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Just Admit It: The Surge Worked (Updated)
Ever since my friend and mentor Tom Ricks concluded at the end of his book The Gamble
If you really move the goal posts, defining up "success" as the Surge having not only reduced levels of violence and addressed immediate drivers of conflict but having also managed to fix all the problems in Iraq's political process, then yeah, it failed. But I don't recall that ever being the aim of the operation in 2007, and I don't think it's reasonable to expect the U.S. military and its friends in the diplomatic corps to be able to settle the political affairs of a host nation. That's not what a military does, and I am known for having a pretty expansive definition of what militaries should be expected to do on the battlefield. “We intervene in … a conflict,” Gen. Sir Rupert Smith wrote in 2005
So how has the U.S. military and its partners done in carving out that conceptual space Sir Rupert writes about? Well, let's take a look at the numbers:
We can argue about how many other factors aside from U.S. diplomatic and military operations led to the stunning drop in violence in 2007. There was a civil war in 2005 and 2006, tribes from al-Anbar "flipped" in 2006, and Muqtada al-Sadr decided to keep his troops out of the fight for reasons that are still not entirely clear. Those are just three factors which might not have had anything to do with U.S. operations. But there can be no denying that a space has indeed been created for a more or less peaceful political process to take place. Acts of heinous violence still take place in Baghdad, but so too does a relatively peaceful political process.
If you want to argue that getting involved in Iraq in the first place was a stupid decision, fine. I agree with you. But trying to argue that the Surge "failed" at this point -- even if Iraq someday descends anew into civil war -- simply isn't a credible option anymore.
Update: Sullivan, Larison and Cohen object. Cohen's concern is that we'll take the Iraq experience and think that we now have a one-size-fits-all COIN blueprint that we can apply with equal success to Afghanistan and elsewhere. And I have some sympathy for that concern. (Rand's Nora Bensahel -- who knows more about Iraq than Sullivan, Larison, Cohen or me -- wrote a note in the comments, and I have a lot of sympathy for her concern as well.) Sullivan and Larison, meanwhile, cannot seem to come to grips with the fact that a stunning drop in ethno-sectarian violence -- caused by several factors, including U.S. military operations in 2007 -- has indeed facilitated political reconciliation. We have the recent elections and several negotiated agreements -- not least the status of forces agreement negotiated between the United States government and the Iraqi government -- as evidence that the space created for a political process has been exploited. So my beef with Larison is like the conversations I have with Tom: I don't think he gives enough credit to the political successes in Iraq since 2007.
Again, I thought the Iraq War was a really stupid idea too -- and I actually had to fight in it, so I should be more bitter than most. But the inability to admit that we managed to avoid a horrific defeat in 2007 is really something. You simply cannot look at the above chart and read what Sullivan is arguing without scratching your head. Sullivan even points to something Ayad Allawi said about this Iraqi government not representing all Iraqis and saying that is evidence the Surge failed. Which I think is hilarious, since Allawi is ... an opposition politician. Sullivan regularly links to opposition politicians in this country saying nuttier stuff than Ayad Allawi has ever said (and I have sympathy for what Allawi is saying, actually) without wringing his hands as to whether or not it amounts to a Constitutional crisis. ("The U.S. Civil War failed!") "Opposition politician criticizes government" is hardly a shocker. And after denying he is moving the goal posts, Sullivan then says his criteria for success is "a non-sectarian space for a non-sectarian national government capable of running the country when the US leaves." Well, okay, so an absence of sectarianism is now a requirement for success? You're not going to ever beat "taifiyya" in Iraq, so though I do not remember eradication of sectarianism as one of the metrics tracked by either Gen. Petraeus or the Bush Administration, I guess Sullivan will never have to say he was wrong about the surge.
You make a very strong argument for why the surge worked, but the graph may be misleading. It is not clear how the graph's author defines "ethno-sectarian" deaths. I suspect that while the trend may hold true no matter the definition, the dramatic drop may be less well defined if you include a broader definition of "ethno-sectarian" deaths.
