Abu Muqawama retains its autonomy and the views and beliefs expressed within the blog do not reflect those of CNAS.
1. Yes, it might be true that NATO and Afghan troops outnumber insurgents 12-1. This is as irrelevant a statistic in guerrilla warfare as enemy body count. The only things worth measuring in any war are those things that bring each side closer to or farther from realizing expressed political objectives. We do not set our troop levels in counterinsurgencies or any other war based upon those of the enemy but rather upon what levels are appropriate for operationalizing the expressed strategic goals of the civilian leadership. Only if we had the option of pursuing a strategy of annihilation against the Taliban would their troop levels matter. As long as the Taliban and other insurgent groups continue to have the effect on the Afghan population they are having, their troop levels can be 600 guys or 60,000 guys and it does not matter.
2. I like how pundits who spend their time casting doubt on the assessments and opinions of those with in-depth understanding of Afghanistan and NATO operations there jump at the chance to sing the praises of others with in-depth understanding of Afghanistan and NATO operations when they conveniently advance assessments and opinions that match up with conclusions they themselves have already reached. (Here's but one example.) Afghanistan and the U.S. presence there is a wicked problem about which many intelligent people can disagree. But suddenly the opinion of a junior State Department employee -- talented and patriotic though he may be -- is the only opinion that matters? So Matthew Hoh is wise but Carter Malkasian and Kael Weston* are what, fools? Or Rory Stewart is clever but Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart are dim? All three are clever, of course, and that's what makes policy options on Afghanistan so devilish. Look, if someone writes something and it matches up with your opinion, by all means say so. But I know about 50 really smart people on Afghanistan with lots of time on the ground there, and no two have the same opinion about what U.S. policy should be. Let's not turn one dude whose opinions on Afghanistan happen to line up with the zeitgeist into the flippin' Delphic oracle.
*To name two people currently doing the same work as Hoh -- in conditions equally tough.
Also and finally, do not miss my post this morning for the awesomely named "Daily Beast." The key take-away:
The Obama adminstration has, I believe, some leverage at the moment, which it could use to affect the composition and behavior of the next Afghan government. As long as Afghanistan’s ruling politicians—Hamid Karzai especially—think the United States might reduce its commitment to Afghanistan, they could be willing to accede to U.S. demands on key ministerial and provincial-level appointments. Just as an Afghan government consisting mainly of those politicians thrown out by the Taliban in 1996 would spell continued insurgency and mission failure, a more inclusive and competent Afghan government would enable the success of a counterinsurgency strategy.
Am agree that troop levels of Taliban or affiliates do not really matter. Likewise the actual number of hard core members or affiliates of AQ do not really matter - what matters is the philosophy they hold to be true, the ideology that drives them and has permeated through many levels of militancy, not just if AFPAK but increasingly an a global scale.
This ideology must be countered, ideal by a solid Islamic based alternative to the austere interpretation of the Koran that the Taliban and AQ has as their worldview.
And it is the effect that they have on the population that matters. That fear and intimidation coupled with the ability to provide services that the 'legitimate' government in Kabul fails to deliver means that they like other shadow governments in other insurgency situations can claim a certain legitimacy of their own.
"I like how pundits who spend their time casting doubt on the assessments and opinions of those with in-depth understanding of Afghanistan and NATO operations there jump at the chance to sing the praises of others with in-depth understanding of Afghanistan and NATO operations when they conveniently advance assessments and opinions that match up with conclusions they themselves have already reached."
Isn't this simply the way that public argumentation occurs, for better or worse?
Haven't you, yourself - former Army Ranger and Fellow at the Center for a New American Security - been "used" in the same way?
Thucydides has a more dire assessment of the misuse of words and civil discourse, I think, for the Classics majors among us.
ADTS
"The Obama adminstration has, I believe, some leverage at the moment, which it could use to affect the composition and behavior of the next Afghan government. As long as Afghanistan’s ruling politicians—Hamid Karzai especially—think the United States might reduce its commitment to Afghanistan, they could be willing to accede to U.S. demands on key ministerial and provincial-level appointments. Just as an Afghan government consisting mainly of those politicians thrown out by the Taliban in 1996 would spell continued insurgency and mission failure, a more inclusive and competent Afghan government would enable the success of a counterinsurgency strategy."
Ironic that this mirrors, to some degree, Stephen Walt's blog post today. He noted that as the sole superpower, the US can exploit its asymmetric influence to its own advantage. Your example is a good one. Does the US need Karzai more than he needs the US?
ADTS
"I like how pundits who spend their time casting doubt on the assessments and opinions of those with in-depth understanding of Afghanistan and NATO operations there jump at the chance to sing the praises of others with in-depth understanding of Afghanistan and NATO operations when they conveniently advance assessments and opinions that match up with conclusions they themselves have already reached."
