Center for a New American Security

"And if -- Heaven forbid --

"And if -- Heaven forbid -- such a war were to be fought, I indeed think the Israeli military machine would punish Hizballah and the people and infrastructure of Lebanon to a horrific degree. If there is to be another war, the gloves would be off. But after the shooting stops and the Israelis inevitably go back across the Blue Line, what will have been accomplished in terms of Israeli policy aside from the further isolation of Israel within the international community?"

I think this could probably be said of many of Israel's military "adventures." I liked the headline of Mearsheimer's article in the American Conservative (I think) after Operation Cast Lead: "Another War, Another Failure." It kind of goes along with your (AM's) propensity to use Schelling. As Fearon (probably channeling Schelling and channeling Blainey)) pointed out, every war represents a bargaining failure.

Fears over Israeli deterrence power were overwrought *then* - just, perhaps, as fears over what American deterrent power would be were the US to withdraw from Afghanistan?

I'm not even sure Israel can claim operational brilliance anymore. As Moshe Dayan supposedly said in Vietnam - and I'm going to sound racist here and offend some, no doubt, although I rest my claim on the work of Kenneth Pollack and, in a second, Martin van Creveld - we're fighting Arabs. In other words, in my attempt to be non-racist, Israel's history of military brilliance, while well-earned in some respects, was also earned against militaries noteworthy for their incompetence. And as Martin van Creveld noted in The Olive and Sword (or was it the reverse?), the IDF suffers from a number of deficiencies. To mix and meld a one-eyed general, a (discredited?) think tanker, and a brilliant military historian within a single paragraph with a rapper who was/is on a radio station with a television commentator who likes you (AM), "Don't believe the hype." I'm sure after Cast Lead, the Winograd Commission reforms, the IDF is more competent and feels that way. I'm just saying, Israel's original foundation of operational brilliance rests upon a set of isolated events (crossing the Suez, Entebbe) than a complete whole worthy of emulation.

"Second, one or two successful special operations raids into southern Lebanon should not should not should not inform your calculus as to whether or not you should attempt to strike Iranian nuclear facilities. Apples and freaking oranges. The former is a tactical exercise that carries with it moderate strategic risk. The latter is a strategic decision that carries with it enormous geopolitical consequences for you, your neighbors and your allies. I mean, how does the cabinet discussion go on that one? "Well, you know, we managed to send a seven-man team into southern Lebanon last night. Pretty awesome, yes. Who, then, is up for sending the entire IAF to Qom tonight? Anyone?""

Bueller. I kid, I kid. You're right. But the bigger issue is that the special operations raids are being used as proxies as to Israeli military competence. So the logic isn't, "We can infiltrate seven-man teams successfully into Southern Lebanon," it's, "We've got our mojo back," so that if we needed to bomb Iran, we wouldn't have to worry about the northern third (half? whole?) of our country being rocketed, because the IDF can accomplish whatever tasks are assigned to us.

ADTS

I am a bit confused about

I am a bit confused about the ISraeli "brilliant performance" ability. Is it Cast Lead they are so proud of?The term "shooting fish in a barrel" leaps to mind, and even then they could not fulfill their operational goals. Hell, noone is sure if they *had* a operational goal, except meting out collective punishment. They stopped the rockets, but are standing looking like butchers in return. This seems to be costing them (and the US?) Turkey at the moment, and in terms of international standing it was a way more severe blow than 2006. Having soundly humiliated president Obama in public, having told Europe to fck off, I think Israel may be falling into the trap of holistic politics, refusal to ackowledge their own position. In a sense, another war, and another may be what is needed to make the int. community finally take their toys away and demand international inspection of Dimona.

So do you think American

So do you think American deterrence would remain relatively respected if we pulled back from Afghanistan or if, god forbid, McChrystal/whoever the Afghan gov is doesn't make much progress? FYI, I'm not trying to take a shot at your ideas or COIN or sending more troops or whatever.

