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Tribal Engagement in Afghanistan: Tactical Lessons Learned
As many of this blog's readers know, I helped facilitate the Tribal Engagement Workshop run by the crew at Small Wars Journal. I was put in charge of collecting lessons learned from those who have done tribal engagement at the local level in Afghanistan -- mostly Special Forces officers -- and wrote this with Jason Fritz, a former armor officer and Iraq veteran (and "Gunslinger" over at the Ink Spots blog). This will be really dry reading for 98% of the blog's readership but might be of interest to junior officers about to deploy to Afghanistan.
Tribal Engagement at the Tactical Level
This short paper is intended to supplement the Tribal Engagement Workshop (TEW) Summary Report by addressing those findings at the tactical level. The information provided here was drawn from the experiences of the members of the tactical working group at the TEW to create a planning framework for community engagement at the tactical level – specifically at the team or company/platoon level – in Afghanistan.
At the tactical level, tribal engagement would best be leveraged as community engagement for reasons outlined in the TEW Summary Report. Community engagement at the tactical level is something that can be done by both special operations forces and general purpose forces – but it depends on what you define as community engagement and where you attempt to do it. Significant time and effort must be devoted to determining which areas and communities are ripe for engagement (and when) while also determining how engaging those communities would benefit the overarching regional or theater campaign plan. Some communities do not readily lend themselves to engagement, and other communities do not lend themselves to engagement at all times – as any kind of engagement depends first and foremost on buy-in from local authorities.
The resources organic to a Special Forces “A Team” are different from those organic to a light infantry company. In order to do community engagement, though, both require specialist language, cultural, medical, and intelligence assets as well as dedicated air assets and, when possible, a detachment of female soldiers or civilians capable of interacting with the local female population. Without the necessary enablers, either organization would have difficulty in effectively engaging communities.
Like all other military operations, community engagement proceeds by phase. The first phase, at the tactical level, involves a careful reconnaissance of a potential community to determine whether or not local buy-in makes the community ripe for engagement. This phase also includes supporting operations such as allocating the assets identified above, determining the engaging unit’s logistics plans, and initiating the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration plan for any local forces mustered through community engagement.
The second phase can be described as either the “clear” or “secure” phase, dependent on whether or not it takes place in a permissive or non-permissive environment. It must be Afghan-led and tied to existing political structures in the village. Conditions for moving onto the next phase include the establishment of security, the establishment of relationships with community leaders, some semblance of government, an information operation campaign begun, and the community purged of anti-Afghan forces.
The third phase of the operation – “hold” and “build” – should end with security and governance firmly established, mid-term development projects begun and long-term projects identified, and ongoing shaping operations – to include information operations, key leader engagement, and direct action as necessary. The provision of essential services should be established as necessary to meet critical needs of the population, and security forces should be spread out among the population so as not to be a drain on local markets and resources.
The fourth and final phase of the operation is contingent on locals feeling confident they can provide security and govern on their own. As such, U.S. and allied forces should “test” the ability of local forces to do both. At this phase, there exists a huge risk that U.S. and allied forces will withdraw too early, leading to a collapse in relations between the people and security and the people and their government.
Success in engagement is defined by capable, responsible, and autonomous security and governance apparatuses perceived as legitimate by locals. Security and governance are both linked to higher echelons, and space exists for a peaceful political process to take place.
The Goldman case is civil
The Goldman case is civil and only has to find specific instances of wrong doing.
Be very careful about saying it is a weak case. Again civil is not criminal and burden of proof is a lot easier "preponderance of evidence," etc. Reading the WSJ can rot your mind. FT is a lot easier on mental health grounds.
Good summary Ex.
Good summary Ex.
Maybe its just my naiveté,
Maybe its just my naiveté, but the phrase "..and initiating the disarmament, demobilization,..." is raising a concern. I understand that it is necessary to control the weapons on the scene, but I am thinking, particular for Afghans, that has to be a major dent in their pride, if not even their ability to perform minimal self-defense in the environment they are in. I think a better approach would be to identify what weapons are on the scene, operated by whom and then give these folks a bit more attention in terms of how they can be convinced/engaged/integrated on the scene: police, guard, etc. - find out if these are really bad guys. The best scenario I can picture, if anyone wanted to "disarm" at my house would be: there are no weapons, because they are stashed somewhere else. That is in any case starting up in the wrong direction.
Excellent summary. Special
Excellent summary.
Special Forces “A Team” - I love with when Ex is on the Jazz and I pity the Taliban!
