Center for a New American Security

Reading. Maybe he's right,

Reading. Maybe he's right, but if Flynn or any of them want to understand they are going to have to stay there a long time....I don't know if it covers it but it would probably be helpful if units had a local who's who book to hand off for RIP/TOA (or whatever TF it's called now) - relief in place. In Iraq that was a a bunch of question marks. Certain US people stayed longer - now I am talking like 2 years same place and they knew who was who and what. They had their own process (it's called hitting the street).

It might be understandable that Military Intel would focus on the enemy. In any case it recognizes that the people who know the local area and locals are rather understaffed to try and assemble that all source product (speaking of which wasn't ASAS and SIPR supposed to fix that??)

"It is hard to imagine a battalion or regimental commander tolerating an operations officer, communications officer, logistics officer, or adjutant who fails to perform his or her job. But, except in rare cases, ineffective intel officers are allowed to stick around.."

OK, that answers my ASAS (all source analysis) and SIPR question. I knew I fucked up in career choices!!

Wow! I do see a lot of

Wow! I do see a lot of "counterintuitive dynamics," to quote one of the authors' favorite phrases:

"The second inescapable truth is that merely killing insurgents usually serves to multiply enemies rather than subtract them. This counterintuitive dynamic is common in many guerrilla conflicts and is especially relevant in the revenge-prone Pashtun communities whose cooperation military forces seek to to earn and maintain."

I misread this for a moment, and got a spark of hope for America's dreams of Afghan conquest. Yes! Merely killing insurgents - serious tactical error! Complete misunderstanding of 2500 years of Afghan history! Why, everyone knows that in Afghanistan, you can't possibly earn and maintain the cooperation of revenge-prone Pashtun communities, just by merely killing insurgents!

Come on. Without any torture at all? Even just a little casual mutilation - just to show who's boss? And what's to become of their families? What, are we supposed to pay them damages? For breeding, nurturing and harboring these scorpions? It's ridiculous. They should thank their stars that the entire revenge-prone Pashtun community isn't sold into rug-weaving child slavery in Baluchistan.

As every emir of Cabool has known since Alexander the Great, if you handle the Pashtuns as if you're a pussy, they might actually begin to suspect that you're a pussy. And then you'll really have a problem earning and maintaining their cooperation of their revenge-prone communities! Oddly enough, we seem to have just that problem. Who'd of thunk?

The emperor's new garments were so counterintuitive that no one could see them at all. Sometimes I wonder if the guys who write these things, who are obviously smart guys, ever say to themselves: gee, maybe everything we think is counterintuitive, subtle, and sophisticated, is just crazy, stupid, and wrong? Because that surely explains the amount of work we have to put into selling it.

We are now seeing the reality of PC-COIN, 2010 edition. It is simply the same politically-correct "softly, softly" approach the British tried in Basra. Google will tell you what results were promised from this strategy, and what results achieved. The outcome was perhaps the most ignominious defeat that British arms have suffered since Boudicca was a little girl. In Afghanistan it will be the same - on a national scale. And no one, needless to say, will learn anything from it.

Somewhere in their tombs, Sheridan, Grant and Sherman are weeping. The colossus they built is at its end. The US simply no longer has any meaningful military forces. Social work had better conquer Afghanistan and quick, for all we have there now is an army of social workers. I would say uniformed social workers - except that Sheridan, Grant and Sherman wouldn't even recognize their pajamas as uniforms.

"PC COIN: You Muslim fucks

"PC COIN: You Muslim fucks kill us, and we help the fuck out you fuckers!"

"PC COIN: We're doing all this shit for China and Iran"

"PC COIN: Let's help the fuck out of these Muthafakas!!!"

"PC COIN: I joined the Army to help you ignorant fucks? And all I get is this fucking T-shirt?"

See a few challenges. It is

See a few challenges. It is a pipe dream to happen in the time needed. Shoot for the moon, and expect to accept what you get.

1) When humans are involved in data collection and sorting, filtering is always going to happen at all levels. Usually managment sets the tone of the reports, it is temping to please the boss.

2)The central file is something every organization wants. Putting information in is easy, getting it back out is the challenge. Think the government is good at making central databases. It might be worth their time to got to the power brokers like Google to see how the private sector handles the problem. Bandwidth, storage, and maintenance is always an issue, in a third world war zone the problem is amplified.

3)Folks at the Stability Operation Information Centers are going to be one-legged-paper-hangers. They are being set up as a one stop shop. Priorities will be an issue. Commanders and above are going to get the full bandwidth and the rest are going to get a trickle of attention. The more information you think you are going to get, the more you will ask for and the further behind the curve the givers will be. Watch out for a bottle neck.

4)Attention span. If they are expecting WORD docments to replace Charts and Power Point bullet items, they better think about the audience. The higher in the Command, the more distilled the presentation is required. I have never had a VP level of above sit for longer than a one page presentation with a few bullet items. These guys are the ones that are the movers and shakers, egos play into it also. Attention span reduces with rank. Word documents work at this level for detailed reports, if the person who receives it has the time to read it.