For all the limitations of historical analogies, I am just wondering if there is something particularly applicable about Israel's 2006 war with Hizballah. Personally I'm increasingly torn over what we should do there but I think that realistically the US will be involved at some level for quite a while. Admittedly, the hard core of extremists groups are so hellbent on attacking the west that it will be hard to ever deter them, but I'm just thinking about Gates's and Sir David Richards's warnings about the 'empowering message' or 'catalytic' or 'intoxicating effect' of failure in Afganistan.

ADTS: As I remember, the

ADTS: As I remember, the operational goal was to disable Hamas, wich was not done, quite the opposite. But I grant you the point that if establishing a deterrence against rockets was the only goal, then it functioned. As to my "fixation" with Dimona and the Israeli nuclear weapons, I would think it evident: If Dimona was put under int. inspection, Irans main argument against inspections would fall away. And more importaqntly, it would be a long step towards disabling the Samson option, or at least give us a oversight about how devastating such an option would be. It would also be a vindication of the concept of international law. Wich is a point in itself.

Abu Muqawama; this is one of

Abu Muqawama; this is one of your best articles in weeks. Some thoughts:
- Israeli deterrence was damaged after 2006. There was a lot of Arab and Iranian propaganda about how weak the IDF was, and about how the IDF could be defeated in a fight. I got in some tactical military discussions with some pro Hezbollah folks, arguing that the IDF didn't perform as badly against Hezbollah in 2006 as the mythology implied. Military types sympathetic to Hezbollah were not convinced.
- Hamas attacked Israel in 2008 December, because they believed that they could perform well against the IDF. Hamas quickly found out that they were wrong, and almost certainly would not have gone to war if they had a do over.
- Israel's policy was tactically successful against Hamas, and the policy was strategically successful in a narrow Palestinian context.
-Notice how Fatah lead Hamas by 44% to 28% in an August, 2009 public opinion poll? In part this is because of anger at Hamas for losing the war with Israel, as well as partly because Israel, the international community, and Fatah, have successfully facilitated some economic growth in the west bank.
-It is increasingly becoming conventional wisdom among Palestinians that the Palestinian Authority US trained National Security Forces might be able to defeat Hamas' militia. This is in part due to the considerable damage Hamas' militia suffered in its war with the IDF.
-However, Israel lost so much in global support (including from Russia, China, Turkey, India), that it wasn't worth it strategically from a global context. Israel therefore, overall, seems to have lost the Gaza war.

Israelis are well aware of how important their relationships with Turkey, Russia, China and India are (and how important Japan is to the Israeli business community.) I am continually amazed by how clueless so many American strategic analysts are regarding this subject. Netanyahu wouldn't make several secret trips to Russia this year if Russia didn't matter to Israel. China is very influential with the Israeli business community for obvious reason. Also important to Israel is its relationship with India's 160 million muslims. India is Israel's second largest trading partner, and India buys a plurality (in some periods a majority) of all Israeli defense exports. Much of Israel's cutting edge defense research is done collaboratively with India and other nations. Therefore, any Israeli policy has to be judged in part, on how it affects Israel's relations with non Western great powers.

Thanks to ADTS and anan for

Thanks to ADTS and anan for those response. I suppose I tipped my hand by even asking, but my sense that I wanted to check was 'yes, the credibility of America's deterrence will be damaged as Israel's was in '06, but not to the extend that we will face mortal danger.' Sorry about the double post as well.

Independent Austrian defense

Independent Austrian defense analyst Tom Cooper's (TC) responses to the Ronen Bergman (RB) piece:

RB: ..proving that it was in flagrant violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, which forbids stockpiling weapons south of the Litani River.

TC: Er... any clue what kind of Israeli recce platforms are doing the searching inside Lebanese airspace? Isn't that considered violating somebody's sovereignty, a "flagrant violation" and how many UN Security Council Resolutions has Israel ignored now?

