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The State of COIN 2010
I am in Vermont, in Basin Harbor, at a conference sponsored by Eliot Cohen and the Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins University. (It is so ridiculously gorgeous here that I am putting everything I see to “the 20-inch test” – that is, I am imagining how all this greenery must look with 20 inches of snow covering everything.) The conference, a follow-up to one held several years ago, is on counterinsurgency warfare, and tomorrow I’ll share a panel with Con Crane and Brian Linn on the state of the art.
It seems as good a time as any, then, to write a “State of COIN” post, which I have been meaning to do for quite some time. When this blog started, in February of 2007, counterinsurgency was very much in the ascendant, but the U.S. community studying it was still improbably small given the nature of the wars the U.S. military was fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. So very much has changed in the years since. For one, this blog is now less about counterinsurgency and more about national security and the Middle East (and Central and South Asia) more broadly. For another, counterinsurgency and its defenders are no longer the plucky underdogs in the national security community.
A few weeks ago, I was at USIP listening to the secretary of state speak with Hamid Karzai, and Sec. Clinton, at one point and in response to a journalist’s question, went on at length about the theory and practice of counterinsurgency operations. It struck me then – but not for the first time – that the things theorists and proponents of counterinsurgency had wanted in 2005 have largely come to pass: counterinsurgency is accepted as an appropriate operational choice for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, policy-makers and platoon leaders are conversant in its principles, and the academic community from anthropology to economics is taking it seriously as a field worthy of inquiry.
As such, if I had just one message for the counterinsurgency community today, it would be the following: stop being so defensive. Up until about a year ago, I myself could still be really prickly with some of those would criticize counterinsurgency as an operational choice, taking it upon myself to crankily respond to every Tom, Dick and Henrietta who said something either ignorantly critical or incorrect about counterinsurgency. Today I am less likely to get into a flame war on the blogosphere or to write a 600-word critique of some newspaper article. Other than the fact that I don’t like the nastier side of me when I just go off on someone (save California politicians who claim global warming isn’t a national security issue), this development can be explained by two reasons:
1. The critics of counterinsurgency have gotten better. Sure, there are still some yahoos out there whose criticisms can be safely dismissed. But I have always said that I thought people like Gian Gentile made counterinsurgency theory better, and this is also true for other critics – not all of whom want to throw the baby out with the bath water and just want to make counterinsurgency more effective. (And I genuinely think people like Gian are in the latter camp.) Some, for example, like Eli Berman and Andrew Wilder, have poured all kinds of cold water on our earlier assumption that the provision of social services inevitably benefits the counterinsurgent force, leading folks like me to conclude that insurgents actually benefit from providing services to the population in a way that counterinsurgent forces – especially those fighting as a third party – do not. Others, like Michael Cohen, quite reasonably fret that casual observers will look at the drop in violence that took place in Iraq in 2007 and decide that rather than insurgencies being sui generis phenomena, the U.S. military can replicate those effects elsewhere with the same step-by-step, send-more-troops template. (The reality, of course, is that the successful troop surge of 2007 benefited from several other factors – the “Awakening”, the brutal effects of a horrific civil war in 2005 and 2006, Moqtada al-Sadr’s decision to keep his troops on the sidelines – and that it is quite impossible to definitively parcel out causal responsibility for the dramatic drop in violence. We may never know why exactly “the Surge” was so successful, but we can safely say that anyone pointing toward just one variable is off the mark.) If we were still fighting for acceptance, it might be tempting to spend more pixels and ink fighting back against all the criticism. But our time is better spent carefully reading the criticism and separating out the wheat from the chaff. Some of our critics, after all, have some damn good points.
2. For counterinsurgency to remain relevant as an art, its practitioners and theorists must be its harshest critics. In effect, we need to join the Gian Gentiles of the world. (Or at least the Eli Bermans.) I have no doubt, for example, that a lot of what is in the literature on counterinsurgency is simply wrong. What assumptions, when tested by Iraq and Afghanistan, have proven in need of amendment? How do we need to examine wars against insurgents differently? Have we gone too “soft” in Afghanistan? Have we spent too much time fretting over tactics and operations and not enough time thinking hard about the politics? (My answers would be “no” and “yes”, respectively, to those last two questions.) What are we missing? And what are we too timid to challenge for fear of giving the more unreasonable critics (the baby + bathwater folks) ammunition? These are just some of the questions this blog and the rest of the community needs to think about.
