Abu Muqawama: Post

Abu Muqawama retains its autonomy and the views and beliefs expressed within the blog do not reflect those of CNAS. Abu Muqawama retains the right to delete comments that include words that incite violence; are predatory, hateful, or intended to intimidate or harass; or degrade people on the basis of gender, race, class, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or disability. In summary, don't be a jerk.

I hate it when CNAS scholars only write about stuff that has to do with counterinsurgency...

...like when one of our interns writes about Thorium and the nuclear fuel cycle. Another COINdinista, obviously.

Nukes

47 comments

Intern? Good to know you

Intern? Good to know you have your high-level people on the non-COIN stuff.

http://www.cnas.org/naturalse

http://www.cnas.org/naturalsecurity

I know dude. Only teasing. I

I know dude. Only teasing. I am a pro-CNAS COINdinista myself. Just pointing out a product by an intern isn't the best example

Okay, as a non-think tanker,

Okay, as a non-think tanker, non-inside-the-beltwayer, non-DCer (thank heavens, I say that every time) I have to ask: why is work by an intern automatically suspect? Isn't quality of work the issue, and not 'rank' or credential of the author? Am I taking your jokey comment too seriously, Visitor at 11:52?

I dunno, it's my bias. The youts should be encouraged, that's what I think. At that critical time in a career, we senior types should support and encourage their work! Work hard, interns! Scribble away - we appreciate it out here in the hinterlands of the internets.

I am all for giving credit

I am all for giving credit to work done by others in your organization. But what would be the tragedy if CNAS were in fact known as - gasp! - a predominantly COIN think tank.

ADTS

Not AT ALL suggesting work

Not AT ALL suggesting work by an intern is automatically suspect. At think tanks, just like ar other institutions, interns often do very important research that makes the higher level analysis possible - and they often engage in great analysis independently.

I was just trying to make a jokey snarky point (that has now been taken too far I guess) that CNAS can/should find more prestigious non-COIN work to showcase.

Yeah, what ADTS said. What's

Yeah, what ADTS said. What's wrong with that? I imagine any think tank will come in and out of 'fashion', as political winds blow in a different direction, but quality wins, right? Am I being too naive? Likely, I am.

Shoot Andrew, you sound like

Shoot Andrew, you sound like the firm's PAO with this constant beating drum of CNAS does more than coin.

It is getting old.

And to build on ADTS's question why would it be such a big deal for the CNAS folks to be known as a Coin-centric think tank? Many of your senior analysts do claim that to be your area of expertise, no?

A little pimping for the

A little pimping for the military-industrial complex never hurt anyone's career prospects, snicker.

    "Unfortunately, this section was absent from the final version of the bill. But with nuclear energy and natural resources competition on the rise, thorium deserves a close look for the benefits it can provide to our national security."

Now, why was it removed from the bill? You might want to look at this history of the so-called "hafnium bomb" which illustrated the problems of military science - namely, without committed independent oversight and analysis, a whole lot of blatant BS can survive under the cover of secrecy - stuff that would be laughed out of the room if it ever saw the light of day.

Now excuse me, I got some goats to match mental kinesthetic coercive abilities with - a bit weird, sure, but I got a ten-year grant on this baby, I gotta milk it for all it's worth. We'll teach these skills to the boys in Afghanistan, and then they'll just stare down the enemy, the way they do in Washington foreign policy meetings.

Thanks for the comedic relief, anyway.

P.S. the technical problems are the same ones that killed off reprocessing spent fuel rods - if you really want the technical details:

http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/britains-reprocessing-boon...

    Now in its sixteenth year of operation, THORP has been afflicted by multiple accidents and unplanned closures--some due to worker error and some due to technical problems. Even when operating normally, THORP's performance has been lackluster; converting only 14 percent of recovered uranium into new fuel for export. An even smaller percentage of plutonium has been reused, leaving Britain with an embarrassing stockpile of more than 100 tons of separated plutonium that it doesn't know what to do with. While the domestic nuclear industry maintains that the plutonium would best be used as mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) for light water reactors, the higher cost of MOX fuel compared to conventional low-enriched uranium fuel and the additional security required to safeguard it from theft or attack has dampened consumer interest.

Any plausible thorium approach relies even more heavily on reprocessing spent fuel than before - it's a bad joke, but then, so was the claim that Star Wars could stop MIRV'd warheads and provide a "nuclear security umbrella." More often than not, classification is just used to hide the fact that the technology doesn't work. That's also the case with the current "clean coal carbon capture" program - all the data is proprietary, so the lobbyists can keep claiming it works.