RB: This caused further embarrassment to Lebanon, as it exposed the army's lack of neutrality and the active aid that it extends to Hezbollah.

TC: ...which is not really Lebanon's fault. After all, its army was quite strong and the situation actually under control, until a certain "outside power" began to destablize it, causing ever more hatred, as well as the emergence of Hezbollah, through massive bombardments and then a subsequent full-scale invasion.

RB: The episode also led to heightened tensions on the Israel-Lebanon border. The specter of renewed fighting between Israel and Hezbollah looms as large today as it has at any time since the end of the Lebanon war in August 2006. Yet senior military officers in Israel's Northern Command are confident that the embarrassing outcome of the last round will not be repeated.

TC: Oh? So, 2006 was a defeat after all? The last I heard, this is usually fiercely denied or various claims of victory offered instead. But of course, it could be there was some other kind of embarassment for Israel. Perhaps it was the realization that Sharon's politics had caused such a turmoil in that country during the past twenty years.

RB: The recent explosions have highlighted the weakened geopolitical status of Hezbollah, a diminishment which no one could have foreseen at the end of the last war.

TC: Sounds great. However, it reminds me of a similar commentary made in mid-1972 regarding Sadat's position, and then again in 1973. It also mirrors contemporary commentaries about al-Assad's position, following the well-known air battle in September 1973. But barely a month later, Dayan was suffering nervous breakdowns in public... One is really left to hope we do not need to go through that entire process again. [Yom Kippur war]

RB: At the end of the war, a commission of inquiry was set up in Israel to investigate the military and political failure. A number of senior army officers resigned, and Israel's deterrence power was seen as having sustained a severe blow.

TC: Another very strange statement. We are usually taught that if Israel does not possess sufficient deterence power, it is going to be attacked by its neighours (-and destoryed, or?). So, after Israel's deterrence power sustained such a severe blow in 2006, why is it nothing of the kind happened?

RB: As part of [Hezbollah's] combat doctrine, which eschews reliance on reinforcements and resupply...

TC: If anybody thinks this is Hezbollah's doctrine, they learned nothing at all from 2006.

RB: Hezbollah has stockpiled its weapons throughout Lebanon, but particularly near the Israeli border. According to current Israeli intelligence estimates, Hezbollah has an arsenal of 40,000 rockets...

TC: These types of estimates were proven wrong in 2006, and on a few other occassions as well (Iraq 2003 comes to mind). Given the collapse of the Israeli-run intel network inside Lebanon earlier this year, why should we trust them any more now?

RB: Hezbollah also has a number of highly advanced weapons systems, including antiaircraft missiles, that constitute a threat to Israeli combat aircraft.

TC: ...I doubt so. That is, unless Israeli aircraft are actually violating Lebanese airspace. But why should Israeli aircraft do so? [sarcasm]

RB: But all is not rosy for Hezbollah. After the war, considerable dissatisfaction with the organization was voiced inside Lebanon. Many blamed its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, for Israel's retaliatory bombardments that caused widespread damage. Nasrallah stated that had he known Israel would respond as forcefully as it did, he would have thought twice before ordering the abduction of the two Israeli soldiers—the act that sparked the conflict.

TC: Voicing "considerable dissatisfaction" belongs to a democratic process. So does this mean Bergman considers Hezbollah for what it is, first and foremost- namely a political party in the Lebanese Parliament?

RB: Harsh criticism of Hezbollah also came from an unexpected source: Tehran. The Iranian strategy calls for Hezbollah to play two roles. One is to instigate minor border provocations. The other is to launch, on Tehran's command, a full-scale retaliatory attack should Israel target Iran's nuclear facilities.

TC: Could the author show me some kind of documentation that could confirm this statement?

RB: The 2006 war met neither criterion, and, as the Iranians complained, merely served to reveal the extent of Hezbollah's military capabilities.

