Abu Muqawama retains its autonomy and the views and beliefs expressed within the blog do not reflect those of CNAS.
I just watched the Frontline documentary on Afghanistan. It is really excellent. All Americans seeking to understand the debates on Afghanistan and whether or not to pursue a counterinsurgency strategy there should watch it. John Nagl, Bill Mayville and Stan McChrystal make a good argument for a counterinsurgency campaign, while Andrew Bacevich and an especially pithy Celeste Ward make a good argument against pursuing such a campaign. All sides, in other words, acquit themselves rather well. All sides, that is, save for the Pakistani officials. An American watching this documentary might be of two minds as to whether or not we should pursue a counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, but he or she will also be of two minds as to why we continue to send so much money and other resources to a country whose leaders are either lying or delusional about the presence of anti-Government of Afghanistan insurgent groups -- such as the Quetta Shura Taliban and the Haqqani Network -- in Pakistan. The judgment of the documentary's producers seems to be that Pakistan is more an enemy of the United States than an ally. Amrullah Saleh's reaction to the Pakistanis and to U.S. policy toward Pakistan is especially amusing. But watch the video yourself. Really, it is very well done and contains some amazing combat footage. (At the beginning of the documentary, a U.S. Marine dies on camera. This blog appreciates the fact that Marcela Gaviria and Martin Smith sought -- and received -- the permission of the dead Marine's family to use the footage they used. This blog also appreciates the fact that the footage captures combat at its rawest, just the way Americans in their living rooms should see it, with all the blood and cursing included.)
Yeah, glad I watched it. Things are really clear now. Basically, we don't know what we want to do in Afghaninam, we wouldn't know how to go about it if we had a goal, and we probably don't have the resources to see the plan through if we had a plan. Meanwhile the highly trained, cool headed and ever lovable leathernecks are WHAMing the natives into hugging us by tramping through thier living rooms and shooting at things they can't see. Yeah this is gonna turn out well.
I agree, hats off to Frontline. I would have liked them to speak more on the extensive background that Nagl, Fick et al have to give an idea where this strategy is coming from, to differentiate from those coming from the Glenn Becks/Michel Moore's of the world. We don't want you all looking like strategists that have spent their careers in front of a chalkboard... They said in one quick clip that you figured that the pop-COIN would be easier than it is in practice, but I tend to think that you fellows have a pretty good idea. Still, they did a great job of conveying the various aspects (human, strategic, etc) without forcing a judgement on the viewership. If only the rest of the press could be as informative.
I don't think many who watch this film will have their confidence in our ability to succeed in Afghanistan on the terms proposed by Gen. McChrystal and others increased as a result.
Mike D: Imagine if they had done a segment on ANSF.
Your beard. Hahaha, gets me every time.
definitely excellent show. To me the COIN vs CT debate has convinced me COIN is the best way to go, but I'll be honest that this documentary makes me feel worse about it, and especially when I think of the Pakistani's. Holy JC!!! Those guys are the epitome of sleazy, crooked liars. And, we're giving those guys billions of dollars/year!!!! To me the most sane sounding person was the Afghani head of intelligence who said you'll only change them through pressure, not incentives. At least his anger was genuine and honest. At least something was. Does $billions not give us some leverage?! Instead of invading Iraq, maybe it should have been Pakistan...
How about we get these Marines some decent weapons, jeesus still having M-16s give me a break here. Cancel 1 or 2 of the Air Forces planes and get them some weapons. That's an exaggeration but come on this is crazy that they have weapons that are that old.
cn: COIN is the best way to go? Today it was announced that the manpower cost of the last reinforcement wasn't 21,000 but 35,000 because the "support" troops weren't included. It's also come out that the latest troop options given Obama range as high as 80,000. I wonder if that includes support troops or will that tidbit come out after a few months? That's $ 300 billion per year once long term costs are factored in.