Counterinsurgency theorists and practitioners, though, should enjoy their moment in the sun. (Although that sentence will ring hollow for those who are in eastern Afghanistan at the moment rather than Vermont. The people actually fighting the counterinsurgent’s fight downrange, let us remember, continue to deserve our immense respect.) For though irregular warfare will endure, the third great age of counterinsurgency will likely draw to an end after U.S. and allied involvement in the Afghan civil war winds down. We must work hard in the meantime, then, to ensure that we have learned all that we can expect to have learned from Iraq and Afghanistan and to get all of these lessons down on the internet and in our journals in order to be better prepared for the day – hopefully many decades from now – when we will need them again.
AM, is there some way to
AM, is there some way to view full, not cut-off comments from old posts from before the switchover from blogspot?
This is a fascinating post
This is a fascinating post for me to read as I am in the process of researching and setting up my own blog on Afghanistan, which will focus on the history of the country, and posit ways in which the international community might improve the situation there. (Personally, I think that corruption and the narcotics trade are the two key culprits.)
However, in preparation for a Masters investigating the latter two points, I am looking more and more into counterinsurgency theory and the ways in which it is being applied in Afghanistan. I would tend to agree with your assessment that we have gone in too 'soft' in Afghanistan. I think that more could be done, proactively, to improve the situation there. Having read some accounts from the front line recently, not least Joe Klein's excellent piece in Time magazine about the attempts of one Captain to build, open and sustain a school in one of the most volatile areas of Afghanistan, I am beginning to think that more could be done, in terms of both 'kinetic' and 'non-kinetic' operations.
Further, I am intrigued by your labeling the conflict in Afghanistan as a 'civil war'. I think that contextualizing it in this way, something that I think I have been on the verge of doing, but have resisted due to a dearth of true knowledge on my part, is a valuable way to consider the role of the international community in that country. Should we perhaps be taking more of a 'peacekeeping' role? I think that perhaps this might be dangerous, as it could encourage a situation similar to that which faced the British in the early days of the Iraq occupation, whereby they thought that everything was going well because of the relatively low levels of violence. However, this was just because, through lack of proactive counterinsurgency protocols, the British were inadvertently allowing the insurgency there to fester. Considering the Afghan conflict as a civil war is an interesting idea, and something that I would be interested to pursue.
With regard to using the effective counterinsurgency in Iraq as a model for Afghanistan, I think that this could be problematic. Firstly, is the problem, which is unique to Afghanistan, of opium production. The trade in opium and heroin is highly lucrative, and is a key source of funding for the Taliban. This complicates the situation, because, while farmers generally would like not to be growing opium (it is haram in Islam) they are kept in a sort of bondage by the Taliban, who essentially blackmail the farmers into growing the opium. Therefore, the farmers are stuck in a loop, where they have to grow opium, to pay off debts secured against their future opium production. Further, if the Taliban are able to trace the money back to the US or NATO, which is a tactic that was tried at various stages, the farmers would be subject to 'punishment' from the Taliban. Further, Afghanistan is, as I'm sure we're all aware, very much a rural country, the vast majority of its people live in disparate villages, separated by their country's harsh terrain. On the other hand, Iraq, when the Coalition troops arrived to topple Saddam, was a reasonably developed country. This meant that the population was much more centralized, allowing for far easier propagation of the counterinsurgent message.
With the opposite being true in Afghanistan, I think that it is more important to focus on a highly flexible approach to counterinsurgency there. This approach should have an overall goal (something other than the arbitrary dates for the withdrawal of troops) the machinery for the completion of which is then divulged much more to the lower ranks. From what you said in the middle of the post that "policy-makers and platoon leaders are conversant in [the] principles" of counterinsurgency, I am encouraged, and certainly from reading Klein's article which outlines the commitment of a man who is entirely voluntarily going beyond the call of duty, and the orders from on high, to achieve something that he believes, in his area of the country, will make a significant difference in the overall situation.
Do you guys sell CNAS
Do you guys sell CNAS shirts? or have any stickers?
"For counterinsurgency to
"For counterinsurgency to remain relevant as an art, its practitioners and theorists must be its harshest critics"
Wise words EX, I have spent the better part of the last few weeks reading a series of lessons learned papers in pursuit of some extra knowledge and some research. It seems that while LL is a standard practice for both corporate and government, especially defense,e amongst theorist of new ideas it is still a touch and go thing.
Like any new theory, those who fervently believe it it will go to, in some cases , absurd lengths to justify it, like a guy with a new girlfriend that all his friends hate, they will refuse to see the bad side of things, gloss the inadequacies and just focus on what they see as the positives.