Uh, what turnip-truck did you fall off of again? Kidding! Sort of!
"But suddenly the opinion of a junior State Department employee -- talented and patriotic though he may be -- is the only opinion that matters?"
That is, like, every complaint of every conservative, EVER, when it comes to the...wait for it...MSM. Once again, kidding! Sort of!
(I gotta quit procrastinating, now: It always weirds me out when I haunt these comments sections. It probably weirds the rest of you commenters out, too? Never fear, it usually means I should be doing something else. Which I will now do.
And, what a sad, sad day in Afghanistan. Jeez, you lot over there are amazing, you know?)
We are a country full of people who only want to hear others who they agree with (people only watch fox or msnbc) who reinforce what they already believe. There is no middle ground and where there is no middle ground there is no consensus. There is no third way or post partisan. Forget it, Andrew. It's Chinatown
I disagree with the basic accounting the determines how many insurgents there are in Afghanistan and how much they spend. True, we may have a 12-1 advantage in terms of numbers of actual fighters, but does that count the people who support insurgent ideology but do not bear arms? If you factor in the people who provide homes, provide food, provide logistics, provide intelligence, then the number of Taliban fighters or supporters jumps way up.
You are totally right, in a counter-insurgency the number of fighters isn't the point, the ideological/political affects are the point.
Of course, the key to destroying the Taliban is not killing or threatening the non-arms bearing supporters, but convincing them to switch sides.
Michael C
Good, because Exum has never been hyped in the media for saying agreeble Zeigeisty things.
It's Hoh, not Koh...at least get his name right.
Very much agree on Hoh. Obviously a very impressive guy -- but there are more like him who have NOT resigned.
Ex, your writing would benefit from your not using the word "operationalize." There is always a better word.
"You are totally right, in a counter-insurgency the number of fighters isn't the point"
I agree with both Abu M and Michael C. I think the metric assumes importance not because it's useful in assessing the war in Afghanistan per se (although I think it's interesting to speculate on what metrics *are* useful*). I think the metric assumes importance because it seems so reminiscent to the Shinseki Congressional testimony in which he extrapolated, from the Bosnia experience, that SASO in Iraq would require on the order of hundreds of thousands of troops. Needless to say, at a time of extensive (excessive?) deliberation about what to do in Afghanistan, and debates about civil-military relations and what senior military leaders can and should be saying to their civilian overseers, anything that seems similar to another crucial decision point will be noted. Any grasp at analytic leverage that can be compared to another, prior grasp at analytic leverage will quite likely be observed and commented upon.
ADTS
"We have embarked on stormy and perilous waters. The strong current of events forbids return. the sooner the farther shore is reached, the sooner will the dangers and discomforts of the voyage be over. All are anxious to make the land. the suggestions as to course are numerous. There are some, bad and nervous sailors perhaps, who insist upon returning, although they are told it is impossible, and who would sink the ship sooner than go on, were they not outnumbered by their shipmates. While they are delaying, the current bears us towards more disturbed waters and more rocky landing places.
There are others who call out for "Full steam ahead", and would accomplish the passage at once, whatever the risks. But, alas! the ship is run out of coal and can only spread its sails to the varying breezes, take advantage of favorable tides, and must needs lie to when the waves are high.
But the sensible passenger may, though he knows the difficulties of the voyage and the dangers of the sea. fairly ask the man at the wheel to keep a true and constant course. He may with reason and justice insist that, whatever the delays which the storms or accidents may cause, the head of the vessel shall be consistently pointed toward the distant port, and that come what will she shall not be allowed to drift aimlessly hither and thither on the chance of fetching up somewhere some day."
- Winston Churchill, 1897, "The Story of the Malakand Field Force"
He could have written that yesterday instead of 112 years ago and still have been accurate and to the point. In fact, he could have posted it on this very blog.
Maybe our leaders, civilian and military, need to get their heads out of their computer consoles and read a bit of history, eh, wot?
I thought the Cointras had counter-insurgent to population ratios all worked out, so why wouldn't a counter-insurgent to insurgent ratio also be important?
If one NATO unit can perform a task with half or twice as many people as another isn't that something we should know?
If the AQ aim in this campaign is to drain US resources wouldn't the cost to them for their economy of force mission be relevant?