So a plan that requires as many as and probably more than 160,000 US troops plus at least as many civilians and close to $ 1 trillion every three years, that according to the doctrine of it's supporters needs a legitimate local government to work is the way to go? And that's before you throw in waning public support, a useless police force and dodgy army, Pakistan and basic questions about the capability of the US military to act as a police force in a Muslim country.
Did I mention that the doctrine PC COIN is based on has never actually worked in a substantial country and is largely copied from French hopes on what may have worked in Indo-China and Algeria (the fact that the French were colonial occupiers apparently being overlooked).
Pakistani government denial is not the hard to believe. We (the U.S.) had a secretary of state that denied there was an insurgency in Iraq as long as he could, even when it came across publicly as being utterly ridiculous.
Mr. Exum,
If you're still in the Stanford area, allow a future Army officer to buy former one lunch. I'm part of the SCU ROTC program, which includes Stanford cadets, and it'd be an honor to meet with you.
Sincerely,
CDT Domalewski
Interestingly, U.S. financial support for Haqqani in the 1980s is glossed over. Amrullah Saleh's own institution has been largely inept, too, along with other institutions run by Karzai's lackeys. The dearth of actual experts in Afghanistan's history, cultures, and languages in this documentary are unfortunate. It is an excellent documentary of U.S. policy debates. It is, however, easy to think the situations are quite simple after watching an hour-long documentary. This is, of course, not the case.
Abu Muq - well done on the abandonment of the pink shirt (I have a pink shirt but i don't wear it to the rugby) - pink ties are ok. . . .
apart from the content, i thought the amazing bit was the links that come up, relevant to the content being played
very starship troopers - 'interested? read more here'
i felt the second most depressing line was 'we can do everything right but still lose' - and we are pretty fucking far from doing everything right. (sorry ma ex)
the most depressing line was 'he's bleeding out'.
sigh.
Frontline completely ignores the ethnic dimension of the situation.
The Director of Afghan Intelligence, who holds such a negative opinion of his counterparts in Pakistan, is an ethnic Tajik. It is only natural Amrullah Saleh distrusts Pashtun-supporting Pakistanis. And as we all should know by now, Pashtuns make up the rank and file of the so-called Taliban. I'm sure the good Tajik also despises the small but dedicated corp of Saudi-supported Arab mercenaries, commonly referred to by Americans as "al-Qaida".
The Tajiks are actually an Iranian people. During the documentary, I could actually understand Abdullah Abdullah using his native tongue; Dari, a local rendering of Persian.
Before the spectacular events of 2001 (the assassination of Shah Massoud, 9/11, direct US military involvement in Afghanistan) Iran was in a similar situation to which the US now finds itself in. However, there were two crucial differences: Iran was smart enough not to directly engage its own troops in open conflict, nor was it foolhardy enough to commit to a military occupation. Back then, Iran confronted the same exact Taliban/Pakistan axis which dumbfounds US forces today. Where the US currently has an advantage in firepower, Iran held an advantage in cultural links to the Tajiks, Hazzara (Shia), and to a certain extent even the Uzbeks (Turks). The game was the same: bring in as many Pashtuns as possible over to their side.
The fault lines in Iran's pre-2001 dealings in Afghanistan were much clearer defined than those which currently perplex the US. Pakistan-supported Taliban and Saudi-supported al-Qaida did not represent adverse support from respective allies, with either large aid transfers or huge trade ties conflating the issues at hand. It was relatively clean cut for Iran. Still, it represented a difficult distraction.
It must be terribly frustrating for American leadership and US soldiers to find themselves in this dirty, resource-diverting morass. For their part, while not publicly admitting so, Iran's leadership is extremely grateful. For if the US wasn't committed to its own hopeless, open-ended engagement in Afghanistan, Iran would surely have to deal with it. This REALLY saves Iran the great trouble. Winner- Iran!
