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As I watched the Frontline documentary on Tuesday night and read the Dexter Filkins profile of Stan McChrystal in the New York Times Magazine yesterday, I found myself thinking the same thing as Spencer Ackerman*: when are the people so eloquent in their criticism of counter-insurgency strategies actually going to step up to the plate and offer constructive alternatives?
The only real alternative I have heard with respect to Afghanistan has been articulated by Robert Pape, and while I do not think it would work, I give the University of Chicago professor full marks for putting it out there like a man and letting people take a swing at his argument.** Because it's easy -- really easy -- to make a public argument for why a counterinsurgency strategy is a bad idea in Afghanistan. Heck, I think we should execute a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan yet cogently argue the other side of that particular coin in debates with peers and colleagues on a regular basis. What I cannot do is defend -- in an intellectually honest way -- alternative strategies. Like our commanders in Afghanistan, I just do not think alternatives will work without accepting a lot more risk than the president has thus far allowed himself to accept with respect to Afghanistan and Pakistan as safe havens for transnational terror groups.
I'm an East Tennessean and apparently face limits with respect to my cognative capacity that perhaps some of you smarter folks out there do not. So you guys tell me if there are alternate strategies out there of which I, in either my ignorance or blind adherence to counterinsurgency doctrine, am unaware. But I challenge some of those who have been effective and intelligent critics of counterinsurgency strategies in Afghanistan to come up with alternatives and hint at how they might be operationalized. Otherwise, those folks are not being terribly helpful in this public debate.
*CNAS Writer-in-Residence, Class of 2023
**There is the much-written-about but less-known-about-in-specifics Biden Plan, I guess. I would want to know more about this plan before I started slinging stones at it.
I think the alternatives can be summarised as the 1. Black Adder Strategy and the 2. Monty Python Strategy. To whit:
1. Kill them all.
2. Run away quickly.
The Biden plan is somewhere in between - run away at moderate pace and then kill some of them.
There is the "Medieval Fortress"/hamlet strategy/operation that Elf and I have talked about. ie, you secure the cities and bigger towns, then work on the wilderness. In the meantime, you build up the security forces and send them out on "search & destroy" patrols. And root out corruptions in the cities while you're at it.
While we'd all love to have unlimited troops, there's a limit to how much we can do. So we need to efficiently save who we can. Give support to those who ask (give village militia guns, ammo, and a radio).
Basically, make the CT our main effort, and population security the supporting effort.
At $400/gallon of gas in Afghanistan, it's becoming unaffordable.
And oh yeah, toss Karzai to the wolves and give up on the whole puppet Afghan president, Westphalian Nation-State Paradigm obsession for now.
Oh come on Andrew; plenty of coin critics have offered alternatives. Bacevich did in a number of different places. Bernard Finel has on SWJ and so have I. SNLII on this very blog a few months ago did as well. Doug Macgregor has in a number of places. LTC Danny Davis just did in a widely disseminated analysis from him. I could go on.
Perhaps the problem is with you being blinded by your hope for Coin to the point where anything thing that sounds different to nation building in Astan is dismissed as noise.
You sound like the French Coin officers in 1960 telling DeGaulle that there were no alternatives to Algeria other than continuing on down the same road or face catastrophe.
The French left and the world did not fall apart for them.
g
So Gian, would it be fair to say you are of the Monty Python school?
Andrew,
There are some of us to believe that the goal of a stable, democratic Afghanistan that does not harbor AQ is not an achievable goal regardless of strategy, and we also happen to believe that a stable, democratic Afghanistan isn't necessary to support our vital interests. So, to really offer an alternative requires reexamination of the problem and underlying causes along with national priorities. If one lowers horizons a bit (or even a lot) from what the COINdinistas assume, then other strategies become obvious and have been discussed pretty extensively in the comments on this site and elsewhere.
