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The thought-provoking (Stewart) and the sublime (Bleuer). With respect to the latter and by my own count, I have at times been guilty of #9, #14, #17, #21 and #26.
With respect to the former, meanwhile, I found myself agreeing with the lion's share of what Rory Stewart wrote as well as his major conclusions. I worry, though, that we will observe a tension in the coming year between political and strategic decision-makers seeking to chart a minimalist course on Afghanistan and operational commanders and representatives seeking maximalist means to get there. Count me as one of those who believe the president will not accept the kind of resource and time-intensive COIN strategy outlined in FM 3-24 and that operational commanders in Afghanistan should then ruthlessly triage with respect to their priorities. I have faith they are doing that, as evidenced by the priority they seem to be giving to the training of the ANSF over all else.
This touches upon a longer research question I will be working on that deals with politics in COIN -- both domestic politics as well as seeking leverage over host nations in third-party interventions. I noted to a reporter yesterday that FM 3-24's primary flaw is that it is apolitical. It does not adequately address the public's impatience with long and resource-intensive military campaigns, nor does it address (at all, really) the idea that the interests of the host nation might not line up with those of the counterinsurgent. Steve Biddle and Mark Moyar
have written on this, so I can only hope to build upon what they have done. Your thoughts, of course, are always welcome. I pledge to shamelessly steal them, after all (#12).
I really wish you would
I really wish you would refer to people by their last names rather than their first, even if you're super best pals in real life. Using the first names may be casual, but it also sounds sort of sycophantic.
Okay, done.
Okay, done.Too formal now? This is a
Too formal now? This is a blog, after all.Number 9? "Place yourself as
Number 9? "Place yourself as a central character in your article. You are Lawrence of Arabia, or perhaps Tintin. You are the intrepid hero of your hopefully non-fictional adventure. Just go with it. People love a good story." Doesn't everyone do this? Ok, apart from wire journalists - who can't use "I" in an article - and photographers - who can't take pictures of themselves? But then they make up for it at the bar.. near closing time.. surrounded by girls. If you are in Beirut right now.. you are probably smirking.We're bound to see a major
We're bound to see a major reevaluation of FM 3-24 at some point in the future, after American main force units are not fighting in Afghanistan or Iraq. There are a lot of things about counterinsurgency doctrine that would work better, and a number of conflicts that would be less difficult, if we started with a situation before large numbers of people started shooting at each other. Actually, I tend toward the view that COIN will look better then than it does now.
As far as the public's impatience, I wouldn't make worry about it. I mean in the context of the doctrine. Sure, the public doesn't want to hear about a ten-year counterinsurgency in Afghanistan now. The public would have been pretty upset about an invasion of the French coast if we hadn't gotten around to it until 1950. Keep sending Ambrose Burnside and John Pope to get their brains beaten out in northern Virginia until about 1870 and see how the public takes Grant slugging it out in the Wilderness.
There's nothing wrong with the public's patience. The problem is with using counterinsurgency for damage control after your political and military leadership has blundered into untenable situations. We've done that twice now within a decade, at enormous cost in blood, treasure and reputation. There are people to blame for this, and some ideas too, but the defects of counterinsurgency doctrine as set forth in the FM 3-24 are far down the list.
This touches upon a longer
This touches upon a longer research question I will be working on that deals with politics in COIN -- both domestic politics as well as seeking leverage over host nations in third-party interventions. I noted to a reporter yesterday that FM 3-24's primary flaw is that it is apolitical. It does not adequately address the public's impatience with long and resource-intensive military campaigns, nor does it address (at all, really) the idea that the interests of the host nation might not line up with those of the counterinsurgent.
You're theiving my thoughts. I want royaltyz....
Comment by Boondoggle on June 1, 2009 - 9:28am
AM,
I posted last week that in part because of the political clock faced by the President, he had about 2 years to accomplish what he wants in Afghanistan. Sec Gates recently put it at a year, but I think his "clock" has more time than that.