"You cannot incentivize bad behaviour." (Segment 4: 44', 35")
http://www.dangerousminds.net/index.php/site/comments/why_republicans_ar...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kERqL0fty50
one thing that seems to be shared by both the taliban and us forces is the enjoyment of firing off light anti tank weapons.
We are so screwed.
Why is it that I for the last year has kept on hearing Joy Division singing in the background?
"Just for one moment
I thought I found my way
Destiny unfolded
I watched it slip away"
What is the sound of one window of opportunity clapping?
Finding your natural point of aim.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dQtY2gkUM0Y&feature=fvw
Derringer vs. Creedmoor
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Derringer
http://www.assra.com/remington_creedmoor_rifle.htm
The New York Times has an interesting article this morning that further confirms my suspicions about the curious take VP Biden is taking on Afghanistan: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/14/world/14biden.html?_r=1&hp.
"A few hours after getting off a plane from America’s war zones, Joseph R. Biden Jr. slipped into a chair, shook off his jet lag and reflected on what he had seen. The situation in Iraq, he said, was much improved. In Pakistan, he said he saw encouraging signs.
Then he came to Afghanistan and shook his head.
“It has deteriorated significantly,” he said. “It’s going to be a very heavy lift.”"
While I agree with AM that Frontline was making a judgment on Pakistan and their government's seeming duplicity, I can't deny I've seen much to make me disagree with their assessment (though I've been greatly appreciating Londonstani's take in recent weeks). Can someone show me the "encouraging signs" in Pakistan then VP-elect Biden may have been referring to? The willingness to wage a campaign in Waziristan seems less about assisting "allies" and combating Taliban and more about protecting self interests--and who can blame them? I liked Dr. Nagl's take last night: he admitted to "holding his nose" when dealing with the Pakistani government. (And, for the record, I agree we need to continue to work with them.)
Clearly, Biden's take on Pakistan is a political one--I can understand that even if I disagree personally. But, I don't see how he can look at Pakistan and be "encouraged" and at Afghanistan and be completely deterred (sobering as the situation is). Nor, can I see how his counter-terror proposal would further what he sees as "encouraging signs" in our work with the Pakistanis. I fall more on the Nagl/Fontaine view of COIN's success in Afghanistan than this blog's host, I think, but I can't quite follow the VP's logic on this.
I only caught the last 20 minutes of so of the program. I didn't hear any argument from Nagl and McChrystal about WHY we should do COIN - just how. Bacevich talked about "COIN people need to show that there's no alternative to COIN, etc." and then Frontline cut to Nagl saying "we need to do COIN but we aren't going to have 600,000", etc.
What was the argument showing that a COIN campaign is actually necessary?
We actually did a SNCO and officer PME on the abbreviated 24 mintue version that came out a couple of weeks ago. As a Marine infantry battalion we obviously have a vested interest in what our sister units are doing. Needless to say the first 10-15 mintues were enlightening in regards to both tactical errors and errors in engaging the locals. It is documentaries like this that allow us to adjust training and anticipate many of the problems we would likely face in theater. I highly recommend that anyone deploying to Afghanistan with a combat unit watch the documentary and discuss it afterwards.
Visitor 8:31,
"What was the argument showing that a COIN campaign is actually necessary?"
There really isn't one. And you won't hear the people at CNAS seriously debating that question, because if there is a serious debate about conditions on the ground, what they mean, how serious the al-Qaeda threat in Afghanistan is, they likely lose.
The fact is people like Exum, Nagl, Fick and co NEED to fight a COIN in Afghanistan because if there weren't wars being fought, what would they talk about? That's the problem with people whose credentials are centered around the tactical application of military force. If there's no military force to apply, they lose out career wise.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01-2pNCZiNk&feature=PlayList&p=B83DC291F2...
That's right Bart, its those damn dirty apes at CNAS who got us into Afghanistan, and they alone are keeping us there. If we could only shut them up, all americans would agree we need to leave afghanistan post haste.
It's everyone whose career expertise centers around the application of military force. That would also include General McChrystal and many military officers.