So, what is the priority? If it's preventing an AQ safe-haven in Afghanistan similar to that which was present before 9/11 then I submit that can be achieved in a variety of ways. Minimally, all that needs doing is preventing the Taliban from taking over the country, an easy task, and maintain the ability, either directly or through proxies, to interdict any substantial AQ presence in Afghanistan. The result would be that AQ may move back to Afghanistan, but it's position would be no better that what it currently enjoys in Pakistan. In reality, AQ in Afghanistan would be much more vulnerable.
And here's a question for you: At what point can/will you conclude that COIN cannot succeed? The factors that would enable such a strategy to succeed are quickly falling down, yet the prognosis of the COINdinistas does not change. We now have eight years of failure and the quite significant effect that has on Afghan's confidence that we can deliver. IOW, after crying wolf so long, do we even have enough credibility left with the population? Judging from the Frontline piece, probably not. Secondly, we have a corrupt, incompetent Afghan government that has little legitimacy. This latest election, the fraud that it was, only confirms what many of us have known for some time. How does your support of COIN square with the reality that the Afghan government cannot do much of anything? Finally - and these are only the three biggest Bulls in the COIN china shop - there is the Pakistani safe-haven, which is a problem that no one has an answer to beyond platitudes about pressuring Pakistan to "do more." One doesn't need to offer "alternatives" to see that these three factors make belief in a COIN solution wishful thinking at best. COIN cannot succeed with an insurgent safe-haven, it can't succeed with an incompetent, corrupt, illegitimate and overly-centralized host government, and it can't succeed when you've lost all credibility with the population. What you, Nagl and the other COINdinistas must do is explain how to overcome these barriers to a successful COIN campaign and it would be nice if you were specific.
At the suggestion of this blog, I've started "In the Graveyard of Empires" by Seth G. Jones. In it, he explicitly states that most insurgencies begin because there is breakdown in governance, which is not meeting the needs of the populace. Insurgent groups capitalize on the distrust/anger/etc. left by this void. Kilcullen states something similar in "Accidental Guerilla". It seems that poor governance is indeed to root of the problem.
Any alternative would need to explain the emergence of insurgents/transnational terrorist groups, and the corresponding strategy would need to put an end to it. So far, from what I've read (and I don't claim to be an expert at all), the alternatives are just to kill more bad guys with a lower human cost to the US (not that this is a bad thing). It is highly unlikely that all insurgents/transnational terrorists will be killed in any such strategy. Without confronting the problem at its source, they will just regroup at a later date.
I find the COIN solution to be so convincing because they explain the cause of the problem, and provide a solution that will not only do away with the irreconcilables but create an environment that is inhospitable to the return of said insurgent/transnational terrorist group.
"The French left and the world did not fall apart for them."
The world of all the Algerians who had worked for/supported them and couldn't get out fast enough pretty much did though. I am not saying that should be a decisive consideration for the US in Afghanistan but it ought not be ignored either.
I'm sorry but for someone to argue that no one is offering alternative ideas to COIN tells me they really aren't looking that closely. Beyond the ones mentioned by Gian I would also add Austin Long this week in Af/Pak; Sean Kay several weeks ago in Af/Pak; hell I did it in Af/Pak not to mention at DA. Gilles Dorronsorro offered one of the smarter alternatives to COIN earlier this year. How many posts has Foust written on folks who want to 'bribe tribes'?
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/blog/10488
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/blog/10108
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/01/from_coin_to_containment
I'm sure I'm forgetting a bunch on a Friday evening at 7:00, but my advice Andrew is look harder. Just because you don't like them - or they don't fit the unshakable COIN paradigm - doesn't mean alternative ideas don't exist.
I'm sorry but for someone to argue that no one is offering alternative ideas to COIN tells me they really aren't looking that closely. Beyond the ones mentioned by Gian I would also add Austin Long this week in Af/Pak; Sean Kay several weeks ago in Af/Pak; hell I did it in Af/Pak not to mention at DA. Gilles Dorronsorro offered one of the smarter alternatives to COIN earlier this year. How many posts has Foust written on folks who want to 'bribe tribes'?
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/blog/10488
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/blog/10108
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/01/from_coin_to_containment
I'm sure I'm forgetting a bunch on a Friday evening at 7:00, but my advice Andrew is look harder. Just because you don't like them - or they don't fit the unshakable COIN paradigm - doesn't mean alternative ideas don't exist.