I could totally be wrong on this, but wasn't the surge supposed to decrease violence in order to carve out space for political solutions. In this way you could say that the surge was a tactical and military success but was a pretty astounding failure on the civilian political side. Again, I'm basing this on the rhetorical flourishes used to get congressional buy in so it may have nothing to do with actual strategic thinking at the time.
Iraq in late-2006 was in a death spiral and was coming apart at the seams in an orgy of ethno-sectarian violence. At this point, the country is pretty coherent, though it still has major political issues to work out.
If you define "the surge" as an addition of troops alone and "success" as "solving all of Iraq's problems," then you're right. Throwing 25k more bodies more at the issue didn't make all of Iraq's problems go away: George Bush was wrong after all.
The silliness of this debate boils down to this: If the Surge DIDN'T work, how would a successful Surge look different from the current situation?
Andrew Sullivan would sooner date Sarah Palin than admit the surge worked.
"creating space for political solutions" is obviously not a goal, it's a means of achieving other goals. Just because you've done that doesn't mean the surge was a good idea. The U.S. paid a huge price in blood and treasure, not to mention opportunity costs in Afghanistan, for the Surge in Iraq. It can only be said to have "succeeded" if that price was worth it. Even if there is never an Iraqi civil war, it wasn't.
"But trying to argue that the Surge "failed" at this point -- even if Iraq someday descends anew into civil war -- simply isn't a credible option anymore."
I don't care if you "created space for political solutions" if Iraq descends into a civil war anyway.
1) I'm assuming this is in response to what Colonel Gentile wrote yesterday in the "Horses" post.
2) The title of this post is that "the Surge" worked.
3) What was "the Surge?" Define explicitly. Was it the introduction of five additional BCTs, the transition of troops from FOBs to JSSs and COPs, or something more?
4) Was it also other factors that you mention, i.e., "three factors which might not have had anything to do with U.S. operations."
5) Additionally, I'd argue you have yet to rule out a fourth explanation: the ethnosectarian war, perhaps partticularly in Baghdad, "burning itself out."
6) How can you test your explanation beside the graph you put up?
6a) One, I'd try and measure the extent to which the ethnosectarian war burnt itself out - I read in Harpers how some researchers (I think at UCLA) attempted to do so (using light emissions as their key measurement). Their conclusions do not lend themselves to your conclusion - which doesn't mean your wrong, just that you have to explain away their findings.
6b) If you accept the explanation in 3), which I think you do, then
6bi) show more Iraqis were under US control (by dividing population "covered" per JSS/COP versus FOB?) post-Surge then pre-Surge.
6bii) Additionally, if you're so inclined, show that this increased control led to increased collaboration, and thus, more information, if you're so inclined (tip lines?). (We both know from where this second sentence comes.)
6c) Acknowledge explicitly you have a "degrees of freedom" problem - you have multiple factors operating in a single instance, so parsing out the causal force of any one factor is going to be difficult.
7) My $.02 on the debate and how to conduct it.
ADTS
I've always thought that Rick's prevarication on this was completely ludicrous. So long as we're defining "the Surge" as an addition of troops and a change of emphasis in CF's method of operation, then how in God's name could one ever imagine that political reconciliation -- an event that can only take place in the hearts of men -- could be achieved by that? It took a century for the ethno-sectarian rift to heal in the American South, and anybody thought "the Surge" could do that in fifteen months in an alien culture?
Be serious, people. The objective of the Surge was to stem the rising tide of ethno-sectarian violence and end the Iraqi civil war. That objective was accomplished, both through the efforts of CF and the other environmental developments listed above (as we're so often reminded by COL Gentile, who inexplicably seems to think that there's a big group of COINdinistas out there denying the influence of ethnic cleansing or the Sadrist stand-down).
The Surge worked, end of.
