Center for a New American Security

can you make this

can you make this downloadable without having to use scribd?

The thing that jumps out at

The thing that jumps out at me is the assertion that denial of a terrorist safe haven is a "core American interest," or that such a safe haven is necessary to the continued existence or success of AQ and like-minded groups.

Malign actors around the world will continue to have the capability to kill Americans; this is something that's unlikely to ever change. AQ and its confederates don't presently present any larger threat to American interests (though that would certainly change if they were to come into possession of a WMD, either through "normal" proliferation or the collapse of a nuclear state).

Uncomfortable as it is to say, peace in Afghanistan may not be the priority for the U.S. and the world that you suggest it is. If the Durand Line serves as a sort of pressure valve for the release of Pakistani extremist tensions, and if Afghanistan ends up as a rump state in which regional conflict can be played out without the use of what may increasingly be seen as weapons of first resort between Pakistan and India...

Horrifying tragedy for Afghanistan and Afghans, but perhaps an acceptable tragedy for Americans.

Andrew I fell off a ladder

Andrew I fell off a ladder last week, and since then everything has become clear.

I can now see that the accusations of you being a zionist-imperialist-warmonger as well as a terrorist-loving-american-serviceman-endangering-hezzie/hamas/aq/tallie-sympathiser are true.

you are a mossad agent, and obviously all these terrorist groups are created, funded and guided by the zionist conspiracy so that the everything stays in perpetual conflict and the elders of zion who run the military industrial complex stay rich and in charge.

your cover as a CNAS chap allows you to conduct trips through the middle east to brief your agents, then report back to your masters in israel at the end. you recently did this, and sure enough the next week saw a wave of bombings and attacks as your minions commenced the new phase or your master plan. the bombings the week before were obviously just the last of the previous phase.

we're onto you Andrew.

diablotakahe: Is AM reallly

diablotakahe: Is AM reallly Alex Schindler?
"And taking out terrorists who happen to be politicians too doesn't strike me as unreasonable when they have posed a direct threat to you in the past and constantly threaten, verbally and through (illegal) military stockpiling, to do so again."
Comment by Alex Schindler on October 20, 2009 - 10:38am

Alex seems to live in a world so small that everyone agrees on who the terrorists are.

No, I don't think AM and Alex are the same people: AM reads history and questions his own verities, as well as those of others. Alex just doesn't seem to get that others might find his idea of what is reasonable to be, instead, terrifying.

Andrew: You note at the end

Andrew:

You note at the end of the paper that Afghanistan had been at [relative] peace for a half century until the Soviet invasion in 1979. Fair enough, but it was a peace that they worked out themselves without a substantial and long term foreign occupier in their land. What happened to the two British adventures into Afghanistan in the 19th Century when they as an occupying power tried to impose peace at the barrel of a gun?

Why do you think the United States can do it now? Your best case scenario crumbles into fantasy when considered in the light of history and more importantly thought through with reasoned strategy. Go back and re-read Kalyvas and tell me how the United States can maintain persistent control in Astan with military force with a paltry few more brigades even if they are wielding the light sabers of 3-24. I just don’t see it, and the more that I read from the advocates of population centric coin the more fantastic your claims appear to me of promise and hope in the Hindu Kush if we just persevere, try harder, listen to you and the rest of the experts, and cough up just a bit more troops.

Two things spring to mind, a

Two things spring to mind, a post over at Tom Barnett's site that links a Wired article about slums being a springboard to a better way of life and the Land Register. What links those two thoughts was a report I saw the other night on Australian TV about slums in Kabul being bulldozed and mansions replacing them, land sold to Karzai affiliates are rock bottom prices.

Having a section of the community in an area that pushed them toward betterment, hard as that may be, can only be beneficial. Now I don't know for certain that living in a slum is a good thing, but Stewert Brand who is references for the Wired article thinks so. It decreases the amount of children families have, drives them to educate those remaining children more, empowers women - the panacea for many of Afghanistan's issues.

However none of that occurs if there are no slums because Karzai affiliates have torn them down to build what can only be described as monstrosities ( in architectural terms) .