Barts right why do we have a military that focuses on the application of military force? Maybe they should focus on conflict resolution, trust building, and self esteem.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WmxT21uFRwM
(I think they should focus on marching up and down the square, but I'm old Army...)
Never mind Afghan scholars, I was surprised the documentary didn't feature a single AFGHAN to argue that there's some value in the West staying (Saleh doesn't count; he just argues for stronger Western measures against Pakistan). They come across as largely mute, skeptical bystanders. Which is not entirely untrue, I guess. But there's no way any dispassionate observer would see this and think it's an argument for spending more time or troops on this.
Marching up and down the square.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nLJ8ILIE780
great Frontline show. Agree that Mr. Saleh was probably the most truthful in describing the Pakistani government's efforts. sigh... It will be a tough slog getting COIN working well enough so that Obama can bring 'em home.
I'm an avid Frontline watcher and yesterday's showing on the Afghanistan debate did not dissaopint. However, I'm still not sure that the powers that be have clearly articulated our objectives and strategic goals in Afghanistan. Also, given the botched summer election, can we really convince ourselves that we have an erstwhile partner in the Karzai government?
Abu Muq - you're quite a dashing young man.
" I was surprised the documentary didn't feature a single AFGHAN to argue that there's some value in the West staying."
Might that not be a coincidence?
@Visitor but not a troll
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DtUMa0FtuWY
No mention in the episode of where our money to Pakistan actually goes. My thumbnail understanding of the situation is that we give bags of cash to the Pakistani (military) establishment to fight the Taliban. They neglect to do this, and buy more guns to point at India, until the Taliban start killing people in Pakistan instead of in Afghanistan and they are forced to react. (Kerry-Lugar is meant to remedy this somewhat, right?)
Doesn't this suggest that the way out in "Af-Pak" necessitates some kind of solid diplomatic settlement with India?
Apologies if this is hopelessly naive or a well-known dead end, I'm talking out my a** here. The US conversation about Pakistan is coming around to their self-conception as a state under dire threat, but India doesn't get mentioned as a part of that at all.
I thought it was a very well done documentary about the dilemma we are in.
Aside the obvious and already mentioned observations I noticed a few details that I find disturbing and hope are not normal MO.
1.) The Taliban strategy to fire one round into the market, following by 20 Marines emptying their magazines at something they cannot see is disturbing. They finally got one soldier to actually aim at a target and hit it. This obvious overreaction on our side is probably natural, considering the place and situation, but I think it needs to be untrained. Maybe its the age and maturity that plays a role here. It reminds me of bringing down the New York towers and in response getting into the war in Afghanistan and later Iraq, if that ever was AQ strategy.
2.) I don't think COIN works if you have an 18 year old strongtalk an assembly of village elders through a "terp" that's not from the region. At least show up with some white hair and a beard to give these elders something to relate to. You wouldn't be able to pull a stunt like this in the US, even with the advantage of speaking the same language. And what would be wrong about volunteering for a couple of hours to help build that house the Afghanis were working on? That might not be the orders or job description but that would have been a friendly gesture.
So.. don't want to step on the Marines too much (never a good idea), I am sure they are doing their best considering the situation and orders. Also don't want to judge by one video, I understand in Afghanistan 'one shoe doesn't fit all'.
$.02 Out.
I think you make two valid points. These are the types of things we need to overcome - and I would say that it is extremely difficult. It is extremely easy for me to armchair quarterback from the rear, but in that situation they are reacting to training. Further, I can't even say the response was wrong - but I think it is a learning point for units in CONUS to understand what likely reactions of their Marines and soldiers will be.
Unfortunately what they don't show is the company commander or the battalion commander circulating the battlespace and doing the engagement. I can say with a fair amount of certainty that they do and that the results are much different than what the documentary displayed. However, I think it clearly highlighted the point that "frustration" is the norm and that we have to prepare our junior Marines and soldiers for that. That's the difficult task because aside from learning to engage the locals appropriately there are general proficiencies that must be met as well, such as basic marksmenship, calling for fire, comm gear proficiency, as well ensuring the well being of the rest of his squad. And then spread that load on every squad leader within that platoon, company, battalion, etc. It's doable, but it certainly isn't easy.