Do you bother to read the voluminous critiques of McChrystal's report or do you not care?
Exum can't find alternatives because he doesn't want to, it's as simple as that. Exum has ridden the COIN wave over the past six months, suddenly becoming an expert on Afghanistan, because Obama said he was going to escalate in Afghanistan, and Exum was in a logical position to jump on the bandwagon and narrate the escalation to the media. The media appearances on Frontline, PBS, Rachel Maddow can all be attributed to the fact that he can explain that apparent COIN strategy, and hardly have anything to do with serious original analysis.
Does anyone think that the industry has any interest in seeing a shift from COIN in Afghanistan? Of course they don't. The simple fact is that if there is a shift towards anything other than fighting COIN in Afghanistan, that's bad news for the COIn industry.
I would add to Gian's comment:
"You sound like the French Coin officers in 1960 telling DeGaulle that there were no alternatives to Algeria other than continuing on down the same road or face catastrophe.
The French left and the world did not fall apart for them."
Exum also sounds like the Generals in Vietnam 1967-1973. The US left Vietnam and the world did not fall apart for them either.
... when are the people so eloquent in their criticism of counter-insurgency strategies actually going to step up to the plate and offer constructive alternatives?"
You've got to be kidding. Have you had your hands over your ears for the past two years or more? Is your willful ignorance on this indicative of the group think going on in the DC bubble? I guess asking the question is better than erecting a strawman, but not by much.
Ditto what Col. Gentile and Andy said.
More nonsense. People have put forward plenty of alternatives - they just usually aren't foolish enough to attempt to sell them as complete solutions, and as such are immediately ignored.
Anyone read the transcript of Richard Barrett's recent comments at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy? Well worth your time: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/barrett20090929.pdf
Dear AM,
Long time reader, first time commenter. Please don't take the Cointra arguments personally, as you have been doing in increasing measure since you took your position at CNAS. You've lost some of your snark, and seem to be taking petty put-downs on your blog more seriously than you used to. Just because you've been subject to personal attacks doesn't mean you should lose your sense of humor. You reach a much wider audience by making your subject more approachable and less academic. On a blog, it shouldn't be all business.
-A past and future reader.
Here a couple:
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20091019/polk
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20091102/hayden
I concur with others-literally dozens of alternatives have been offered to the population-centric COIN policy which would take 25-40 years to execute properly and would both destroy NATO and risk permanently malforming and demoralizing the UK and US armed forces. Pretending that no alternatives have been put on offer, or that 'offshore balancing' is the only other game in town really does sound like strategic-level groupthink deafness. To cite just three alternatives that are out there:
(1) do what the Soviets did. Build up a halfway decent Afghan army, secure the urban centres and main highways, buy off some major warlords, and pull out. Leave the tribal politics to be managed by the Afghans themselves, the people who understand it best, and be prepared to pour in military subsidies to Kabul for decades. Based on the Soviet experience, this whole plan could be executed in two years, not ten.
(2) There was much talk when Obama came into office of a regional 'grand bargain', but nothing came of it. Stop flogging the dead horse of Afghan sovereignty, offer the Russians and Chinese an informal sphere of influence in northern Afghanistan, and leave the Pakistanis and Indians to battle it out over the south-my hunch is the Pakistanis would win that fight. Establish a major drone centre in Tajikistan with Russian and Chinese personnel fluent in the local languages, and a long distance link to Tampa Florida, and run an intelligence-led CT operation orientated around permanent overwatch and full spectrum electronic surveillance.
(3) Buy up every poppy field in sight for medicinal use, dissolve the Afghan army, remove the heavy western military footprint, and go for fully decentralized government instead, with tribal militias bought off to fight the Taliban at their own game. This to be a variation on the 2001 strategy, which seemed to work just fine until 2004-6 when we started trying to nation-build instead. Our wallets have got to be bigger than the Taliban's after all.