I agree with all of your substantive points, but I wish that we could find a different phrase to describe what worked other than "the surge." To most Americans, who do not follow Iraq developments as closely as we security wonks do, "the surge" simply means the additional deployment of military forces. But as you rightly note, there were many other developments happening at the same time -- and I'd add to your list the fact that the United States fundamentally shifted its counterinsurgency strategy at the same time as well. I think it's very clear that all of these developments taken together succeeded at reducing violence and the drivers of conflict, though we don't know how causality should be divided among them. But I worry that continuing to refer to this cluster of developments as "the surge" will lead many non-experts to conclude that Bush's deployment of additional troops was the single causal factor that led to success, and I think that could lead to grave policy errors in the future.
sure, it worked. if you kill enough people eventually things will calm down. if you build enough walls to contain people, things will calm down. how many deaths is worth it? a million? sure why not. 2 million? sure as long as they aren't american. how bout 5 million? 1/2 the country? if it had ever been about what was best for iraqis we would not have invaded. it is about what's best for those who decided to go to war and therefor it only makes sense to ask them if it worked. i think by their standards it worked, therefor it worked.
I think it's fair to say the Surge worked, strategically. But grand strategically and politically... it was definitely sold to Congress and the public as doing more than reducing violence in the short term, but leading directly and inevitably to political conciliation.
"Our past efforts to secure Baghdad failed for two principal reasons: There were not enough Iraqi and American troops to secure neighborhoods that had been cleared of terrorists and insurgents. And there were too many restrictions on the troops we did have....This new strategy will not yield an immediate end to suicide bombings, assassinations, or IED attacks. Our enemies in Iraq will make every effort to ensure that our television screens are filled with images of death and suffering. Yet over time, we can expect to see Iraqi troops chasing down murderers, fewer brazen acts of terror, and growing trust and cooperation from Baghdad's residents. When this happens, daily life will improve, Iraqis will gain confidence in their leaders, and the government will have the breathing space it needs to make progress in other critical areas. Most of Iraq's Sunni and Shia want to live together in peace -- and reducing the violence in Baghdad will help make reconciliation possible. "
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/01/2007011...
So, you and Tom are both right.
I think you could make an argument either way. I don't think the strategic side of the surge has worked itself out yet. it may be that the surge only put off what is about to unfold. remember.. iraqis are playing nice for the cameras because we still have troops there. When I was in Iraq, every single Arab I met said that Iraq will descend in to civil war when we leave. Factor in that we are creating problems, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, by making the government all powerful. We did this in Vietnam too. As government is seen as the main source of revenue in Iraq, you will see massive corruption within the groups fighting for pots of money and a general distrust of the government by the people. Again.. same thing we did in Vietnam.
The best way to ensure democracy in Iraq is to promote and build private industry and education in hard sciences like engineering etc. Allowing foreign direct investment and providing a safe environment for private industry to operate is also crucial. This is a long term project that may take a generation to enable. It won't happen before 2011.
So, before I saw the Surge worked, I want to see peaceful transfers of power after elections AFTER we leave Iraq. Then I think it will be safe to say it worked strategically.
Just picked up my copy of "Kaboom". On chapter 3, will let you know how it is after the weekend.
Anyone else start or finish this book by Matt Gallagher?
Just picked up my copy of "Kaboom". On chapter 3, will let you know how it is after the weekend.
Anyone else start or finish this book by Matt Gallagher?
If we take the justifications/goals of our leadership for the initiation of the war in Iraq at face value, the war was clearly a 25+ year project, in that a non-trivial US military force would be necessary for the duration. This force would be on a war footing and would intermittently engage in random shooting actions, the frequency of which would decline over time. It would take a number of years (and may not ever occur) before it would be safe enough for military families to relocate to Iraq, as they did in Germany, Japan, and South Korea.
In this context, the Surge was akin to a 11-0 run that erased a 5-12 deficet in the first quarter of the first game of a 7 game NBA play-off series. Whether this 11-0 run determines the outcome of the series can only be accurately judged at the conclusion of the series. Be that as it may, the Surge has been the most successful phase so far in the war. There is just more work to be done, whether the US stays for the duration or leaves some time sooner.
I'm sorry to bring this to your attention this way--I've done a cursory check of the site and I can't find an email address for you, just for the CNAS at large, and I don't know how to bring this up except by making a comment about it. I know this isn't directly relevant to the surge, and I don't know if you've seen this already, but if you haven't seen it, I think you need to:
"Collateral Murder - Wikileaks - Iraq"
http://www.youtube.com/verify_age?next_url=/watch%3Fv%3D5rXPrfnU3G0
This video contains graphic footage of the 2007 shooting and killing of two unarmed Reuters reporters by a pair of Apache helicopters in a non-combat setting, in flagrant violation of the rules of engagement.
