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Ricks on Wanat
Abe and I are in the office marvelling at Tom Ricks on Fareed Zakaria's show.
"Tom's wearing a tie?"
"And I think his hair is combed!"
The helicopter footage at the beginning of this video is intense. I have to be honest, the only time I have been in a firefight even remotely like the one at Wanat lasted less than 10 minutes, so I have no idea what this must have been like for the guys on the ground.
Too bad we can't have arty
Too bad we can't have arty and fast movers anymore. Then again though then we may have hurt a witto terrorist or two. Wouldn't want that now would we.
another problem is you are
another problem is you are using our best and brightest in defensive positions when their expertize is to work offensively. When you are on defense you are fighting a losing war of attrition. ( Lieutenant General George S Patton)
Grab em by the nose and kick em in the ass. If civilians get in the way then chances are they are NOT civilians. Nobody in their right mind goes running TOWARD a firefight.
Andrew, I was slightly
Andrew, I was slightly miffed that Tom Ricks didn't mention the ANSF that occupied the same base as the GIs during both Nuristan battles and died alongside them.
Why can't the international community respect and honor the sacrifices and efforts of the ANSF that die alonside ISAF?
Anan, that is a good point
Anan, that is a good point -- I bet Tom would agree it was an oversight.Apropos of nothing, have you
Apropos of nothing, have you seen this AM:
http://www.d-n-i.net/dni/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/kotkin_shadow_course...
I'd like a layman's explanation of exactly what he's suggesting here, and also your thoughts.
I'm pretty sure Tom wouldn't
I'm pretty sure Tom wouldn't know anything about the suffering of the Afghans since so little of his two books on Iraq had little to do with the Iraqis.
Abu Muqawama, I know Tom is
Abu Muqawama, I know Tom is your friend, so please don't take criticisms of him the wrong way:
"I'm pretty sure Tom wouldn't know anything about the suffering of the Afghans since so little of his two books on Iraq had little to do with the Iraqis." I read his book. Try an exercise. Look up "Iraqi Army" in the index of "Gamble." He wrote a book about the Iraq war of 2006/2007 with little discussion of the Iraqi Army or the Iraqi Police. Many very smart people noticed this other than me.
Tom's analysis on Afghanistan might have similar biases. But I am withholding judgment for now. Maybe Tom will do better with respect to Afghanistan.
Remember that Tom lived in
Remember that Tom lived in Afghanistan in between 1969 and 1971, so he has seen the country through eyes outside of those belonging to the US military.I love those old war stories
I love those old war stories of Afghans (read here Pashtuns) fighting entire wars against Britain thinking it was all a bit of a laugh. I grew up on them. But I can't help but wonder whether things have moved on from the 1800s because of the sort of war you fight in the modern world. I'm not an expert on Afghan wars, but I think most British-Afghan conflicts were largely military-to-military affairs.. (ok. military-to-militia). They didn't involve lots of village bombing, burnings etc. I know this wasn't always the case. The Sikh-Afghan wars were pretty brutal. The British started the village bombing in the 1930s when the Faqir was doing his thing. And before that, there was the Rolhilla War, which was so brutal parliament called Warren Hastings of the East India Company to task over it. This "Afghan way of war" which people talk about for the most part kept civilians out of it, honoured seasonal ceasefires, didn't mess with water supplies or burn crops. But I think the last three decades of war have been very different. And for all the hardman, stoic resilience of the Afghans as well as the philosophical outlook, it seems to me the refugee camps, bombings, kidnappings, assassinations and now the introduction of suicide bombings have distorted the mind set into something truly ugly. It's taken that romantic figure of the fiercely independent mountain man ready to kill for a slight and to die for a guest image (if it ever reflected reality) and morphed it into something way nastier. Also, whereas, the Taliban mentality and Islamic practice was a new import in the early 90s, the last few years have made it into an unavoidable fact of life. By the same measure, the people deploying suicide bombers against the markets of Kabul and Peshawar are not the same people as the fighters of the 90s. But that's the situation we now face.RE: Londonstani I think
RE: Londonstani
I think you're confusing the feuding tradition of the Pashtun with, well, actual war.
The problem is that people from feuding traditions are like domestic cats who start out playing with a ball of yarn and end up attacking ankles -- they're easily confused about escalation of violence.
I think there are several
I think there are several inaccuracies in Rick's interview. My experience (and I have probably spent more time in Wanat than any other US officer) suggests a few different things.
First, the actual reason for going into the Waygal valley was more than to just shut off a supply line. SIGINT suggested that the valley was THE one area in Afghanistan that 99% of AQ, TB, HiG, HQN, and LeT leaders have all been in. Additionally, we had reason to believe that Osama bin Laden's alternate headquarters was in the valley. Finally, yes, a primary infiltration route for fighters and supplies ran from Chitral through Kamdesh and the Waygal and then into the Pech, Korengal, and other areas in Kunar province.