5) Working within a small time window. Expectations need to be set accordingly. The powers that be have no idea that it takes, just that they want. They are not going to get the library of Congress within the 18 month window for first results. Something way shorter than 18 months is the time to set up a system. They might be better off messaging what they have to give them more the type of information they what. They expect too much and may end up with very little.

I especially liked the idea

I especially liked the idea of "female engagement teams", sounds very lesbian. We should also stand up a "male engagement team" headed by fnord. He's PC COIN's secret weapon (secret, pronounced with a gay "s").

"...the most ignominious

"...the most ignominious defeat that British arms have suffered since Boudicca was a little girl."

ROFL. BTW are you suggesting that we go Roman? Wait, you always want that...

It's actually a good document, and whether or not you agree with PC COIN Intel does need a shakeup and reform. BTW Zak - our Commanders have learned humility - they'll read it. You would normally be right about bullet points, ego's inflate with rank, etc...etc...but at some cost they've learned humility (blood).

Not that we couldn't use a few less ranks. We operated better historically without so many pay grades and so much overhead in the Army, which deliberately bloated the Officer Corps ranks.

AT- ok pal. It's on. No one calls me reasonable.

Fnord - it's eyepro, they're not supposed to take it off. And I don't know - but maybe the Afghan's wouldn't draw the same conclusions about sunglasses that Arabs would. In particular Arab's that grew up with the Mukarbarat.

BTW Zak - our Commanders

BTW Zak - our Commanders have learned humility - they'll read it. You would normally be right about bullet points, ego's inflate with rank, etc...etc...but at some cost they've learned humility (blood).

Elf, I hope you're right. I is my experience that the higher up you go into management levels, you are more insulated from the day-to-day. Call it being de-senitized or what ever, death becomes justified as "acceptable losses" or "body count". Think that some are trying to change that culture, but at the end of the say, goals have to met. Egos and career goals are part of a highly motivated professional's tool kit. Remember that most of the armed forces were trained to fight a convention war, playing for keeps. Some will read, some will required their staffs to read, and others will keep their handy power point presentations. No one is going to show up to a morning briefing with a 20 page thesis.....that only works in acedemics. That makes for a long meeting and sleepy grumpy people.

We pay our statemen almost $200,000/yr and I doubt that most have read the health care bills cover-to-cover. I know a guy that divorced his wife on her death bed to keep from going bankrupt. No I am not for Obama's health care. That crowd is selling insurance like a car sales man sells cars. What can you afford a month? Rather than, we can take out the radio, fance wheels, racey engine and it will get you to where you want to be for a lot less base cost. Obama wants me pregnant, then I would have to deal with it, I would sign-up for unversal health care if the base costs were addressed first. Nope, I do not think that death bed divorces even show up on my Congressman's radar.

Maybe that is the difference between corporate and government worlds. Corporate it is about the bullet item and decision. Acedemic and Beaucrats can fuss with a 20 page thesis. The acedemic has his tenure. It is hard to get rid of a beaucrat once you hire them. Neither can loose. The corporate guys at the top have learned the hard way, that is what a golden parachute is about.

Really my point is, McCrystal has a time limit. What ever they do to collect their intel has to happen with in that time limit. A good project manager always addresses the pacing items first, this report means well. Question is, can they get to the intel system they want to have it completed and be meaningful or would it be better to make some incremental changes to the system they have and still be effective. Personally, I think to be effective, they would have to do their ground up changes within about two months and get it on line to have have the changes they want in 18 months. They are expecting to change a intelligence culture and changing culture is that hardest thing to do in an organization!. Been there. They really need to take a hard look at their expectations and be realistic about what they can do in the given time frame. You really need to know yourself, before you leap.

MG Flynn recognizes that the

MG Flynn recognizes that the human terrain system has failed. He nearly says as much in the report when he brings up the point that much of this population-centric analysis should normally be done by the CJ9, however that staff element lacks the resources to be able to do the mission.

Many of the questions that MG Flynn says are not being answered (roads, services, schools, etc) do indeed fall doctrinally into the J9 domain. However, the J9 does not have the resources that the J2/S2's can bring to bear. This is much like the debate that occurred (and was settled) within the J3 communities about what the proper dividing line is between DoD and DoS. Yes, DoS should be primary for many functions, however reality dictates that DoD take the lead. The same is happening here. Yes, the CJ9 at ISAF should be able to answer these questions, however in the real world the CJ2 will. Going back to the J3/S3 example - that community has largely accepted the shift in thinking required between conventional conflict and COIN. The intel community by and large hasn't. This report addresses some of that directly. Again, doctrinally the S-2 world is enemy centric. Take a trip down to Huachuca and see what is being taught. However just as the S-3 world has shifted so to much the S-2 world.

