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A Big Idea
No one has ever explicitly told me this is part of my job, but I have always thought that one of the more useful things think tanks can do is to mine the world of the social sciences (and academia more broadly) in search of those theories and ideas that -- if proven true -- can and should have a big impact on U.S. policies. On my way to Abu Dhabi, I was reading Greg Gause's The International Relations of the Persian Gulf
[Oil] was not the primary driver of any of the Gulf Wars ... [Regional] states acted more against perceived threats to their own domestic stability emanating from abroad than to counter unfavorable changes in the distribution of power or to take advantage of favorable power imbalances. They chose their allies not on classic balance of power considerations, balancing against the strongest regional state, but on how their own domestic regime security would be affected by the outcome of regional conflicts.
This is, to me, a classic example of a theory that, if proven true, should have major policy implications -- especially as we deal with an empowered Iran -- that you shouldn't need me to explain. I am still reading the book, but so far, Gause has made a compelling case.
I generally self-identify as
I generally self-identify as an IR realist, but I don't think this is an entirely novel suggestion. After all, there's clearly historical precedent: a Tsarist government likely would not have sought or accepted the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, while the survival of the revolution very nearly demanded that the Bolsheviks do so.
Hi, welcome to IR 102.
Hi, welcome to IR 102.
Save yourself all that
Save yourself all that Academic mumbo-jumbo, Ex. And just read all of Robert Baer's books, including his novels.
I identify as a realist as
I identify as a realist as well. I do find some sympathy for this statement, though, and think it can be found in the writings of some defensive realists, e.g., Jack Snyder (Myths) and Stephen Walt (Revolution and War) (and offensive realists too?). I think Walt does a good job parsing out how domestic factors and international factors interact (see the figure on the second-to-last page of the theory chapter). And I think it's Snyder in "Myths" who writes a sentence along the lines of, "It may be pointless to try and separate innenpolitk and ossenpolitik" (at which point Snyder's realist union card was revoked). Reading AM's post, I'm also reminded of Andreski's "On the Peaceful Disposition of Military Dictatorships."
I'm not sure balancing behavior and Waltzian system-level dynamics were absent in the Middle East (see Walt, Origins) although I'm not sure how they apply/applied to the Gulf - dual containment of Iraq and Iran would seem to constitute classic balancing behavior (would two adjacent regional powers be allies or adversaries?).
Turning back to Andreski, which is, to what extent were/are the Gulf states (military?) dictatorships, and to what extent did/does this affect their foreign policies compared to "oil"? Finally, at what level should oil be considered - the domestic level, by creating rentier states (say), or the international level, in a way/shape/form I can't really conceptualize. Presumably in a Peter Liberman "Does Conquest Pay?" (yes, it does) and offensive realist world, oil should be a material resource that over which states should fight.
ADTS
Greg Gause's The
Greg Gause's The International Relations of the Persian Gulf, and the author makes a pretty bold claim?
It came down to money and stability in the middle east... Saudi Royal Family staged most U.S. Troops in the Triangle, many of our troops were living there for almost a year, before the war, then operations started - we saved Kuwait.... We didn't invade Iraq because...WE didn't want a long term war.
Saudi Royalty was the one pulling the strings the entire time Ex, this is why the war happened. We have always been their slaves / their knights in shining armor. Many Saudi's hate the United States, but they love our lifestyle, music, our booze, education system and our technology. The fundamentalist Saudi's just fly jets into our skyscrapers.
If the Bush didn't have a personal and professional relationship with the Saudi Royal Family, which they did at the time, the first Gulf War would have never happened Ex.
The only domestic regime security that really mattered was in Saudi Arabia and they gave us the tools, information, airspace / bases, logistics and support we required to save them from instability in their region.
Stop drinking the Cool-aid Ex.
I'm absolutely riding the
I'm absolutely riding the slow bus in this crowd, so please be kind and use small words, but I'm not sure I understand your point here. I appreciate the fact that regional states act to mitigate internal instabilities but I don't see how that necessary translates to a policy change for ourselves. Our interests in the region are not tied to domestic politics as much as to the oil itself. So while Iran may act "irrationally" in order to quell internal issues through external force projection, the end result to us is still the same, we have to retain access to the region and to the resources in that region.