I bet Sarah Palin would buy it, though - just tell her it's true and give her the talking points, she's like a trained dog, even better than Reagan.

Ha, I had to laugh when Gian

Ha, I had to laugh when Gian Gentile accused someone else of constantly beating a metaphorical drum.

And to build on ADTS's question why would it be such a big deal for the CNAS folks to be known as a Coin-centric think tank? Many of your senior analysts do claim that to be your area of expertise, no?

You know the answer to this question, of course, and you want Ex to respond because you imagine the answer will make him uncomfortable: if CNAS marketed itself as a COIN shop, and COIN turned out to be "just a fad" (or the deciders in this country determined that COIN missions were a waste of resources, or that the sacrifices required to engage in them were not commensurate with the potential gains -- something that is more likely), then CNAS would lose influence and its COINdinista cast would fade into obscurity.

Now, this answer is so obvious that I can only imagine you're being disingenuous and intentionally confrontational when you pretend to need Andrew's help in sorting it out.

Perhaps CNAS seems like a "COIN-centric think tank" to you because you've only ever viewed it through the lens of a COINtra? What I mean by that is that if you were working on "natural security" at State or EPA or Northeast Asian security at Brookings or the NSC instead of working on anti-COIN from inside the U.S. Army, maybe you'd perceive that organization differently.

I'm not sure the causal

I'm not sure the causal arrow in your third paragraph is correct, although I can't see inside AM's brain (meant respectfully even if that sounds snarky), so I decline to comment.

However:

"If you were working on "natural security" at State or EPA or Northeast Asian security at Brookings or the NSC instead of working on anti-COIN from inside the U.S. Army, maybe you'd perceive that organization differently."

If so situated, would one view CNAS more positively or less positively on that issue area (natural security, or others) relative to its peer competitors? I'm inclined to say, "less."

Bernard Finel, please jump in any moment now; I think you've made the same argument here before.

I'll raise the question once more: why is AM so insistent that CNAS is more than a COIN think tank?

ADTS

Better questions: is

Better questions: is Michelle Flournoy a COINdinista? How about Floyd Baker? Patrick Cronin? Marc Lynch? Who are the people that claim COIN as their area of expertise, exactly? Did they only become a COIN shop when the original folks left? Or because they employ/ed John Nagl, Shawn Brimley, and Andrew Exum, and because Ricks shoots his mouth off about whatever happens to be going on in and around the military, which lately has included COIN?

I don't have any stake in this and couldn't care less whether CNAS thinks of itself as a COIN-centric place or not, but it seems clear why they'd choose the latter. I've answered your question about why Ex would insist that CNAS is about more than COIN, deigning to "see inside AM's brain" in a way that you've refused to do. So here's my question: why are you so insistent that CNAS is not more than a COIN think tank? I know about COL Gentile: his interest is in marginalizing their work, making them look like an insider cabal with an undue influence on policy -- it feeds his "dominant narrative." But you -- why do you care?

Gulliver: Short answer - I

Gulliver:

Short answer - I don't care, don't have a stake in this, and also, I'm not sure how insistent I am.

Longer answer: You may well be right. I'm not a Beltway Insider. I'm someone who looks at what seem like provocative headlines intended to deny persistent charges, and assumes that if the provocative title are written, there must be some reason for that. Maybe I overreached - I'm willing to concede that. My cursory skimming of the bios of CNAS fellows does lead me to think that COIN is their area of expertise compared to all others, and my cursory knowledge of the competencies of other think tanks does lead me to think that they have greater depth of knowledge regarding other issues. But I haven't engaged in comprehensive scanning of bios of staff/fellows, and/or their research output, and compared that to other think tanks, which to me would seem the methodologically appropriate way to answer this research question. Again, what struck me is that AM seems to have initiated, sua sponte, this debate, with a provocative title, and it makes me think that he's overly defensive. And if he's overly defensive, I further reason - combined with my limited knowledge base about CNAS - there might be good reason for it. Based on my admittedly limited knowledge base, which I'm willing to concede, it makes me think that indeed, CNAS is a COIN think tank.

Short answer (again): you might be right, I might be wrong, I gave you the reasoning behind my posting. Take it for what it's worth.

ADTS

Whoa. What happened in this

Whoa. What happened in this thread? Is this all inside baseball stuff? Don't tell me about it, because I don't want to know! Ignorance is bliss. I always thought AM was just trying to use AM traffic to highlight the blogs and work of colleagues. Standard stuff in academia and the equivalent. Standard stuff in modern American life, actually - gotta market yourself, gotta get your name out there, and, well, why not? How else are you gonna be 'discovered'?