Snake
So you DDR the tribal forces
So you DDR the tribal forces so you can build local security by giving the same people their guns back?
You can't engage with a local community unless your rifle company has it's own helicopters?
Why do you think engaging local females has value? Or do you hope it has value? Or does saying this keep the PC crowd onside?
Good letters section in FP
Good letters section in FP on Afghanistan and aerial bombing back and forth with Edward Luttwak..
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/26/collateral_damage
Visitor 1003 raises a good point...why do we want to engage the women with ours? That's a very touchy subject...
Despite the emphasis on
Despite the emphasis on COIN, irregular warfare, tribes in remote mountains, border incursions and the opium trade, I encounter no discussions about how -- or why not -- lessons learned in Laos can be applied to Afghanistan.
Am I wrong, but among other things, was it not the opium trade and the politics of that trade, for example, that prevented us from applying lessons learned in Malaya by the UK later on in SE Asia?
It seems that in a country where we went out of our way to woo tribes to fight on our behalf, and where we conveniently avoided trampling on opium fields, we would have picked up quite a few pointers.
Perhaps not.
The reason the US didn't
The reason the US didn't apply the lessons of Malaya was that the situations were completely different.
The Brits took the wind of of nationalist sail by announcing they were leaving very soon in the campaign. In Malaya the enemy were a racial minority. The only country with a (short) land border with Malaya, Thailand, did not support the guerrillas. Soviet and PRC support of the Malay guerrillas was very limited. The Chinese rural population was small enough to segregate in concentration camps. The campaign took place before the counter culture made using conscripts more difficult. The war was conducted with far less TV coverage than Viet Nam which limited the unlikely chance of serious anti-war sentiment building in the UK. The colonial administration was competent and there was unity of command. The British had decided to withdrawal from their Empire- the opposite situation the US found itself in the mid 1960s.
Viet Nam wasn't winnable. The problem with re-fighting the war is that the people who think that if only this or that had been done the US would have won are now selling the idea to pols that a counter- guerrilla war in medium sized Asian countries is winnable with the right tactics. Not only are they pushing a hope as a doctrine but conveniently skip the strategic questions of value for resources.
Smart principled power.
Smart principled power. Principle compounded by interest.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/26/brainier_brawn
"January 13, 2009:In her confirmation hearing for secretary of state, Clinton defines her strategy as one of "smart power." Defense contractors soon look to cash in, building their portfolios in health and human rights to align "with the Obama administration's emphasis on the application of 'smart power,'" as DynCorp Chief Executive William Ballhaus puts it. "
Visitor, you are absolutely
Visitor, you are absolutely right about border not coming into play in Malaya . And your other observations deserve a closer look too. Posting intentions of an early exit, keeping the number of ground troops / advisors deployed extremely low, minimal reliance on population relocation / isolation -- all these helped immensely.
But I raised the point about Laos which you fail to address. Winnable or not, was the US really out to win Laos? Or was Laos and its border with Vietnam simply being used by the US to undermine NVN resupply and troop movements?
Again, the dynamics of the opium trade in Laos, and both our ability there -- from the standpoint of planting a widely shared perception -- and our willingness to push autonomous tribes to sign on in support of the what they perceived and embraced as an effort which if successful might better preserve their autonomy and culture goes untreated in this TEW exercise.
Unless I am wrong -- and of course, I could be wrong -- allowing the opium trade to flourish played into this decentralized approach in Laos which perhaps not only served the purpose of helping us to keep an extremely low profile but also kept the central government happy and contributed to the sense of empowerment of the hill tribes. Contrast this approach with what is unfolding today. I get the sense that in OEF, the opium trade is having a corrosive effect and running contrary to the phenomenon in Laos by reinforcing -- in fact, supercharging -- tensions between Kabul and the tribes.
As far as Laos - I know SF
As far as Laos - I know SF Bay Area pilots who were approached by the CIA in the 1960s and offered large sums of money to fly in and out of Laos. Why? Money for guns for the Hmong fighters.
The CIA has a long history of using drug running operations to finance insurgency movements - the Iran-Contra scandal was really the Iran-Contra-Cocaine scandal, for example - and they taught these tricks to the Taliban, along with several other skills - car bomb construction, for example.
However, to understand the deal in Afghanistan, you have to understand village economics - namely, opium keeps better than fruits and vegetables. If you grow opium, you can store it until the opium buyer comes along - so in a war-torn country where markets are restricted by warfare, the farmers have very little choice.