I'm in favor of the El Salvador option, myself, where we are fully engaged in training missions, continue with CT, and bust the tails of the ruling gov'ts in AfPak on reform. Send ISAF home. Send the US Army home. Take the Marines up on their offer to fight the Afghan war and let them do SF-lite, use SF in Somalia and Pakistan, and let the direct action boyz and the CIA do CT.
"Like our commanders in Afghanistan, I just do not think alternatives will work without accepting a lot more risk than the president has thus far allowed himself to accept with respect to Afghanistan and Pakistan as safe havens for transnational terror groups."
My own mental limitation is being unable to understand why we must COIN Afghanistan but CT is OK for Somalia and Pakistan. We are not accepting risk with an unCOINed Somalia? If we're talking about stepping up to the plate, you need to articulate your view on that point.
Also, I don't hear any mention of "the love that dare not speak its name" -- military-budget-luv and the cost of COIN in Afghanistan. The next time CNAS has a CNN spot, why doesn't someone tell the American people what kind of health care the high-option COIN budget could buy and then suggest an online CNN poll to let the people speak on an evaluation of their health risks versus the risk of transnational terror groups.
On an up-note, don't forget that when it comes to COINdinista and COINtra, we're all sitting around the same table at the end of the day.
"There is the "Medieval Fortress"/hamlet strategy/operation that Elf and I have talked about. ie, you secure the cities and bigger towns, then work on the wilderness." Sounds to me like a doctrine that could be called "Fortress America" ~ 'where your nationality keeps you safe.'
Israel is such a resounding success, is it?
Thanks, but no thanks - one president suited up for war crimes is enough.
747
All this talk of China and India influencing Afghanistan is pretty humorous stuff. Even the Russians are comparatively limited in influence in this region.
You want to talk about group think tank deafness? Nobody so much as even whispers IRAN in any of this.
Afghanistan is literally Iran's backyard (Iraq is its front yard). Millions of Afghanis have lived in Iran for long stretches of time, as Iran was compassionate enough to take them in during both the Soviet and Taliban conflicts. Moreover, Iran has decades of experience involving itself in Afghani internal affairs. It still does.
Come on you guys, it was Iran's influence that was instrumental in getting the Northern Alliance to accept the US deal that delivered the massive setback to the Taliban in 2001. (Of course, the US responded to Iran's good faith by branding it an "axis of evil"! Remember that one? Oooof!)
Iran shares a border with Afghanistan, as well as millennia of common culture and Persian rule. Many Afghanis speak basically the same language as Iran. A sizable minority shares the same exact brand of Islam. China? India? Please... You're deluding yourselves.
It would be interesting for a moment to consider Iran's own perspective on the two main options being presented for US strategy. The COIN approach holds several advantages for the Iranians. It serves to bog down a substantial US military force engaging Iran's enemy, the Taliban. It also pours in a lot of money to build up the country, which is useful for Iran's economic penetration in the short run, and especially so after an inevitable US drawdown. The CT approach has the advantage of a diminished US footprint in the country, enabling Iranian influence to better permeate the Tajik, Hazara and Uzbeki regions. While at the same time, the US assists directly or indirectly in the promotion of an effective balance of power between these basically Persianate peoples and the Pashtuns. Both approaches offer advantages (more than those cited above), but the one that Iran is most likely hoping for is COIN. COIN clearly offers the very real possibility of a weakened US military, as well as a weakening effect on the US economy. And in the event that Iran is faced with increased hostility from the US, a large US presence in neighboring Afghanistan offers a convenient, abundant means of retaliation.
Yes, the Iranians are certainly interested in how their unwitting "gardeners" are going to "clean up" their backyard. After all, these same "gardeners" did manage to "cut down the fence and pull out most of the weeds" in the front yard! Best thing of all? Iran doesn't even pay for these goods and services. Those are paid for on credit, by the "gardener's" friends, families and relatives. You really couldn't ask for a better set up. Could you?
and i ran
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wA1_aw2wAYI&feature=related
I agree with the above comment by Long Time Reader: "You reach a much wider audience by making your subject more approachable and less academic." Continue, please, and don't pay attention to my making fun of D.C. culture; it is second nature to a small government conservative to make such jokes.