Why does so much of the discussion around here dwell on personalities and not the substance of the arguments, or information presented?

Man, the things I let myself get drawn into. I really need another hobby.

Madhu: To repeat: "I am all

Madhu:

To repeat:

"I am all for giving credit to work done by others in your organization."

That includes doing so for reasons of personal recognition, and organizational marketing. I only asked, initially at least, what would be so bad if CNAS were thought of as a - the? - COIN thinktank.

As for the "whoa," hopefully I haven't escalated matters to the "whoa" level. That wasn't my intent.

ADTS

ADTS: no, no, I was only

ADTS: no, no, I was only expressing confusion, and I thought the same as you initially - what's the big deal? Has the term COIN become so politicized to layperson, by the Afghanistan debate, that the academic nature of the discussion is being obscured (not talking about you or this thread, just wondering, in general, that's all :) )

Ex, thanks for giving

Ex, thanks for giving Michael a shout out. One of the things I like about CNAS is that the interns get the chance to publish.

Gulliver: Well there you

Gulliver:

Well there you have it, you caught me in an enveloping tactic, but so what? Why not have these discussions? This blog lost one of its most important critics in SNLII and his often strident and correct expositions of problems with the think-tank world and more specifically at CNAS. There are troubling conflicts of interests at hand: e.g., Exum's review of the recent book on Tillman; the contradiction between Tom Ricks as a purported reporter and correspondent yet now becomes a think tank expert beholden to a certain policy and ideological view which points to a much larger problem in our country with journalists who take a year off to write a book on whatever subject and do it by ending up on the payroll of a think tank. These are just a few examples.

You said it very accurately: Coin is a Fad, and it should be exposed now as such, especially the Coin of population centric coin as Exum and CNAS has been pushing. History shows this to be the case. Why do I care? Because this Fad of Coin has taken over our ability to do strategy. It has seduced folks into thinking that it can work, that it has worked, and that it will in the future as long as we follow its precepts and techniques.

If this blog claims any semblance of intellectualism along with its sponsor think-tank it should embrace this discussion in the way that Madhu and ADTS frame it in their posts.

"... this constant beating

"... this constant beating drum ... It is getting old."

AWOOOGA! AWOOOGA! AWOOGA!
Step away from the keyboard and place your hands on the monitor, sir.

"It has seduced folks into

"It has seduced folks into thinking that it can work, that it has worked, and that it will in the future as long as we follow its precepts and techniques."

I do so appreciate it when intelectual ideas become personified entities. It brings back many good memories of oldschool anticommunism, how the ideology of communism was like a virus that entered the body thgrough excess amasturbation and lack of exercise and wich then proceeded to *eat up your brain*.

Not that there arent plenty of arguments against the current idea of COIN. ANd its not a magic bullet, as some folks may come across thinking. But I do hope that the next 5 years, as we phase out according to Karzais "plan", will be focused on learning the limits and applications of "COIN" so that the instituional knowledge is embedded in the military forces of the west whenever next some crazy leader decides its timwe to invade and destroy a foreign country. I think there can be little doubt that even a underfunded COIN campaign in the first 3 years of the Afghan conflict would have seriously altered the base we are building on now. To start drawing a caricature of the idea seems dishonesty intelectualy to me.

COIN for

COIN for COIN...

Counterinsurgency tactics for dealing with colonial insurrections? Are U.S. foreign policy debates between counter-terrorism neocons and counter-insurgency neoliberal hed within the overall context of neocolonialism, especially related to control of oil resources?

The program has largely failed, hasn't it? The Central Asian gas pipeline games - what became of Plan Cheney? From Georgia to Afghanistan, the "avoid the Iranians and the Russians" agenda has run into the ground. Empires based on fossil fuel control that can't control fossil fuels are doomed to failure.

David Killcullen on Empire's Last Gasp:

"A key adviser to Nato forces warned today that Barack Obama risks a Suez-style debacle in Afghanistan if he fails to deploy enough extra troops and opts instead for a messy compromise."

Did he really mean to present the U.S. foreign policy stance as a modern version of the old French and British imperial approach, or did it just slip out?

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/nov/12/obama-us-troops-afghanistan-...

Even the Obama plan to "re-engage South and Central America" is looking to do little more than increase the violence level - Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia all seem to think military action is imminent, or maybe it's just posturing - but it's obvious that sphere-of-influence thinking is back in vogue, not that it ever left. Yeah, well, good luck with that, empire-builders... Your time is over.

Gulliver, Gian would be the

Gulliver, Gian would be the last person on earth to suggest that CNAS only held COINdinistas. He was simply pointing out this blog's unfortunate recourse to serve sometimes as an echo chamber for other CNAS proles, regardless of their academic interests.

