at the moment, which it could use to affect the composition and behavior of the next Afghan government. As long as Afghanistan’s ruling politicians—Hamid Karzai especially—think the United States might reduce its commitment to Afghanistan, they could be willing to accede to U.S. demands on key ministerial and provincial-level appointments. Just as an Afghan government consisting mainly of those politicians thrown out by the Taliban in 1996 would spell continued insurgency and mission failure, a more inclusive and competent Afghan government would enable the success of a counterinsurgency strategy.

 

As Steve Biddle and others have noted, though, the primary weakness of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine is its assumption that the interests of the host nation will line up with those of the United States. In Afghanistan—as in Iraq and Vietnam—U.S. military officers and diplomats have dealt with host-nation governments whose composition and behavior has often been at odds with U.S. objectives and interests. So while countless memoranda and manuals exist instructing U.S. servicemen on how to wage counterinsurgency campaigns at the operational and tactical levels, there is currently little guidance for how U.S. policymakers should use leverage over its Afghan partners.*

Mark Moyar notes that his new book has exactly this kind of guidance for policy-makers, and as I plucked it off my shelf, I discovered that yes, yes, it does in the final chapter. I have not yet had the chance to read this book, though it has been on my list and even traveled with me to Palo Alto a few weekends back. But if you are so inclined, you can buy it here. Gian Gentile reports that it is excellent, and Gian moonlights as a darn good historian when he's not being a skeptic of counterinsurgency doctrine, so you can take his word on it in lieu of my own.

*This sentence, obviously enough, was not underlined in the original op-ed. But that grammatical error? Yeah, that was there. Mama Muqawama will no doubt let me hear about that one...

A great American, sure, but a reader noticed this important comment posted by "gadstian" on the Washington Post's website at 11:50 yesterday morning.

I am very disturbed by the journalistic standards of this article and strongly encourage Washington Post readers to contact the paper directly.

First, I am currently serving in a PRT in Iraq. I trained with Matt in northern Virginia in April of this past year before we both moved on to our respective assignments. Matt is a smart young man who has honorably served his country, but by no means was or is he an expert on counterinsurgency, Afghan tribal culture, or U.S. strategic policy.

Second-- this article is riddled with inaccuracies to an extent that almost shocks me, and really makes me question its intent and veracity, coming as it does at a critical time in the debate over Afghan policy.

Matt Hoh is NOT a Foreign Service Officer. This basic fact, central to the article and its headline, is wrong, despite the wording in his letter.

Matt is a "3161" State Department employee, a special category of temporary appointments brought on for 12 month assignments in certain areas of expertise-- engineering, ag, business, rule of law, etc. Some may sign on for a second 12-month tour.

This is a very different thing than being an FSO-- a commissioned, career diplomat who is a generalist and is appointed not as a result of an online job application and single interview (sometimes over the phone), but after a series of competitive oral, written, and physical exams.

Referring to Matt as a "U.S. Official" is about as accurate as referring to a postal employee as a U.S. official.

I am not trying to denigrate 3161s or postal employees! But this article gets such basic facts wrong about Matt that I am astounded, and either bespeaks very poor journalism or, worse, an article produced primarily to push a specific political agenda and that knowingly uses false facts to give a certain impression.

There are hundreds, perhaps over 1000, 3161s in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many, many of them are ex-military (having done multiple tours in Iraq and/or Afghanistan), and have also faced combat, death, etc., just like Matt bravely did. In my own PRT, we are rocketed frequently, have small arms fire, IEDs, etc., hit our movement teams, you name it.

My point is that as compelling as Matt's story sounds to civilians, it is a fairly typical story here in theater, and by no means gives one any special insight.

There are so many people here with the same experience--or much more experience--that would passionately disagree with Matt's assessment.

Maybe Matt is right; maybe not. But to present his memo and resignation as a significant event of a "U.S. official" with special insight is, with all due respect to Matt, patently absurd. He is a de factor contractor that was on the ground in his PRT about 4 months! On that, one assesses strategic counterinsurgency??