For Gause to say that oil was not a driver for the conflicts in that region I think needs to be tempered with "for regional powers." Oil, I believe, was certainly a driver (though maybe not the most significant one in all cases) for US involvement in the region. Our interest in that has led us to some ufortunate alliances that would not normally be in our best interests.
Please educate me on the subtleties of this case...
We don't really need their
We don't really need their oil, we have plenty of our own reserves of oil inland and offshore, as well as the worlds largest coal deposits and newly found huge fields of natural gas. There's also huge untapped energy in nuclear power. It's just that our Luddite elites won't let us get it.
Our allies need the oil - most of them - as they usually don't have their own, Britain and Norway are two exceptions.
We did get into the region because of oil, and because of the USSR invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was perceived rightly or wrongly as a drive towards the Indian Ocean and possibly the Gulf. See Rapid Deployment Force. Also Cold War.
I actually think the authors premise is right as far as local motives.
As far as Saddam in 90 there was a perception that he would keep going at some point, rightly or wrongly. At the time there was really no counterweight to him in the region short of Israel (tricky business that). Maybe Egypt but they're far away. Iran was in no shape to act outside it's borders against his conventional Army. He easily could have brushed aside the Gulf States and the Saudi military if left on their own. Remember his Army of 91 was a much more formidable force than 03. Also remember what a gambler he was. Left unchecked the Gulf would be far too much temptation for him.
hey Ex, were you able to
hey Ex, were you able to visit the 99 theme park in Kuwait?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Iw5iF7LiVPY
http://www.youtube.com/user/The99
Gause's book is sensible.
Gause's book is sensible. Turns out that, in contrast to what realists say, you can't understand the way states make choices about alliances and war and peace without unpacking the black box of the state and looking at domestic politics. This is far from novel from an international relations scholarship perspective. Many have been beating their heads against a (realist) wall trying to make this point for decades. Fortunately (in my opinion), most international relations scholars now acknowledge this point as well. States make decisions for a lot of reasons - preserving their internal stability seems like a pretty darn important one for a national leader. Especially since, as Goemans (yes, him again) finds, autocratic leaders removed from power have a lot more to fear in terms of punishment than democratic leaders who are voted out of office.
To ADTS: Keep in mind that Walt's Origins of Alliances is arguably a classic *constructivist* take on alliances. After all, in his account the key driver is threat *perceptions*. And how do the Middle Eastern states in his book decide whether to balance or bandwagon? Based on who makes them *feel* the most threatened. But since you seem quite well read on international relations issues, I suspect you know this already since you are aware that Snyder's realist union card got taken away years ago.
I agree. Walt's
I agree. Walt's constructivist, at least as Wendt would say (and quite convincingly, in my opinion). Look at the early attempts to proceed from Waltz, "Theory." How do ostensibly materialist (and parsimonious) realists theorists make their theories "work?" By bringing in *ideas:* military doctrine, threat perception/balance of threat, hypernationalism, etc. Moreover, to return to Walt, some have asked that, since the balance of power is included in one's threat assessment, the theory of balance of threat is arguably superfluous.
But I'm telling *you* something *you* already know anyways, too.
To ramble a bit for fun: It still is interesting to apply IR theory to concrete (in this case, area studies) cases. I suppose the starting point for a realist would by the polarity of the system. How many "billiard balls" are there and what sizes are they (in re the last point, how much power they possess)? From that definition of structure, one should be able to able to explain the behavior of individual units and the process of the system. I am not sure where to go from there. I suppose, as noted above, that bipolar systems are prone to stability, but if one considers Iran/Iraq, the method appears disconfirmed. Maybe GCC behavior, though, better matches realist theory in that its members sought the US security umbrella and bandwagoned with it as well (yet I don't know the empirics surrounding the GCC enough to make such claims). And, as noted above, I'd be curious what unit-level factors - e.g., not democratic (and thus not "primed for peace") rentier states with questionable political stability might play a role in the Gulf's international politics. Then again, and finally, Waltz (Neorealism and Its Critics) states he is not attempting, nor does consider himself able, to construct a theory of foreign policy.
And again, once more, except perhaps for the Gulf-specific material (which I fully plead ignorance of), I'm not telling you anything you don't know already.
As always, I appreciate and enjoy the discussion.