Frankly, I don't read this blog anymore. It's not because Andrew has lost his competence as an original, oftentimes essential, voice on the COIN debates, but rather that the tone has changed. He's the star pupil at the front of the classroom now, ratting out the kids with their spitballs in the back, ensuring that the teacher has a polished apple every morning.

He politely raises his hand, sings in the glee club and has proven himself an able waterboy for the team when it takes the field. There's nothing wrong with any of this, and there is much to admire in his honest, dogged advocacy for friends.

But it makes for pretty boring reading. It was so much more fun when he accused (rashly) the Kagans of being chickenhawks with the cadavers of our troops in their blooded beaks, ridiculed the heady assumptions of politicos and bad generals or otherwise caused mayhem with everyday's acerbic posting.

As for Gian, he'll be the first also to tell you that although we're friends, there ain't much that we agree on, much less COIN. I'm actually probably more akin to Exum, both in my interests and my methods. But it's also patently unfair to accuse Gian of being simply interested in COIN.

Like his earlier mentor Con Crane, Gian's work on airpower is brilliant and persuasive. He expertly teaches a wide range of military subjects at a university that uniquely values this competence, and his intellectual interests are catholic and fascinating to those of us who are unlearned.

I know for a fact that when Gian ventures in here to tweak Exum, he does so in a fatherly way because he wants the former Ranger to succeed, and he considers this gentle chiding to be part of a Socratic process that apparently deans of history departments routinely visit upon their brightest students.

There's nothing wrong with that, and I hope both you and Andrew treat it in the congenial spirit in which it is tendered.

While I do respect Gian

While I do respect Gian Gentile's body of work, to an extent, I am really sick of seeing him argue that COIN doesn't work historically without presenting accurate historical case studies. His Oct 30 piece in the New York Times, for exampple, tries to come up with imagined ironies about the fact that much of FM- 3-24 and our current COIN operational doctrine is based on Galula. But for a historian, he presents some weird interpretations of history:

“In fact, the Algerian insurgents chose to lay low while the French Army and people impaled themselves on the political problems of colonial rule. In the end, President Charles de Gaulle ordered the French Army out of Algeria in 1961 and Algeria got its independence.”

MASSIVELY incorrect and simple interpretation of history, even by op-ed standards. While rather dramatic and intense political problems that arose from the war certainly had a major effect on the war and the war’s end, the FLN insurgency did not “lay low.” To suggest that is a little bizarre.

There were some French military figures who believed that if only France stuck by them through the dirty bits (torture) it could have been resolved - but this was clearly bad COIN. And the French thinking he alludes to in the piece was David Galula's, who wrote Counterinsurgency: Theory and Practice while studying at an Ivy League university. This work was a major influence on our own COIN manual. Galula was an officer during the French-Algerian war, and his own operational experience, combined with his subsequent academic study, formed the basis of his study, but counterinsurgency as he envisioned it in his book was NOT what the French did in Algeria. More like a “lessons learned.”

There have been many examples of failed COIN, but his explanations as to why they failed (see what he says about Vietnam in the same op-ed) fall far short. No disrespect meant on a personal level, but as Gentile has become a walking anti-COIN information operation, he has strayed too far from accurate representations of history - at least when it comes to COIN - which is a shame considering his position.

Had to get that off my chest.

Ryan, Do you have a source

Ryan,

Do you have a source for your claim that the FLN was fighting actively while the French were fighting against the OAS? It certainly contradicts what I've read about the period - see, for example, Paul Henissart's excellent history of the OAS conflict, Wolves in the City: The Death of French Algeria.

For instance, I take it that Paul Aussaresses was he practicing "bad COIN"? This, presumably, would be PI-COIN rather than PC-COIN. As far as I'm aware, it is generally considered known history that the French paras defeated the FLN on the battlefield using PI-COIN techniques, eg, electrical torture, extrajudicial executions, and all the other things admitted by Aussaresses. Again, what is your source for the opposite interpretation?

Nothing personal - I am sure you have your own interpretation, which may be more true. But generally I become slightly suspicious when someone calls an interpretation of history I regard as more or less settled "a little bizarre." Generally, to sweep the truth under the rug, one has to insult it with gigantic Stalinist epithets. Falsehoods, on the other hand, can be reduced calmly and with polite discourse.

BTW: the OAS rocked. Vive Salan!

Oops, that was me with the

Oops, that was me with the communism post, directed at fnord. Grrr, I'll never get used to this site....