I proposed that a continued CT campaign allows him to keep his options open. If the dual COIN strategy has not succeeded, whether
After reading Stewart's
After reading Stewart's piece I found myself a little depressed. Writing a paper on how Development and Diplomatic Initiatives might be more effective that military force in Counter Terrorism, I was all geared up for the affirmative. And certainly in theory it holds some valid truths, develop a stable and educated middle class and you see less violence, Develop international trading standards and you begin to build that stable middle class, educate women, they have less children, they educate those they do have, those kids are less likely to pick up AK0-47s.
In theory.
In practice we've been banging on in AFPAK for nigh on ten years and we're not really able to say we've developed anything remotely stable.
Maybe I can just preface my introduction with bold text...In Theory...
"I noted to a reporter
"I noted to a reporter yesterday that FM 3-24's primary flaw is that it is apolitical."
I don't understand. How is such a document to be political? Political in what way? Do you mean better communications with the general public or something? Are you saying the military should be explicitly political? What?
@Madhu, Not to speak for
@Madhu,
Not to speak for him, but Boondoggle answers it...
"It does not adequately address the public's impatience with long and resource-intensive military campaigns, nor does it address (at all, really) the idea that the interests of the host nation might not line up with those of the counterinsurgent."
In other words (mine) it ignores the political aspects that any US or Western or whoever political leadership cannot wage endless, pointless wars. It also ignores that the host nation's interests, for instance the perceived or real interests of Pakistan's military caste don't line up with ours.
Which is a problem our elites and FP types seem to have across the board, they don't understand other people from other cultures don't think or act or hold the same values we do. I do believe that the Pakistan military or Yemeni "govt" might "value" US aid money differently then we do. We would value farmer Abu getting a new well or electricity or telephones. They are looking at a new wing in the LA dream house, or sending little corrupt spoiled shit to school in London, or how many payoffs they can make to people who rate more than farmer Abu.
That's a good question for the "waterboard list" of questions for pantybomber: your father was at the World Bank. When did you figure out your family was just a little bit too well compensated, and did that play into your decision?
This nugget below I pulled
This nugget below I pulled from yesterday's DC Court of Appeal case GHALEB NASSAR AL-BIHANI v. OBAMA.
Even so, we do not rest our resolution of this issue on international law or mere common sense. The determination of when hostilities have ceased is a political decision, and we defer to the Executive’s opinion on the matter, at least in the absence of an authoritative congressional declaration purporting to terminate the war.
After reading Madhu I was thinking again about the time vampire games I was fond of in my geo batch time like War In The Pacific which has every freaking pilot, every ship, every plane, every freaking dump transport from every side in that theater of war over 4+ years. You could probably count the nose goblins of each pilot assigned to the Akagi. But in no way does it ever account for the horrible depression, anxiety, suffering and weariness that had fallen over the combatants, even the US, after 4 years of war. There is no "input" to describe the shock that hit this country after the carnage of Tarawa and its effect on our national war effort. I think we get so wrapped up in the fascinating, difficult but somewhat easier to quantify metrics of the battlefield (whether physical or virtual) and forget that it is the human spirit that decides ultimate victory. Compel, crush or reason their spirit to comply with your own, and you win.
Politics is a closer marriage to that than the battlefield in many contexts IMO. It's against that backdrop you can measure sucess in far longer time spans than just the shorter period of time when bullets are flying. the bullets of WWII flew for 6 years but the ultimate winners and losers were still being decided long past that point. I'm sure the same will apply to Iraq and the same to Afghanistan. And that's something the military needs to maintain awareness of as it executes its missions as assigned by its elected political leaders who are charged with directly responding to and representing the interests of those who elect them. Our flagging or rising spirit and changing political paradigms directly affect the course of action we take on the battlefield and affect it long after we stop shooting.
"I noted to a reporter
"I noted to a reporter yesterday that FM 3-24's primary flaw is that it is apolitical. It does not adequately address the public's impatience with long and resource-intensive military campaigns, nor does it address (at all, really) the idea that the interests of the host nation might not line up with those of the counterinsurgent."
YES to both in huge letters.
First point: there's a tendency for counterinsurgents to treat not only the local population but also the population back home as the targets for 'strategic communication'. This is, of course, terribly unethical. The people back home are ultimately the ones who will decide on the course of the campaign and they deserve accurate information.