And I absolutely guarantee the only reason Matt warranted an audience with Holbrooke and sudden offers of a Kabul job on the Embassy's front office was that the State Department was well aware of plans to go very public at a critical time-- plans for articles like this splashed over front pages, offers from detractors of Afghan policy to meet and speak, etc. I don't know Matt well and will not impugn his motivations, I believe he is no doubt sincere. But there is nothing special about him that's not special about hundreds of others still in theater, and I cannot believe that he has simply stumbled into the current publicity without discussions with many people about how to use this situation for maximum effect.

I wish Matt luck, and don't doubt that he will do well, with a career jump-started by the current affair. Again, maybe he's right.

But I challenge the Washington Post to explain what I note above-- How and why do you assert Matt is a Foreign Service Officer? Did you not confirm that with him, or did he present himself as such? How did he come to your attention? Why did you not interview other 3161s or FSOs with different views? And, finally, WHY does someone on the ground for a few months warrant such front page coverage?

I'm a fan of the Washington Post, but as I told a family friend in Tennessee this past weekend who was asking me for good news sources on Afghanistan, the "down-range" reporting the Times, the Post, and the Wall Street Journal produces on Afghanistan is worlds better than anything produced from Washington. Datelines, in other words, matter. I have a little less respect for the Washington Post after this article.

Why, you ask? Because if this is true, and if the CIA is empowering Ahmed Wali Karzai at the same time in which NATO/ISAF is saying abusive local power-brokers are a threat to mission success, then this is yet another example of NATO/ISAF carrying out one campaign in Afghanistan while the CIA carries out another -- with both campaigns operating at cross purposes to one another. I should say here that I am in no position to confirm or deny this report. I can, however, say that numerous military officials in southern Afghanistan with whom I have spoken identify AWK and his activities as the biggest problem they face -- bigger than the lack of government services or even the Taliban. And so if AWK is "the agency's guy", that leads to a huge point of friction between NATO/ISAF and the CIA. Again, I am not currently serving as an advisor to ISAF and cannot speak for Gen. McChrystal's command. But I do not have to:

“If we are going to conduct a population-centric strategy in Afghanistan, and we are perceived as backing thugs, then we are just undermining ourselves,” said Maj. Gen. Michael T. Flynn, the senior American military intelligence official in Afghanistan.

 

“The only way to clean up Chicago is to get rid of Capone,” General Flynn said.

Again, I am not in a position to confirm or deny that the CIA has an enduring relationship with AWK, and I am telling the truth when I tell you that all I "know" about this is what I read in the open source world. But you can be darn sure that if we think that AWK is the CIA's guy, the Afghans most certainly believe that to be the case.

1. Yes, it might be true that NATO and Afghan troops outnumber insurgents 12-1. This is as irrelevant a statistic in guerrilla warfare as enemy body count. The only things worth measuring in any war are those things that bring each side closer to or farther from realizing expressed political objectives. We do not set our troop levels in counterinsurgencies or any other war based upon those of the enemy but rather upon what levels are appropriate for operationalizing the expressed strategic goals of the civilian leadership. Only if we had the option of pursuing a strategy of annihilation against the Taliban would their troop levels matter. As long as the Taliban and other insurgent groups continue to have the effect on the Afghan population they are having, their troop levels can be 600 guys or 60,000 guys and it does not matter.

