Abu Muqawama: Post
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Two from the Post
Woke up this morning in Riyadh to spot two articles in today's Washington Post that made me smile. The first was an op-ed from former Abu Muqawama contributor Erin "Charlie" Simpson. Charlie is on the ground in Afghanistan and has been for several months. As much as I respect John Nagl, Gilles Dorronsoro and Andrew Bacevich, I care a lot more about her informed assessment of the war at the moment than any of theirs. (And to be fair, I think John would second that!) The second article was this front-pager that suggests the president was thinking the same thing I was thinking when I wrote this newly-published policy paper. Always nice when policy-makers already agree with something you have written!
Charlie's a hottie.
Charlie's a hottie.
2. Build a functioning
2. Build a functioning relationship with Hamid Karzai and demonstrate to the Afghan president that he has an enduring partner in the United States and its allies.
Are you kidding? Ex, he's in our pocket. Smoke and mirrors....nothing more. Google - "Hamid Karzai security" and images and see what you find. Tell Karzai we will remove the last word and see if he doesn't cooperate with the U.S. after a week.
Additionally, Karzai is a LPR - Legal Permanent Resident. He attended college in the United States and has lots of family here. Another way we could persuade Mr. Karzai to cooperate with U.S. military operations / our foreign policy in Afghanistan is, by him not cooperating, Karzai could essentially be committing an act of treason or subversion. Being a person with U.S. LPR status, their status can be lost by acts of treason or subversion. In fact, it is also important to remember that laws broken outside of the U.S. by Karzai, could be used to prosecute him in a U.S. Court.
If Karzai was smart, he would renounce his LPR status- but of course, some of us know this will likely never happen... Because, who's your daddy Karzai....? This is like a really bad Opera, only it's being played out to the music of IED's, M4's and AK-47's.
2. Build a functioning
2. Build a functioning relationship with Hamid Karzai and demonstrate to the Afghan president that he has an enduring partner in the United States and its allies.
Are you kidding? Ex, he's in our pocket. Smoke and mirrors....nothing more. Google - "Hamid Karzai security" and images and see what you find. Tell Karzai we will remove the last word and see if he doesn't cooperate with the U.S. after a week.
Additionally, Karzai is a LPR - Legal Permanent Resident. He attended college in the United States and has lots of family here. Another way we could persuade Mr. Karzai to cooperate with U.S. military operations / our foreign policy in Afghanistan is, by him not cooperating, Karzai could essentially be committing an act of treason or subversion. Being a person with U.S. LPR status, their status can be lost by acts of treason or subversion. In fact, it is also important to remember that laws broken outside of the U.S. by Karzai, could be used to prosecute him in a U.S. Court.
If Karzai was smart, he would renounce his LPR status- but of course, some of us know this will likely never happen... Because, who's your daddy Karzai....? This is like a really bad Opera, only it's being played out to the music of IED's, M4's and AK-47's.
2. Build a functioning
2. Build a functioning relationship with Hamid Karzai and demonstrate to the Afghan president that he has an enduring partner in the United States and its allies.
Are you kidding? Ex, he's in our pocket. Smoke and mirrors....nothing more. Google - "Hamid Karzai security" and images and see what you find. Tell Karzai we will remove the last word and see if he doesn't cooperate with the U.S. after a week.
Additionally, Karzai is a LPR - Legal Permanent Resident. He attended college in the United States and has lots of family here. Another way we could persuade Mr. Karzai to cooperate with U.S. military operations / our foreign policy in Afghanistan is, by him not cooperating, Karzai could essentially be committing an act of treason or subversion. Being a person with U.S. LPR status, their status can be lost by acts of treason or subversion. In fact, it is also important to remember that laws broken outside of the U.S. by Karzai, could be used to prosecute him in a U.S. Court.
If Karzai was smart, he would renounce his LPR status- but of course, some of us know this will likely never happen... Because, who's your daddy Karzai....? This is like a really bad Opera, only it's being played out to the music of IED's, M4's and AK-47's.
Hey take it easy, I'm slow
Hey take it easy, I'm slow in the morning Visitor....let me wake up before you demand instant sex!
