Center for a New American Security

I have to disagree that this

I have to disagree that this is either timely or particularly important. For one thing, he's not saying anything that hasn't already been said.

But most importantly, this entire analysis is flawed for the assumption that downsizing of the U.S. effort necessarily implies the return of the Taliban to power, that the return of the Taliban to power necessarily implies a re-established safe haven for transnational terrorists, and that the occurence of both of those things necessarily imperils the Pakistani government, inflames global anti-American terror, and almost guarantees the acquisition of WMD by those groups. This is argument by assertion. It's simplistic, and it's based on an acceptance of certain foundational principles that most proponents of drawdown or a more narrow construction of American national interests simply do not accept.

Wow - this sure is a neat

Wow - this sure is a neat little box Biddle is trying to force the debate into.....either fully and unconditionally support McChrystal's plan or fully withdraw....and we know what his advice is. His last piece in The New American Interest (Jul/Aug 09), "Is It Worth It?," must have only been a disengenuous runup for his foregone conclusion-in-waiting ("On balance, then, reinforcement is a better bet than withdrawal. But neither option is unassailable"). That sounds markedly different than the all-or-nothing call he makes here. It's almost as bad as Scheuer's recent rant in FP last week.

But in any event, he still glosses over ("waves a hand at" I think was the quote used recently about this general line of arguments) the fundamental point. This, the main point is NOT: "It is understandable that Americans would like a cheaper way to secure U.S. interests in Afghanistan than reinforcement and COIN; it is far less clear that a middle way exists that can accomplish this."

This isn't what Americans are asking at the moment nor is it the curent debate at hand; Americans want a valid, succint, and coherent reason why this new incarnation of OEF must be waged. Then the debate can migrate to tactics and necessity of an all-in uber-COIN plan versus anything else.

Why is it assumed that

Why is it assumed that counterinsurgency is somehow algebraic, that if x = y, multiplying x by 1.5 results in y being multiplied by 1.5? Especially after watching Frontline, it seems that every marginal injection of resources is little guarantee that said resource is operating at full effectiveness. If it was as simple as +1,000 Marines -> +10 secured villages, wouldn't we have done that already?

Why is Afghanistan some sort of special case? Biddle himself concedes that American interests are "real, but limited and indirect;" indeed, as they are in the vast majority of other countries. I hereby propose $5 billion in aid and 50,000 troops be deployed to the Philippines! Simply, if our interests are limited and indirect, why must our engagement be so expansive and direct?

Also, Biddle says of other solutions "they probably won't work." How has this level of commitment to COIN become such a guarantor of success? Why should we prefer a solution of great expense with a 60% chance of success over a solution of limited expense with a 40% chance of success?

His take on manipulating Afghan warlords is also pretty far off the mark:

"It is dangerous to end up on the wrong side, and today, too many Afghans think the Taliban will win...why would coldly self-interested warlords risk their lives by crossing the Taliban on behalf of an absentee benefactor who clearly lacks the motivation to defend its local allies? The odds are that such factions will take U.S. money, then side with the enemy once the latter shows up and threatens superior force."

This certainly sounds a lot like a description of Mohammed Fahim and Rashid Dostum, doesn't it? I thought so!

I think there are plenty of Tajiks and Hazara who would categorically reject this entire line of argument. In fact, many of them hate the Taliban even more than we do and would simply never side with them. Moreover, with our support, it seems that they could do a pretty good job of keeping the Taliban at bay, especially as the warlords could be (militarily) stronger than they were post-9/11, and the Taliban are almost certainly weaker. Biddle simply doesn't address that element of the situation.

"What's more, some of the more prominent sub-national authorities are even less popular than the central government."

That depends wholly on who is asked.

Anyway, I fail to see how this article can be differentiated from Biddle's standard position on Afghanistan, which seems to be "COIN may not work, COIN may be really expensive, and Afghanistan is really difficult and not really in our interests - let's COIN the shit out of Afghanistan!"

fnord -- You can plan for

fnord -- You can plan for worst-case scenarios without acting in a way that treats them as certain.

What makes you think a "new Pashtunian caliphate/emirate" is even remotely plausible? What makes you think, when we're repeatedly told that Pashtun unification takes place almost reflexively as a response to foreign meddling, and when there has never been a unified Pashtun polity dedicated to global jihad or anything that could be said to even vaguely resemble it, that we're in for a "new Pashtunian caliphate/emirate" that aligns itself with the global goals of AQ?

With all due respect, there is absolutely no reason whatsoever to believe any of that nonsense. What seems far more likely is that with the departure of Westerners from Afghanistan, Pashtuns in the tribal areas will go back to doing what they've done all along, which is trying to eject the foreigners; in this case, we're talking about Arabs and Uzbeks and Chechens and whoever else.

I'm not going to get into the slippery-slope thing here, but to demonstrate how nuts this "always plan for worst case scenarios" idea is: why aren't we flooding Somalia and Yemen with Western troops in order to prevent the worst-case scenario in which rebel groups there form governments which offer sanctuary to terrorists? Why aren't we targeting Iranian or North Korean nuclear facilities in order to prevent the worst-case scenario in which U.S. or allied territory or assets are attacked?

Panic is not a plan. How do you eliminate the possibility of anti-Western terrorists obtaining nuclear weapons and killing Westerners with them? Eliminate nuclear weapons or eliminate terrorists. Let's take it as a matter of fact that neither of these things are possible, and that everything we do is a form of damage mitigation rather than a solution. So is your considerably more expensive and time-consuming form of mitigation worth the marginally reduced risk of catastrophic terrorism? I don't think so, but that's what the conversation is about.