How hard is it to put together a "link dump" of pro vs contra? Honestly, the paper detailing the online arguments is waiting to be written! As an educator, YOU ALL completely frustrate me, internet persons! Mark Safranski at zenpundit does this sort of thing all the time, for various subjects, and it is enormously useful. Get to it! :)
Ask your readers to send in the best pro and contra articles, set up two columns, link dump in two general columns, and have your readers, or better yet an intern, summarize, and include the summary at the botton. Yes, a simpleton task for an enormous and complicated subject, but it might be interesting to do as an excercize.
I've read many of the articles mentioned in the comments sections and one thing that frustrates me is HOW LITTLE HARD DATA some of those articles include. They are essays arguing general points. Am I wrong about this? Correct me, please, if wrong, I don't mean to disparage at all! I come from such a different field, I'm not used to the format in this area, perhaps.
I have no idea, absolutely none, as to what should be done. I'm a bit distrustful of the more confident assertions: how can you know you are any more correct than the other guy or gal if all you are doing is arguing general principles and don't include hard data? Well, I certainly don't know.
Finally, this gave me MASSIVE pause: "The Internet penetration in Afghanistan remains low, at 1.8 percent, but connectivity is significantly higher in Pakistan, where more than 10 percent and a huge number of people in absolute terms - more than 17.5 million families and individuals - have Internet access. Pakistani youths are enthusiastic consumers of the Taliban's multimedia products." - Thomas Rid, War 2.0. (BTW, this really is a brilliant book. The blurbs say that all the time about all sorts of books, but in this instance, it's actually kind of true.)
So, perhaps, as we are already in Afghanistan, and have a chance to kind of, well, 'squeeze' both sides of the Durand Line, we ought to? Safe havens, as mentioned here, on Dr. Finel's blog and at Kings of War, recently, are physical and intellectual spaces, and are varied in geographic distribution. This does not speak to how one should do the squeezing, so COIN vs. non-COIN I dunno from
Go back to first principles, I suppose. What do we want? What is the endstate? How best can we acheive it? The reason this argument is frustrating is that the pro vs contra don't agree on what we want and what the endstate should be. So, the arguments on how to secure such are confusing and contradictory. I think.
Oh, heck, so glad I studied medicine instead of all of this. It's too hard.
Oh, and one more general comment: in terms of the communication aspects, someone is going to have to take charge of the argumentation at some point. So, er, Mr. President, when you do eventually decide (hey, I'm not knocking deliberation), you are also going to have to be the communicator, and not just the decider. Or, someone in your administration will have to take the lead in the communication efforts. It will be hard, you can't please everyone, you can't poll everything out or lead by a putting up a finger to test which way the wind is blowing. The last crew didn't do a good job communicating and it hurt war efforts. Well, when things were difficult. When things are going well, everyone goes back to reading TMZ.
Last comment on this thread, I promise.
Many of the pro-COIN types think a centralized Afghanistan government is achievable, many of the anti-COIN types don't. And, the desirability of such is argued, too. Or so it seems to me. So, if you are arguing different endstates as most desirable and acheivable, you are arguing past each other and it has nothing to do with COIN. Am I right or am I wrong about this? Confusion!
@ Jimmy - thanks but both AM and frankly you (over on your blog) have put in some real time, thought and effort on this...I have only plugged in two cents worth.
But he did ask for alternatives. So that's one.
I still am willing to give the Pope and Humanae Triage till Dec 2010 but I now have a big caveat - only IF POTUS gets behind it. And I don't know if he's got it in him.
And if he doesn't - then he should either 1) Adopt Bush's economy of force/CT strategy or 2) Cut and Run.
Whether it's #1 or #2 depends on the unknowable unknown of just how much sand and staying power the Salesman has - the record of which is not encouraging for those who would stand their ground and fight someplace other than our soil. Other than on Healthcare's public option and more importantly the stimulus (which was a Congressional orgy, so how encouraging is that) and in terms of accomplishments he has nothing other than the Stimulus.