According to a New York Times article (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/world/middleeast/06baghdad.html), "a senior American military official confirmed that the video was authentic."
Again, I'm sorry to have to bring it up this way, but I think you need to see this video.
I'm sorry to bring this to your attention this way--I've done a cursory check of the site and I can't find an email address for you, just for the CNAS at large, and I don't know how to bring this up except by making a comment about it. I know this isn't directly relevant to the surge, and I don't know if you've seen this already, but if you haven't seen it, I think you need to:
"Collateral Murder - Wikileaks - Iraq"
http://www.youtube.com/verify_age?next_url=/watch%3Fv%3D5rXPrfnU3G0
This video contains graphic footage of the 2007 shooting and killing of two unarmed Reuters reporters by a pair of Apache helicopters in a non-combat setting, in flagrant violation of the rules of engagement.
According to a New York Times article (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/world/middleeast/06baghdad.html), "a senior American military official confirmed that the video was authentic."
Again, I'm sorry to have to bring it up this way, but I think you need to see this video.
I'm sorry to bring this to your attention this way--I've done a cursory check of the site and I can't find an email address for you, just for the CNAS at large, and I don't know how to bring this up except by making a comment about it. I know this isn't directly relevant to the surge, and I don't know if you've seen this already, but if you haven't seen it, I think you need to:
"Collateral Murder - Wikileaks - Iraq"
http://www.youtube.com/verify_age?next_url=/watch%3Fv%3D5rXPrfnU3G0
This video contains graphic footage of the 2007 shooting and killing of two unarmed Reuters reporters by a pair of Apache helicopters in a non-combat setting, in flagrant violation of the rules of engagement.
According to a New York Times article (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/world/middleeast/06baghdad.html), "a senior American military official confirmed that the video was authentic."
Again, I'm sorry to have to bring it up this way, but I think you need to see this video.
Whoops--sorry, didn't mean to triple-post. I guess I'm used to blog comments appearing immediately, and when they didn't I figured something had gone wrong. This hasn't exactly been a banner day for me, competence-wise.
Sean,
What exactly is your point? have you seen footage of apache helicopters or F15 fighters killing our own soldiers? is it only a crime when reporters are accidentally killed? at any rate, it's completely off topic for this discussion.
Exum - Enjoyed your post and tentatively agree with you. I would love to see a longer, deeper (perhaps published?) essay/article from you on this. I know you are a busy guy (even though I know you think tank types don't actually do much work...kidding...maybe) but it seems like its right up your alley.
So where did the events depicted in Collateral Murder appear on that graph?
***NOTE- This post is actually on topic, not a rebuttal to a spamming troll.***
Andrew,
You are one of my favorites. That is why it is painful to see that you use the violence bell curve as "proof" the surge worked. Thank you for at least mentioning the other factors (2006 tribal rebellion, Sadr, etc.) that were occurring in a country of 26 million roughly the size of California. You forgot to add the sectarian homogenization of Baghdad to that list of other "possible" factors. Baghdad is still a city where the surviving Sunnis are encased in T-walls. Here is Columbia University's map showing the purge over time:
http://www.epic-usa.org/2009/11/26/columbia-university-charts-sectarian-...
We have yet to conduct our "responsible withdrawal" down to 50K or zero. The new "democratic" government has yet to form. These two events will become the historic endstate events of the surge.
There is a reason King David and Big Ray refuse to answer whether or not the surge was a success. It is still too early to tell.
Can we please stop talking about the impact of the Surge? For crissakes, it's still current events. The Surge's success will not be determined for at lease a decade to come. Not that there aren't positive lessons to be learned, but the profusion of Surge "histories" written within 18-24 months of its conclusion are a little silly.
Does anyone else feel like the debate about the success or failure of the Surge is simply a way for people to justify their particular worldview?
ATW!
