Center for a New American Security

Here's something else

Here's something else guaranteed to ruin your breakfast. In the latest issue of TNR, Ganesh Sitaraman writes about his visit to COL Agoglia's School for Boys. The article includes this mind-blowing passage:

"'How many of you have read David Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice?' Lt. Colonel Matt Galton, the deputy director of the center, asked in his Australian accent. Two hands slowly went up. It was not surprising. Though Galula's book is a - possibly the - starting point for counterinsurgency, it was written over 40 years ago, and isn't required reading. More troubling, when Galton asked how many had read the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, only about five hands went up."

The article doesn't specify how many folks were in the room, but it says elsewhere that the classes average 130 every two weeks and this sounds like an introductory lecture, so it seems probable that it was the entire group. But to be cautious, assume it was a breakout session. That's hardly much better - five out of twenty? Out of thirty? It's been three years since FM 3-24 was promulgated, and the overwhelming majority of officers serving in Afghanistan either haven't read it, or aren't willing to admit that in front of their peers. The rest of the article makes it fairly clear that the first of those possibilities is more likely - if others had read it, there was certainly no evidence of that in their subsequent interactions with instructors.

Forget about the strategic corporal. We're failing at the level of the strategic captains. We're writing terrific manuals, but the guys in charge of implementing the lessons they contain aren't even reading them.

I don't know what to make of this. Is it an argument for staying the course for a couple more years, on the grounds that we haven't even managed to train our company-grade officers yet, and once they know how to fight there's a chance they might secure some portion of our goals? Or is it, increasingly, an argument against counterinsurgency itself? If we can't train our people, and we can't get them to buy into the vision, does the theory itself at some point come into question as compelling yet impractical to implement? I'm just immensely discouraged by the vision of a room full of officers, sent to learn about counterinsurgency, who haven't even taken the time or trouble to read the damn manual before they show up.

Did he know what Offshore

Did he know what Offshore Balancing is? George Will didn't seem to.

I suspect not, at least not if we're talking about the definition of the term in an IR sense.

For example: If we should

For example: If we should leave Afghanistan -- and China step in (as it often does; initially without military involvement) -- are there any ultimate strategic consequences for us -- and for India -- in such an outcome?

For one thing, very few people are advocating leaving Afghanistan altogether. The White House in particular has said that this isn't happening.

Two, China may "step in... without military involvement" in certain places, doing infrastructure development and so on and making a lot of money, but it's difficult to envision this happening in an Afghanistan that would still be gripped by insecurity. So what's our concern, that China will get bogged down trying to get rich and fighting an insurgency, too?

Visitor 10:48 AM is right.

Visitor 10:48 AM is right. Beyond even COL Gentile's attempts to speak of strategy - for him, how to win the war in Afghanistan, or any COIN campaign, at the level of strategy - this blog does not speak to broader issues of IR theory. What state benefits from our presence in Afghanistan, etc., etc. An interesting omission.

ADTS

Thanks for the transcript;

Thanks for the transcript; CNN is pretty crummy about posting immediate full-length video of their programmes, even as podcasts, which is pretty frustrating on the whole. Is Pape accurate when he says:

Right now, over the last several years, we have lost a portion, at least 10, 20 percent if you follow our intelligence reports, of the country to the Taliban.

And this is as we've been pursuing COIN, this counterinsurgency strategy.

I ask only because it was my understanding that prior to this calendar year we'd been pursuing CT, and it's only in the last six months that the shift has been made to COIN.

(Sorry if this shows up twice, I can't tell if my comment got eaten or is awaiting moderation.)

Just checked out the

Just checked out the transcript. Here is the best part, by far:

Again, the big problem is, if we want to get all social science theory, it's a matter of control versus collaboration. There's no way -- you can't just simply buy off the Taliban. You can't seek to get collaboration from them without exerting some degree of control over the area.

You start to sort of give a hint of the fact that there is some legitimate substance to counterinsurgency theory, and I don't think enough people are doing that. People like COL Gentile and Bernard Finel are right to be critical of those who seem to suggest that "protect the people = win"; there needs to be more granularity in this explanation, and an extra step (or more) in there. It may be less palatable for public consumption, but what we're really talking about is "proximity to the people = information = targeting of enemy elements = difficulty of denunciation of pro-government individuals = less safety for insurgent sympathizers and cadres = collaboration = more intelligence = movement towards control = the opportunity to consolidate influence, extend protections and services, and provide public goods."

Obviously these equals signs aren't exactly "if, then" statements. There's no certainty about any of it, but there's historical evidence of probability.

(And I appreciate that the public doesn't have any patience for social science mumbo-jumbo and that puppy dogs and ice cream and good government sounds better, but we're doing ourselves a disservice when we fail to explain what the causal mechanisms operating in COIN really are.)

ADTS -- I was going to try

ADTS -- I was going to try to quote a section of what you've written, but let me just say that I agree with the whole thing. These are all important questions that deserve consideration (and I've been putting off answering them myself simply because I don't feel capable of getting my arms around the whole thing all at once), but it's not really what we're talking about here.

The subject of the op-ed series was what it will take to win in Afghanistan. Each of the contributors defines "winning" differently, which is fine. But I'm not going to take Ex to task for advocating sound counterinsurgency TTPs and operational methods inside the construct of the strategic approach that he believes (and that he's been told in the context of performing the assessment) is the one we are taking and ought to take.

But again, I completely agree with what you say about the debatable requirement for counterinsurgency, or the tenuous connection between anti-Taliban COIN and U.S. national security, and so on.

What state benefits from our

What state benefits from our presence in Afghanistan, etc., etc.

I'll take "Every State But Us", for $500 Alex.

Transcript no longer

Transcript no longer available. :(