The question then becomes, who is the buyer? Karzai's brother? A Pakistani agent? A Taliban agent?
Here's an idea: let's be the buyer ourselves, take the opium, and resell it to Purdue Pharma, makers of oxycontin, and then they can distribute it legally in the U.S. through their networks of shady doctors and shadier "pain management clinics."
Get Joe LIeberman on this - he's taken in $155,000 from Purdue Pharma, and they'd probably love to have a cheaper supply of raw materials.
Whassamattawitdat? Folk gots to get paid, mofo!
You know, if you run into
You know, if you run into some Afghani villagers, and they seem hostile, you can try and break the ice with a funny joke - here's one courtesy of National Security Advisor James Jones - what a card!
A Taliban militant gets lost and is wandering around the desert looking for water. He finally arrives at a store run by a Jew and asks for water. The Jewish vendor tells him he doesn’t have any water but can gladly sell him a tie. The Taliban, the jokes goes on, begins to curse and yell at the Jewish storeowner. The Jew, unmoved, offers the rude militant an idea: Beyond the hill, there is a restaurant; they can sell you water. The Taliban keeps cursing and finally leaves toward the hill. An hour later he’s back at the tie store. He walks in and tells the merchant: “Your brother tells me I need a tie to get into the restaurant.
Ha ha ha! What? Huh? Whud I say?
P.S. Have you heard the one about the two Americans, the Saudi, and the Israeli?
An American gets lost while exploring for oil in Saudi Arabia. He finally runs into a camel caravan headed for Mecca, but is told he can't come along unless he converts to Islam. He considers, agrees, and goes to Mecca, prays before the Kaaba, and lo - he's granted an oil concession by the ruler. The other American is off trying to sell arms to Israel, and has the same problem - they won't deal with anyone but a fellow Jew. So, he converts to Judaism, puts on the little hat, and lo - he gets the arms deal. Later on in a hotel in Beirut, the two Americans meet up, and discuss how they're going to get Congressional approval for their respective deals... "So buddy," one says, "You gonna go as a Catholic or as a Protestant?"
. . "The eyes see only what
.
.
"The eyes see only what the mind is prepared to comprehend"
"The eyes see only what the
"The eyes see only what the mind is prepared to comprehend"
"The ears hear only that which resonates with preconceived notions"
"The mouthpiece says only what the master tells it to say."
Another type of tribal
Another type of tribal interaction, looks like the UK soldiers dont like G. Brown that much, lol.
http://www.arrse.co.uk/Forums/viewtopic/t=148606/postdays=0/postorder=as...
If you haven't seen it - the
If you haven't seen it - the now Globally Viral Power Point PPT slide to "explain" Astan made Drudge Report.
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1269463/Afghanistan-Po...
AM - was that a CNAS presentation? Or did someone copy the Fiscal Crisis CDO/CDS flow chart?
Mr. Exum, sorry to use the
Mr. Exum, sorry to use the comments, but I cannot for the life of me find an email address for you. But, I knew you'd want to see this too.
http://www.blackfive.net/main/2010/04/why-coin-wont-work-in-afghanistan....
Why COIN won't work in
Why COIN won't work in Afghanistan.... interesting powerpoint... Patton would have smashed the computer that PPT slide show was on... and screamed for his men to engage the enemy.
All the Contractors in J2, DoD Defense Contractors and producers of military vehicles and equipments want McChrystal to take his time (they are probably even providing him with mis-information) so they can drag out the war in Afghanistan as long as possible.
How are they going to get paid, since the occupation of Iraq is coming to a close? If we end the war too quickly in Afghanistan, all these contractors for BW, Dyna, Titan, Triple Can, STG, SAIC, Lockheed, Pluribus International, Hawkeye Systems... all of them won't have a job...the economy would collapse and our country would fold...
If Al- Queda and the Taliban really wanted to stick it to us, they would raise a peace flag and give up. That would cause our entire economy to shut down and a massive economic depression would overwhelm the United States.
Patton could have ended WWII
Patton could have ended WWII far faster than it did - see Daniel Yergin to understand why:
August 1944: "In consequence of their logistical problems, the fast-moving Allied armies simply outran their gasoline supplies. The same thing happened to Rommel when his forces had raced across North Africa in 1942. Patton fumed about the situation. "At the present time," he wrote to his son on August 28, "my chief difficulty is not the Germans but gasoline. If they would give me enough gas, I could go anywhere I want..."
