Abu Muqawama: Post
Abu Muqawama retains its autonomy and the views and beliefs expressed within the blog do not reflect those of CNAS. Abu Muqawama retains the right to delete comments that include words that incite violence; are predatory, hateful, or intended to intimidate or harass; or degrade people on the basis of gender, race, class, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or disability. In summary, don't be a jerk.
Sectarian Cleansing and the Surge
Josh Foust passed along this report arguing that "the surge dovetailed a series of converging dynamics on the ground, facilitating more so than engendering a cessation of hostilities." I think this both correct and relatively uncontroversial. I also think the key takeaway from this report -- the we should be very wary of thinking we need only replicate the mechanics of the Surge to be successful in Afghanistan is also correct ... and also largely uncontroversial. I know of few informed people who would argue this, but I suppose it is useful to keep reminding people here in the United States that this is indeed the case.
Yeah, glad I'm not out in
Yeah, glad I'm not out in left field on this one. I see the more interesting angle -- again, relatively uncontroversial -- is the role ethnic and sectarian cleansing of different areas played. In essence, they had already separated most of the people from the enemy through either murder or expulsion.
I also think that's partly what makes all this surge talk in Afghanistan nonsense. We haven't seen a similar grass roots-level sectarian movement (to say nothing of the rather fundamental social differences between the two societies).
When something works or is
When something works or is seen to work I think that there is always going to be a danger that it is replicated as a mirror imagine in another area.
The danger of this of course is that these two operations areas are so very different. For one thing while devastated by the war, and by years of neglect Iraq at least had a semblance of significant infrastructure. while Afghanistan is as some have put it on this blog as waste land of hot rock.
As a result while minimize violence against civilians and broadening the security zones outside of urban area is a necessary step the build up of actual infrastructure is like wise important, and I don' think you can surge that build up, unless of course you increase the number of engineers and project mangers along with the grunts.
That's where I'd like to see those nations, like China, looking to invest (exploit) the natural resources of Afghanistan pull more wight both in terms of projects that improve the life of locals and also help secure them.
I am glad that Muqtada
I am glad that Muqtada Al-Sadr's declaration of a cease fire was mentioned as a part of the success of the surge that was a key moment and is normally overlooked. Had Al-Sadr not declared a cease fire to police his militia the surge would not have been successful. We got very lucky in Iraq, the enemy (AQ and Iranian back shia militias) was more brutal than we were, this turned the Iraqi people and nationalistic resistance groups of both sects against the enemy. Additionally prior to the 2003 invasion Iraq was a functioning nation, not by our standards, but it Iraq did provide the basics for its people, Iraq also had been united during its long war with Iran. All these factors had begun the end of the civil war when the surge started. The additional surge troops helped but were not the key factor that ended the bloodletting. The Sunnis should not be discounted from the political process, the former Ba'athist are making a come back in the political scene, in the north the Sunnis organized and gained control of the Ninewa and Salhudinn provinces. Most Iraqi politicians are seeking to build diverse nationalistic alliances to ensure their longevity.
The major differences that I can see between Iraq and Afghanistan are the lack of sectarian violence in Afghanistan and a lack of insurgent violence against the Afghan populace. Also as several people have pointed out, Afghanistan has not had a strong centralized government in quite a while, making our current efforts to centralize the government a much more daunting task than we had in Iraq. In Iraq all we had to do was find the guys that we fired in 2003 for being Ba'athists that ran the interworking of day to day Iraqi society and hire them again. I don't think that a cookie cutter surge in Afghanistan is the is the answer, nor do I think that more drones and whack a mole targeting is the answer either. I believe that MAJ Jim Grant proposed the most realistic option for success in Afghanistan, and the region.
Thanks for letting me rant! This is a great sight Abu M ! Abu Isloof
I read David Finkel's "The
I read David Finkel's "The Good Soldiers" last month. Finkel covered the 15 month deployment of an Army battalion into the Bagdhad "surge." The 2-16 Infantry BN was commanded by Lt. Col. Ralph Kauzlarich (who played a role in the Tillman case when he was the Ranger RGT XO) .
The author didn't offer much in the way of his opinion. But my takeavway was that Finkel would probably agree with the referenced report that the surge was largely incidental to to things quieting down in Bagdhad. Sadr's cease-fire was probably the biggest factor along with using new techniques to track and target IED manufacturer's.
I didn't get the feeling the soldiers "secured" anything more than themselves (although of course IED's took a toll).
Their last day before they departed was so crazy, even the "Lost Kauz" thought it crazy to stay out. I guess that was Sadr's militia's way of saying goodbye.
"I am glad that Muqtada
"I am glad that Muqtada Al-Sadr's declaration of a cease fire was mentioned as a part of the success of the surge that was a key moment and is normally overlooked. Had Al-Sadr not declared a cease fire to police his militia the surge would not have been successful." - Visitor at 6:32
Yes, but the Battle of Sadr City sort of nudged mookie into that cease fire decision as I recall.
Thanks for that ISN report by Claudio Guler, J.Foust!
