Abu Muqawama: Post
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COIN at the Political Level
Yesterday, I wrote the following in an op-ed which ran in the Daily Beast:
The Obama adminstration has, I believe, some leverage at the moment, which it could use to affect the composition and behavior of the next Afghan government. As long as Afghanistan’s ruling politicians—Hamid Karzai especially—think the United States might reduce its commitment to Afghanistan, they could be willing to accede to U.S. demands on key ministerial and provincial-level appointments. Just as an Afghan government consisting mainly of those politicians thrown out by the Taliban in 1996 would spell continued insurgency and mission failure, a more inclusive and competent Afghan government would enable the success of a counterinsurgency strategy.
As Steve Biddle and others have noted, though, the primary weakness of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine is its assumption that the interests of the host nation will line up with those of the United States. In Afghanistan—as in Iraq and Vietnam—U.S. military officers and diplomats have dealt with host-nation governments whose composition and behavior has often been at odds with U.S. objectives and interests. So while countless memoranda and manuals exist instructing U.S. servicemen on how to wage counterinsurgency campaigns at the operational and tactical levels, there is currently little guidance for how U.S. policymakers should use leverage over its Afghan partners.*
Mark Moyar notes that his new book
*This sentence, obviously enough, was not underlined in the original op-ed. But that grammatical error? Yeah, that was there. Mama Muqawama will no doubt let me hear about that one...
I've been reading your blog recently and just wanna say thanks for posting insightful/worthwhile information. It is nice to read something that has the possibility of exposing you to something new and interesting. Also appreciate the Counterinsurgency reading list for someone wanting to learn more like myself.
If we expect line troops to hold that line and to wage whatever type of war that politicos back in DC, London, Canberra etc ask them to wage them I think its realist that we can expect the same of those doing the asking.
I am reminded of the graffiti on the wall of the Marnie barracks - America is not at War - the Marine Corps is at War - America is at the Mall - and Congress out to lunch.
http://img386.imageshack.us/img386/7371/pic06940pc7.jpg
We ask so very much of these men and woman and to have a political apparatus that is untrained in the ways to exploit the opportunities they make, as well as make opportunities for them to exploit is a grievous fault.
COIN training for FSO - is it that strange an idea? The same for congressmen and women?
I'm just throwing this out there, but has anyone ever thought about doing a comparison of military operations today, with military tactics used during the American Indian Wars? Probably our earliest COIN operations and where this type of warfare realistically started.... for us. Would be interesting to use a comparison model concerning amount of time and money it took / will take to defeat Indians (then) and what is expected for the Taliban (today).
Think about the weapons, firearms and technology advances our organized military had from 1622–1918.
Case in point, the Second Seminole War was a conflict from 1835 to 1842 in Florida and is considered the most expensive Indian War fought by the United States. Estimates of $30,000,000 to $40,000,000 for cost of the Second Seminole War. The number of Army, Navy and Marine regulars who served in Florida is given as 10,169. About 30,000 militiamen and volunteers also served in this small war. U.S. Army officially recorded 1,466 deaths (I would think this figure is low & inaccurate) in the Second Seminole War, mostly from disease. The number killed in action is less clear. US Army killed in action, the Seminoles killed around 269 officers and men. (Again, I believe this figure is low and inaccurate).
Now think about the current numbers of KIA, WIA, cost to run the war in Afghanistan. How did we ultimately win? We weaponized small pox and gave them new homes on reservations!
The most expensive battle (war) in a (larger) 296 year war, on our own soil = went on for 7 years. How many years are in into Afghanistan right now?
Abu, use that big brain of yours and apply some Research Methods here = Lamda, Chi Square, etc... to figure out comparatively, how long it will take for the United States to win a war in Afghanistan. Then figure out how much it will cost. Once you have got the figures, post them so I can ponder the time & money over a glass of Vat 69.
Texas Thunder - OUT.
My personal hero, Lord Cromer, who strangely enough was both a scholar and a "policymaker," has some guidance of his own. Having read Moyar's old book but not his new one, I can't help but suspect that his advice is pretty similar to Cromer's! But more sensitively phrased, of course, for the delicate American ear...
Ex:
thanks for plugging my book with a link to Amazon. Sadly as I clicked it on (this was the first time I had visited amazon for my book in years) its sales price has gone up substantially from when it first came out. It was never priced to sell as an academic book and now with its current price only the library at bumfrick state will buy a copy. No worries, folks should be spending their money on books like yours and Moyar’s.