"Down to a half-day supply of gasoline, Patton was furious. He appeared, 'bellowing like an angry bull,' at the headquarters of General Omar Bradley, commander of the American forces. "We'll win your goddamn war if you'll keep Third Army going," he roared at Bradley. "Dammit, Brad, just give me 400,000 gallons of gasoline and I'll put you inside Germany in two days."
September 1944: "I now deem it important," Eisenhower noted in his own diary the next day [Sept 5], "to get Patton moving once again." And thereafter, Patton did get more fuel. But the minute passed was to prove most unforgiving; the few days that had elapsed had given the Germans critical time to regroup.... nine months of bitter and costly warfare would follow. And when the Germans mounted one massive last-ditch counterattack, the Russians, not the Americans, took Berlin."
"..Of the million casualties the Allied forces suffered in liberating Western Europe, fully three-quarters occurred after the September check on Patton's advance. Many millions more died as a result of military action and in the German concentration camps in the last eight months of the war."
Daniel Yergin, "The Prize", pg 368
You can find people who disagree with that analysis, sure - but clearly, the best chance for the capture of Osama bin Laden and the complete defeat of the Taliban was wasted in the Tora Bora region in 2001, when OBL was allowed to escape into Afghanistan - not that it was the fault of the CIA/Special Forces group on the ground, who were given crappy orders - rather, that appears to have been Rumsfeld's decision.
Senate inquiry says US failure to attack al-Qaida's leader at Tora Bora had far-reaching consequences, Nov 2009
Outrageous.
GD your comment about Tora
GD your comment about Tora Bora is very true, however it is also irrelevant.
Thank you for the information AM, the leaders of at least one unit headed to Afghanistan soon have been made aware of it.
Infidels let me introduce
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Gosh, did Exum really help
Gosh, did Exum really help facilitate the Tribal Engagement Workshop? I didn't know that. The problem is, he doesn't talk about himself enough.
And did you know he served in the military?
No, it's quite relevant,
No, it's quite relevant, considering that the foreign fighters in Afghanistan are still coming in from Pakistan - see this from Jun 2009 (Tom Coghlan, Kabul)
A Taleban commander in Helmand, who asked not to be identified, told The Times: “We have seen a 40 per cent increase in the number of foreign fighters this year in Helmand. They are mostly Pakistanis and Arabs but also Uzbek and Chechen.”
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6514933.ece
and this:
2010-04-24 14:10:00
"About 100 Taliban and Al Qaeda militants from other countries have infiltrated into Afghanistan's northern Kunduz province, a top official said Saturday."
'We have information some 100 foreign fighters from Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, the Middle East and other countries have penetrated to Kunduz,' Xinhua quoted provincial governor Mohammad Omar as saying."
"The foreigners will train local Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives as part of a campaign to destabilise security in the province and adjoining areas, he said.
Here's the most comprehensive look at the situation I could find:
http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/us-exit-from-afghanistan--dont-bo...
Those who fail to learn from past blunders will certainly repeat them. Don't swallow your own PR.
My point was that what
My point was that what happened nine years ago happened. We can't go back in time and catch UBL, so why bring it up when discussing the way forward?
Tribal engagement afghanistan
Tribal engagement afghanistan tactical lessons learned.. Corking :)
Why do you think engaging
Why do you think engaging local females has value? Or do you hope it has value? Or does saying this keep the PC crowd onside?
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To understand the deal in
To understand the deal in Afghanistan, you have to understand village economics - namely, opium keeps better than fruits and vegetables. If you grow opium, you can store it until the opium buyer comes along - so in a war-torn country where markets are restricted by warfare, the farmers have very little choice.thesis writing service
To understand the deal in
To understand the deal in Afghanistan, you have to understand village economics - namely, opium keeps better than fruits and vegetables. If you grow opium, you can store it until the opium buyer comes along - so in a war-torn country where markets are restricted by warfare, the farmers have very little choice.
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I;ve learned a lot of lessons
I;ve learned a lot of lessons from it so you don't have to worry about this/
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I hope that whatever war is
I hope that whatever war is between those countries will be soon over.. I hope this will end.
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Fighters are coming in
Fighters are coming in Afghanistan from Pakistan.It should be stopped.
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If it is true that fighters
If it is true that fighters are coming from pakistan then the authority of pakistan should concern.
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It seems that in a country
It seems that in a country where we went out of our way to woo tribes to fight on our behalf, and where we conveniently avoided trampling on opium fields, we would have picked up quite a few pointers.
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