ADTS
I was thinking, Fearon's
I was thinking, Fearon's work on audience costs might be useful to understanding non-democratically regimes. (I think Kuwait is the only Gulf state with a parliament, and even then, there's the al-Sabah family.) If I recall correctly, Fearon makes some claims about the relative propensity of democracies, versus other regime types, to back down in or escalate crises. And his brilliant "Rationalist" piece could perhaps explain why Gulf states have gone to war. If one considers Fearon a realist - and I actually think he's arguably paradigmatically agnostic (but if I had to assign him a paradigm it would be realism) - then there are some contributions realism can contribute to understanding the IR of the Gulf. Perhaps the fact that he has focused (or used to focus before his shift to civil wars), admittedly only somewhat, on comparatively small phenomena - eg, bargaining failure - makes his scholarship more, not less useful for understanding.
ADTS
Talking of ideas - you
Talking of ideas - you co-wrote the "Triage: the next twelve months in Af/Pak" in June last year. According to my basic maths, that is nearly 12 months ago. I would really welcome an update!
Cheers
Tim
ADTS - If you had to
ADTS - If you had to classify Fearon, I'm not sure how you could say "realist". Audience costs, which make nearly all of his arguments from the early 1990s series of articles go, are inherently about domestic politics. And his work with Laitin sure isn't boilerplate realist.
The core of Fearon's argument, which Schultz's work supports, is that democracies make more credible commitments/threats because they face the clearer prospect of domestic audience costs. Autocrats don't face the risk of public disapproval when they back down to the same extent, which makes their threats/promises less credible. Of course, this isn't really just about democracies versus autocracies. Weeks' work suggests that non-democracies face audience costs as well, which is a logical extension of Geddes' work differentiating types of non-democratic regimes (personalist, military, etc.).
Anyways, another way to think about the Gulf States is in the context of literature on civil-military relations, coup-proofing, etc. We know, empirically, that some types of non-democratic states alter their military policies in ways that are sub-optimal for efficiency reasons but make it more likely that the leader can stay in power. This seems like a potentially similar example. These states want to avoid specific types of instability - instability that threatens their domestic legitimacy. It seems perfectly logical that the fear of promoting influences that could undermine their domestic legitimacy would play a powerful role driving the alliance and other choices of the Gulf States.
In fact, you could think of that as the causal mechanism that drives the decision of whether or bandwagon or balance - that's how, in Walt's terms, they decide what is "threatening".
ADTS - If you had to
ADTS - If you had to classify Fearon, I'm not sure how you could say "realist". Audience costs, which make nearly all of his arguments from the early 1990s series of articles go, are inherently about domestic politics. And his work with Laitin sure isn't boilerplate realist.
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I fully agree.
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The core of Fearon's argument, which Schultz's work supports, is that democracies make more credible commitments/threats because they face the clearer prospect of domestic audience costs. Autocrats don't face the risk of public disapproval when they back down to the same extent, which makes their threats/promises less credible. Of course, this isn't really just about democracies versus autocracies. Weeks' work suggests that non-democracies face audience costs as well, which is a logical extension of Geddes' work differentiating types of non-democratic regimes (personalist, military, etc.).
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First, you know more about this than I do, so apologies if I screw anything up. Indeed, I contemplated deleting this whole comment, because I think it's apparent that you have a better handle on all the topics concerned. Moving on, I agree with your characterization of Fearon's early 1990s work (and am unfamiliar, actually, with Weeks's work - how embarrassing - and I've never read Geddes on the topic you reference - again, how embarrassing ) as well as his work with Laitin. I suppose my characterization of Fearon is based in part on "Rationalist" - if it deals with war and security, it must be realist (which, of course, is false). As a disclaimer (again), crisis bargaining is something I've never really studied, or at least, really understood when I've read it (too game theoretic). I've read a bit of Schultz on audience costs (I think). But I've never really been convinced by the argument that autocrats don't face disapproval for backing down, and thus have greater credibility in crisis bargaining. On the contrary - and in a sense, this relates to the civil-military relations arguments you raise later in your post, consider what perhaps Saddam was thinking when he didn't back down in 1990-1991 or 2003, or the fate of Khrushchev after the Cuban Missile Crisis. But I suppose I might be simply summarizing Weeks's work. Maybe the important thing to bear in mind is that, like transaction costs,** no one can quantify or really operationalize the concept of domestic audience costs.