If this article is true you can throw the 12 to 1 ratio out the window:
North Waziristan 'bustling' with 'Foreign Mujahideen'
"I even challenge [the identified individual who posted the survey online] to just walk around the bazaar in Miranshah. This bazaar is bustling with Chechens, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Russians, Bosnians, some from EU countries and of course our Arab brothers. According to MY survey the foreign population is a little less than a third of the total. Any Waziri of Mehsud I spoke to seemed grateful to God for the privilege of being able to host the "Foreign Mujahideen.""
http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2009/10/us_jihadi_n...
We may have a 1 to 1 ratio as they move back and forth across the boarder at will. Ex if this is true, would this change you mind about ratios?
"I like how pundits who spend their time casting doubt on the assessments and opinions of those with in-depth understanding ... jump at the chance to sing the praises of others with in-depth understanding ... when they conveniently advance assessments and opinions that match up with conclusions they themselves have already reached."
The funny thing about that statement is that it applies to every issue that gets debated in Washington. Is this really worth getting upset about?
"But suddenly the opinion of a junior State Department employee -- talented and patriotic though he may be -- is the only opinion that matters? So Matthew Hoh is wise but Carter Malkasian and Kael Weston* are what, fools?"
Don't we see this argument put forth every other month? In 2007, for example, General Petraeus was made out as a traitor and liar because 7 Soldiers in Baghdad, looking at the situation through a soda straw, disagreed.
"... I know about 50 really smart people on Afghanistan with lots of time on the ground there, and no two have the same opinion about what U.S. policy should be. Let's not turn one dude whose opinions on Afghanistan happen to line up with the zeitgeist into the flippin' Delphic oracle."
I think Petraeus summed it up in 2007 when he said something along the lines of "there are 150,000 Soldiers in Iraq with 150,000 different views."
Railing against stupidity in American politics is like railing against the weather.
Why is it that we are counting on the grace and kindness of Karzai to appoint the provincial governors?! Why do we need to pressure Karzai to act for the good of the Afghan people?
Wouldn't it be more reality-fitting to have the provinces come up with their own governance? It probably ends up that Karzai appoints the politically best choices for these provincial positions, but that is just one extra layer of management with an extra layer of reality distortion.
I can see why we set up the system this way, to curb the power of the warlords and to pull the provinces toward Kabul. But Karzai has to accede to the power of the warlords anyway. We're engineering the Afghan governance to fit our own sensibilities, and it's destroying our ability to understand the situation there.
Sounds like sour grapes - that a contrary, and compelling, point of view is getting airtime. no doubt the only reason I know of Exum is that somebody else was using his arguments to bolster their agenda. The thing about Rory Stewart (and perhaps Hoh) is that their interpretations don't sound like fairy tales wrapped in academic jargon; and they acknowledge the likely limits of what we can achieve, and more importantly the opportunity cost of going all out in Afghanistan. Certainly we can achieve some kind of circumscribed success in Afghanistan, it just may be the cost is too high.
But then, this is an argument against foreign military occupation, as I have argued for some time. Asking any democratic polity to understand the conditions on the ground in a foreign country, with as much complication and politics as an occupation is going to bring, is simply asking too much.
i thought kael weston was indeed a FSO, not one of these 1361's exum compares him to...
I like how pundits who spend their time casting doubt on the assessments and opinions of those with in-depth understanding of Afghanistan and NATO operations there jump at the chance to sing the praises of others with in-depth understanding of Afghanistan and NATO operations when they conveniently advance assessments and opinions that match up with conclusions they themselves have already reached.
Right, and Exum doesn't play virtual circle jerk with Steve Biddle on a regular basis?
It goes without saying that people will latch onto an argument which aligns with their already established opinions, prejudices, and sentiments. As others have noted above, this is the way public discourse works. 99% of the American population has no personal experience whatsoever with Afghanistan, so all of their judgments must be based on reports and opinions of others. I think you're missing the main reason Hoh's letter has been spread in the media (which happened before the Washington Post article) -- it's not because people believe he is an "expert" after four months in Afghanistan, but because he makes a powerful argument in his letter.
The supporters of counterinsurgency have articulated arguments contrary to Hoh's, but, in my opinion, less persuasive ones. You have the harder job. Even the best case scenarios for a continued US occupation necessarily involve sacrifice of blood and treasure. Withdrawal from Afghanistan does not; there is only the contingency of some possible future attack based from Afghanistan, as exists from numerous places around the globe. You also bear the burden of overcoming the fact that we have been in Afghanistan for eight years with little progress to show for it. The lessons of Iraq, where a troop increase may have helped to initially lessen violence, but where no political solution has been reached and mayhem persists despite the presence of more US soldiers, are also fresh in the public mind. So the idea that our presence in Afghanistan exacerbates rather than lessens the violence and instability there, particularly since it's now clear we have knowingly supported a corrupt regime, makes a lot of sense to an outside observer.
I heart your complaints.
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