There's few reliable methods for predicting future behavior of a person or a group. The most reliable is past behavior. He was always going to be a spendthrift Prez because he's been a spendthrift his entire public career.
He ran up $800 million in earmarks in his short stay in the Senate, it should not surprise us that it became $800 Billion as POTUS.
Past behavior - he doesn't stand his ground against thugs. He makes a deal with them, or pretends they don't exist. Any associations will be overlooked by the media and his connections can handle anything more serious...like deflecting determined investigators.
I am from a section of NY/NJ that felt the bite deep a few years ago...so I really don't want to risk another city..but..maybe we should just back off.
Sorry AM/CNAS and the vets and ones fighting now. Look at it this way - we haven't been hit in 8 years and 1 month.
So - it was for something.
Backs the Pope. And AM and Humanae Triage.
Because they've done the diligence, diligence in so many ways, and I don't feel qualified to second guess them...no, it's not mulish backing of the CDR in the field, or AM's star media presence, or Recon Nate's HBO gig, or a sympathy F**k for CNAS working so hard (pace SNLII). It's not even because of the entertainment value of watching the smoldering repressed carnality between Maddow and Exum on MSNBC (although that last bit comes close. I might actually sell out to watch Maddow come out of the closet and jump over the desk at Exum. Of course, I'm an asshole).
It's important that we do something to keep the asshole nihilistic genocidal scum at bay, and being in their backyard seems to pre-occupy most of their time. We probably can't get this "right" because there is no right. So we have to muddle through with the best least worst solution.
Madhu's point on general theory is spot on. Now I'm going to sin against it again - I don't know Yemen either, or Somalia. I believe I am reliably informed that there are however a great many tens of thousands more trained and well equipped and supplied (and funded) fighters in AF/PAK. And 100 nukes. And "A.Q Khan roaming around" as Jane Harmon put it yesterday at Brookings. So it's a little more important IMHO than Somolia, Chad, Buttfooistan, or the Grape blight afflicting the Duchy of Grand Fenwick.
Salman's points on Iran - yeah. WTF do we do about it....? I don't think there's a deal to be made with these guys...
And I don't buy into this Prestor John Taliban that we can make a deal with....that's not who they are or what happened.
Though COIN doctrine is supposed to refocus the mission on the people I feel it fails to meet the necessary cause of the insurgency: material condition. In COIN I see efforts to win over the population with paltry improvements in essential services and infrastructure, as well as a complete disregard for the realities of an economy struggling in a globalized free-market . Certainly poor governance and lack of security play significant roles in the continuation of an insurgency, however material condition is paramount. The forces in Afghanistan must meet the expectations of vastly improved conditions with reality; substantial improvements in infrastructure and essential services, and protection from globalized free markets for at least 5-10 years are thus requirements for a successful COIN strategy. Limiting the exposure of the Afghan local economies and country-wide free market to the globalized free-marketplace would allow for the growth of a truly resilient Afghan economy. Look at Iraq, Bremer dumped tens of thousands of men out of their jobs and into the streets with De-Ba'athification and the dissolution of the Iraqi military and security services. He also mounted a full-frontal assault on the Iraqi economy by privatizing the country and opening its borders to nearly unrestrained foreign competition. In return for his decisions Bremer received an insurgency. Iran provides a similar example, do a little research into the economic measures implemented under the Shah. If you can't provide meaningful employment and a strong, internally focus economy, then you'll get an insurgency, guaranteed.
*cough* I have been saying this for well over a year. *cough*
It's strange how no one noticed that while there was criticism of COIN abound, there were very few real alternatives offered. Saying something utterly simplistic like “oh, we will do CT operations using SOF and SF units while line units are employed in a greatly reduced capacity” is in no way reaching the level of complexity needed to develop an applicable operational strategy to either Iraq or Afghanistan.
And no, I am not being mendacious in making this statement. I have seriously never heard a real alternative offered by the two leading critics of COIN: Bacevich or Gentile. Unless of course you count “let’s get the fuck out as soon as possible because the costs are not justified” (Bacevich’s response, more or less).