** Although, I think Douglass North wrote an article (early 1980s?, some economics journal) in which he argued that it is 20% of the finance, insurance, and real estate industry. That, to me, seems pretty different than search, bargaining, and enforcement, but I digress (sort of).
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Anyways, another way to think about the Gulf States is in the context of literature on civil-military relations, coup-proofing, etc. We know, empirically, that some types of non-democratic states alter their military policies in ways that are sub-optimal for efficiency reasons but make it more likely that the leader can stay in power. This seems like a potentially similar example. These states want to avoid specific types of instability - instability that threatens their domestic legitimacy. It seems perfectly logical that the fear of promoting influences that could undermine their domestic legitimacy would play a powerful role driving the alliance and other choices of the Gulf States.
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That seems, first, plausible, and second, ties in with the audience cost literature (if a leader backs down, he/she will lose the confidence of his/her security apparatus, and be more prone to coups. I agree that coup-proofing probably makes regimes less capable of defending themselves (although, while there's been literature on coup-proofing, has there been an article on *how much* this impacts a state's ability to defend itself?), but how this plays out in countries that are so small they have no chance of really defending themselves anyways, I wonder. I also think about coup-proofing in countries like Indonesia, which *is* large, but does not *really* face an external threat.
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In fact, you could think of that as the causal mechanism that drives the decision of whether or bandwagon or balance - that's how, in Walt's terms, they decide what is "threatening".
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I imagine that's *a* causal mechanism, but hardly the *only* possible causal mechanism. While it contradicts some of what I wrote about above about autocrats and domestic audience costs, the Joint Forces Command Iraqi Perspectives Project (admittedly, at least what little I've read does not) does not imply a leader too concerned about coup-proofing; then again, in Ricks's "The Gamble," in the section "WWSHD," it is stated that Republican Guard divisions were stationed according to where the domestic threats to the regime were. For another causal mechanism, I imagine Press, "Calculating Credibility" (which I admittedly haven't read) and Mercer, "Reputation" provide some traction on the question of whom one should trust.
ADTS
To clarify: "But I've never
To clarify:
"But I've never really been convinced by the argument that autocrats don't face disapproval for backing down, and thus have greater credibility in crisis bargaining. On the contrary"
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What I mean by this, to allay any confusion, is that Fearon doesn't get the causal mechanisms quite right (and is what follows a throwback to Goemans, ie, a "gambling for resurrection"-type argument?). Democratic leaders lose their chance to stay in office if they back down; dictators lose their internal credibility if they back down, with potentially more severe consequences - and it may be this which lends them greater credibility in crisis bargaining (assuming, of course, that they *do* have greater credibility in crisis bargaining.
Hopefully this clarifies rather than obfuscates; apologies if it doesn't, or if it's internally inconsistent. Again, you understand this better than I do.
ADTS
Check out Steve David's
Check out Steve David's article "Explaining Third World Alignments" in World Politics in 1991. What he calls "omnibalancing"-- i.e., leaders making alliance decisions in order to balance against both internal and external threats-- is very similar to Gause's argument. As far as relevance to U.S. policy, I would argue that when we are trying to assess the fighting capability of adversaries and allies, we have to have a complete understanding of which threats they're most concerned about. We over-estimated the fighting power of the Iraqis in 2003 because we didn't realize Saddam had mostly built his military to protect him from internal threats. On the flipside, we under-estimated the fighting power of the army we could build in South Vietnam because we didn't realize (or didn't acknowledge) that the host government was more concerned about building a force to fend off internal threats (coups, the Buddhists, etc.) than about the North Vietnamese. You can give a government all the training and equipment in the world, but you will have a tough time producing results if you don't agree on what the threats are. Certainly relevant to our net assessments today of states like North Korea and Iran, and to our army-building efforts in Afghanistan....
At the risk of sounding
At the risk of sounding condescending, certainly a relevant, and on-topic, comment. Thanks for the cite.
ADTS
You're welcome. Now back to
You're welcome. Now back to writing my dissertation (which is on this exact topic)....
I would agree Gause's
I would agree Gause's hypothesis is correct; however, while oil may not have been a primary driver, it certainly plays a large role and acts as an underlying factor in disputes. It is somewhat analogous to our Civil War (and I’m probably going to upset some folks here) which did not start over the issue of slavery. It began as a result of the South taking issue with the Federal Government's interference it what was felt to be individual state sovereignty (state’s rights) and the North’s desire to preserve the Union, even if it meant war. Slavery was at the root of the South’s complaint but did not become the focal issue of the conflict until after the Emancipation Proclamation. Thus in the Persian Gulf hegemony often means control of oil, oil means money, money equals power.