But to substance on this post. I would also add that Mark gives the fairest treatment yet in his book in the Iraq chapter to general casey which is a very nice counter to what I think the overly unfair treatment Casey has received by Ricks, and more recently by Jaffe and Cloud and Filkens in his review of the latter. To be blunt I thought "The Fourth Star" combined with Filkens's lame review of it were a combined hatchet job on General Casey and an unfair one to boot without evidence (beyond the interviews that they did for the book) to support their assertions.
Back to Mark's excellent book, his chapter on Vietnam is also quite good and he gives a fair assessment of Westmoreland which, like the case with the iraq narrative, is a good balance to the incorrect interpretation of Westmoreland provided by Sorley.
gian
A while back Muqawama posted a piece on Robert Fisk, financial markets and how he sucks. I have something of a professional interest in that piece and I was wondering if you could provide some sources that support the veracity of your piece.
Thank you.
Andrew,
Interesting report, but I wonder if you could provide a little more insight into your recent trip to Astan? General McChrystal, picked you to be part of his team; why? Also, I know you have considerable experience in Astan but what did you learn new this time? Help me to understand, in Clausewitzian terms "clash of wills", who really is the enemy. I mean, is AQ or the Taliban our primary opponent or perhaps the criminal drug trade; or is it just plain politics or is there a regional Pakistan component that overshadows these other opposing forces? You seem to be overly cryptic about your specific involvement in the current debate, yet general McChrystal picked you to help develop a way forward. What specifically did you learn and why are you giving President Obama a pass on supporting the plan you helped develop? This interesting article produces more questions because of what you leave out.
Major Bill Jakola
Here is a question.
If the United States et al was about to bomb the piss out of Iran, what would the immediately preceding situation in Af/Pak and Iraq look like?
May they are not deliberating or dithering. Maybe they are aiming.
Ex... you better email permissions-en@wikimedia.org to let them use your photo, or they are taking it off tomorrow. Bum bum bum.
diablo: Paranoid as I am, I still cant see Obama bombing Iran as any viable scenario. Turkey has just signed friendship pact w. Iran and Syria, and there are still 120 000 US personel in Iraq. Not to mention that the diplomatic chanels are actually making headway. It would surprise me very much if the US would be willing to commit itself to an all out war at this point of time.
Fnord.
There is an old Vulcan proverb
Only Obama could bomb the piss out of Iran.
Fnord - this from stratfor.com. connecting the dots as they do. . .
The other explanation might be that the White House wanted to let Iran know that the Americans don't need Russia to deal with Iran. The threats to Russia might infuriate it, but the Kremlin is unlikely to feel much in the form of clear and present dangers. On the other hand, blasting the Russians the way Biden did might force the Iranians to reconsider their hand. After all, if the Americans are no longer thinking of the Russians as part of the solution, this indicates that the Americans are about to give up on diplomacy and sanctions. And that means the United States must choose between accepting an Iranian bomb or employing the military option.
And this leaves the international system with two outcomes. First, by publicly ending attempts to secure Russian help, Biden might be trying to get the Iranians to take American threats seriously. And second, by directly challenging the Russians on their home turf, the United States will be making the borderlands between Western Europe and Russia a very exciting place.
yo yo yo
"As Steve Biddle and other have noted, though, the primary weakness of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine is its assumption that the interests of the host nation line up with those of the United States. In Afghanistan -- as in Iraq and Vietnam -- U.S. military officers and diplomats have dealt with host governments whose composition and behavior have been at odds with U.S. objectives and interests."
I think we are begining to understand that there is an additional disconnect here (and an additional weakness in COIN doctrine?), one that extends beyond the disconnect noted between the interests of the United States and those of the host government.
Herein, I am talking about what is now being called "village-ism" or "valley-ism." It would seem that the people in the Afghan villages and valleys have, historically, pretty much governed themselves. And it is for this freedom that they appear most willing to fight.
Thus, today, it would seem that the people in the separate villages and valleys see their interests as being at odds with those of both the so-called host government -- and the United States -- as they see both of these entities as "outsiders," whose primary purpose is perceived to be (1) to interfere in their affairs, (2) so as to control them and, thereby, (3) exploit them for their (the host government's and the United States') own (distinctly different?) purposes.
So, in the case of Afghanistan, at least, (same in Iraq and Vietnam?) there appears to be a triple-layed disconnect that must be overcome.
As someone who is new to this COIN stuff, I would ask: Does COIN strategy, guidance, etc., address this triple-layed disconnect phenomenon and the central problem -- for both the host government and the foreign occupier -- of being considered "alien" and at odds with the desires and interests of the people?
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