That only stops with the cessation of corruption and that only stop s if the US and allies get firm enough with Karzai. Exum has a point - the window of opportunity is small and I'd like to see some of that old school American get up and go applied to convincing the current government that they cannot act the way they do and expect a blank cheque in return.

Andrew, First, good quotes

Andrew,

First, good quotes on your weekly rounds with the reporters. I thought you did well.

Second, I won't be as harsh as COL Gentile, but I am going to give you a peer-reviewed B minus for that paper. My critique follows along the lines of what Gulliver initially posted. Don't take it personal. It's just my opinion. Here it goes...

-If we left A'stan tomorrow, seriously packed up and left, Karzai's tribe would duke it out with the Taliban. Got it. In this worse-case scenario, are we supposed to presume that within two years that the Taliban would have full control of the country and AQ would have substanial safe-havens, training camps, and projection capability to be set for a 9/10? I would say no. Even if they did, would that be such a bad thing for us? Back in the late 1990's and early 2000's, when the Taliban controlled A'stan, we had plenty of opportunities to take down UBL. Both the Clinton and Bush administration failed to do so. Maybe we should let AQ come down from the hills, attrit themselves with the ANA, and then strike. It's like rugby rather than football where one plays for space rather than trying to gain yardage.

-As for the middle-scenario, why don't we see how it works out? If the boss doesn't give McChrystal anymore troops, then he already has an additional 30,000 to secure the major cities, buy time for the ANA to stand up, and put some pressure on the A'stan gov't.

- As for your best-case scenario, we lack the civilian surge and host-nation support to make it succeed. Here's my prediction. The boys (military) would surge over the next two years clearing and rooting out every inch of ground. We'll suffer casualties, and at the end of the day, we'll probably be in the same spot that we are right now.

Just my critique. Take some time to consider it. If you've been following SWJ, particularly Steve Metz's piece, then you'll see how I'm trying to frame things to something that I understand. Besides my tough critique, I'm enjoying your blog. Take care, and tell Craig Mulhaney that I said hello and I appreciated the piece that he posted from MG Bob Scales.

v/r

Mike

I was thinking that, in the

I was thinking that, in the event of a precipitate American withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Pakistani government might seek to reach an accommodation with the Islamist bunga-bungas in which a substantial number of them would leave the country to set up up shop across the border and rout the non-Pashtuns in Afghanistan. Facing the prospect of protracted civil war, the Pakistanis would seek to export their terrorist problem; facing the prospect of stalemate south of the Durand Line and no American army north of it, a fair number of their terrorists would oblige them.

There would follow the requisite bloodletting in Afghanistan, possibly with greater Iranian involvement than we have seen up to now, along with the reestablishment of al Qaeda Terrorist U. This could enjoy renewed support from ISI now that it was off Pakistani soil and directing its operations once again at Western and Indian interests. The Pakistani security services could then break off their current unnatural preoccupation with Pakistan's domestic enemies and resume their traditional, greatly treasured and more than a little idiotic preoccupation with the Indian threat. That preoccupation, the provocations of the Islamists with which Pakistan has settled and the reduced attention of Islamabad's American overseers will combine to produce a fourth India-Pakistan war sometime before 2020, which will include the detonation of somewhere between two and twelve nuclear warheads over South Asian cities.

OK, nuclear war is a worst case scenario. I admit that. I'll also admit that keeping an American army in Afghanistan would not be my first choice among policy options to foreclose this possibility. Weakening the enemy on the battlefield, in the short term, and undermining the core of its recruitment appeal to disaffected young men without purpose in their lives, in the long term, seem to me the best steps for the United States to secure its interests, allow the retrenchment this country badly needs and incidentally permit Afghanistan a fighting chance to make a peace for itself. Having said that, I cannot escape the thought that we could do everything right and still see things end in catastrophe. Modern means of destruction in the hands of cultures used to thinking of their enemies in tribal terms are bad enough when they go no farther than roadside bombs, automatic rifles and airliners full of fuel. In Pakistan today they go much further than that. I do not trust these people.