Hit post too soon. Gause's
Hit post too soon.
Gause's theory also warns that America must also be cautious in viewing regional conflicts through the lens of our own strategic viewpoint and priorities. We “see” the Gulf as a significant resource provider and will go to great lengths to protect our access to oil. On the other hand, we often tend to fail to recognize ancient enmities in the region which leads to conflict; using our view we assume it is all about oil.
Colin S. Gray makes the same
Colin S. Gray makes the same point about internal politics driving war as much as external in "Another Bloody Century".
The point of the book being (so far) that war will continue, and history should be our guide, rather than being enamored of technology or faddish notions about "new" war.
You guys should be aware of
You guys should be aware of the branching problem in academics - graduate students of professors often divide up the professor's work as they move into their own careers. Over-specialization is the result, and since many academics have recognized this, there's now a new emphasis on interdisciplinary work. This is true in areas as diverse as computer science, biology, physics - and the psychological & social sciences as well.
"Primary drivers" of conflict - are you talking about the prelude to conflict, or the practice of conflict? Why did Rommel lose North Africa? Bletchley Park broke Axis codes, and that information allowed Allied forces to cut off most of Rommel's fuel lines. Drive that tank with no oil, you won't get very far. Similarly, attacks on fuel convoys have been a central feature of the Afghanistan conflicts since 1979.
Thus, as a result of this constant tactical necessity, the long term strategic thinking of any modern military force must include secure access to energy supplies. If the military forces are professional, there will be a kind of jockeying for position - but if you have a political group seeking to exploit the situation, or which has its eyes on conquest, the situation can explode into conflict. Take Saddam Hussein in the early 1980s - his exploratory forays into Iran were all about securing control of the oil-rich upper delta region - see the map:
http://cambridgeforecast.files.wordpress.com/2007/11/iraqoilmap.gif
Or, was it that he thought that he would become a pan-Arab national unifier? Secure the oil in the Persian Gulf, drive the Saudi Royals out of Europe, take over Egypt, then push Israel into the sea (well, with all those nukes, that's unlikely) - Saddam was pretty megalomaniac, but that didn't keep the U.S., Britain, and a host of European countries - plus various intermediaries from Saudi Arabia to Egypt to Chile - from funneling billions in military aid to Saddam, since the Iranian Revolution was judged the more serious threat... although we were of course, at the same time, backing an equally dangerous brand of militant Islamic fundamentalism via the joint U.S./Saudi-Pakistani anti-Soviet effort in Afghanistan.
The point should be obvious: in certain situations oil can be a primary driver of conflict, and in others it is a minor factor. Iraq and Afghanistan provide good examples of non-equivalent cases.
Now, let's look at Iran. Nuclear power and uranium and nuclear weapons is the top concern, I'd say. The U.S. just put the cards on the table about the domestic nuclear stockpile. Israel will now be feeling some pressure to do the same, as will Pakistan and India. If they do, Iran will be unable to do anything but fold.
Fossil fuel-wise, Iran wants to build a gas pipeline to India, but they claim that their nuclear program is for "domestic energy." Here's what the U.S. should offer to do, I'd say:
First, cut off Export-Import bank support for Exxon's gas drilling in Papua New Guinea ($3 billion) and Petrobras offshore in Brazil ($2 billion). Along the lines of the World Bank deal in North Africa, offer Iran that financing and set up the deals with solar technology firms in the United States, which will spur on the domestic solar industry - in exchange for cessation of uranium enrichment activities and complete transparency.
If Iran refuses this generous offer, then their "domestic energy" arguments for their nuclear program are clearly bullshit, right? If they accept the offer, well, that works out pretty well for the domestic manufacturing industry... it's not like the only things we can sell to the Middle East are weapons systems and subprime loan packages, is it?
The Asian Development Bank is going to get the jump on this, it looks like: ADB to provide $2.25bn for solar energy projects
Hey... I made this point a
Hey... I made this point a year ago:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/12086868/Neoclassical-Realism-and-Middle-East-...
Glad the comments are now
Glad the comments are now being moderated. I really enjoyed reading these -- thanks to everyone who posted.