I like Biddle a lot, but

I like Biddle a lot, but this does repeat things he has already said. That being said, there's nothing wrong with that. And AM is right - it is important if it gets the message out to a new audience. That's not "bad on Biddle" - he's trying to get more people to hear his arguments and that's smart.

Is the argument about

Is the argument about reducing presence or maintaining existing force levels while using space and time to build Afghan capability? Arguing for space and time is is inherently flawed if you believe that General McChrystal is correct in that we have a narrow window of one year to stanch the bleeding. However, we’ve already lost two months time since he delivered the report . Irrespective of all else it will several months to generate the forces required to execute his strategy. Those same forces will then have, what, six months to stem the tide?
By positing that opponents of General McChrystal’s strategy are supporters of drawdown (“The real difference between his vision and that of his opponents is the latter’s desire to accomplish this while reducing our combat presence” –pg 3).Biddle succeeds in creating a strawman that supports his preferred COA.
Undoubtedly training Afghan troops during a war is not like teaching math in a classroom but is 40000 the right number given our interests there and resource constraints. I’ll confess to being somewhat persuaded by the operational logic in the Kagan’s work on troop requirements (Securing Helmand report) but this does not address the strategic concerns as expressed by the Rory Stewart’s and Andrew Bacevich’s of this debate. Further, it’s not clear to me that sustaining the combat forces we have now while increasing trainers (another asset very much in low supply) is an imperfect if not also viable approach despite assertions that there is no middle ground.
I can’t resist picking at a few of his assumptions either. Ignoring that few are actually talking of a w/drawl from Astan Biddle again asserts that the Taliban represent a threat to the survival of the Pak government. But here I think he mistakes brutal terrorist attacks for the collapse of the State - the Pak Army may not be able to conduct a COIN efficiently, if at all, but I somehow seriously doubt that the Taliban is capable of seizing power (as opposed to create instability) in Pakistan.
With regard to assertions about militants have collectively turned on the Pak government (Biddle write on page 6 that “Collectively, they have mounted an insurgency that is dangerous enough as it is: given the advantage of a state-scale haven across the Durand Line, their virulence could increase dramatically”) is worth noting where the Pak Mil is not, and does not plan to, crack down. North Waziristan, just across from Paktia and Paktika, is not on the list for a crackdown – nor is Quetta. No one is going after Haqqani, Hekmetyar or Bahadur as far as I can tell. Seems to me the militants that are fighting in Astan (the aforementioned) are still mostly unobstructed. And what about the comment on safehavens. Sorry, but wasn’t the Taliban in power for five years without posing a threat to the Pak state? If Mullah Omar were a threat to the Pak state would there be a Quetta Shura?
Incidentally, what do you think the Pak Government thinks of a prospective ISAF surge? Do you think they believe it helps them with their problem in the FATA? Suggest you do some data mining on their position on this issue.
Is it really plausible that the Taliban will return to power? I’d argue this is possible only if we withdrew completely which to my knowledge no serious observer has suggested. If the Taliban did presume to take over (assuming they’d reached some form of Mao’s third stage or something) I’d think they’d have to mass at which time we might just be able to deal with them on favorable terms. Point is that is unlikely. The most likely COA in the absence of an additional 40000 troops(which is the true reflection of the debate vice w/drawl) is instability and Taliban control of the countryside with the cities in coalition and Afghan hands. Worth noting that even when in power, and without Western involvement, the Taliban was unable to secure all of Astan.
None of this is to say that circumstances aren’t dire in Astan/Pakistan today but to imply, if not outright assert, that Kabul, and inexplicably I’bad, are about to fall mischaracterizes circumstances and obscures a clear review of the alternatives. Believe it or not I’ve not made my mind up yet on this surge issue but I commend the Obama Administration for not being bull rushed into resourcing a strategy without clear thinking first. Admittedly, would have been best to do this back in March when they first rolled out the strategy but we are where we are.
I fear group think continues to find home with this crowd – unfortunate because it did so much to stem the tide for the disaster that nearly (and may still) befell us in Iraq in 2007.

I usually just read and soak

I usually just read and soak in all the knowledge available at AM, alas, today I must inject these two cents.......

First, why does the current COIN argument for Afghanistan seem so hypocritical to me? Maybe, cause it really is, at least a little??? If all the parts/aspects of COIN are sooooo critical and interconnected, and Obama 'absolutely muuuuust' send the whole 40,000, then why does it seem like so much is being ignored in the blind worship of the McCrystal plan. You know.......little things like, say......hardcore logistics. I read/heard somewhere that its costing $400-500 a gallon of fuel in Afghanistan, let alone water, food, and those KBR foam containers (aka to-go food boxes) at $40 a pop.

How about the Afghan component both political and military. People act like some Afghan army is just gonna magically form with a few thousand more ISAF and US trainers. Tell me, where is the US gonna find these magical Pushtuns that all of a sudden like the West and are willing to work with us, cause hell WILL freeze over before the Pushtuns allow Tajiks and Hazaras to occupy their lands for any length of time, especially if they are with Americans.

And then there is the Political component. The rampant corruption, smuggling, and war crimes aside, I just gotta ask, WTF MAN? Do we really think a place that has never, and I mean NEVER, accepted the rule of Kabul, to actually change with just a few years of COIN strategy?

Im sorry if this is harsh, but for the author of this article to write "the whole is greater than the sum of the parts; implementing just one or two pieces alone undermines their effectiveness," seems a bit hypocritical considering the current plan falls so incredibly short.

"This is an important and

"This is an important and timely piece of work"

ROFL!