None of the contributors are
None of the contributors are experts on Afghanistan. Attributing "expertise" to people who can't speak the languages and have been in country a few months is extreme hubris and one of the reasons the US keeps getting stuck in other peoples civil wars. The "experts" in Pop Centric COIN are doing serious damage to the US by selling a theory that's costing an additional $ 30-50 billion in borrowed cash per year with no attainable strategic goals worth even one tenth of the cost.
BTW the "build" phase hasn't got off to a good start in Marjah with most if not all USAID efforts on hold due to insecurity. The troops in Nawa and Garmsir aren't part of the surge. Most surge troops will go to big box FOBS ( i.e. 1 MEF HQ and 101 Ab Div HQ) and harm US efforts by increasing log requirements and slowing down decision making by inserting another level of colonels in the chain of command.
Dude upgrade your
Dude upgrade your server.
I'm surprised you missed this one in WaPo..
"Pentagon asking Congress to hold back on generous increases in troop pay"
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/07/AR201005...
Seems we're spending too much money on Joe and Jill.
The people make the difference, they make the equipment work.
If the puzzle palace wants to save some money here's some suggestions: cut down on personnel overhead by retiring or otherwise separating 60% of the Army Officer Corps, which as we know is about triple of what it should be at (it's 15-19%, it should be between 5-7%). Senior NCO Corps needs a good scrubbing as well.
Shutter the Pentagon, or cut it's staff at least by about 60%. That's a WW2 and Cold War dinosaur. The real Command work is done by the regional Commands.
Get rid of JCS. The Regional Commanders have the ball now. It's a vestigial appendage that is good only for mischief, rather like the appendix or tonsils.
Merge FORSCOM, TRADOC, and the Various "Army's" into one Training, Readiness and Deployment Support Command. If I missed any duplication of effort or conflicting organizations (yes they do conflict) please add more to the merger/consolidation.
Cease up or out. It's been a disaster from Day One, and it costs more in pay, benefits, and unnecessary work generated by people without justified jobs. And no promotion without blood (combat time). For all Branches and MOS's. Even if you're just practice for the mortars.
Drastic Officer and Senior NCO personnel cuts are the key and step one. Without that the rest won't happen, with it at the beginning the rest falls into line neatly.
Reference Erin's
Reference Erin's comments---not so sure she got her facts straight with the only COIN pop centric operation that Gen Mc has staged---current percentage ratios are indicating that the Taliban are still at 75% which while down from 100% they still control the night and the locals are still afraid to speak to US troops and the "government in a box" has still not gotten "out of the box".
If you ask me the operation is not the roaring success everyone in the mainstream media claims it has been when your opponent is still fully functioning with his shadow government.
Here are some signs things
Here are some signs things aren't going well this year:
Innocent Afghans killed by ISAF up 100% over last year
ISAF fatal casualties are up over 100%
Taliban fatal casualties- hard to tell but if we're using less air power and artillery the safe guess is that they are down
Afghan anti-NATO protests up
Development outfits with HQs outside the wire in Kandahar- all but one gone
NATO going home- the majority of the public in all NATO countries, except the US, against the mission and disfavor is increasing
The Canadians and Dutch will leave within one year. The Danes will probably leave soon after.
ANP training has been cut from eight to six weeks.
Afghanistan is now the worlds biggest dope producer as well as opium.
The parliamentary elections may not be held in inseccure areas.
My mistake. ABC News just
My mistake. ABC News just published a poll indicating 52% of Americans are against the Afghan campaign.
Why do you think one person
Why do you think one person on the ground whose purview might be limited would have a better perspective than someone in the US able to look at the big picture? That might be true, but it doesn't necessarily seem like it is true.
I have a feeling that Andrew
I have a feeling that Andrew Exum's confidence in Ms. Simpson's judgement may be misplaced.