Hahahaha. Carl Prine sure

Hahahaha. Carl Prine sure knows how to give a compliment! "Frankly, I don't read this blog anymore. It's not because Andrew has lost his competence as an original, oftentimes essential, voice on the COIN debates, but rather that the tone has changed. He's the star pupil at the front of the classroom now, ratting out the kids with their spitballs in the back, ensuring that the teacher has a polished apple every morning. He politely raises his hand, sings in the glee club and has proven himself an able waterboy for the team when it takes the field. There's nothing wrong with any of this, and there is much to admire in his honest, dogged advocacy for friends."

Alistair Horne, A Savage War

Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace (the definitive English language history of that conflict) especially on your latter point. I suggest you read it if you haven't already. Truly fantastic book.

Torture certainly proved decisive in the Battle of Algiers, which was the small victory that led to the big defeat. It was effective in allowing the paras to move up the hierarchy and eliminate the FLN presence in the Cabash, but once it was discovered that torture was being used, a great deal of public support and all of the international support dissolved - contributing to the rise all the problems later in the war. Horne writes very effectively on this issue (I think chapter 10 or 11, I forget).

The war was already lost before the OAS came around toward the end of the war.

Ryan, Yes, I have a copy of

Ryan,

Yes, I have a copy of Horne. I don't regard it as a very good book, but I also don't recall it saying what you say it said. I would interpret "lay low" as "stop fighting." Perhaps you have some other creative definition? If so, the issue could be resolved quite easily.

So you, like everyone else, admit that the French defeated the FLN - "militarily" - with PI-COIN techniques. It's a very interesting argument: PI-COIN cannot produce real peace. Why? Because our campaign against PI-COIN will make sure that if you use PI-COIN and win militarily, we will defeat you politically! Therefore, PI-COIN does not work and should not be used. Real peace can only be produced by PC-COIN.

Of course, PC-COIN tends to fail "militarily." Google: "softly, softly Britain Basra." But that's okay! It always wins politically. Popular support, as we all know, is the keystone of all power. If the People say 2+2=5, the People may well be right. Therefore, our armed forces should wander around Afghanistan, handing out Bibles and getting their balls blown off, on the basis of the assumption that 2+2=5.

In short, your argument boils down to "resistance is useless - we will defeat you." To make it even shorter: you've discovered that Might makes Right. Which may well be the case. It was certainly the case for France in the 1960s. France, like Spain in the 1890s, could not resist America. Should it not have tried? Should it just have said: "America, Algeria is yours - make a desert paradise of it!" Perhaps it should.

And indeed, what a desert paradise the American way has made of Algeria! The result of France's defeat, of course, was not restricted to Algeria. Care to have a look at the result? Head over here. Or follow the link to M. Desouche's. Vive Salan!

If you're really interested in the Algerian war, I'd recommend diversifying your reading a little more. If you only read sources that agree with you, you're not going to learn anything at all. I've already recommended Henissart's Wolves in the CIty (very neutral in perspective), as well as Aussaresses' book. The latter is a primary source despite its recent publication, because Aussaresses was there. Another great primary source, however, is Michael K. Clark's Algeria in Turmoil (1959). If your knowledge of the period is restricted to conventional secondary sources, you'll quickly find that history is much more interesting than you think!

You are putting words in my

You are putting words in my mouth. The French defeated the FLN in the Battle of Algiers militarily - not necessarily elsewhere - which was one instance when the FLN insisted on staying to fight rather than abandoning the city. It was also in an urban environment, which changes the calculus. My point on the OAS was that by that point it didn't matter - the French had already lost the war. The FLN had already defeated them. So you are moving the focus of your analysis to a less strategically significant time period - moving the goal posts - to support your theory.

Andrew, don't be so prickly.

Andrew, don't be so prickly. You're excellent. Your blog, eh, not so much anymore. Just my opinion.

If you need a hug I'm sure Ricks or someone bearish in a nearby cubicle can come over and embrace you sufficiently to take the sting out of whichever inadvertent sling or arrow I hurled your way.

Sheesh.

Don't worry, I'm not

Don't worry, I'm not offended. I, actually, have been thinking a lot about hanging up the spurs, blogwise.

Gian Gentile is the last

Gian Gentile is the last person who should be lecturing others on intellectual honesty. I mean the SNLII plug was so ridiculous - in a paragraph that complained about suspect relationships no less - that Carl himself had to step in and clarify their 'friendship'. By the way, what do you guys do on the weekends? Wander around Gettysburg, hold hands and place bets on who can get red-in-the-face angry first?