2. I like how pundits who spend their time casting doubt on the assessments and opinions of those with in-depth understanding of Afghanistan and NATO operations there jump at the chance to sing the praises of others with in-depth understanding of Afghanistan and NATO operations when they conveniently advance assessments and opinions that match up with conclusions they themselves have already reached. (Here's but one example.) Afghanistan and the U.S. presence there is a wicked problem about which many intelligent people can disagree. But suddenly the opinion of a junior State Department employee -- talented and patriotic though he may be -- is the only opinion that matters? So Matthew Hoh is wise but Carter Malkasian and Kael Weston* are what, fools? Or Rory Stewart is clever but Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart are dim? All three are clever, of course, and that's what makes policy options on Afghanistan so devilish. Look, if someone writes something and it matches up with your opinion, by all means say so. But I know about 50 really smart people on Afghanistan with lots of time on the ground there, and no two have the same opinion about what U.S. policy should be. Let's not turn one dude whose opinions on Afghanistan happen to line up with the zeitgeist into the flippin' Delphic oracle.

*To name two people currently doing the same work as Hoh -- in conditions equally tough.

Also and finally, do not miss my post this morning for the awesomely named "Daily Beast." The key take-away:

The Obama adminstration has, I believe, some leverage at the moment, which it could use to affect the composition and behavior of the next Afghan government. As long as Afghanistan’s ruling politicians—Hamid Karzai especially—think the United States might reduce its commitment to Afghanistan, they could be willing to accede to U.S. demands on key ministerial and provincial-level appointments. Just as an Afghan government consisting mainly of those politicians thrown out by the Taliban in 1996 would spell continued insurgency and mission failure, a more inclusive and competent Afghan government would enable the success of a counterinsurgency strategy.

Sen. Feingold on a troop increase in Afghanistan: "There will be resistance to this if necessary."

Newspapers reported today that the F8 incident reported with much ensuing panic yesterday was a hoax. However, it wasn't long before the small sense of relief was overshadowed by new episodes of death and destruction.

A mine exploded under a bus in Mohmand killing 15, mainly women and children, various news outlets reported. It seems this time the civilians might not actually have been the target since the road where the blast happened is used frequently by the miiitary. Although of course, you have to wonder if the people who put the mine there decided a few dead civilians was a risk worth taking.

A suspected car bomb in Peshawar wounded 13, nine of whom are in critical condition. While a suicide bomber attacked a military aircraft servicing facility 75 km from Islamabad killing seven.

The capital itself got a respite, but the streets were pretty quiet. Londonstani toured the various markets on his daily chores and found most of the shops to himself. The downside was that there were no cabs.

While the blow back is clear for everyone to see, no one really knows what is happening in the tribal areas themselves. Reporter friends have been up to Dera Ismail Khan and Peshawar to talk to those fleeing the conflict zones but their stories of having to flee after government forces suggested (in no uncertain terms) that it's time to leave did little to shed light on how the fighting is actually unfolding. Of course, the government and the militants claim to be heaping humiliation on each other in buckets, but its anyone's guess what's actually happening. 

The latest government numbers put Taliban deaths at 142 and their own losses at 20. The latest figures from aid agencies suggest 120,000 have been made homeless.

But while the military operation and the attacks away from the frontline are getting the headlines, it seems to Londonstani that the predictable see-saw of Pakistani politics is thinking of double backing on itself once more. There are whisperings amongst the English speaking super elite, the taxi drivers and the very low level government clerks that maybe it's time the army took over once more.

From Londonstani's point of view this is just wierd. It wasn't that long ago that everyone seemed to be on the streets shouting death to Musharraf. Now, I've heard a possible Pakistani future leader say, "You know if Musharraf hadn't made a couple of small mistakes towards the end, he would have been remembered as the man who saved the nation."

At the time of the most stringent anti Musharraf hysteria, Londonstani remembers sitting in a newsroom asking a visiting Pakistani analyst, "But who's gonna replace Musharraf? You think the same people who ran the country into the ground before him are suddenly going to start amending their ways?"

The analyst said he thought they had learnt their lesson. But it seemed much like bringing Afghan warlords back to Kabul. And, the fear is that the results could actually be much the same.