If the Taliban can only succeed by "outgoverning" the Afghan government, our chances for success on the Obama administration's own terms rest largely on that government -- which has had the same leadership for the last eight years. Exum's counsel to establish more publicly respectful relations with that leader may or may not make good tactical sense, but begs the question of how likely it is making Hamid Karzai as comfortable with Obama's team as he was with George Bush's will improve anything fundamental about our position in Afghanistan. If the Afghan government is ineffectual and shot through with corruption after eight years of Karzai's leadership, making him less unhappy and nervous about us than he's been recently accomplishes....what, exactly?
Ms. Simpson glosses over this whole question, giving us instead Gen. McChrystal's party line about one province (Helmand) to which he committed a major part of his force shortly after taking command. The correctness of that decision, the adequacy of the force deployed to accomplish its objective, and (of course) the ability of the Afghans to supply the "government in a box" of which McChrystal boasted as the Helmand operation began, are all just assumed. Simpson's report conveys little information not already available, and offers little reason for confidence that the administration has not simply found a new way to spin its wheels in Afghanistan.
"As much as I respect John
"As much as I respect John Nagl, Gilles Dorronsoro and Andrew Bacevich, I care a lot more about [Erin Simpon's] informed assessment of the war at the moment than any of theirs. (And to be fair, I think John would second that!)"
So, we have a Persian-fluent scholar who's been studying Afghanistan for decades, and a young Harvard PhD who writes about counterinsurgency, and Exum chooses the COIN lady over the established local scholar for who has a better handle on the war. Got it.
Anyone notice Erin basically says we're winning while Gilles basically says we're losing?
Zathras posted thoughts similar to mine at 2:48, so I'll second what he said and rate this post as a big, "whaaaa?"
Foust: Your caricature
Foust:
Your caricature improperly sums things up. Erin works on an advisory group for ISAF in Afghanistan, and she's been in Southern Afghanistan (the site of the surge) for months now. Having a close up view of a war tends to give one a better understanding of it than observing it from continents away. Furthermore, she doesn't basically say "we're winning." In fact, to quote her, her assessment is "It's far too early to tell whether the so-called surge has "worked." "
Visitor 10:45 am:
101 HQ isn't part of the surge, they're replacing 82 HQ. 2 BCT/101 (a Combat Brigade) Is part of the surge and will be the main effort in Kandahar. "Most" troops of the surge will not be bureacracies but ground troops.
Visitor 10:26 am:
Go to Afghanistan, or any other warzone, and participate; you'll find you gain an understanding of it you never could have from studying the news reports on it.
Visitor 2:23 pm:
Upon the surge in Iraq, casualties on all sides spiked, but dropped thereafter. The current strategy involves moving into "red" (or "insurgent-controlled") zones to provide security to the area. Of course casualties are going to spike because we're moving into enemy-controlled territory. Also quoting Kandahar's development HQs outside the wire is a fallacy as the surge hasn't moved into Kandahar yet, and in fact it makes perfect sense that developments would close up shop (temporarily) as we've announced our intention to move in during the summer. Using that as evidence that the surge is failing is like saying "the war in Iraq isn't going well" in February, 2003.
I'll keep this short as I've
I'll keep this short as I've a new manger less sympathetic to COIN/Uni study or just having a life while at work.
Elf - No promotion without blood - Yes and more yes, ( and I admit I don;'t serve in any fashion myself) but for those who do some time has to be spent in the mud.
Mike: Most of the surge
Mike: Most of the surge troops will certainly not be on the ground any more than most of the existing forces are. The support and command elements of the US Army outnumber the combat elements. If 1/3 of the surge troops actually spend significant time off FOBs I'd be surprised.
How does closing a organizations HQ that is located off a FOB have anything to do with the escalation due this summer? They closed because one was blown up and NATO, despite having 20,000 people sitting on KAF 12 km away can't secure the city it regularly says is the key to the campaign. How will this change when they dump 7,000 101 AB guys on KAF and sprinkle whatever else comes in through the outlying districts?
"Erin has been in southern Afghanistan for months"- not even a year yet she's become an expert. Super.