"I do not trust these

"I do not trust these people," being a quote from Zathras.

What I mean is: The

What I mean is: The significant difference to me seems to be the amount of power held by different cultures in a technological world, rather than the terms by which those cultures define the enemy.

Great job. I think the

Great job. I think the following article effectively illustrates the perspective of the European left... Striking example of a fundamental failure to grasp COIN and indeed, the broader strategic context of Afghanistan.

http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/johann-hari/johann-har...

Andrew, Karzai discussed

Andrew, Karzai discussed what he would do in the worst case outcome you discussed during his trilateral meeting with Bush and Musharraf. Karzai threatened Musharraf that if NATO withdrew support from Afghanistan (because Pakistani backed extremists were causing them to bleed), Karzai would be forced to call in Russian and Indian help, and that this would be very negative for Pakistan. Although Karzai didn't mention this in front of Bush, Karzai would also bring in Iranian help, Chinese help, and to a lesser degree the help of the 5 Stans in this scenario. In other words a long term war between the GIRoA and ANSF (backed by its allies) against the Taliban backed by her allies.

However this isn't the worst case scenario. The worse case scenario is a major terrorist strike against Iran, China, India, or Russia, Europe or America, that causes them to go full blast against Pakistan or the Taliban in Afghanistan. This has the possibility of precipitating a nuclear exchange.

gian p gentile, some historical notes:
"it was a peace that they worked out themselves without a substantial and long term foreign occupier in their land."
-not completely true. Afghanistan has rarely been independent within its current boundaries over the past 5,000 years. Afghanistan has usually been part of a larger international empire or allied to international empires. The peace of 1919-1973 was permitted by a huge international aid program (gigantic when compared to Afghan Government annual tax revenues), and a complex alliance between Afghanistan and Iran, Pakistan, India (or British Raj 1919-1947), West, and the USSR. All of them agreed to provide foreign aid collaboratively to Afghanistan, and to not fight each other inside Afghanistan. When Afghanistan's allies started fighting among themselves, Afghanistan's domestic peace fell apart.

"What happened to the two British adventures into Afghanistan in the 19th Century when they as an occupying power tried to impose peace at the barrel of a gun?" The Brits were amazingly effective. Remember that before the Brits, Afghanistan included all of modern Pakistan, much of Northern India, Eastern Iran and much of the former Soviet Union. The Brits partitioned Punjab, Kashmir, and Pakistan out of Afghanistan and ruled them fairly well. The Brits allowed Persia and Russia to seize parts of Afghanistan. The remaining rump state became a British protectorate. The British protectorate of Afghanistan proved loyal to the British Raj, and low maintenance. Without much expense or fighting, Afghanistan was part of British empire until 1919. Gentile, by the standards of previous millenia, British rule and influence in Afghanistan were large successes. Just two lost battles in one century? Not bad. The Brits won the other battles,and often enjoyed decades of tranquility at a time. Note that the Brits ruled much of India the same way they ruled Afghanistan, through local kings supported by the Brits. The large kingdoms were the Nizam of Hyderabad (last remnant of the Seljik Turk Mongol Moghul Empire that ruled Afghanistan for two centuries), Afghanistan, Kashmir (which the Brits split out of Afghanistan), Punjab (which the Brits split out of Afghanistan), Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangalore.

"Why do you think the United States can do it now? Your best case scenario crumbles into fantasy when considered in the light of history and more importantly thought through with reasoned strategy. Go back and re-read Kalyvas and tell me how the United States can maintain persistent control in Astan with military force with a paltry few more brigades even if they are wielding the light sabers of 3-24. I just don’t see it, and the more that I read from the advocates of population centric coin the more fantastic your claims appear to me of promise and hope in the Hindu Kush if we just persevere, try harder, listen to you and the rest of the experts, and cough up just a bit more troops."

Gentile, who said anything about the US doing it by themselves? Why not do it through the GIRoA and ANSF? Spending $120 billion on grants to the ANSF over the next 20 years is a lot cheaper than doing it ourselves. Lets remember that Al Qaeda linked networks pose a greater threat to Iran, Russia, the 5 Stans, China and India than they do to NATO. Part of the solution is bringing them in and forcing them to pay part of the bill for the ANSF and Afghan economic development.