I still don't understand how people think quitting is a plausible option for the military. Unless my understanding of the military has been wrong for years, if the civilian powers designate a task for the military (i.e. invasion and occupation of Iraq, Afghanistan), the military must seek the best possible way in which to execute the given the task. If enemy-centric tactics were truly the best way, we wouldn’t be having these goddamned fucking problems in Afghanistan 8 years in. Maybe that is a very disingenuous statement, as the entire campaign was under-funded, under-supplied (troops numbers, etc.), and put as far back on the backburner as could be metaphorically possible. Maybe a strategy of CT + enemy-centric would have worked if the campaign was properly looked after, but it wasn’t. For 8 fucking years it wasn’t. And no one said a goddamned thing. I didn’t hear any of you “conservative” morons complaining as Afghanistan slid towards being viscous, burdensome quandary. No, no, no. Now that Obama took the horns, suddenly Afghanistan has gone off the deep end and “conservatives” give a fuck. Fuck partisan politics. Fuck the endemic stupidity within this country. Fuck the civilians who couldn’t give a fuck about Afghanistan from 2002-2008.
God fucking dammit. Soldiers will die due to stupidity and NATO’s overt pussiness and aversion to doing any real work (I’m looking at you, Germany).
And I know I am being overly critical.
Mr. Cohen, thank you for the links. I am going to read them as soon as I get back from brunch (how douchey did that sound?). I do hope that those linked articles put forth a plausible, thorough plan by which an alternative to COIN may be executed to meet the demands put forth by our civilian overseers.
I agree with Madhu. What is the end state desired?
Arguing whether COIN or CT is more appropriate for the US and allies to follow in Afghanistan (or Central Asia, the Middle East... or the next "hot spot") seems to me singularly shortsighted. We need to engage diplomatically with other nations, with recognition that resources are limited and not ours to command - whether militarily or by any other means.
A real problem for the US is the focus on 'security' to the exclusion of other societal needs. The Department of Defense is massive, as are our annual expenditures for military activities, either directly or in aid to other countries.
The continuing diversion of money for military activities keeps a large sector of the populace employed. However, that diversion of money, effort and attention to military action deprives the nation of vitality sorely needed and even more sorely missing. It results in significant distortions of purpose and value throughout society.
If we continue as we are doing, the model used for comparisons won't be of Afghanistan, 'graveyard of empires'. It will be Rome - where the consequences of failed policies was subject to limits that no longer prevail, while similar forces of nature remain beyond our control.
Exum's criticism of counterinsurgency critics has been mine for a while now. It doesn't really change the fact that the detailed, specific and intellectually coherent arguments for counterinsurgency in Afghanistan will have us pouring tens of billions of dollars and a significant number of American lives into the place for the next generation at least.
Insurgencies are easiest to stop before they begin. If failures of governance contribute to them, it matters a lot who the failure is blamed on. In 2001, most Afghans blamed the government -- that is, the Taliban. We were the insurgents, in this sense, something that surely isn't true any longer. Counterinsurgency proponents now sometimes talk as if the intervening eight years hadn't happened, and I'll grant that had a properly resourced, population-centric counterinsurgency strategy been implemented shortly after the Northern Alliance's rusty tanks rolled into Kabul, Afghanistan might well not be the problem it is today. This is a moot point, completely and utterly moot. We don't get a do-over.
I yield to many people with respect to knowledge of Afghanistan, but I understand my own country pretty well -- well enough to know that committing to a 20-year Afghan counterinsurgency strategy now is not something we can do. A different strategy may not work; this one will not work. I could see where emphasizing population security in those parts of the country where the population is relatively more secure already might lay a foundation for American forces to draw down within five years. On the other hand, practically the first thing Gen. McChrystal did after assuming command in Afghanistan was to send a few thousand Marines to rattle around in Helmand province, a place we might get under control with several times that many troops by the time I retire. If that's what he'd try to do with more troops, I'm not sure I want to give them to him.