Completely off topic, but i
Completely off topic, but i thought you might be interested in this piece on terrorist attacks by Hindu fundamentalists in India in recent years. Its not an often-covered topic...
http://satp.org/satporgtp/sair/index.htm#assessment2
"How does closing a
"How does closing a organizations HQ that is located off a FOB have anything to do with the escalation due this summer? They closed because one was blown up and NATO, despite having 20,000 people sitting on KAF 12 km away can't secure the city it regularly says is the key to the campaign. How will this change when they dump 7,000 101 AB guys on KAF and sprinkle whatever else comes in through the outlying districts?"
What's going to change? The 7,000 troops from the surge are going to Kandahar proper, not Kandahar Airfield. That's the point. Each battalion has its AO assigned already and when they hit the ground, they're going to move in and set up patrol bases in order to secure Kandahar and the surrounding villages.
Why are you faulting the surge for the problem it's intended to rectify?
' "Erin has been in southern
' "Erin has been in southern Afghanistan for months"- not even a year yet she's become an expert. Super.'
non quis sed quid
Hey all - maybe back off on
Hey all - maybe back off on the personal stuff about Erin. She's trying to serve her country as a civilian working in Afghanistan. Maybe she's right, maybe she's wrong, but perhaps less snark from these parts would be nice. . .
This also raises a very
This also raises a very interesting empirical puzzle. Why not track all Washington Post and New York Times op-eds since 9/11 that make predictions about the course of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Place people into 1 of 3 categories: 1. Never been there 2. Used to be there but now back home 3. There now. Systematically assess how those people did at predicting what would happen next.
Seems like this would give a good read on the question of whether people on the ground or people at "home" more accurately assess how things are going.
Thoughts?
My comments have nothing to
My comments have nothing to do with Erin. My point is that supporters of escalating the campaign trot out people they maintain are "experts" on Afghanistan when they are not. If you would accept that a Russian who couldn't speak or read English and had spent four months in the US primarily sequestered in a Russian speaking community was an "expert" on the US fine, but don't be surprised when the advice you get turns out to be based on misconceptions.
For what it's worth my experience is that the less first hand knowledge of Afghanistan someone has the more likely they are to be optimistic about the outcome of the campaign and confident in the abilities of the US military and its civilian assistants. See Fox News for good examples.
Scott Wedman: Sounds
Scott Wedman:
Sounds Tetlock-ish to me.
ADTS
"For what it's worth my
"For what it's worth my experience is that the less first hand knowledge of Afghanistan someone has the more likely they are to be optimistic about the outcome of the campaign and confident in the abilities of the US military and its civilian assistants. See Fox News for good examples."
I can find just as many (if not more) people with Zero firsthand knowledge of Afghanistan with a very pessimistic view of the campaign. See MSNBC for good examples.
Your comments have everything to do with Erin, you singled her out as inexperienced and unqualified to give a rundown of current operations (even though in her position as a counterinsurgency advisor to ISAF in southern Afghanistan she is in a very good position to give an account of what current operations entail; she explained the current situation on the ground and explained what needs to happen next and ded not claim a "win" or a "loss" as Gilles did from his position in America). Furthermore, nobody (save you) has claimed that she is an expert on Afghanistan. She is an expert on counterinsurgency, something one *might* consider relevant when discussing a counterinsurgency. But then, perhaps we should never consult experts on anything save for the country-in-question's culture, as you seem to believe that is the be-all end-all to discussing war.
She explained what needs to
She explained what needs to happen next in Afghanistan- but she's not an expert on Afghanistan- but she is an "expert" in counter insurgency- a field that no doubt is interesting but is the realm of guesses and hope.
You wouldn't accept any of this level of "expertise" in a plumber or mechanic and certainly not in a doctor but you seem happy to use it to decide how to spend hundreds of billions and put thousands of people at risk.
Anyone who plops down in Afghanistan and after a short stay announces they have the answers is deluding themselves and the American public. This goes for Phds, journalists and generals. You can read all you want about the place but it doesn't replace long term practical experience and the ability to communicate with the locals. Submitting a well written thesis in an Ivy league school is nice but it increasingly is taken for expertise- which it is not- anymore than writing a doctorate on the Battle of France would have give you more expertise in armored warfare than someone who had served for decades in tank units. It is theoretical knowledge versus practical ability and too much of the debate is framed by the former.