Second, with regards to water. The Waygal river probably is clean enough to drink with considerable risk of disease (even if a light infantry platoon were not carrying iodine tablets).
Finally, the argument about putting all of our forces in Kabul, Kandahar, and Khowst doesn't work in Afghanistan. I thought it was here on AM's blog that we discussed that the top 35 population centers still don't make up even 40% of Afghanistan's population. Places like Nuristan remain important because of their ability to be a major swing faction in a volatile war. Neglecting any province or people prohibits full success. Furthermore, part of COIN is counter-guerilla operations. While IED attacks in Logar-wardak or TB ops in RC South are devistating, there still remains an organized, capable guerilla force in N2K and in Nuristan in particular. Ignoring them will ultimately backfire.
-Andy
I think there are several
I think there are several inaccuracies in Rick's interview. My experience (and I have probably spent more time in Wanat than any other US officer) suggests a few different things.
First, the actual reason for going into the Waygal valley was more than to just shut off a supply line. SIGINT suggested that the valley was THE one area in Afghanistan that 99% of AQ, TB, HiG, HQN, and LeT leaders have all been in. Additionally, we had reason to believe that Osama bin Laden's alternate headquarters was in the valley. Finally, yes, a primary infiltration route for fighters and supplies ran from Chitral through Kamdesh and the Waygal and then into the Pech, Korengal, and other areas in Kunar province.
Second, with regards to water. The Waygal river probably is clean enough to drink with considerable risk of disease (even if a light infantry platoon were not carrying iodine tablets).
Finally, the argument about putting all of our forces in Kabul, Kandahar, and Khowst doesn't work in Afghanistan. I thought it was here on AM's blog that we discussed that the top 35 population centers still don't make up even 40% of Afghanistan's population. Places like Nuristan remain important because of their ability to be a major swing faction in a volatile war. Neglecting any province or people prohibits full success. Furthermore, part of COIN is counter-guerilla operations. While IED attacks in Logar-wardak or TB ops in RC South are devistating, there still remains an organized, capable guerilla force in N2K and in Nuristan in particular. Ignoring them will ultimately backfire.
-Andy
Andy -- great comments.
Andy -- great comments.Sorry for the dbl post. My
Sorry for the dbl post. My BB said it didn't submit... Untrustworthy technology!
While Vietnam analogies are
While Vietnam analogies are dangerous, whenever I see the description of Wanat, or other similar fights, I can't help thinking of similar firebase assaults (re: Keith Nolan’s “Sappers in the Wire; the Life and Death of Firebase Mary Ann”). The formula is pretty simple: surprise and overwhelming force at a key point, then withdrawal prior to the U.S. being able to apply the supporting fires and QRF that such outposts depend upon for enduring survivability. It’s the same formula we would apply in raid planning (see McRaven's book "Spec Ops").
I would also have to agree with Rick's to the point that with scarce resources, you need to set priorities. I'm not an Afghan expert, but it seems from history that no one has conquered, or pacified, or stabilized, or whatever, that country with a "whole of geography" approach. If we are going to be "population-centric" you need to go where the populations is, wherever that is. You obviously won't get to the whole population, or possibly even most of it. You cover the area within your capabilities. It’s the whole idea of the oilspot. Once you secure, and I mean really secure, those areas, you will have the forces to available to expand outwards. If the Taliban do strengthen in outer areas, it just can't be helped--however, I'd imagine that they would present targets slightly more amenable to our "kinetic" fire & maneuver forces in those areas.
I think this also goes to building a competent Afghan Army to secure areas. I can't think of a worse way then to try and do it country-wide from the get-go. You build an effective and cohesive force within the oilspot areas. You blood them with battles they can win and get confidence in. Only then do you use them in offensive operations to secure new areas. If our rotational model, which provides time for training and cohesion prior to combat operations, works for us, could we apply something similar to the Afghans? Maybe on a smaller scale where each battalion is taken "out of the line" for training for certain periods of time, or there is built in strength to support a constant rotation of company sized forces in and out of more hostile areas. Just ideas, but I'm haven't seen we've thought it through from this angle, other than to build battalions and put them into the fire, then incrementally try and improve their performance.
Phil Ridderhof USMC
Capt. Monkey, great comments
Capt. Monkey, great comments (to copy Abu Muqawama.)
"SIGINT suggested that the valley was THE one area in Afghanistan that 99% of AQ, TB, HiG, HQN, and LeT leaders have all been in. Additionally, we had reason to believe that Osama bin Laden's alternate headquarters was in the valley."
Don't want to ask you to break OPSEC, but could you discuss under whose banner LeT and AQ fight in Nuristan? Do LeT and AQ fight through Haqqani (which they seem to do elsewhere in Afghanistan; for example near Khost)? Or do LeT and AQ fight through HiG, HQN, and some extreme elements of the QST (Quetta Shura Taliban.)