Anyone who has had the misfortune of watching Gian work and re-work his arguments over the last couple of years will have noticed his tired iterations spin endlessly, trying to come up with cute catch phrases, apply COIN logic against itself, and latch on to anything that folks with actual credibility say, then make it about COIN. Remember when Gian fell in love with Bacevich a few months ago? Now apparently, COIN has ruined our ability to do strategy. What next, does COIN cause cancer?

Gian does however have a talent for intellectual negativity. How many papers/comments has he written railing about how COIN is 'bad' compared to actually articulating a helpful alternative? I suppose it's important to stick with what you're good at though.

And now Gian just wants to straight up insult AM, after simperingly kissing ass in the early days. None of us knows if AM is right or not but at least he has the integrity to try and make a positive difference.

Wow that was a fun read.

Wow that was a fun read.

I've said this before the fact that this blog attracts pro and anti COIN kids is why its a great read. AM's posts make me think and for a student that a good thing, but the comments section really gets things rolling along.

If CNAS is a COIN centric think tank, and I don;t think it is, I just think that's where it started, so freakin what. If you don't like that , don't email resumes.

Everything evolves, even bad ideas, so if CNAS did start as something, and if you have, as many of you have, enjoyed the benefits of that experience, then for god sakes let it become what it may be and relax.

Debate is good for the soul, that's why I pop in. But Like Madhu says, to much debate about the personalities draws us away form what we shroud be arguing pointlessly about.

Ryan, My, your tongue is

Ryan,

My, your tongue is slippery! By "not necessarily elsewhere," you are either referring to FLN presence in the rural areas, or you are switching the ball under the cup again and referring to a political "elsewhere." In the former case, you are mistaken by any reasonable sense of the words, and in the latter case you are just deploying your Jedi mind tricks. Nobody cares what anyone writes on a blog, so why bother? Save it for the State Department.

Moreover, you call Colonel Gentile "a little bizarre" for saying that the FLN was "laying low" during the period of the struggel between the OAS and France. Do I have this right? Is there some other period that you're referring to? Because you've got to realize that if the French paras were playing dirty before the OAS rebelllion, there was certainly no stopping these badass fsckers during the rebellion. The toughest, most hardened French ass-kickers on the planet were running around Algiers without civilian control. It is not only a fact that the FLN "lay low" in this period, it is unimaginable that they wouldn't have. So if they weren't "laying low" - what were they doing?

And it was not the FLN that defeated France, Ryan. In any sense that counts, France defeated the FLN. It was America - or more specifically Washington - or most specifically Foggy Bottom - or even most specifically Foggy Bottom's Atlanticist shills in the Quai d'Orsay - that defeated France. The same wonderful people that gave us the EU.

Then, after having defeated France, this coalition gave Algeria to the FLN - which France had defeated. So, basically, in the sense of national honor, raping Joan of Arc and giving her to the stableboys as a whore. Droit de seigneur, baby.

(No one could ever have imagined that France would lose her Empire, let alone to a bunch of Arab thugs and two-bit schoolteachers, until she became an American client state. In retrospect, it was probably inevitable once she became an English client state. Poor France! May she rise again.)

Just as in almost all the revolutionary struggles of the democratic era - including our own - the heroic military efforts of the nationalist patriotic revolutionary liberation forces is not what wins the war. Rather, the war is won by either (a) treason at home, (b) British (pre 1945) or American (post 1918) intervention, or (c) both. (In our case, (a) - Burke and the Rockingham Whigs were the political sponsors of the American rebellion.)

When de Gaulle said "I have understood you," and then stabbed the pieds noirs (who had brought him to power) in the back, he committed the traditional Atlanticist act of choosing the "international community" over his own country, France. That makes him a traitor - different in no existential way from, say, Quisling.

And if you don't believe this, try the experiment of replacing the word "international community" with "State Department" every time you see the former in the news. You'll find the fit is just about perfect. If the State Department and the international community are always on the same page, why assume the causal arrow points from the latter to the former? My impression is it's a little more in the other direction. I mean - given events like the above.

Also, I'd encourage anyone

Also, I'd encourage anyone interested in liquid-thorium reactors to swallow g.d.'s attempt to associate the technology with the various failures of plutonium reprocessing with a serious grain of salt. At least hear the other side from the Thorium Energy blog.

I am not a physicist, but the thorium LFR technology actually sounds very simple and promising to me. It is certainly much simpler than a plutonium reprocessing setup, which relies on chemical separation etc. It's a little silly to confuse the two, just because they both involve the R-word.

Madhu: You have a good point

Madhu: You have a good point about communism, Im old enough to remember it (our neighbour in the east). Having said that, lots of excellent communists. Depends on how they view Stalin in my opinion. (And Ceauscesco, lol.)