Yeah probably is a bit
Yeah probably is a bit Tetlock'ish, but the guy is very successful and influential in parts of political science. And what I'm thinking about is more systematic. Moreover, while such a research design would certainly miss a lot of stuff, it seems like it would help bring more evidence to bear on the question than we currently have.
To expand on your analogy,
To expand on your analogy, if you had a plumbing problem in Afghanistan, would you consult academic who had written books on the Taliban to solve it? If you had a car break down in Afghanistan, would you look to a Persian linguist to fix it?
Experts on Afghanistan have alot to contribute to a conversation on a country's problems, but they shouldn't be given a monopoloy on the discussion. They aren't the only ones with experience relevant to the conversation. Ahmed Chalabi was an Expert on Iraq and Iraqi culture, should his opinion be taken as Gospel and Petraeus' thrown out because Petraeus didn't spend his life studying Iraq?
There is room enough in a discussion of a certain kind of problem to seek opinions from experts on the country in which the problem is occurring and from experts on the kind of problem that is occurring in the country. To discount someone's view entirely because they haven't spent twenty years in a country is foolish. One can learn alot in just a few short months when they're spent on the ground.
They aren't experts. The US
They aren't experts. The US government is getting advice from people billed as 'experts" who are not. A few months on the ground is barely tourism. The term "expert" is used to give weight to opinion that supports your position.
I'm not discounting anyone's position just the billing it's given. I would be much happier if people introduced as "experts" who fess up that the amount of knowledge they have about Afghanistan is very limited and that their advice on most things is a hunch. COIN isn't a science and too many people claim expertise they don't have. The result is an increasingly expensive folly whose supporters have used academics and journalists as salesmen.
Call-sign Charlie... Kinda
Call-sign Charlie... Kinda ironic? She's never seen or heard of a 4G negative dive.... But she's an expert?
Makes me wonder if Charlie's ever worked with JIOC or DCGS?
Probably not. My question is, if Erin is expert on COIN from A to Z, is she also an expert on the technical aspects of what needs to happen over the next six months in Afghanistan, with the tool and troops who operate those items in COIN? Is Erin an expert on reconnaissance, surveillance and exploitation? Has Erin ever used a BAT system before? Does she know how tagging, tracking and locating initiatives take place in COIN Operations? Does she know how to provide technical guidance and advisory assistance to troops in the field on COIN operations? My guess is "no". Perhaps she saw a little playing with the Marines in Quantico, VA, but most likely she's never worked with the tools and people in the field until now.
How's that make her an expert?
Talk to me, Elf.
You never close your eyes
You never close your eyes anymore when I kiss your lips.
And there's no tenderness like before in your fingertips.
You're trying hard not to show it, (baby).
But baby, baby I know it...
You've lost that lovin' feeling,
Whoa, that lovin' feeling,
You've lost that lovin' feeling,
Now it's gone...gone...gone...wooooooh.
Now there's no welcome look in your eyes
when I reach for you.
And now your're starting to critisize little things I do.
It makes me just feel like crying, (baby).
'Cause baby, something in you is dying.
You lost that lovin' feeling,
Whoa, that lovin' feeling,
You've lost that lovin' feeling,
Now it's gone...gone...gone...woooooah
Baby, baby, I get down on my knees for you.
Not to go all Mao on
Not to go all Mao on everyone, but shouldn't we be "Letting a hundred flowers blossom." There are lots of different types of expertise that someone might rely upon when making a prediction about the trajectory of the war in Afghanistan: local knowledge, academic expertise on the region, grand strategic expertise, military on-the-ground experience, etc.
All of these perspectives probably bring something good to the table, which is why it is good to hear from all of them.
Call-sign Charlie... Kinda
Call-sign Charlie... Kinda ironic? She's never seen or heard of a successful 4G negative dive.... But she's an expert? Makes me wonder if Charlie's ever worked with JIOC or DCGS?