There has been a lot of public discussion about the links between the "Taliban" (which in practice is a loose collection of militias from many countries) and "Al Qaeda" (whatever this means anymore.) It strikes me that HQN and some extreme elements of the QST are more closely linked to global terrorism (LeT, AQ, Lashkar e Jhanvi, Sipah e Sahaba, Jundullah, Jaish e Mohammed, Uzbek Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Chechans, Uighars, Harakat ul Ansar/Mujahadeen, Al-Ittihad Al Islamiya (AIAI), Islamic Army of Aden, Jemaah Islamiah, Tehrik-e-Taliban) than some of the local Taliban components of the QST.
This is why this question is relevant.
Phil Ridderhof, good comments as well, especially the last paragraph. Your ideas have been discussed, especially with reference to 205th ANA Corps in the South; which is becoming brittle due to the high tempo of operation and heavy casualties. The 205th ANA Corps has the highest AWOL rate in the ANA. Some soldiers quit 205th ANA and "rejoin" the ANA to fight in other ANA Corps, so many of the AWOL are de facto transfers of ANA soldiers to other Corps. Several ANA mentors have suggested substantially expanding existing ANA battalions and brigades, versus grow the number of ANA brigades (including the former top advisor for 201st ANA Corps.) A larger [assigned/authorized] ratio for ANA battalions (kandaks) would enable more of the training/rest/refit rotations that you favor.
Thanks both to you Phil and Capt. Monkey for your service.
I love how Fareed suggests
I love how Fareed suggests this "may be the key battle of the war" (sic)
It amazes me
It amazes me this.................... disproportionate response bullshit. Did somebody go write rules that include that war is fair and never to be won? Lets just waste a bunch of lives, God knows we wouldn't want to offend anyone.
Again I ask this question
Again I ask this question and I have never seen this question answered.
If this battle had never happened would the replacing unit 1-26 INF have taken over that valley? Seeing as how they were reportedly understrength when they deployed did the incoming BC have the intention of placing troops there?
My reaction when I read
My reaction when I read Capt. Monkey’s comment was “well, that’s a sensible reason to build a base there.” But if you’re going to place a base in that kind of an environment then it makes no military or moral sense to understaff it. In Vietnam (or at least in my part of it), I don’t think I ever saw a firebase with less than an infantry company (plus the cannon-cockers) occupying it. If you get much smaller than that, you don’t have enough warm bodies to do all the things that need to be done for an adequate defense — keep sandbagging, patrols, LPs, ambushes, etc.
One other point: After COP Keating was hit, I read a lot about how the soldiers had lost everything they owned. I later learned that this meant things like videogames, TVs, sound systems, etc. Not to make too fine a point of it, but if soldiers had enough time on their hands at an outpost like Keating to be playing videogames, then they should have had that base so well-fortified that it would have been impossible to take with a division. Seriously, sandbagging at firebases never stopped, And soldiers lived in holes in the ground with lots of PSP and sandbags overhead. Losing everything that you owned would mean you lost a couple of books or dog-eared magazines that you had probably already read at least 6 or 7 times. When you’re stuck out in Indian country, staying alive is — or should be — a 24/7/365 operation. Bases can always be made more secure and soldiers should leave the toys and comfort items back at the FOB
To visitor 4;14, They were
To visitor 4;14, They were trained to "get " the enemy not wait for them. "G.S.Patton" said " fixed fortifications are monuments to mans stupidity". Now we must Pat their poo poos and kiss their ass lest we be called for "UNFAIR" actions.
Phil- Great comments and
Phil- Great comments and points!
Anan- To be blunt about your question... I don't know the answer. I left Nuristan in 2007. From what I remember, AQ, LeT, and HiG all operated independently. They would cross-pollinate intel and skills, but they didn't just defer to one group or to TB. Back then, HQN was mostly limited to the Khowst bowl. Beyond that, I don't remember... Sorry!
Paul- I agree 100%. Without a super strong platoon sergeant, we probably would have had a lot of dumb things like iPods, video games, etc, when we went into Wanat. Thank God for SFC T, he saved me on a lot of things. As a matter of fact, thank God for all NCOs.
-Andy
Paul, Phil, Anan, and Capt.
Paul, Phil, Anan, and Capt. Monkey,
Thank you very much for your commentary. I really enjoyed it. The bits about constantly improving your firebase reminded me of what Hackworth used to say (paraphrased), "the defense of a firebase is never finished." As you said, more wire, more sand bags, more barriers, etc. should and and probably could have been set up before the attack that followed the one at Wanat.
Define unfair in a conflict
Define unfair in a conflict where people try to kill you before you kill them. You ever been in that situation? or are you just talking out your asses as usual? How many of you have been in "the shit". I doubt any of you have.
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