We perhaps need to define victory better. If the ANSF give the extremists one hell of a fight over more than a decade, that = victory, because it would divert the attention of AQ linked networks from creating trouble elsewhere. If we define this as victory and focus on increasing the capacity and performance of the ANSF, why do you think this strategy won't succeed?

Gentile, would you agree that training the ISF was a success? If the US military could build up the ISF, why can't we (assisted by many other countries) achieve the same with the ANSF. Remember that only this past summer, Russia publicly offered more help in training and equipping the ANSF, an offer they were not accepted (in part because of Afghan domestic politics.) India has offered to play a much larger role in training the ANSF, but India's offers have not been accepted to avoid offending Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Iran offered to help train the ANSF under US command in 2001 and 2002. The Bush Administration didn't accept the Iranian offer. Many other countries, including in NATO, are willing to help with the ANSF.

I think the paper is

I think the paper is generally on target. And I too think that a stable Afghanistan is NOT impossible, but would take hard work, which the US may not be willing to do (or capable of doing? one has to consider that imperial decay may already be past the point of no return).
Some commentators feel that this overstates the importance of the "af-pak haven" for AQ. While it is true that AQ does not really NEED a haven to continue as a terrorist group, a victory in Afghanistan would make a huge difference to their prospects. The difference is the difference between Baader-Meinhoff and a serious worldwide threat. Defeat in Afghanistan would make the whole AQ project seem even more of a fantasy and a cultish fringe act. They would still get the occasional Saudi willing to walk around with explosives up his butt, but such nutcases would not have wide support in the Muslim community (which would see them as dangerous crazies, not a serious alternative to the current crop of corrupt "leaders"). On the other hand, if the US goes down to defeat in Af-pak, it would translate into a huge boost to the jihadi project. They would have proven their point: they got a superpower to walk into their trap and they defeated the superpower. Palestinians and others Muslim communities with grievances (real AND imagined) do not have to regard these people as medieval crazy morons who are more dangerous to their own community than they are a threat to US-Israel. Instead, they can see them as a real alternative to all the "corrupt puppets" the US has supported all over the Muslim world. Increasing numbers of Muslims will start thinking afresh about joining the cause or at least hedging their bets. Maybe no dominoes will actually fall, but many dominoes will have to be rescued using brute force, nasty tactics and extreme violence. Baader Meinhoff never got that far.....

Gentile, would you agree

Gentile, would you agree that training the ISF was a success? If the US military could build up the ISF, why can't we (assisted by many other countries) achieve the same with the ANSF.

I, for one, am not sure whether the situations are comparable. Iraq had a long tradition of having an unified, effective army, which actually fought many battles in the 20th century and won some of them. Therefore, the concept of a "national" armed force which, at least theoretically, should be neutral WRT tribal structures, is acceptable and imaginable for the population.

Afghanistan is much more tribally fragmented and I am not sure whether something like real Afghan national, tribe-neutral army ever existed. Building something from the scratch, without pre-existing concepts in minds of the population, may be harder to do.

Problem number one is that

Problem number one is that the previous admin apparently only saw Afghanistan as a staging area on the way to Iran, which is why they got rid of all the local leadership that was on good terms with Iranian border guards, i.e. Northern Alliance types, thus allowing the Taliban to become established in the west and north of the country, which is what McChrystal said he did not expect.

Then you have the record of Unocal in Afghanistan, and the pipeline project for Central Asia, which would bypass Russia, ever of interest to Ms. Central Asian oil, i.e. Condi Rice - and Cheney made more than a few trips to the region as well. You can bet there are still a few hangers-on there, visions of sugarplums dancing in their fevered brains - to quote Road Warrior, "circling and circling, like angry ants gone mad for the smell of gasoline."