Probably not. My question is, if Erin is expert on COIN from A to Z, is she also an expert on the technical aspects of what needs to happen over the next six months in Afghanistan, with the tools and troops who operate those items in COIN? Is Erin an expert on reconnaissance, surveillance and exploitation? Has Erin ever used a BAT system before? Does she know how tagging, tracking and locating initiatives take place in COIN Operations? Does she know how to provide technical guidance and advisory assistance to troops in the field on COIN operations? My guess is "no". Perhaps she saw a little playing with the Marines in Quantico, VA, but most likely she's never worked with the tools and people in the field until now.
How's that make her an expert?
Talk to me, Elf.
Jeepers...... you folks are
Jeepers...... you folks are reading into it....
AM said....
I care a lot more about her informed assessment of the war at the moment than any of theirs
AM did not tell us why........."he cares".
I don't see that as grounds for expert status....lets be smarter. Don't know Erin and was not blogging during her time. I did follow her Afghan blog for a while, but that was more of a "hi, mom/dad" thing and I stopped following it. To be fair, there was hardly any space in the WP OpEd for any one to give anything meaningful. It was also just an Op Ed.....one person's OPINION. Ain't suppose to be a research paper.
AM.....Why do you care?
PS....Elf @may9, 12:06....think Gates heard you.....looks like the military mucky-d-mucks are going to have to use their retirements. Think I see a lot of defense cuts in the future.
Erin......good for you. You applied yourself and are gaining knowledge in something that your interested in. Got yourself in the WP. Keep learning and gaining knowledge. Sounds like you found something your interested in.
"I would be much happier if
"I would be much happier if people introduced as "experts" who fess up that the amount of knowledge they have about Afghanistan is very limited and that their advice on most things is a hunch. COIN isn't a science and too many people claim expertise they don't have"
I guess I have to reiterate: Nobody has claimed that Erin is an expert on Afghanistan, not AM, not the Washington Post, not me, not anyone on this blog outside of you.
Regarding expertise on COIN, who established you as the authority to declare who is and who isn't an expert?
Regarding COIN not being a science, Afghanistan isn't a science either. Gilles and everyone else in that article and on this forum, yourself included Visitor, is going off "a hunch." The people whose opinions were expressed in the article based their hunches on the expertise in their field, whether their field was "Afghanistan" or something else relevant to the analysis. Having a well-rounded discussion with experts in Afghanistan, Counterinsurgency, Non-Governmental Organizations, Nation-building, and all of the other myriad fields of study that can be drawn on to develop and/or analyze an effective counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan is a good thing. Limiting the discussion of the war only to those who have studied Afghanistan academically is being close-minded and unwise.
Wolfman:
What are you going on about? Who claimed she was an expert on COIN "from A to Z"? Technical expertise on a biometric system is not at all a requirement to understanding COIN grand strategy.
What a red herring.
Mike: At least you've
Mike: At least you've started to admit that the Cointras 'experts' are guessing. I'm surprised you state that Erin isn't a COIN expert but is limited to "COIN Grand Strategy", whatever that is.
Technology (the hardware and
Technology (the hardware and software) drives COIN today and if you don't understand that Visitor on May 11, 2010 - 5:12pm, you're about as smart as the horse you rode in on.
I did not say Erin is not a
I did not say Erin is not a COIN expert. She is one. I said that she isn't necessarily an expert on Afghanistan, but this doesn't mean her view should be discounted because she was writing from the position of a counterinsurgency advisor.
This does not mean she knows every answer to any question on counterinsurgency, no human in any field of study knows all the answers, save perhaps for the unnamed Visitor.
As for the experts guessing, almost any human experience is hard to predict, there are always variables. As human interactions go, an insurgency is one of the most complex with all sorts of competing factors and countless variables. No one can predict the future, but sound counterinsurgency, properly applied to the local environment (that is, looking at the specific situation the counterinsurgent is operating in and applying the proper tenets of counterinsurgency to it) has worked in the past and can work in the present and future.
With all this talk about
With all this talk about Erin, can somebody tell us if she's hot or not? Post some pics and we'll rate.
Actually the population
Actually the population centric version of counter-insurgency conducted by a foreign occupier has never worked. It is a theory that has never been successfully executed. It is largely an attempt by French and US officers to explain how they could have won in Algeria, Indo China or Viet nam if they had just been allowed to do what they wanted to do- as if the Algerians and Vietnamese didn't have a say and they could ignore domestic politics.