So its good to see someone who has passionately asserted the positive side of COIN fold in to their own viewpoint , those viewpoints that are different, but as you have noted, make the entire argument for COIN stronger by making the theory more robust and usable, both in theory and practice.
Because pro or anti COIN its in practice in some of the worst palaces in the world and we owe it to those that now have that tool in their tool box to make it the best we can.
Jesus.. it's like you're
Jesus.. it's like you're claiming victory already. I don't follow that line of reasoning if on the one hand perhaps COIN had some help in Iraq due to fortuitous circumstances while COIN is not working so well in Afghanistan.
here's the problem with our COIN model. we prop up centralized, autocratic governments. they have a sheen of "democracy" because people voted but make no doubt the people in Iraq and Afghanistan are more subjects than citizens. that is not democracy. do you want to know why we have a problem with corruption in both countries? that's too easy. it's our fault. we set up a centralized government that owns almost every part of the economy. in country after country with this sort of all powerful government, the patronage system is in effect. leaders award friends and families etc, etc. here are some good examples.. Mexico where presidents retire with multibillion dollar fortunes. China where the lower caste are serfs and the rulers suck them dry. And of course, as we are seeing in America, our own ever growing Leviathan has no problems transferring bank's risk to the public but keeping the bank's profits private.
we must judge COIN by it's end results and not short term successes. we know that Vietnam is in the hands of the Communist because COIN didn't work. let's wait several years and see what happens in Afghanistan and Iraq before we say the matter is settled. Again, I'm on record as saying that Afghanistan will be the first to fail after we leave. Iraq appears to be heading the way of a Maliki dictatorship but it's a little early to call it.
Counter Insurgency is when
Counter Insurgency is when you fight an insurgency. The use of the term to describe anything that works in the short term in Afghanistan is dishonest. It smells of picking sides in a bureaucratic war inside the Pentagon.
Should you join in someones civil war it is the first question. How much you're willing to spend is the next and how you will spend the cash the third. In Afghanistan Exum and his allies ignored the first and encouraged the second to be virtually without limit to focus on the third.
So now we're stuck with using a dubious theory (western troops can replace bad local security forces to prop up a corrupt and incompetent Asian government) being soaked with borrowed cash for largely domestic political reasons with the fear of losing face hanging over planning. Sounds familiar.
The idea that the Cointras are coming to understand that they have sold a bill of goods to the US gov't is heartening and I'm sure that they will all have soft landings because they certainly won't be making up the hundreds of billions their theory will cost the west.
Good effort, Exum, but there
Good effort, Exum, but there will never be a coherent discussion about pros and cons of COIN. A large religion has taken hold among a devout faithful who adhere to the first principle that pop-COIN is the appropriate approach and all other principles follow from there. That devout core has tried to seize the mantle of COIN, asserting their version of COIN is the one and only true COIN. Having a discussion about COIN, so long as the pop-COIN cult members are lurking about, is like trying to argue Hanafi fiqh versus Shafi'i fiqh while in a room full of screaming Twelver Shia clerics. Ain't gonna happen, whether Insha'Allah or not.
"..all kinds of cold water
"..all kinds of cold water on our earlier assumption that the provision of social services inevitably benefits the counterinsurgent force, leading folks like me to conclude that insurgents actually benefit from providing services to the population in a way that counterinsurgent forces – ....do not"
Kudo's for intellectual honesty.
Exum, keep the lamp
Exum, keep the lamp lit...Your words have helped many through intellectual struggle that is boots on the ground coin. How about a best of series since 2007 to 2010?
1. Lots of big arrow
1. Lots of big arrow stuff.
2. How are we doing down in the trenches?
3. Hear a lot of complaints from in-country that the forces are led by risk averse commanders. Venturing briefly out in MRAPS and the like, body armor, mandatory vision protection, armed to teeth. Apparently appears cowardly to and irritates locals.
4. My experiences from long ago are more keyed in to the nature of troops.
5. My reading of FM 3-24 tells me it will be hellish difficult for our forces to implement broadly.
6. Older soldiers and well trained special operations people will do better than...
7. ...the average infantry LPCL or PFC to whom Haji (or whatever other derogatory term is in current use) is a danger and whose personal behaviors are anathema.
8. The commanders can order the troops not to use the language, but it's difficult to enforce.
9. I talk to the returned troops -an increasing number from AF.
10. Their viewpoint is markedly different from that of their leadership.
11. Like we were many years ago, I find most of them to be pessimistic, cynical and dubious.
12. Talk to high rankers about our shared implementation of ROE (40 years back and now) and get, "I don't like to hear that." That probably carries over to other areas of concern.