Putting such geostrategic and energy concerns aside, and avoiding the Baluchistan bombing and the largely undiscussed link to the proposed Iranian-Pakistan-India gas pipeline, say it isn't Saudi intrigue, or maybe the Iranians blew themselves up to get some attention and justify a crackdown across the region, WTFDAK? (hint: last three letters stand for "does anyone know.")...

Okay, putting all that aside, what do the Afghan people think about everything? Stuck between the Taliban and U.S. forces and a rather highly corrupt government in Kabul that appears to make a living skimming off reconstruction aid and heroin sales, ahem, what do they think? During the day, they're interrogated by U.S. soldiers, during the night they're interrogated by the Taliban.

In order to survive, these villagers have to be among the best diplomats anywhere - and perhaps it's time to give them some direct assistance rather than trying to funnel it through obviously corrupt USAID/State - Flour/LouisBerger/Bechtel deals - those have built a lot of McMansions in Kabul, but not much else. Say, solar-powered water pumps, irrigation piping, sacks of non-explosive grade fertilizer and farming tools for starters.

As McChrystal said, if you don't get the locals on your side, you haven't got a chance of hitting the most favorable outcome.

One is increasingly coming

One is increasingly coming to the conclusion that this may be the Autumn of discontent for the COINdinistas.

Strangely compelling blog

Strangely compelling blog from documentary maker, Adam Curtis (The Power of Knightmares, Century of the Self), made up of obscure footage re. Western involvement in Afghanistan: Kabul: City Number One - Part 3. The earlier parts are there also, but not very well linked. A bit off topic but still under the (non- pop cent) CI umbrella KINSHASA: CITY NUMBER TWO re. mercenary counter revolution. Not sure what it all means but some nice old footage.

abu Muqawama is WAY OFF BASE

abu Muqawama is WAY OFF BASE when it comes to drones strikes.

From the Long War Journal:
...Bergen and Tiedemann did a fairly good job with their analysis. They debunked some of the rather outlandish estimates of civilian deaths -- including that of Andrew Exum and David Kilcullen, who implausibly claimed in a New York Times op-ed that 98 percent of the casualties from drone strikes have been civilians. Our 10 percent civilian casualty figure was, as we noted, a low-end estimate. A 30 percent civilian casualty rate is certainly plausible.

Read more: http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2009/10/predators_t...

(George Soros' Lancet study on civilian casualties in Iraq is ringing a bell with me right now...)

Even if the high end is right, Exum is still WAY OFF! What else is Exum utterly wrong on?

@Kevin - ON POINT CNAS would

@Kevin - ON POINT

CNAS would be well served to nix the push up contests in the gym in favor of virabhadrasana stretches. Flexibility and balance as strength for your war ideologies are incompatible with your proclivity for state (exercises). NO metaphor involved here.

Thus cogently and correctly

Thus cogently and correctly spoke Zarathustra

from stratfor.com Obama does

from stratfor.com

Obama does not want this to be his war. He does not want to be remembered for Afghanistan the way George W. Bush is remembered for Iraq or Lyndon Johnson is for Vietnam. Right now, we suspect Obama plans to demonstrate commitment, and to disengage at a more politically opportune time. Johnson and Bush showed that disengagement after commitment is nice in theory. For our part, we do not think there is an effective strategy for winning in Afghanistan, but that McChrystal has proposed a good one for "hold until relieved." We suspect that Obama will hold to show that he gave the strategy a chance, but that the decision to leave won't be too far off.

asymmetrical makes ass out

asymmetrical makes ass out of yr metrics

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1oU7M4OeSRM

al-Qai'da (spelling!) It's

al-Qai'da (spelling!)

It's always difficult to transliterate a sound that doesn't exist in English, but your version is downright nonsensical. "Qa'ida" would make sense, but would be a bit obscure. "Qaeda" is a reasonable phonetic rendering for our delicate Western throats.

Back to topic: Is there a serious possibility that Iran might pick up the fight if we just cut and run and the Taleban take over the place again?

as it is to say, peace in

as it is to say, peace in Afghanistan may not be the priority for the U.S. and the world that you suggest it is. ads|part time jobs|import export

I come here often to read and

I come here often to read and I have to say you have some good articles, thanks

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