This is why the efforts to cloak it in success by trotting out "experts" and the use of the term "classic" are deliberately misleading. It's primarily an attempt to prove big army has a use.
Of course admitting this and focusing on the cost of pacifying Afghanistan would lead to scaling back the campaign and with it the need for academic "experts" and think tanks selling the war. Mike even talks about future counter-insurgency- you'd think we'd have learned our lesson in Iraq and Afghanistan but apparently not.
The
The Phillipines
Nicaragua
Malaya
Iraq
Algeria and Vietnam were examples of how Not to fight an insurgency. As were China, Israel, Crete, and other examples were PC-COIN was not properly applied.
"My point is that supporters
"My point is that supporters of escalating the campaign trot out people they maintain are "experts" on Afghanistan when they are not."
And many of them, mind you, are the same ones always boosting area expertise and credentials whenever it doesn't get in the way of them laying down their own wisdom.
There are "experts" and
There are "experts" and "think tanks" making beaucoup money from this COIN product, providing "solutions" to the gov't. You gotta get your hustle on, don't hate.
Don't hate the playas, hate
Don't hate the playas, hate the game.
Andrew, To be fair, I'm
Andrew,
To be fair, I'm posting this on your blog as well.
Can someone please explain to me how Andrew Exum, constantly self-referenced and publicized as an advisor to LTG McChrystal, in his own words in 'Back from Afghanistan' dated 22 Jul 2009,
"About five weeks ago, I was asked by General McChrystal to be part of a small team of scholars and practitioners helping to conduct his 60-day review of strategy and operations in Afghanistan. So I have spent the past month traveling around Afghanistan conducting interviews and trying to evaluate ISAF's operations."
http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2009/07/back-afghanistan.html
is now making a published academic article describing how his own surge will not work?
I have nothing against Andrew personally, he is a decorated combat veteran, a published author, and runs his own blog, but I'm wondering where the accountability and responsibility are?
Is no one responsible?
I simply don't understand.
I've lost a couple of brothers between Exum's post and his latest publication.
In the simplest terms that I know,
WTF, over?
Major Michael Few
This Erin gal better be
This Erin gal better be worth the squeeze.
10 years and no solutions to
10 years and no solutions to the Taliban in Afghanistan and Insugents in Iraq. The term "COIN vending" could very well one day be associated with the term "snake oil peddling" and be used as a derogatory term to describe such practices.
When someone shows a new COIN theory / solution, your first question should be, “What has the designer broken?” Anyone can design a solution to a problem. So when someone announces, “Here’s my COIN solution,” your first reaction should be, “Who are you?” If they are someone who has solved dozens of COIN problems, their solution is worth looking at. If they have never broken anything, the chance is zero that it will be any good.
The skills that engender competence in a particular domain are often the very same skills necessary to evaluate competence in that domain—one’s own or anyone else’s. Because of this, incompetent individuals lack what cognitive psychologists variously term metacognition, metacomprehension, or self-monitoring skills. These terms refer to the ability to know how well one is performing, when one is likely to be accurate in judgment, and when one is likely to be in error.
Several lines of research are consistent with the notion that incompetent individuals lack the metacognitive skills necessary for accurate self-assessment. Work on the nature of expertise, for instance, has revealed that novices possess poorer metacognitive skills than do experts. In physics, novices are less accurate than experts in judging the difficulty of physics problems. In chess, novices are less calibrated than experts about how many times they need to see a given chessboard position before they are able to reproduce it correctly. In COIN, novices are less likely than experts to successfully gauge whether specific operations were successful.
We propose that those with limited knowledge in a domain suffer a dual burden: Not only do they reach mistaken conclusions and make regrettable errors, but their incompetence robs them of the ability to realize it.
Good summary of the
Good summary of the objections by re kwon do and done without personalizing it.
Let's remember she didn't toot her horn, someone else did, lay off her.