Let's remember that we invaded a country, based on lies, which did not in any way attack us. So, "getting involved" in Iraq is a bit like saying that Jack the Ripper got involved with the hookers he slaughtered.
Sure, the surge did what it was designed to do. But geebus. Let's have some f*cking perspective while we're doing the high fives and telling Sullivan "in your face". We're several trillion in the hole, thousands dead on our side, a f*cking nightmare in Iraq, and on and on and on - we all know the scored.
The high fives are pretty lame, all things considered. Pretty frickin' lame, indeed.
Surge means an increased number of solders on the ground.
Of course, if you flood a country with military solders it's going to have an effect.
The important thing is what happens when you withdraw troops.
The grab-bag of other factors you cite in this post ("just three factors which might not have had anything to do with U.S. operations" - emphasis added) makes your certainty that the surge "worked" ridiculous. ADTS above adds further likely reasons for the decline of sectarian violence. In addition to that, is "host nation" the term foreign policy experts now use to mean "invadee"? Did Iraq lobby to be the venue of this war, beating out Helsinki and Lake Placid, NY?
Of course the surge worked. If it didn't then how could the COIN gang sell the Afghan surge?
If Petreaus was just lucky that the Shia had decided they had won and could sit back and wait for the US to leave and or the Sunni nationalists had decided they needed a time out to wait for the US to leave while stocking up on cash and guns then putting a lot faith in him in Afghanistan might be misplaced.
If the "surge" didn't work and the reinforcements were irrelevant to the reduction in violence then what use is the big army?
David, you say "of course if you flood a country with military soldiers it's going to have an effect." A big point is, the Democrats said flooding a country with more American GIs would have the effect of increasing the violence, almost permanently. The Democrats also said the war was lost.
What happens when you withdraw the troops? Who knows? We haven't done it yet in Germany, Japan or South Korea.
Saddam Hussein violated U.N. Resolution 688, which required, as a condition of the 1991 cease fire, that he end his repression of the Iraqi people. 688 was the first resolution President Bush referred to in 2002, when he went to the U.N. to make his case for action against Saddam's fascist regime. Saddam's repression truly had not ended. And he violated the cease fire in several other ways.
Now Saddam's regime is gone and democracy is taking root for the first time ever in Iraq. But Democrats can take no credit for the purple fingers on election days.
All of you banging about the "failure" of the political process:
Iraq went from civil war to legitimate elections (in which a non-sectarian, back-from-the-grave candidate won) in less than five years!
Yeah, the current Iraqi administration are playing bad losers, and trouble might flare up again in the very near future. But seriously, how long did it take in Northern Ireland to establish political stability, with a much lower level of violence? Hell, is there even real political stability in NI right now?
Yeah, the civil war had largely run its course and segregation had increased dramatically - but NI has been segregated since forever. Didn't do much to prevent the Troubles. You can't seriously ascribe much of the fall in violence to ethnic cleansing.
The Surge (more boots on the ground + more brains in the heads) worked. I didn't think it would, but it did. I've eaten my bowl of crows, and so should you.
Looks like the Obumbler and chief is doing a crack up job.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230341160457516812401466440...
First off, love the banner with Lego guy. Awesome.
Agreed on the surge working based on what it was designed to do, not on unrealistic and idealistic expectations. Enjoy the blog and like the way you approach topics with a critical eye.
Good Lord, if I hear "the Surge worked" one more time I think I'll go crazy. Great. It worked. Kudos to Petraeus et. al. who made it work. But it was one very late bright spot in an otherwise bleak picture. The Iraq War was a catastrophic strategic blunder on the part of Bush and Cheney, from which "Obumbler" is doing his best to extract us. And by the way, I don't think the Surge was "more boots on the ground" so much as it was cutting deals with various militias to 1) turn against al-Qaeda in Iraq and its high-handed outsiders, and 2) not shoot at Americans or each other until the Americans were gone. And make no mistake, we are going -- the only sensible thing to do, as Obama recognizes. If it goes to crap after we're gone, so be it. We'll have to find a way to live with the consequences. But for God's sake, stop patting ourselves on the back for having done one thing right on top of so many things wrong.