Abu M, it would be smart careerwise to fade for a few years. But your blog is always going to haunt you ;-)

Fnord: lots of excellent

Fnord: lots of excellent fascists. Depends on how they view Hitler in my opinion. (And Himmler, lol.)

Petain: good. ("Work, family, country!") Franco: better. Salazar: best...

Color me entirely

Color me entirely unsurprised by the most recent contributions from both Fnord and Moldbug.

Mencius, To clarify (and

Mencius,

To clarify (and this is my original point that you largely managed to avoid in your comments): I said it was bizarre for him to say that the FLN laid low, the French were defeated by colonial politics and that was that. I don’t dispute the FLN had little reason to fight when the OAS began having their fun. But until that point, the FLN insurgency had been robust and strategically (key word) successful. My point is, by that time (1961), the French had already gone past the point of no return – they had lost in Algeria and there was no going back. Gentile thus misrepresents why the French lost in Algeria and is being historically dishonest, which I argued is something Gentile unfortunately seems to do often with history when it comes to COIN.

Your insistence that the French actually defeated the FLN is the perfect proof that you haven’t internalized the strategic implications of what insurgency actually is. It pains me to write that sentence because that is an accusation that is thrown around irresponsibly in order to prevent more serious discussion, but in your case, it seems true.

Did the French defeat the FLN in tactical engagements and in larger episodes like the Battle of Algiers (a sort of unique event in the war for its scale)? Absolutely. But effective insurgencies force their enemies to fight and even “defeat” them in such a way that they cannot ever hope to hold on to governance in that territory because not enough of the populace will support them. Tactical victories and strategic defeat. So did the French kick the living hell out of the FLN more often than not and seriously diminish their structure and capacity? Absolutely. But the FLN still managed to foster an effective “climate of collapse” before the OAS showed up. Thats what insurgencies do.

You are looking at the wrong center of gravity.

And I am not going to touch your rant about de Gaulle, but thank you - I enjoyed the exchange.

"Don't worry, I'm not

"Don't worry, I'm not offended. I, actually, have been thinking a lot about hanging up the spurs, blogwise" - AM

:(

I've always liked this place for its free ranging comment threads (I mean, just look at this thread! It meanders all over the place. Think tanks, COIN, the politicization of academic trends or supposed 'fads', communism, Mencius Moldbug's Victoriana - okay, I might be talking about a different thread with the Victoriana! I kid! Seriously nutty, interesting, and a perfect example of the vibrant, messy and creative nature of free societies expressing themselves, er, freely. Huh. Good writing is hard, innit?)

Education happens in a variety of ways, and this place does a good job of introducing many people to topics, and blogs and articles, they might otherwise miss. It's not like I would have started reading Small Wars Journal right of the bat, you know?

Ryan, You are looking at the

Ryan,

You are looking at the wrong center of gravity. I'll give you a hint: it starts with "W" and ends with "n." I mean - duh.

You keep switching the ball under the cup! First you admit that the French lost Algeria because of French politics, then you try to argue that they lost because they alienated the Algerians (ie, the Arabs). I can't imagine how you could think that Arab public opinion could be considered as a cause of de Gaulle's surrender to the FLN! (And I can't even parse your latest explanation of how Gentile is a bad historian. I, too, just gotta give up.)

Perhaps the most curious element of democratic thinking is the belief that Public Opinion must always be considered as an ultimate cause. Whatever it is, is; is destiny.

What you're illustrating, sadly, is the utterly metaphysical disconnection of the democratic mind from reality. You're right about one thing - PC-COIN is directly and naturally derived from the axioms of democracy. Effective imperialism is in conflict with those axioms. A democracy, among many other things it can't do right, cannot properly occupy a foreign country. Therefore, rather than doing it improperly, it should abstain from the practice whenever possible.

Public Opinion is always a proximate cause. As Walter Lippmann will tell you, the ultimate cause of Public Opinion is whoever shot their way into the television tower - and therefore enjoys the arbitrary and autocratic privilege of informing the public. Even beyond this matter, Public Opinion always responds beautifully to power - as Osama puts it, the people like a strong horse. Caesar, for instance, made the Gauls love Rome forever.

And in 1961, Washington was certainly a strong horse! No, sirree, Foggy Bottom was not ready for the glue factory then. Nor is she now - but closer, closer...

I would be quite surprised

I would be quite surprised to find one essay Gentile has written wherein the message was "COIN is bad." He publicly has called for counter-insurgency doctrine to be part of the training of every ground combat unit in the US arsenal because he believes popular insurgencies are on the spectrum of conflict that any commander will need to confront.

