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Understanding the Surge
November 9, 2009 | Posted by Abu Muqawama - 3:02pm | 20 Comments
Kim Kagan, author of this book on the Surge
Yeah, but its by Kim Kagan, the imperial snow queen. As soon as she can think outside of her jingoism, then I'll read her stuff. Her husband's awful too.
For those of you who haven't read the book, here's a brief review:
Kagan, Kimberly. The Surge: A Military History. New York: Encounter Books, 2009. 250 pp. $25.95 (hardback).
Understanding the complex endeavor of the Iraq War is difficult for the military professional, let alone the civilian, to accomplish. However, with that aim in mind, Kimberly Kagan sets out to write a narrative of military operations conducted as a part of 2007’s surge of forces in Iraq. In this respect she succeeds.
In 2006, Baghdad was one of the most dangerous places in the world, fraught with sectarian violence. Beginning with a description of the conditions on the ground that precipitated the Bush Administrations change in strategy, Kagan gives the reader an operational perspective without straying too much into the minutia of tactical actions. From this viewpoint, we see how additional forces, equipped with new counterinsurgency doctrine, were employed as a part of President Bush’s “new way forward.” Utilizing access gained through her husband, one of the architects of the surge strategy, Kimberly Kagan provides the reader with a detailed account of how Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno utilized the additional forces to increase security in Baghdad.
Readers should be aware that The Surge is a military history, and as such is told from the perspective of the military. The book places most of its emphasis on those military actions which are considered active combat or “kinetic” operations against the insurgency, and spends little time talking about the “non-kinetic” activities of that are the hallmark of counterinsurgency—political-based actions which contribute to defeating the cause of the insurgent. Telling a convincing story in the midst of a war is difficult to do as accurate information is poor in both quality and quantity. Much of Kagan’s information comes from coalition forces press releases and first-person access to major operational commanders, however some information remains classified. As such, Kagan’s book is a tradeoff—it seeks to provide some history now, rather than wait to portray the whole story in the future after the declassification of military records.
The Surge: A Military History fills an empty gap on the ever-expanding bookshelf of the Iraq War. Publishers continue to release books debating the political and strategic machinations of the Iraq War along with many first-person accounts of the war. But only The Surge speaks to the actions undertaken at the operational level, and would be a decent addition to the bookshelf of the military and civilian readers trying to decipher the puzzle of the Iraq War.
I've always been impressed with the tactical results of the so called 'surge' and I think there's a lot worth considering in COIN theory, but this was too much of a puff piece.
It made it seem like things are all better for the future, gave the army a bit more direct credit for the Anbar awakening than I've heard in other accounts, the swelling music was smarmy at times, and I had to wonder whether the release was timed to drum up support for a similar surge in Afghanistan (not something I'm against by the way, just still debating).
I suppose it's nice for commanders below Petraeus to get their place in the sun, but I really did not get any more insight from their 10 second clips than from reading the front pages over past couple of years.
I would have preferred a more matter of fact clinical reporting style with less "feel good" music; and a little less editorializing. This clip conveyed little new information.
I would have liked to see interviews with ISF leaders, their ETTs, local provincial leaders and PRTs discussing specific areas. I would have liked to have seen more discussion about the challenges of Iraqis working with other Iraqis from their perspective.
Comment by Visitor on November 9, 2009 - 3:07pm
You have a point on jingoism. This film should have been about Iraq and Iraqis, with Iraqi music and Iraqi pathos; with a heavy focus on how MNF-I interacted with Iraqis.
Pure Coin-Porn, that is all it is. Unreal, artificial, fake.
I find it hard to believe that AM would give it the label of a "documentary" since that word usually connotes at least a modicum of objectivity. His lede makes it sound like it is anticipating a Ken Burns documentary that might appear on Iraq 25 years in the future.
But at least AM recovers by his very important observation that to understand the Surge and the war in Iraq in general one must understand the enemy side, and of course the Iraqi side. Ironically, Exum should have applied that observation to the many other Coin-porn books out there like Ricks's, Robinson's, Kagans's, etc that purport to tell the story of the Surge and its effects but only tell one side of the story. That important observation applied to those books might have tempered Exum's zeal to promote these other works of Coin-pornography.
To date the best book that I have come across in English that gets at the Iraqi side is Filkins's "Forever War."
gian
Why should WE have to tell the Iraqi side? For that matter, WTF is that the first reaction?
Liberal Guilt Indoctrination may have indeed elected a President, and his freakish cast of "Czars". But it's now seen for what it is, and your clock is running out.
And for another thing, why would any sane Iraqi talk to us?
I felt kinda dirty watching it to, but for different reasons. My question for many is, "why did you wait so long for someone to tell you what to do?" IMO, instead of COIN porn, this video highlights the problems of centralized, micro-managed command and control in a decentralized fight.
In May 2003, my platoon had a patrol base in the Mansour/Abu G district of Baghdad. We lived with the community.
In Sept 2006, my company was back in a patrol base in the Diyala River Valley. The battalion commander that I was attached to identified the problem between the Sunnis and Shias, and he told me to go live their and fix it. It was really simple. We lived with the community.