I don't want to base an
I don't want to base an entire argument on a quote, but as far as the one from Gause offered here goes it should be pointed out that Saddam Hussein's Iraq certainly did attempt to "...take advantage of favorable power imbalances" in both 1980 and 1990. While Saddam's regime was always concerned about internal security threats, its self-confidence after the collapse of the Shah's rule and end of the superpower rivalry in the Gulf, respectively, should not be obscured by memories of the post-Gulf War Iraqi state's chronic, manic security-consciousness.
Now, it is a matter of speculation as to whether an oilless Iraq would have acted in the same way toward an oilless Iran or Kuwait had the circumstances been otherwise the same. Kuwait, in particular, offered an oil sector that would have been big, easy money for an Iraq badly strained by the long war with Iran, had Saddam been able to make his invasion stick. So oil was probably a factor in the beginning of both wars, even if it wasn't the only one.
The argument about the importance of Mideast oil in this country has in any event mostly been about how it has influenced American perceptions and behavior, rather than how it has influenced the behavior of states in the region. In this respect, oil has plainly been a central factor in the thinking of successive American administrations about a region that offers little else of any value to the United States. What it's important to recognize, though, is that this thinking has produced massive efforts to address the oil problem that existed over 30 years ago -- the threat that oil shipments into world markets might be disrupted as a result of political choices made by the region's states, whether these involved wars among the states themselves or (as happened during the first oil crisis) decisions to curtail production in protest of American policy outside the oil belt.
The American response was a steady increase in its military presence in the region. This was mostly undertaken to deter disruptions of the status quo rather than in the expectation that America would have to fight an actual "war for oil." When we eventually did, in 1991, it was a war initiated by Iraq, one which took an American administration known for its skill in foreign affairs completely by surprise. American action to finally resolve the threat to Mideast oil supplies had to wait until 2003, by which time the dominant officials in the Bush administration had occupied senior positions in earlier periods of Mideast turmoil. By that time -- the crucial point -- the threat that had so preoccupied American officials for so long had all but disappeared. Middle Eastern regimes no longer consisted of a handful of ruling families presiding over traditional, relatively impoverished populations, as they had during the 1970s. Nearly all of them had major ambitions for their respective nations' infrastructure and had made even larger commitments of social welfare spending to their (rapidly growing) populations and elites. These ambitions and commitments can be fulfilled only with oil revenues.
The bottom line is that Middle Eastern governments have had little choice but to sell into world markets most or all of the oil they could produce since at least the mid-1990s and probably earlier. There has been no threat of a repetition of the 1970s' oil shocks large enough to justify the vast commitment of American military resources to the region. Middle Eastern oil matters to the United States. It just doesn't matter in the way the American government thought it did.
I came to think years ago
I came to think years ago that much of Saddam's motivation in 90 for invading Kuwait was the Asian dread of debt in particular amongst those who have tasted want as Saddam did growing up. It's a different mindset. Our elites of course don't think that way at all.
The USA has the capacity to again become a net energy exporter - oil, coal, natural gas. We just have to go and get it.
That not only ends our dependence but would work off our vast debt in a way that doesn't cause a breach with China.
Of course we'd need to overcome our Luddites, and the religion of environmentalism - which is what it is at this point.
If we were able to overcome
If we were able to overcome Luddites and environmentalists, we might not have anyone against whom to rant.
The problem with accessing domestic energy sources other than coal is the cost of doing so. Cheap oil means oil that is easy to get out of the ground and inexpensive to process into heating oil, gasoline and other fuels. The United States has gone through most of what was here originally, even as our demand for petroleum products has expanded by orders of magnitude. There is more natural gas available for extraction at a reasonable cost than was thought a few years ago, but demand for natural gas is expanding as well.
One reason is that gas is an attractive alternative to coal as a fuel for electric power plants. Coal, unlike other fossil fuels, is present in vast quantities in the United States. The environmental consequences of relying on it, though, are considerable -- mitigated to some degree by the fact that much coal mining takes place in arid Western states where few people live, but considerable nonetheless. Landscape destruction, water pollution downstream of mining operations, massive emissions of carbon, other greenhouse gases, and other pollutants are significant disadvantages to reliance on coal. If one doesn't care about any of this, that is fine, but I'm afraid many Americans do and with good reason.