Exum is right about the risk if appearing to withdraw in defeat. That's the biggest risk we face at the moment. A Taliban -- and I know the word is shorthand for something more complex, but bear with me -- beaten down, with most of its leaders and foot soldiers dead or maimed and much of its territory in Pakistan's tribal areas lost, could be left to itself without undue risk at least in the near term to anyone else, but that isn't the Taliban we face right now. In the short term, my instinct would be to hurt the enemy everywhere he can be hurt and help the Afghan government to the extent we can, not the other way around. It certainly would be easier to act on this instinct if the Pakistani government offensive now underway in Waziristan did real damage. The record suggests this is not something to count on, but we ought at least to be prepared to capitalize if the suggestion is wrong.
Deus Ex,
Well, anything is plausible for the military as long as it is what the NCA orders. Palatable might be a different issue, but if an individual general has a problem with it, don't let the door hit him on the way out.
I am not so sure of the whole underfunded meme. I think through sheer luck Rumsfeld et al. reached the right strategy here. Do the minimum amount necessary that can both be sustained and keep the Coalition together and pulling some of the weight ,while ensuring the AQN does not reestablish itself here as a base for conducting more attacks against US interests.
I base this opinion primarily on the Coalition's inability to execute a whole of government approach sustained over the necessary time period to accomplish the mission. The CJCS said--back in February, I think--that non-DOD agencies are a decade away from having the capacity to provide the sustainable resources to conduct such a mission. And our allies are even further away--just as they are militarily (not denigrating the efforts of CAN, NE, UK or others, just talking about their size, and contrasting it with the size of their forces during the CW).
To me, the whole COIN vs. CT issue seems beside the point, because it is predicated on our being able to execute and sustain the COIN over a significant period of time, and I do not think that is the case.
I find it fascinating--in a "driving slowly to look at the car wreck fashion"--to read about the debate going on in DC about this as they struggle to deal with the electoral legitimacy issue. I work with the ANSF and find the whole concept of the Karzai government being a viable long term partner ludicrous. I have the same opinion about working with UNAMA, but I admit I am irreparably prejudiced against them after working in one fashion or other with the UN on five different PKO.
Interesting times.
Libertarian Soldier - Amen. On train wreck watching, Rumsfeld stumbled into it...(I wish I'd had the balls to just say it, it was a secret speculation of mine that was the case). And on the UN. I only had to deal with them in Africa and Bosnia - and not that much either place. Of course I'm from Jersey and frequently work in the City, we have our own opinion of the turds all our own. Worse than useless. A lot worse.
I see the rest of our allies are matching the wavering going on in D.C. Liberal Democratic Leader in U.K. is talking about withdrawing his parties support for UK Afghan mission if the strategy doesn't change.
I wonder if people understand there is no strategy. There was a slogan, there was charm. Then reality set in...and...he caved. No doubt an apology is coming for the Taliban. Or at least the Pashtu.
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I have one widdle thing I want to point out for the benefit of the readership - I think everyone knows this but loses sight of this sometimes - we did not take an oath of loyalty to the NCA (National Command Authority). We took it to the Constitution. And a General disagreeing strongly with the political leadership is hardly unhealthy for the nation. We really shouldn't be yes men (which is not saying disobey orders). That's a mistake.
Not to mention - good grief!! Ever listen to the tapes of Curtis LeMay advising JFK during the Cuban Missile Crisis?
Frank counsel is not the same as disobedience.
And if I wanted to inculcate tendencies that were unhealthy to the Republic - the first one would be making soldiers yes men to the political leadership.
And for the record for all - IMO two Generals who definitely undermined the policies of and frustrated the express wishes of the Commander In Chief: Zinni as CENTCOM 6 undermining Clinton's wish to get UBL in the 90's, and Abizaid not getting behind winning in Iraq if it meant surging.
Now I could be wrong about those two, sorry if I am. I wasn't actually directly in the loop.
Elf, if the result of "no strategy" is to expose to the American public the problems posed by all the strategies that had been expressed, with high confidence, as resolutions to problems that either were contrived by the strategists or resulted as 'unintended consequences' from their lack of capability, then "no strategy' is a hell of a lot better than anything yet delivered.
Charm - in physics, results in exponential increase in capacity.
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