In Jan 2007, re-attached to my parent squadron, we identified and destroyed an AQI training camp out in Turki Village. Bravo Troop stayed there and lived with the community.
In March 2007, my squadron cleared another training camp and safehaven in the Diyala River Valley. I stayed there and lived with the community.
In all four examples, we identified problems and worked to fix them. All three examples were bottom-up solutions, and my commanders acted decisive with little guidance. Three different commanders all using ingenuity. I thought that's what leadership is all about? Isn't that's why we get paid the big bucks? This isn't rocket science.
Mike
While not necessarily about the surge, "My country, my country" did a decent job as a documentary presenting the Iraqi side enduring the US military occupation:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0vxbdXVqWGk&feature=related
As for Baath or Al-Qaida military perspectives, I've yet to see anything more than agitprop.
A good buddy of mine, Mark Kukis, former Time Magazine war correspondent, has an oral history of the Iraq war as told by Iraqis set for release in 2010. I read the first chapter. It was amazing. I'll keep y'all posted.
Mike
Mike, thanks for your service. I wish Gen Sanchez had understood what your squad and commanding officers did.
Good example of "Ugly American" caricature:
"Comment by Visitor on November 10, 2009 - 8:20am"
"Why should WE have to tell the Iraqi side?" Iraqis and Americans are both human beings. Why do you feel the need to separate us? No one is asking "YOU" to tell the Iraqi side. However, a documentary filmaker should tell the story of the surge, including from the perspective of ISF, ETTs, PRTs, national Iraqi elected leaders, provincial/local Iraqi elected leaders, Iraqi religious and community leaders, and Iraqi civilians. Without that, you may have a film, but it isn't about the "SURGE" set of operations in Iraq in 2007.
"For that matter, WTF is that the first reaction?" Because this is billed as a "documentary" about the "surge."
"Liberal Guilt Indoctrination may have indeed elected a President, and his freakish cast of "Czars". But it's now seen for what it is, and your clock is running out." Why should there be any guilt indoctrination? There shouldn't be any uneasiness. We should treat foreigners normally, with the respect and understanding we provide other Americans. Your attitude of "us versus them" is precisely what offends foreigners. Many foreigners feel that Americans don't treat foreigners as one of our own. In other words, the problem is treating foreigners differentially from other Americans. No better example of this phenomenon than your words.
"And for another thing, why would any sane Iraqi talk to us?"" Who is "US"? No one is asking "You" to do anything. Why do you think Iraqis wouldn't like to talk to a documentary film maker? Many Iraqis like appearing on TV ;-)
Any documentary would probably need Iraqis (or Iraqi Americans) involved with it. Iraqis who could translate what other Iraqis were saying and understand the soft aspects of what Iraqis were feeling and communicating.
The musical score should be enough to warn away anyone predisposed to critical thought. Got to time stamp 9:00. Listen to the music before and after Petraeus is introduced as "the Godfather" of the surge.
Gah... I need some Metallica to drive it out of my head.
Damn Kim Kagan and her "independent" organization for this piece of crap, which actually forces me to accept and endorse COL Gentile's use of the term "COIN porn."
When the war in Afghanistan goes badly, it's because the Afghans won't fight for their country, the government is incapable, etc. But when the war in Iraq goes well, it's all because of a plucky bunch of neocon academics and their Chosen One general (generals?) who wouldn't let their war - one of the dumbest enterprises in history (and I say this as a supporter of "the surge") go down the toilet without a fight. And of course the contributions of they brave martyred troops who had to sacrifice themselves to complete the story, but whom the Kagans (I exempt Eliot Cohen because his son served) would never have to dirty their hands associating with. The Iraqis, who are also brave, but even more distasteful and uncouth than the poor 19 year old PFCs from Alabama, warrant nary a mention, except as returning to their rightful role as grateful recipients of freedom, 'Murrican style.
This video is f-ing shameless. Only a goddamned Kagan could make me rant like a freakin' Code Pinker. . .
Matt
Comment by Featherock on November 10, 2009 - 11:01am
You said that right. The music was . . . how to say this PC . . . hmmm . . . less than stellar. A "documentary" on the "surge" needs Iraqi music and Iraqi pathos. It also needs to be primarily about Iraqis and the interactions between Americans and Iraqis.
This video is a shameless abortion. This is COIN-porn at its finest, and that's coming from a guy who's done his reading and believes in the effectiveness of COIN. I have absolutely no respect for chickenhawks like the Kagans.
Damn.....
You guys are a little harsh on Kim, huh?
Look, say what you want about COIN, the Surge, Petraeus, etc. Fact is, this worked. For whatever reason you want to rip apart, it worked. Having been a part of this in West Rasheed Baghdad 06-07, I did see this happen. Granted, there were many of us who were doing this before the Surge started, but the fact that we had more troops on the ground and was able to actually secure neighborhoods and embolden a resistance to the insurgents was what pushed the success.