TC: I guess it would be asking too much to hear or see any kind of evidence supporting this contention, as well.

RB: Israeli officials raised four possible reasons for Hezbollah's failure to act, all of which reflect its current weakness.

TC: IMHO, the first of these was nonsense; the second perhaps true, but not sure (then again, it could also be the case that Hezbollah is not the "terrorist" organization the Israelis attempt to show it to be); the third is probably true (well, at least the part with "Israel would regard Lebanese infrastructure as a legitimate target for a military response" was definitely true). Since 1948, Israel regards not only the infrastructure of all of its neighbouring countries as legitimate targets, but also uses these as a form of blackmail (diplomacy), and the fourth is a story for itself. I.e. as always, the truth in the Middle East is "somewhere in between"...

RB: Finally, there are the Iranians. Their primary focus is on proceeding with their nuclear program without unnecessary distractions.

TC: Indeed. Why should they be disturbed? The IAEA is already closely inspecting all their installations. Why doesn't Mr. Bergman insist upon an inspection of Israeli facilities?

RB: Tehran's main concern is that a terror attack that can be linked to Iran would result in the arrest of its agents overseas, who are currently procuring equipment for its uranium-enrichment centrifuges.

TC: Aha. Interestingly, Mr. Bergman fails to observe that, for many years now, Iranian diplomats, officials and scientists have been hijacked by "unknown persons" time and again, yet there haven't been "terrorist attacks" in response. So, his logic does not really fit...

RB: Hezbollah is also clearly aware of the severe blow in terms of power and prestige that the Iranian mullahs suffered as a result of the massive protests following June's presidential election. Automatic support from Tehran is no longer a certainty. For now, at least, the Iranian hardliners have troubles of their own.

TC: Well, I'd say this should actually be more of a reason for Israelis to feel less threatened by the Hizbollah, and not a reason to publish threats of this kind. Or did I get anything wrong?

RB: In short, despite the fact that Hezbollah today is substantially stronger in purely military terms than it was three years ago, its political stature and its autonomy have been significantly reduced.

TC: Aha. So they are stronger, but they are also weaker, and their "autonomy" is reduced, even though they cannot count on as much support from Iran as before (which should be in their control?)... er, sorry, but why am I confused by all of this?

(Note: minor editing performed by poster)

ADTS: Hey, Im sure they are

ADTS: Hey, Im sure they are rational actors. But I notice you use the word "assume" on your knowledge on their capacities and routine. In regards to nuclear power, I dont feel that is good enough.

To shift this away from

To shift this away from Israeli nuclear deterrence, and crib the notes AM so kindly composed for us, is Israeli confidence in its conventional capabilities excessive? Why or why not?

My suspicion is that on an operational level, any war in Lebanon today would resemble Gaza 2008-2009 far more than Lebanon 2006. On a strategic level, I think it is difficult for Israel to win wars, for a variety of reasons, including some that anan pointed out.

ADTS

Pedantic note: I think you

Pedantic note: I think you mean Hattin, not Arsuf. At Arsuf it was the Hospitallers, not the Templars who defied orders and charged, and it actually resulted in a Crusader victory.

Flit

I'm posting just to give

I'm posting just to give kudos for a Hans Wehr reference. I hated using that damn book.

I think you've over

I think you've over simplified or misread the reason behind IDF's cockiness. I would assume the special operations are more likely a result of this cockiness, than the reason for it. In 2006 Israel was under-prepared. Today they are much better prepared, and aren't willing to be caught by surprise. Hence, they are cocky.

Certainly no one made the argument that successful spec-ops are any basis for an attack on Iran. However the Israeli readiness for a possible war with Hezbullah is one of the things Israel should consider when it thinks about the immediate results of an attack on Iran, ehich is why those two unrelated issues would come up in a single quote.

I doubt any one meant that Israeli mojo in Lebanon is directly relevant to a possible attack in Iran.