Andrew: It is also
Andrew:
It is also uncontroversial, but still important, to say that there are huge differences between Iraq and Astan.
But to be sure, and contrary to what you rightly posit, it is the "mechanics" of the Sure that are in fact being replicated in Afghanistan. How can you argue otherwise? General McChrystal's recently leaked assessment and its stinging rebuke of ISAF and their purported inability to do population centric Coin could not have been made without the Surge Coin "gets it" narrative underpinning it. Moreover, General Petraeus has acknowledged that of course there are huge differences between Iraq and Astan, but then in the same breath he goes on to say that the "principles" of Coin that we have learned in Iraq and specifically under his command during the Surge, are applicable to Astan.
Well, there you have it, there it is, the template, more population centric coin and its applicable principles in the mountains and valleys of the Hindu Kush. It is those very Coin principles, maxims, talking points, and catechisms that have come to determine strategy, which in essence means we have no strategy at all, just the noise of the promise and hope of better coin methods being applied in Astan, with a few more troops, under a better general and voila soon success will be ours.
In the current American Army Coin doctrine the key and organizing principle to it is for the Army to learn and adapt toward doing better population centric counterinsurgency. Unfortunately the rules of Coin do not allow and Army to learn and adapt its way out of doing population centric Coin, and that is why the Army has become dogmatic and unable to do strategy because we are mired in the "mechanics" of Coin and can't imagine real alternatives.
gian
So, for all you
So, for all you forward-thinking people, in terms of all this noise about a combined COIN-CT campaign, what does this mean for sectarianism between everyone else and the Pashtun? Are we unthinkingly drawing the lines between COIN and CT areas of operation along ethnic fault lines?
It is true that informed
It is true that informed Iraq watchers understand that the Surge's success was largely a result of existing local processes, but that has not been the dominant narrative about the decline of AQI for a wider audience. GEN Petaeus' great insight was to identify productive processes in Iraq and encourage them. More troops may have been necessary, but that wasn't the central insight driving his strategy. Nonetheless, I would argue that the narrative of troop increases and American operational ingenuity has been dominant, not the underlying Iraqi opposition to AQI, frustration with war, etc... This narrative represents a missed opportunity in the larger fight against al-Qa`ida.
The notion that Iraqis themselves did the bulk of the work against AQI and others is a much more important and valuable message to discredit AQ's ideology and movement than the notion that tens of thousands of new American troops weakened and crushed the group. The fight of AQ writ large is primarily about Muslims, not the U.S. A dominant narrative emphasizing Iraqi's rejection of AQI would have been far more useful regionally than a U.S. v AQ theme.
Although I know it is bad blog comment etiquette to promo your own work, the link below is very relevant to the topic at hand. Readers of this particular blog may get a kick out some work we did last spring up at West Point's CTC (Disclosure: I am no longer on the payroll, but remain a Research Fellow) on AQI's conflict with Iraqis: (I hope that link works. If not, google 'Dysfunction and Decline')
You can take a look at the report itself, but folks will really have fun with the actual AQI documents, which are available on the page. I particularly recommend NMEC‐2008‐612449 (very bottom of the page), which is a lessons learned document written by a couple of AQI commanders.
Best,
Fishman
Apparently the link didn't
Apparently the link didn't work. My apologies...
Are there any books that
Are there any books that deal with the underlying factors responsible for the success of the surge that aren't necessarily covered in great deal in Ricks' works?
Sadr fled to Iran around
Sadr fled to Iran around Feb. 07 fearing that the U.S. would target him. He announced his first cease-fire in Aug. 07 after a big battle with the Supreme Council in the south that embarrassed him. Maliki did not launch his offensive against the Mahdi Army in Basra and Sadr City until March 08. The problem was that even though Sadr ordered a cease-fire at that time, his movement was so fractured that only some listened to it. He also never told his followers to disarm. Overall, the cease-fire did help, but Shiite militiamen were still very active afterward.
Also, there was plenty of sectarian cleansing of Baghdad by the Shiite, but it was not as widespread or complete as some think. There are still plenty of Sunni neighborhoods in the capital. Adhamiya is still smack dab in eastern Baghdad by major Shiite areas for example.
A more important factor was that by 2007 many insurgents were being pushed by the Shiites, Al Qaeda, and then a renewed U.S. effort. They realized they were going to lose to someone so decided to cut a deal with the U.S. and switch sides to preserve what they had left. The Sons of Iraq program and the blast walls ensured that.
After study a few of the blog
After study a few of the blog posts on your website now, and I truly like your way of blogging. I bookmarked it to my bookmark website list and will be checking back soon. Pls check out my web site as well and let me know what you think.Madeira plastica
The next time I read a blog,
The next time I read a blog, I hope that it doesnt disappoint me as much as this one. I mean, I know it was my choice to read, but I actually thougMadeira plasticaht youd have something interesting to say. All I hear is a bunch of whining about something that you could fix if you werent too busy looking for attention.
I agree with your point,
I agree with your point, please share with us more good articles.1989 Buick Apollo AC Compressor
Add your comment