Another except from Mike's World of COIN on people skills-
Outside of all the different literature and doctrine on COIN, I'd suggest the one quality that CANNOT be neglected is people skills and the ability to communicate.
In Iraq, during initial infiltration, I would spend long hours just listening and asking various questions to key leaders to establish repoire. These talks had nothing to do with the immediate fight...
- So how was life under Saddam?
- How did your government use to work?
- Tell me about fighting in the Iran-Iraq war or Kuwait. This was a money question. Every veteran loves to tell war stories. This transcends culture.
- Why do y'all hate Israel?
- So, tell me about Islam.
Later, after repoire was established:
- So, when are you going to quit fighting?
- What type of world do you want your children to grow up in?
- What are you going to do about it?
These talks probably served as one of the best shaping maneuvers for my troop. Over time, regardless of if the sheik was a sunni who backed the resistance or a shia who backed JAM/BADR, my troop was humanized to the leaders in my area. It didn't solve all the problems, but it was a good start.
On the ground, my boys did the same things with the locals. For training, I used the bar analogy. You can't walk up to a girl in a bar and demand that she go home with you. You have to use some mojo. If you really want a long-term relationship, then you're best not getting drunk and sleeping with her the first night. Same rules apply in combat.
If I was a commander in A'stan, I would aggressively search out the tribal elders and ask them to tell me all about fighting the Russians as part of the Mujahadeen. It would be the first step to building repoire. You can't walk into someone's back yard with a bag of money and try to co-opt them. You can get to know them and begin to negotiate from common interests.
v/r
Mike
Biggest impression it leaves it that man is Pakistan a dysfunctional state. I really feel for Holbrooke--he's got a hell of a task. I don't see how anything can change until the civilians are truly in charge there, but that would be a first in the history of Pakistan.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/18/magazine/18Afghanistan-t.html?_r=1&hp
MikeF - great analogy
Thanks for your thoughts, MikeF. Great stuff. Do you mind if those comments are cross-posted to a site called CompanyCommand (an Army site dedicated to the development of Company grade officers)?
Nice pink shirt...
Why don't you tell the audience what the ANSF do with little boys who have painted pinky nails?
Why the hell are we helping these scumbags?
Let them rott...and pull our troops out tomorrow.
MikeK-
No issues with the cross-post.
MikeF
Radio Discussion with Prof. M. Nazif Shahrani, One of the Few Real Experts on Afghanistan's History, Politics, Cultures, & Languages
excellent video. nice to see mr. exum and mr. fick's careers proceeding well.
in listening to the marines talking with afghani villagers, i thought about how different the 'protect the population' mission is from killing taliban. The timeframe is so much wider in the first scenario. The locals have lived in this area for generations -- forever, basically -- whereas the american soldiers may be around only for a few years, or a few months if the political wind changes.
Our soldiers are visitors, and return home at some point. Where as the taliban and the locals are living in the area long term. As I see it this greatly strengthens the enemy's threats and diminishes our own. For example, when the marine is trying to persuade the villagers to shop at the abandoned bazaar. Sure, the americans are here this week, this month, maybe this season. But in a year or two when the troops are gone -- then payback from the taliban? It strikes me that people in the region have long memories, and the families will still be vulnerable.
I support the principles of protecting the population and nation building. But do we have the political capital domestically to be able to stay around long enough -- years, maybe a decade or more? -- for that approach to really be taken seriously by the locals?
another thought. I would submit that the war paradigm is no longer applicable to Afghanistan, especially if we are adopting the mcchrystal hearts-and-minds approach. Instead we're talking about policing and nation building, with an exit strategy looking out a decade or longer.