Maybe you guys are bashing the presentation, maybe you're bashing the theory, but I have email contact with my Iraqi friends to this day who helped us help them and they are living much better lives, now. I have been on the phone with them as well. Things are better. I can't wait to vacation in Iraq soon (although I think I'll stay away from the Iraq/Iran border...).
Is the presentation a little on the cheesy side? Sure. Are the facts wrong? Absolutely not. Say what you will but I tend not to believe in coincidence. Luck is the by product of good planning and passionate execution.
Ex, it's a good video and I'm passing it around as much as possible.
Chris
Chris: "Is the presentation a little on the cheesy side? Sure" . . . You have a flare for understatement. Most of us are bashing mostly the presentation. But regarding content, why weren't there more interviews of ISF officers and their MiTTs? I mean, I love Vice Chief of the Joint Staff Abadi and everything; but he is like the 2nd most senior officer in the IA. Interviewing him is like interviewing Petraeus. Where were the interviews of ISF leaders on the ground and their MiTTs? Where were the interviews of Iraqi elected and community leaders?
I didn't learn almost anything from the clip I saw. That's kind of sad.
Since you were on the ground, you would know the difference between theory and execution. For example the challenge of convincing ISF leaders to execute the Petraeus strategy. Attitude matters. When Gen Keane travelled to Mosul in March 2008, he offended some capable Iraqi Army Division commanders. I suspect it wasn't intentional, but sometimes attitude matters more than substance. Gen Keane has a better attitude than the Kagens.
The "voice" or temperament of parts of this documentary had a slightly off attitude. Presentation and attitude matter.
Another problem was the excessive focus on greater Baghdad (Baghdad plus the belts.) Many of these areas in 2007 had much less capable ISF than Al Anbar, Ninevah, At Tamin, 4th IAD's part of Salahadin, Babil (even North Babil which had the former 4th Brigade, 6th IAD, which has since become 17th IAD), Najaf, Karbala, Quadasiyah and Wasit. In many of the later areas, the ISF were far more in the fight and in the lead than they were in greater Baghdad at that time.
I think that the ISF and MNF outside of greater Baghdad had a much larger role in the success in Iraq in 2007 than conventional wisdom now acknowledges.
Where was the coverage of MNSTC-I and MNC-I MiTTs? Why didn't Kim focus on the surge of the ISF, and the sharp improvement in ISF quality in 2006 and 2007?
Chris-
Yes, the Surge worked, and as the President stated yesterday, we're winding down the war in Iraq to an end. This is good, but
What is the Surge? This answer is critical b/c it will shape future leaders, the historical record, and policy. Kim Kagan's piece does not do it justice. Hence, I felt dirty watching it. It's analogous to trying to analyze a NFL team's Superbowl win based off the team's owner and coach not looking at the QB, offensive line, defense, how the other team played, location, weather, etc. It's just wrong, and it screams political intent or .self-promotion.
SWJ has a pretty good thread discussing the different factors and variables of the Surge. Check it out and see what you think.
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5785
Mike
Y'all need to lighten up. Clearly this movie wasn't made for all you COINdanistas out there, but for an hour-long slot on basic cable. This is not a ten-hour Ken Burns PBS deal. This is for the average viewer who just watched three reruns of Jon and Kate Plus 8 and doesn't know jack about COIN. You can debate the competing narratives all you want, but the goal of the film seems to be to help the average American UNDERSTAND one of those narratives about the surge and heck, even why a surge was necessary.
"Understanding the Surge"....hmmm...I wonder where they got that from...
Visitor at 11:32pm- What's with this we stuff? I'm not a COINdinista. I study small wars. In fact, I thought Kim Kagan's Iraq Reports were most excellent in describing the current situation with the facts at hand. I just think her analysis in this documentary is rubbish.
It took us four years to comprehend that the various insurgencies were conducting classic Mao protracted war- "clandestine organization, psychological preparation of the people, expansion of control, and consolidation of power." It's a failure of leadership on many levels that it took this long. Kim doesn't even acknowledge it in her documentary, and I would submit that many leaders still don't get it. She just shows the by-product of a Phase III civil war- lots of people were dying, and it was bad. Duh, but it didn't happen over night. During my one staff tour in 2005, it was increasingly apparent to many leaders on the ground that a civil war had sparked long before the mosque in Samarra was blown. Some acted- Remember McMasters and Tal Afar?
After we finally defined the situation for what it was NOT what we wished it to be, we employed a counter-strategy of population control measures, increased kinetics targeting leaders, facilitators, and bomb-makers, denial of safe-havens, destruction of training camps, and turning reconciliables. Additionally, GEN Patraeus and Ryan Crocker pressured the Iraqi Gov't to govern.
I stated this in a two paragraph, 30 second soundbite. I think the American people can handle that.
Be careful of your call to "lighten up." After we were briefed the initial plan for OIF in Kuwait, I asked the 'foolish' question of "sir, what are we going to do when we get to Baghdad?" I was told not to worry about it. Apparently, no one worried about it for four years.
I think for the first time I agree with gentile on something. This is COIN porn. A little much, isn't it? And certainly glosses over what the surge was unable to achieve...
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