I don't wish to speak for him, but Gentile seems to believe that the ground component of the US military should cheat toward the more kinetic side of the spectrum, especially because this is a skillset once lost that's hard to revive. He also questions some particular assumptions about the efficacy of COIN doctrine, perhaps because it runs the risk of replacing strategic calculation, perhaps because the causative forces from which "lessons" are drawn in Iraq aren't fully understood by those publicizing them.

While I have strongly questioned certain practices espoused by CNAS and news outlets that fail to disclose untidy relationships with the think tank, I've also been very upfront about my friendship with Gentile and have never quoted him as a source because reporters shouldn't do that.

I'll defend him as a friend even if I don't always defend his notions about COIN. Here, I'll defend his record of scholarship because, most candidly, I don't believe that many making the charges against him here have either read him or understand the rudiments of military science, perhaps both.

An even cursory review of my (rare) public statements will find that I've also defended those who champion ideas quite different from Gentile's notions -- including COL Mansoor, currently at Ohio State -- and, indeed, Andrew Exum.

For those who don't know, Gentile and I first met after we returned from service in Iraq during a public debate over the now infamous Yingling essay. I was still in uniform, and we sparred over the question of whether the generals had failed us, and have continued to debate similar issues over the years, just as he and Con Crane have taken different positions and remain chums.

It's possible to do this, and I see no reason why it should be shocking to confront such a phenomenon.

On the issue of Gettysburg, I believe both Union and Rebel commanders were idiots, but I'm not competent enough to defend this thesis. Gentile, however, probably could.

Gulliver, If you only read

Gulliver,

If you only read one pre-American book this year, make it Sir Henry Maine's Popular Government. If you read two, add Bryce's Modern Democracies, especially the ending.

That's one conservative and one liberal Victorian, both among the most celebrated thinkers of their time, the liberal writing 30 years later than the conservative. Who gets it right? And after that, you can go back to reading Ricks, Kilcullen, etc. You won't actually be trapped in the Victorian Matrix that is Google Books...

I give up trying to

I give up trying to understand how you are processing what I am writing. The collapse of political will brought about the defeat - but what brought that on? Hint: NOT the OAS.
It was...
A successful insurgency that drove the French to do some dark and strategically ineffective things. You still don't get this 101 basic stuff and I have no interest in engaging with you on this anymore.

My last comment on this thread. Feel free to have the last word

Ryan, The "dark things"

Ryan,

The "dark things" were "strategically ineffective" because it was strategically useful for many powerful political actors at that time, in both Washington and Paris, for France to lose Algeria. Specifically, "dark things" were brought to the attention of the public because this served the interests of the journalists and, more generally, intellectuals, at the time. Dark things that do not serve these peoples' interests - such as Stalin's atrocities - tend to remain hidden. Thus, again, the ultimate cause turns out to be a proximate cause.

Why did American intellectuals sponsor the FLN and their like, against the OAS and theirs? One can debate this forever, but the fact is that they did. Thus, they are morally responsible for the horrendous crimes of their proxies. They are the ones that inspired and led this awful wave of revolutions. There is blood on their hands, on their clothes, all over the furniture. It is to disguise this that they blame others. You, Ryan, are educated in this tradition, and can hardly be blamed for defending it. But hopefully you are young enough to learn and change and grow.

All war is atrocious. Therefore, an easy way to lose any war is by defining atrocities down. Every generation has its own definition of what is atrocious and what is acceptable in war, and these definitions do not just vary widely - they jump back and forth all over the map. For instance, no journalist in 1961 could have imagined that in 2009, the US military itself would have been prohibited from shooting back at brigands who shot at it, if the brigands were shooting from a house! This was, after all, barely 15 years after US airpower destroyed the entire French city of Caen in a completely useless raid.

But after the defeat of the Nazis, the American military caste itself was the most reactionary thing in the world. It had to lose, always and everywhere. Eventually the army is reduced to the powers of the police; the police is reduced to the powers of the social worker. Both can only lose.

Moreover, it wasn't just that Caesar subdued Gaul with blood and guts in 50 BC, ensuring 500 years of Gallo-Roman harmony. The French themselves massacred thousands of Arabs in Setif in 1945. No one gave a crap. The Arabs shut their Arab traps and obeyed. Arabs aren't stupid.

You are not, surely, asserting that these subtle principles of human conflict evolved at some point in 1955? You are asserting that they are eternal, n'est ce pas? And always correct? Thus, you should have to explain any counterexample that appears before the foreign offices of London and Washington appeared on the international scene and started manufacturing evidence to fit their historical theories, n'est ce pas?

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