Now it strikes me that a 10+ year commitment in afghanistan actually has some advantages, especially if we have the maneuver room politically to adopt long-term approaches -- which would be perhaps impossible considering our 4-year American political cycle (king obama, anyone?) But from my comfortable office cubicle I am seeing some pros to staying long-term including:
* human intelligence: a long term presence would greatly enhance the potential for developing significant human intelligence resources in the area. Our soldiers learn more of the local language and customs; our intelligence agencies and special forces work their spook stuff with the locals; over time we develop local knowledge so that afghanistan becomes a familiar theater of operations. To my mind, having a strong human intelligence infrastructure in the afghanistan - pakistan area would have a tremendous positive effect on our national security in general.
* armed forces training: it strikes me that this theater is providing excellent training opportunities for the small-intensity conflicts of the future, so we can continue to sharpen our tactics and strategic knowledge. The better we get at this, the better our armed forces can protect us.
* power of example to the arab world: if our nation-building activities can take hold in afghanistan -- if we can get this right -- this will be a powerful example to the rest of the arab world of america's ability to influence in both the hard-power and soft-power realm. What *that* in turn accomplishes I'm not sure... but it gains us respect in the arab world, and makes our other efforts more credible.
* reducing opium funding for extremists: if we can divert agriculture away from opium production over the long term, we are again weakening our extremist adversaries.
In a way this is even a parent-child type of relationship (hmm, that probably sounds arrogant), where we are investing a lot of time, energy and attention to help an ally nation grow into self-governance. I doubt we have the political capital to follow though... but to my eyes, it might be worth it. Again, sitting in my cubible and not risking a finger.
Seems to me, to do this right we need to go into Pakistan to route the Taliban and Al Qaida plus straighten out the ISI. Should we not then the Taliban will continue playing possum straddling the borders to their advantage. No matter which way we go the Pashtun people will sooner or later be our enemy instead of the Taliban.
The Fronline show leaves me very concerned that the COIN proponents are not as sure their tactics will be as successfull as I perceived. Looking at the state of our economy, our governments increasing deficits, other national interests of future concern and the overwhelming lack of will in the American people leads me to believe that a much reduced force concentrating on a CT tactic of limiting the effectiveness of Al Qaeda is in our best interests even if its a 20 year process. As to the Afghanistan people they need to determine their future and our assitance needs to limited.
Time for our service members to come home, rest, see their families grow and prepare for our next major incursion.
"Seems to me, to do this right we need to go into Pakistan to route the Taliban and Al Qaida plus straighten out the ISI."
Sure man the Ho Chi Minh trail goes right through Cambodia, so we HAVE to bomb it, right? Dirty little gooks need to be taught a lesson. Why don't they grow a pair and come out into the open to fight like real men?
My head nodded in time to the clicking of the slide projector as I struggled to stay awake in the heat. My vision alternated between the screen and the sweat rolling down the neck of the guy in the seat in front of me, sometimes catching sight of tidbits of information the way one catches sight of a shorline at the crest of each wave. "No insurgency can survive without the support of an outside autonomous actor." Click.
So, if we knew this and taught it thirty years ago why is it such a suprise now? Why wasn't it factored into the strategy from the start? But then again, we also knew how the Battle for Algiers turned out and we fought that one again, by the numbers, didn't we?
Bart got it right, all the guys who REALLY know what's going on should throw the BS flag and get us out of Afghaninam most rikki tik ain't gonna do it. That's definitely not in line with thier personal agendas.
For the record we've always needed the ISI more than they need us. They've been playing us for fifty years and they'll keep right on doing it. Almost like it's thier country, huh?
"So how was life under Saddam?"
I find this fascinating. I wonder if there was something specific behind why you chose that particular question to lead with in engaging Iraqis? What were you intending to communicate by asking that question first off? On reflection, what do you think you may in fact have communicated in so doing? And what significance did the answers you got have for your company and command?
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