Second point: this has also become apparent with people complaining that [Afghan politician] doesn't seem to take the war as seriously as the Americans do, and how come, because it's his war too, as he has to live in the country?
Bleuer - As you say AM, this
Bleuer - As you say AM, this is a blog. Don't have to worry about writing an op-ed, a simple newspaper article, a long form magazine article or an analytical report. I will let the experts figure that out and let them make money off of # 12. There are not too many original ideas anymore. Venture capitalists will not sign a non-disclosure with you cause they figure ten other people already have your idea. It is about communication and trying to raise the sound level of the tree falling in the forest. We let Exum run with #9 to let us find our backboard to bounce our western thoughts off of. Marketing guys have figured out that the most common ideas are profitable. Have you seen the new Chia Obama?
Stewart - Articles like this make my head swim. Schrodinger's Cat makes more sense to me. Moral - Quantum Mechanics has a lot to with probabilities. Politicians would love it cause you can be in two places at once and not at all. Other moral - Each profession has its own way of looking at things. Stewart generates a fog of ideas going off on tangents while holding a magnifiying glass to other people's words. Think I will get back to the comfort of my Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. Haaaa....the world is in sync.
FM 3-24 is just another business model. We make them, put them on a pedistal, then break them. How's Greenspan's "free market" doing these days? Free markets do work, it is just that no one will elect anyone that can be tagged for making a Depression (PS It ain't Bush, it was all of us).
Going forward? Maybe all FM 3-24 just needs a preface listing the reasons that we go to war. Perhaps a dedication to Sun Tzu, "For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill." Unfortunately, by the time it gets to FM 3-24, the decision is already made and our war fighters are given a job to do. Maybe the right answer is to make a new hand book for the President and Congress, "When to make war - Improve your chances for re-election". In the past, we went to war for reasons of right and wrong. God was on our side and we took the hurt to the enemy. Think the J2/S2's would like that better, that is the way God made them. When we got to the 1960's, we started to get touchy-feely, what if I shoot a bad guy what are his feelings? What have I done to his family and way of life? How did he express himself? We build are armies with 18 year old kids. Why? They are still in the indestructible stage of life, they will drop the hammer. For the same reasons, AQ sources the some age group for their panty bombers. Perhaps for COIN, we should build the army with middle aged men with families to feed. Guys with wisdom to decide when it is the right time to pull the trigger. Having a little skin in the game is good, as the US found out with the Wall Street banks. As we progressed in the century, we tried to make more and more people happy. Now we are trying to make the whole world happy. That is a big expensive job. That is the problem of being a world power, you have money to do stupid things and you have enough people to help justify it. Right now, I would be happy if I can make my family secure. I am afraid that as more special interests grab hold of the US government, our foriegn policy will look more and more like Londonstani's Ummah. Not for the good of making a better life, but to promote business interests and keeping our exponential GDP from toppling over and eating our economy. We are building a house of cards.
This is when my father, that put his life in the line in WW2, gets up and turns off the TV.......not the world his risked his life for.
Sort of like being sued by the guy that broke into your home to rape your wife. He is fully in your domain, laying on your wife with his pants down. Motive is clear and turns to you with cocked gun. You did not what to hurt him, just stop him. Democrats say the law suit is justifible and your going to pay at least $50,000 or more to defend yourself. Think I was born about a 100 years late, the line is too grey. Is it better to be judged by 12 rather than carried by six?
We have so much education today, we get confused. It becomes a probability game to get the right answer. End up in court and spending your treasure for something that should be simple.....right and wrong.
When you look at Vietnam, don't judge by today's standards. That is a mistake we all make, it is the easiest. Judge Vietnam by the standards of Vietnam.
CLICK ......computer off.
Mr. Stewart arguments are
Mr. Stewart arguments are nought in my eyes because of two assumptions he appears to make. The first is the Taliban are amenable to negotiations. I don't believe they will negotiate anything but the terms of their opponents surrender. Their view of the world doesn't leave room for compromise. No compromise, no negotiations.
The second is he appears to view the Taliban, versions A and P, and the Pak Army/ISI as separate independent entities. I think it more accurate to view the Taliban as a protege of the PA/ISI that may, or may not have, gotten out of the control of whatever faction of the PA/ISI thinks it useful to...the interests of the PA/ISI, the long term interests of Pakistan be damned. If that convoluted relationship isn't recognized everything is just an interesting hypothetical.