As for the United States becoming a net energy exporter by just going and getting its domestic energy resources, we're in the realm of fantasy now. I don't mean anything personal by that comment. It's just that, in terms of economics, there isn't any way that can happen. Energy sources that are inexpensive to access and come with less environmental baggage will be used here; energy sources that are expensive to access will not be used until the price of energy becomes high enough to make their extraction possible; energy sources that can only be used in ways that produce major environmental damage will continue to be used as they are now, but their use will not be greatly expanded.
I apologize for drawing this thread so far off-topic, and I'll bring it back by observing that the ascription of a cultural "dread of debt" to Saddam Hussein is entirely conjectural, based on no more evidence than the idea that Saddam attacked Iran in 1980 because he adored pistachio nuts. He was the man who inflicted Iraq's considerable foreign debt on the country in the first place during the 1980s, and he deliberately avoided taking the steps that might have helped reduce it during the 1990s. He invaded Kuwait in 1990 because it had oil, and because he thought he could get away with it.
Certainly Saddam invaded
Certainly Saddam invaded Kuwait to have access to even more oil, and yes he thought he could easily get away with it. There is also another very compelling reason: the Khawr Abd Allah. Look at the map of the northern Gulf. Iraq only has access to the shipping lanes via the Shatt al-Arab. It has only about a 15 mile wide coast line with Um-qasir on the west and Al-faw on the east. The eastern side is dominated by Iran (an enemy) and the western by Kuwait (not really a friend). So in order to keep his ability to ship oil to global markets, Saddam felt he had to secure Iraq’s access to the Gulf by taking Kuwait, and thus better securing his access.
Greg is an outstanding
Greg is an outstanding scholar (and a good friend), and his book is excellent. However, the argument that the national security policies of ME states (or indeed, a great many developing countries) are driven in large part by domestic security considerations is hardly a novel one--it has been argued by a great many scholars of ME foreign policy (in various ways, by Noble, Korany, Dessouki, Ayoob, Hinnebusch, Salloukh, Stein, Lawson, Hudson... and the list goes on). Indeed, I would argue that it has been the mainstream view for a decade or more.
I also think it is a pretty common view in the informed policy and intelligence community too.
An interesting post to go
An interesting post to go through. As said "[Oil] was not the primary driver of any of the Gulf Wars ... [Regional] states acted more against perceived threats to their own domestic stability emanating from abroad than to counter unfavorable changes in the distribution of power or to take advantage of favorable power imbalances. They chose their allies not on classic balance of power considerations, balancing against the strongest regional state, but on how their own domestic regime security would be affected by the outcome of regional conflicts." Find more current events news
Great post. I think everyone
Great post. I think everyone of us should take his/her responsibility to keep peace in the world. any war is guilty. the results of wars is money waste and life lost.
monogrammed beach towels
Big idea.. Corking :)
Big idea.. Corking :)
Gregory Gause's book offers a
Gregory Gause's book offers a comprehensive account of the international politics in the Persian Gulf across nearly four decades. It traces developments from the oil 'revolution' through the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war and the Gulf war to the toppling of Saddam Hussein in the American-led invasion of Iraq.
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I always thought that one of
I always thought that one of the most useful of the think tank can do, is my world of social science (and other colleges) to find the theories and ideas, which - if proven true - could and should have a major impact on policy United States
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he argument about the
he argument about the importance of Mideast oil in this country has in any event mostly been about how it has influenced American perceptions and behavior, rather than how it has influenced the behavior of states in the region. In this respect, oil has plainly been a central factor in the thinking of successive American administrations about a region that offers little else of any value to the United States. What it's important to recognize, though, is that this thinking has produced massive efforts to address the oil problem that existed over 30 years ago -- the threat that oil shipments into world markets might be disrupted as a result of political choices made by the region's states, whether these involved wars among the states themselves or (as happened during the first oil crisis) decisions to curtail production in protest of American policy outside the oil belt . torrents
Egypt but they're far away. Iran was in no shape to act outside it's borders against his conventional Army. He easily could have brushed aside the Gulf States and the Saudi military if left on their own. Remember his Army of 91 was a much more formidable force than 03.
I agree with your point,
I agree with your point, please share with us more good articles.1998 Cadillac Seville AC Compressor
Hi Exactly as you say.
Hi Exactly as you say.
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