The Surge worked in favor of Moqtada al-Sadr. He was the smartest.
Also, reducing violence after 2 years of civil war is not a hard thing to do. People need to rest. But, then, in the past 2 years we've seen many violence directed to high-profile locations (ministers, police), what does that tell you ?
Amount of violence was reduced. But targets are more symbolic. And the "space for political progress" is not here at all.
I don't see how you can call that a success. It succeeded on the easiest most technical aspect: block random violence.
I can't help but note that in your list of contributing factors you (deliberately?) left out "The Splurge", or the unholy amount of money paid to Sunni militias to stop fighting. I think you should at least attempt to disprove the Ockham's Razor analysis that assumes this was a more significant causal factor in reducing violence than increasing the target count of infidel occupiers.
The Surge was like a full back plowing straight ahead for the touchdown, but right now, Obama is busy fumbling the extra point.
The Surge was like a full back plowing straight ahead for the touchdown, but right now, Obama is busy fumbling the extra point.
Daniel Larison, on his blog 'Eunomia', has some comments (http://www.amconmag.com/larison/2010/04/06/by-its-own-standards-the-surg...):
[Start quoting Daniel]
That’s a bit of hyperbole on his [ Abu Muqawama's] part, which is necessary for his objection to hold up. No one claims that the “surge” was ever supposed to “fix all the problems in Iraq’s political process.” However, it was supposed to facilitate political reconciliation, and by Bush’s own standards a plan that did not include political reconciliation on major points of contention would not be a successful one. It was not the critics of the plan who put these measures of success in place–it was the authors of the plan.
Fortunately, we don’t need to rely on anyone’s memory for this. We can refer to Bush’s January 10, 2007 address to the nation, and we can review the White House’s “fact sheet” that summarizes the “key elements of the new approach.” In his address, Bush said:
[start Bush quote] A successful strategy for Iraq goes beyond military operations. Ordinary Iraqi citizens must see that military operations are accompanied by visible improvements in their neighborhoods and communities. So America will hold the Iraqi government to the benchmarks it has announced.[end Bush quote]
What were these? Bush continued:
[start Bush quote] To establish its authority, the Iraqi government plans to take responsibility for security in all of Iraq’s provinces by November. To give every Iraqi citizen a stake in the country’s economy, Iraq will pass legislation to share oil revenues among all Iraqis. To show that it is committed to delivering a better life, the Iraqi government will spend 10 billion dollars of its own money on reconstruction and infrastructure projects that will create new jobs. To empower local leaders, Iraqis plan to hold provincial elections later this year. And to allow more Iraqis to re-enter their nation’s political life, the government will reform de-Baathification laws and establish a fair process for considering amendments to Iraq’s constitution.[end Bush quote]
[End extract from Daniel]
A commenter replied to this statement “I don’t think it’s reasonable to expect the U.S. military and its friends in the diplomatic corps to be able to settle the political affairs of a host nation.” with this comment:
"Once again, the Iraqis have failed to live up to the high hopes we had for them when we destroyed their country. And, *host nation*? Is that the term foreign policy experts are using these days to mean “invadee”? Did Iraq lobby to be the venue for this war, beating out Helsinki and Lake Placid, NY?"
Comment by Visitor on April 6, 2010 - 5:46pm
"If we take the justifications/goals of our leadership for the initiation of the war in Iraq at face value, the war was clearly a 25+ year project, in that a non-trivial US military force would be necessary for the duration. This force would be on a war footing and would intermittently engage in random shooting actions, the frequency of which would decline over time. It would take a number of years (and may not ever occur) before it would be safe enough for military families to relocate to Iraq, as they did in Germany, Japan, and South Korea. "
Gee, I don't remember it being sold on that basis; I remember lot of sh*t-talking about remaking the entire Middle East, and 'real men go on to Tehran'. I don't remember *any* prominent administration person or neoconman talking about the war in Iraq as a 25+ year project.
As for Germany, Japan and S. Korea, it was safe enough to move families in immediately in the first two (not that they did), and S. Korea was pretty frikkin' quiet once the armistice went into place (tense as all h*ll, but far, far quieter than Iraq).
most recent Visitor,
By golly that just has to be one of the most witty, insightful ways of framing this whole debate seen yet. Good on ya, Visitor!