Mr. Stewart arguments are
Mr. Stewart arguments are nought in my eyes because of two assumptions he appears to make. The first is the Taliban are amenable to negotiations. I don't believe they will negotiate anything but the terms of their opponents surrender. Their view of the world doesn't leave room for compromise. No compromise, no negotiations.
The second is he appears to view the Taliban, versions A and P, and the Pak Army/ISI as separate independent entities. I think it more accurate to view the Taliban as a protege of the PA/ISI that may, or may not have, gotten out of the control of whatever faction of the PA/ISI thinks it useful to...the interests of the PA/ISI, the long term interests of Pakistan be damned. If that convoluted relationship isn't recognized everything is just an interesting hypothetical.
@Londonstani - Technically,
@Londonstani - Technically, yes, you're right, a lot of journalists (not all, certainly) of the "new (now old) journalism" school have an "I" at the center of whatever they're writing about. Think Hunter S. Thompson as the preeminent practitioner. But I don't think that's what Bleuer was talking about. His criticism was directed at the war adventurists who airdrop into a place -- Afghanistan, Pakistan, etc. -- describe the local color in near or outright racist terms, lie about the "danger" surrounding them for drama, then fly back to JFK to file the 'story'. Here's a great example of that, brought to you by GQ. As someone who has written a lot about Pakistan, I defy you to get past the first few paragraphs without wretching.
http://www.gq.com/news-politics/big-issues/200804/suicide-bombers-pakist...
Here's a little taste: "The plane lands in Islamabad, and suddenly I’m just a scared American asshole in business-class slipper socks with a carton of cigarettes to bribe the locals with, which no one will care about or want. The doors open, and the first gust of Pakistani air violates the cabin, the smoke-filled air of a country where stuff is always burning: garbage, leaves, wood fires. It’s early in the morning and still mostly dark. A man is squatting at the edge of the tarmac wearing one of those Afghan hats you see in National Geographic photo essays on the Taliban, staring at those of us who descend the gangway. He looks like he could be taking a crap."
what a surprise - Stewart
what a surprise - Stewart constructs an argument defending Obama - analog: Aquinas was brilliant, but I know that if I could travel back in time armed with my Hume and sit down for a chat with him no matter how many times I raised doubts concerning the existence of a God and the rational foundations of any faith in such he would always be constructing arguments to prove me wrong - and that's because the first premise in any argument Aquinas would make is that there must be a God and therefore faith and the universe must be rational. So to with the Obamaphiles: they start out with an unshakable conviction concerning the truth of their beliefs and then construct an argument to demonstrate how it all makes sense. Start with a gambling conceit! Prejudice your audience with false premises - because of course no one really wins at gambling, any stolen victory is transitory, an illusion - and therefore a truly rational and enlightened man, if forced to engage is such an evil game, would play it safe - voila!! - exactly what Obama, brilliant man he is, has chosen to do in Afghanistan. QED. Credo in unum Deum, Patrem omnipotentem, factorem caeli et terrae, visibilium omnium et invisibilium...
'Afghans more optimistic for
'Afghans more optimistic for future, survey shows': http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8448930.stm
The inconvenient truth for the far left, who always lump Iraq and Afghanistan together and describe the Taliban as freedom fighters, representative of the whole Afghan people. It's interesting that in 1 year, the results are so different, e.g: 70% said they believed Afghanistan was going in the right direction - a big jump from 40% a year ago'.
The other significant theme which emerges from the figures is growing antipathy towards the Taliban. Ninety per cent said they wanted their country run by the current government, compared with 6% who said they favoured a Taliban administration.
Sixty-nine per cent believed the Taliban posed the biggest danger to the country, and 66% blamed the Taliban, al-Qaeda and foreign militants for violence in Afghanistan.
Afghans arent as worried as they should be, if they listened to western media. Is the favourable view of NATO forces down to the changes in tactics or just a favourable comparison to the Taliban? It also seems that the election fiasco wasn't such a disaster and Karzsai is still legitimate.
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