The complaints of the upper sections of society is that this present government is completely venal, corrupt and incompetent. "'What's new?" Someone with a sense of history might ask, but it seems that this government is setting new records at such a pace that the whole "only the army can run Pakistan" has come back into popular usage a year and a bit after they were last in power (it normally takes a few years). But of course, there is a conspiracy that this is actually what they have been planning all along anyway.

It would be pretty depressing if it wasn't for the fact that there does seem to be a growing sense among young upper and middle class Pakistanis that its time to step the plate. That the old paradigm is very, very broken and their only other option - going abroad - is not really all that appealing. After all, how many financial professionals with qualifications from their country's best institutes actually want to drive cabs?

Londonstani is going to be off on a world wind tour of Pakistan over the next few days.. so hopefully more on what people are thinking behind the scenes.

Abu Muqawama's Iraq correspondent, Devil Dawg, weighs in on our host nation partners in Iraq:

Much has been made in recent weeks of the need for a reliable and credible host nation government in order for counterinsurgency operations to have a chance of success.  Afghanistan is no doubt the first thought through your head as you read that sentence.  The disconcerting election results and history of less than credible governance by the Karzai administration combined with what I'll politely call the laser-like focus Washington policymakers currently have on the country and their umpteenth policy review are the most likely reasons that Iraq did not immediately come to mind. 
 
I saw something yesterday, however, that makes me question if Iraq is indeed that partner we so desperately need in order to leave this country with at least some modicum of success.
 
We accompanied the division G-9--civil affairs--out on a humanitarian operation to distribute some food downtown.  Contrary to MiTT doctrine, at least USMC MiTT doctrine, we have not accompanied the division on these missions before because we wanted to keep as much of an Iraqi face on the operation as possible; however, this became impossible a couple of weeks ago when a subordinate brigade G-2 was caught loading food sacks into his personal vehicle.  Something about US taxpayer dollars funding an IA brigade G-2's personal food racket didn't sit well with our higher.  Not only can the IA brigades no longer conduct their own humanitarian operations, MiTT personnel now have to accompany the division when it does.
 
So, yesterday we went.
 
Things went really well, at least by Iraqi standards, until we got to the second of two locations.  Now, the reason we moved in the first place was a result of the IA's outer cordon breaking down completely, allowing the masses to start taking food at the cyclic rate.  Several AK-47 rounds into the air did little to dissuade them.  The jundee conducting the operation used the confusion created by moving locations to fill up their Humvees with the very items they were supposed to be handing out.  Our G-9 advisor brought it to the attention of Col Mohammed, who, to his credit, took action.  No words were necessary; the looks on the faces of the men, women, and children as the Humvees were opened and the items intended for them literally spilled out into the street said it all.  The very people who ten minutes earlier were all smiles, grateful to the IA and Marines for their food and cooking stoves, pelted the turret gunners--myself included--with rocks as we pulled away.
 
Way to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory guys... and get my ass pelted with rocks.
 
You can draw your own conclusions about the Iraqi government and their credibility as a partner in our counterinsurgency operations here.  After all, this is just one lieutenant's observation and if you believe CSM Philip Johndrow's father, as told in Ralph Peter's interview with the battle hardened CSM in yesterday's New York Post, the lieutenant is the most dangerous person on the battlefield.  I don't think he meant that in a good way.  Luckily, as a Marine lieutenant, that dictum doesn't apply to me.  The bottom line is that if the actions here on the ground are any indication of what occurs in Baghdad, then, and I'm no expert, we could be in trouble here, same as we are in Afghanistan.

Hahaha, I'm starting to get media requests via my CNAS email account for Londonstani, which is hilarious if understandable given the quality of his dispatches. I know you guys are enjoying them as much as I am -- and more than what's usually on offer here. For what it's worth, I have been trying to pressure Londonstani to pull an Abu Muqawama and reveal himself, if only so we can start getting serious about shifting this blog's focus away from just counterinsurgency and more toward Middle Eastern and Central Asian security issues in general. What would you guys think about such a shift in the blog's stated focus?