Nora is correct in that to the casual observer "the Surge" is analoguos to "increase troop levels." This, I feel, is an unfortunate result of both media sound-bite lazyness and their overt desire to portray "the Surge" as a another "stupid Bush policy" of just throwing more bodies at the problem in an effort to discredit it with the general public. To those paying attention, the increase in troop levels was a necessary enabler to effect the changes in COIN policy that were central to "the Surge."
As to evaluating success or failure, at the time the Surge was designed and planned, anti-government and pro-jihadi forces and sympathies had either control over or the support of a large enough minority of the Iraqi population that they were able to exert an existintial threat to the nascent Iraqi government, and by extension the US political goals in supporting Iraqi democracy. I do not think that condition and threat exists today. It is true that synergy between the Surge and the Awakening helped to make this possible, but without the firepower, logistics, coordination and support of the Surge I doubt the Awakening could have had the same success. One may even convincingly argue that support for the Awakening was in large part predicated on Iraqi perceptions of US commitment to success as demonstrated by the Surge.
The surge worked. Period. The leftist Obama-weasels of the world can't admit they were wrong, so they keep repeating their pernicious lies. I wish I could expect more from the liberal fascist left, but the Obamas and Sullivans of the world have no shame and no soul. Anytime they can advance their authoritarian agenda with a lie they do it. Sad, really. Luckily there are still good people to fight back and resist their evil.
@ Pode: "I can't help but note that in your list of contributing factors you (deliberately?) left out "The Splurge", or the unholy amount of money paid to Sunni militias to stop fighting."
But wasn't that part and parcel to what we colloquially refer to as "The Surge"? You make it sound as if this was some separate effort -- that "The Surge" was merely an influx of new troops and a shift in military tactics.
But that's not the case. What you're calling "The Splurge" -- buying the loyalties of the Sunni nationals away from AQI with cash, weapons, training, protection, and political concessions -- was just as integral to our overall gear change in late '06/early '07 as the troop reinforcements and implementation of the "clear and hold" military tactics of Keane, McMaster, etal.
I don't get the sense that Muqawama "deliberately left out" this aspect of "The Surge". I think it's already assumed.
@ Dave: "I wish I could expect more from the liberal fascist left, but the Obamas and Sullivans of the world have no shame and no soul."
Well, both Vice President Biden and President Obama have already admitted that the surge worked. No, they're not out shouting it from the rooftops or admitting "they were wrong" (what politician would?). But they've said enough to satisfy me. And, even more to the point, their actions regarding Iraq speak even louder.
Andrew Sullivan, on the other hand, is probably a lost cause. In the last 5 or 6 years, he seems to have become almost entirely motivated by those he sees as his political enemies -- to the point where he's more or less let go of substance and principle.
Those who say he's just strongly motivated by issues like gay rights, "torture", etc. would do well to analyze how he's written about one of the more prominent Republican supporters of gay marriage (Dick Cheney) and one of the most prominent Republican critics of waterboarding, etc. (John McCain).
I imagine Ricks will eventually get around to conceding that he was wrong about the Surge. He's a serious, thoughtful guy who seems less driven by broader political or ideological calculations. I think, more than anything, he's just expected the gains made there to prove tenuous and illusory. But that does make you wonder why he went ahead and deemed the policy a failure, rather than simply reserving judgment.
Comment by Mike D. on April 7, 2010 - 10:55am
most recent Visitor,
"By golly that just has to be one of the most witty, insightful ways of framing this whole debate seen yet. Good on ya, Visitor!"
And the repetition just added to the inherent truth lying within any sports metaphor!
Just because the press doesn't cover Iraq's ongoing sectarian strife doesn't mean it's over.
The surge was a failure, and it looks like the tactics employed to 'crush the resistance' bordered on atrocity. See the wikileaks video:
http://collateralmurder.org/
The effect was temporary at best - and let's be honest here, Iran is the real winner in the region, all thanks to our incompetent bungling and greed.