As for the other elements in the report concerning the flow of information; the company and battalion levels possess an enormous amount of strategic level intelligence. They also lack good mechanisms by which to pass this information up the chain of command. Anyone who has spent time at a company intel team or BN S-2 shop will know this. There is a lot in the report that will have them nodding their head in agreement. The information flow is not there; either passing up information that would be relevant 2-3x levels higher, or receiving information down that is useful to the fight.

Looking over the comments it is clear to me that most of the commenters have not spent a day in a BN, let alone BDE S-2 shop. I point this out to make clear that there are a lot of nuances to MG Flynn's work that are being lost on people. On the one hand yes, it is yet another attempt to reform the IC. But on the other hand the cultural changes within the military intelligence community that he is proposing are not in any way cosmetic. Rather many of them cut to the fiber of how MI officers have been trained/socialized.

I have a feeling that fnord

I have a feeling that fnord will chime in about his last "hot" gf from India who use to work for a call center, but now sadly has chlamydia, but is doing fine and go on about how that story connects to pop-centric COIN and the wider US strategy in the region.

It is interesting that an

It is interesting that an open source document just recently released clearly stated that chasing and destroying IED networks had no impact whatsoever on the counterinsurgency warfare effort of securing the local population.

I often recommend that Afghan bound officers find and read a 1982 book written by retired COL Herrington called Silence As a Weapon which explains in detail why the Vietnam villager remained silent in the face of the Viet Cong-absolutely no different to that of the Afghan villager who remains silent in the face of the Taliban.

The Human Terrain system developed out of civilian contractor input in late 2005 in Iraq was initially suppose to work hand in hand with military intelligence, but was initially nestled in the JIEDDO due to funding and has been lately largely segarated at Fort Levenworth, but in the drive to make it a purely academic based organization they threw up walls between themselves and the MI world as they wanted nothing to do MI taskings which in some aspects killed the concept. Some in the old guard MI side will tell you that in fact Human Terrain is nothing more than the old Foreign Area Studies produced in the early 1970s for Special Forces teams deploying around the world and for FAO personnel.

The study is very enlighting and actually is a challegene to the MI schoolhouse and the Army's Combined Training Centers and the training scenarios that have been developed for the Iraq environment. Both Ft. H, CTCs, and the BCT Command leadership has never really come off the concept of kill or capture as it is easier to be a lethal organization than it is to be a local community policeman. AND ones' Officer Evaluation Report does not get you promoted for being a very effective community policeman.

@David Sutton, "And its

@David Sutton,

"And its traceable, we see people screaming all the time about the cracks that Intel falls into, this could narrow those cracks a little. Yes that's one of the points

Then you could get really crazy and have inter agency populating the same work space.

that's absolutely critical to success. You don't want to go with the one dept takes the call, then passes it to another dept, etc...

BTW the way we do support now is the Hierarchical up the chain ...it's also the way we used to do IT. It's not nearly as functional. Chain of Command works much better for line units and the Traditional Combat way of marching, organizing. But not so well for support.

One thing that needs to be

One thing that needs to be discussed and was only alluded to in the study is the simple fact that the entire anti-insurgency fight in Iraq and to an initial degree in Afghanistan was focused on the IED/CIED fight---from intel collection to targeting carried by JIEDDO and the IC.

This was driven by the daily Iraq insurgency ops tempo of sometimes over 2500 IEDs per week. In Iraq it was not necessary to peel away the Sunni's from the Shiite's it was more important to peel away the Sunni insurgents from the Sunni population and that was done via the US dollar and concentrated attacks on the IED networks. The concept though did not destroy AQI and the other Sunni insurgent groups such as the IAI and ASA---it just dampened down the violence levels and gave the military a chance to withdraw and turn over the security to the ISF.

Then with the increased Taliban pressure and successes in Afghanistan starting late 2007 early 2008 JIEDDO and the BCTs simply transferred the anti insurgency fight from Iraq to Afghanistan thinking that was the way forward as the IED threat had climbed to a not previously known level.

What was not recognized was the fact that the Taliban use IEDs in a totally different fashion than did the AQI, or the other Sunni insurgent groups. Namely it is done as a form of actual attacks or ambushes and I think to a large degree the Taliban used the IED as a way of keeping US forces busy and distracts them from the true mission of counterinsurgency-namely taking the population away from Taliban control.

So in fact the IC went left and the fight went went right and changing direction with the current schoolhouse training and the entire IC focused on the CIED fight and defense contractors providing solutions for the CIED fight will be time consuming and I am not sure it will be successful.

Example, there has been since 2004 a discussion around the concept called "open source warfare" and now Nature magazine just released a scientific study (Ecology of Human Warfare) of the concept verifying that in fact there is something to the idea of open source warfare. AND scientifically it is now possible to input changes to the insurgency via a computer model and see what the necessary strategy would be to implement that change ie take down a specific cell tower, build a key bridge or school, target person X--WITHOUT placing "boots on the ground" and the IC to a degree is ignoring the research.