I know nothing about Astan except what I read, I haven't been there and haven't done the diligence, so I am more than willing to defer to a point to those who have, which doesn't stop me from respectfully questioning. Occasional snark aside (I can't help meeself I'm Irish. Have charity).
We have indeed in the last half of the 20th century to now relied more on theorists, academics than practitioners. I might guess that this happened in part because so much of the Big War we were planning for and attempting to avert was general nuclear war with the USSR, there was no historical experience beyond ending WW2 faster with two atomic bombs and who in their right mind would want to develop real expertise in nuclear combat. The theorists then bled into other aspects of war in Vietnam and since.
We should be relying much more on practitioners with local subject matter expertise to set policy, and God knows there are enough articulate ones about. This is *not* a knock on academic's, country or culture subject matter experts. It's saying that the system is far too weighted in favor of the academic and think tank side and has been since before we were born. Policy makers should take note and introduce more balance, get the Gant's and other successful practitioners of war, COIN, etc into the room with policy makers and have frank exchanges of views. BTW I believe this is happening and is quite healthy for the enterprise.
Rock on Charlie.
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I shall now give vent to my normally smart ass persona.
Charlie (warning: blatant sexism follows) - if you want to get these knuckle dragging gun toting types questioning your bona fides utterly disarmed, it's simple. Their psychology is simple. Pose in sabra type propaganda fotos in a tailored uniform with guns, guns, guns. The larger and longer the gun and the more you are in full battle rattle (uh..."realism") the better. A 240 is much hotter than an M4, if you can have a short youtube of you conducting PCI checks on a vehicle mounted M2 .50 cal to include - this is key - setting the headspace and timing within standard and double rocking back the charging handle followed by a test fire, they'll forget all about anything else, and be your groupie man slaves. This is just a new version of all of human history as regards handling men. See Elizabeth the Great, The Empress Elizabeth in Russia, Catherine the Great, Boadicea, etc, et al.
I hope the last brings this question down from the lofty clouds of debate back down to earth. Where this blog does some of it's best work ;-)
EOM Snark Elf
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Glad if Gates is finally putting the admirals on half pay pensions...whatever...just thin the damn ranks at the top and middle. We've known for decades it was a mistake. I doubt if it's me he heard, he can just walk the halls at work for a couple of days.
The Philippines- Pop
The Philippines- Pop Centric- that's news
Nicaragua- which time? The 20's?
Malaya- No. Throwing your enemies civilian population into concentration camps and having body count contests isn't what Petreaus et al are selling
Iraq- a loss- remember the aim- to remake the Middle East- a step on the way to Tehran. If you're happy with 200 civilians killed per month you may call it a win. Iraq is a loss. The US military was forced to bribe gangs of thugs to stop them from killing US troops. The "insurgents" are in charge of most of the country.
So there are no cases of the 3-24 doctrine being used successfuly to quell an external insurgency. Just hope.
"The Philippines- Pop
"The Philippines- Pop Centric- that's news"
Not to the Marines.
"Nicaragua- which time? The 20's?"
Yes. more specifically, '26-'34
"Malaya- No. Throwing your enemies civilian population into concentration camps and having body count contests isn't what Petreaus et al are selling"
Go back and do a little more research. Their aim was to gain the support of the population (what we today refer to as "Populatin-Centric COIN") which they did. Thus, the end of the Communist insurgency, or to put it succintly- Victory. PC-COIN isn't "Politically Correct," it's "Population-Centric." The forced internment gained Malayan Chinese support, thus the Home Guard, hundreds of thousands of recruited Malayan Chinese From The Concentration Camps.
"Iraq- a loss- remember the aim- to remake the Middle East- a step on the way to Tehran. If you're happy with 200 civilians killed per month you may call it a win. Iraq is a loss."
Yes, Iraq 2003-2007 was a loss. Yes, Bush completely failed in his orginal aim, but not in the one he gave Petraeus. PC-COIN has been working there, to say otherwise is to ignore reality (see AM's article "Admit It- The Surge Worked."
"The "insurgents" are in charge of most of the country"
Bullshit. When was the last time you actually visited Iraq? Be honest.
Hi - I am really glad to
Hi - I am really glad to discover this. Good job!
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