We could have gone in, gotten Saddam, and been out in a year, permanently.
However, if we had done that, we couldn't have dictated the terms of the economic surrender, nor could we have kept the plunder - Iraqi oil.
That's the only reason we're still there.
I can understand the conclusion that the Iraq invasion was stupid, and the cost in lives
high, but....
We don't know how many Iraqis would have died if Saddam Hussein were still in power.
Or how many children would be deprived of medical care. How many Iraqis would die in
prison and be tortured (and I'm not talking of panties on the head). We don't know
how long the U.S. would have maintained the No Fly Zone, protecting the Kurds in the
North and Shia in the South from hellfire from above. We don't know if Saddam Hussein
would activate his chemical factories and possibly nuclear technology after the inspectors
left the country. We don't know what terrorism outside the borders of Iraq that Hussein
would bankroll. We don't know the numbers of UN officials Hussein would have bribed.
We don't know the extent to which nations and their industries would have dealt with
Hussein's dictatorship. And we don't know how long Hussein could have maintained
his dictatorship and how many deaths would happen with his downfall. And we don't know
what organization would take control after Hussein. Al Qaeda? Iran? More Baathists?
Or if Iraq's neighbors would have invaded. We don't know yet if establishing a democracy
in Iraq was a turning point in the war against al Qaeda, the Wahabis and the Ayatollah.
This drama is still unfolding, and the historians will have a different view than the majority
of contemporaries in media.
@ Ralph Hitchens: "Great. It worked. Kudos to Petraeus et. al. who made it work. But it was one very late bright spot in an otherwise bleak picture. The Iraq War was a catastrophic strategic blunder on the part of Bush and Cheney."
I don't understand how any serious person could feel confident yet in saying that the Iraq War was a "strategic blunder". If we consider it part of a broader effort to reform and stabilize the Middle East and engage the threat of Islamic radicalism, then it seems that we've got a ways to go in being able to sort out the relative merits of the chosen strategy.
Naturally, had the campaign gone south on us (like Vietnam), then this would already be settled. But it hasn't -- not yet, anyway. So I think it's clear enough the jury's still out on the question of strategy.
Of course, even if it doesn't turn out look to history like a *strategic* blunder, that doesn't necessarily mean it was the best policy option we had c. 2002-3. Because, clearly, the costs -- blood, treasure, and otherwise -- came in way higher than its advocates expected (or, at least, told us they expected). And, moreover, the primary justification given for implementing the invasion proved to be false.
I agree with Hillary Clinton that, if I knew then what I know now, I wouldn't have supported it...even assuming the present conditions on the ground there.
Still, none of that speaks to the strategic merits of the policy. It's still way too early to be making conclusions in that regard.
@Barry/Daniel Larison
To be frank, I don't find it very credible to be evaluating and/or categorizing the success on the surge based on the rhetoric President Bush used to describe it to the public. It's clear from reviewing records of the time and books like the War Within that Bush's commitment to the surge was far more emotional and conceptual, in a Churchillian stay-the-course-against-evil kind of way, than it was any kind of detailed appreciation for the tactical and strategic niceties of the plan.
@g.d. "The effect was temporary at best"
This sounds like Ricks. Now, you (and he) may still prove correct. None of us has a crystal ball -- and it seems entirely possible that whatever was gained will prove tenuous as soon as we start thinning out.
But why not say "I suspect the effect will prove temporary at best", and wait to find out, rather than deeming it so? Because you can't deem it so at this point.
@ g.d. "Iran is the real winner in the region"
Again, there's no evidence of this *yet*. As it stands, Iran is acting like more of a cornered animal than a regional hegemon. Had they really gained from the regime change next door as you suggest, I would expect them to be acting differently than they are...rather than like a country growing more and more isolated.
And, besides, they're still having to rely on Russia for political cover and other sustenance -- not to mention having to put down popular political uprisings in their own streets the likes of which that country hasn't seen since 1979.
Honestly, I think -- one way or another -- things with Iran are bound to come to a head in the relatively near future. And, once that dust settles, I'd be surprised if we'll look back at this period of history as one where Iranian radicals gained influence and strength.
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