13. Suspect successful COIN will require top people, thorough training and strong leadership down to the lowest levels.
14. Am suspicious of rosy reports from report generators.
15. Also, in accord with previous comments I have made here, expect the current negotiations may have more to do with the ultimate outcome than any military policy or action.
16. It seems efforts are being made to negotiate the Taliban and other parties into the solution.
17. Discarding the Nellie talk, that means buying the SOB's off.
18. Something I have been in favor of all along, as it plays to our real strength.
V/R JWest
" We must work hard in the
" We must work hard in the meantime, then, to ensure that we have learned all that we can expect to have learned from Iraq and Afghanistan and to get all of these lessons down on the internet and in our journals in order to be better prepared for the day – hopefully many decades from now – when we will need them again."
And the Army does that kind of thing so well. Just look at how Desert Phase of Ranger School prepared young Rangers for operations in the Middle East in 2003.
Oh, wait... that was cut in 1995 to save money....
The problem with privately published work is that generally the people who need them won't know of or be able to find a copy when they need it. Case in point: privately published works on the craft of sniping capturing the knowledge gained in WWI by authors like F.M. Crum, Hesketh Pritchard, Eric Parker (writing about Hesketh Pritchard), and Nevil Armstrong and published between WWI and WWII were completely unknown to the USMC captains tasked with setting up the right and left coast USMC scout-sniping schools on the eve of WWII.
Great post. I hope advocates
Great post.
I hope advocates of counterinsurgency will keep in mind that its recent vogue is a product of two really massive policy failures, in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result of these failures, counterinsurgency is being applied in some of the least favorable conditions imaginable.
In a narrow context, this leads one to a pro-counterinsurgency attitude. Governments of countries not already riven by civil war or saddled with governments despised by the population could derive great benefit from counterinsurgency tactics developed (or redeveloped, if you wish) over the last three years in Iraq and Afghanistan. To the extent the United States can provide assistance in applying these tactics, it could work to our considerable advantage in several parts of the world, particularly Africa.
More broadly, though, consideration of the conditions in which counterinsurgency is being practiced leads to counterinsurgency skepticism. It is highly unlikely that the United States will soon plunge itself into another situation like Iraq, or even Afghanistan, in which reorientation of most of the force engaged to counterinsurgency was required. In some potential future conflicts, over sea lanes for example, counterinsurgency doesn't apply at all. If counterinsurgency's current ascendancy within the Army and Marines leads us to retain knowledge of and capacity for this type of warfare, that is all to the good. For most of the military, though, counterinsurgency is the remedy for the illness of the moment. Its relevance for the post-Iraq, post-Afghanistan future is questionable.
Andrew: On the lighter side;
Andrew:
On the lighter side; we live not far from your conference site. I have "perfect" before an after images of snow/summer.
If you need a laugh during the conference, send me (louisa.howard@dartmouth.edu) an e-mail contact. I would be happy to show you the true difference between bucolic summers and our other season.
That sounds like a bootay
That sounds like a bootay call, Ex! I didn't know CNAS has groupies. Where do I sign up?
Do you have any pics, Louisa?
gives bucolic a whole new
gives bucolic a whole new definition, doesn't it?
The COIN folks still smart
The COIN folks still smart the way airpower advocates smart when we get handed the same tired responses, shallow pablum, and shoddy logic regarding what we do. Welcome to the world of the big pie and how everybody scrambles to get their slice. COIN, just like other theories and forms of war, does not answer every need every time. It can be oversold and overbought. Finally, it needs to be resourced correctly, trained for, and led competently to be successful. Not sure all of those things are happening right now in addition to a possible lack of strategic commitment. However, this blog does provide useful thoughts and resources for exploring a lot of issues.
The largest failure where
The largest failure where COIN has feared to go is to develop and demonstrate a viable assessment methodology in order to prove that a COIN strategy is working. We can say that we are "doing COIN," but unless we have in place a viable assessment methodology that captures both the opinion of the population, the opinions of the soldiers executing the COIN mission, and some provable quantitative factors with good, independent data, then we are focused entirely on the tactical element of COIN and without focus on the strategic element of COIN - actually solving the country problem and completing the mission. Additionally, how does a command element lead, manage, command, and allocate resources for a country wide COIN effort if there is no uniform, common, and understood assessment program in place? A COIN strategy to be executed successfully must pull in both quantitative and qualitative factors against common, understood, and openly shared evaluation criteria to guide the mission to a successful conclusion.
@ Vet From Montgomery -
@ Vet From Montgomery - "COIN, just like other theories and forms of war, does not answer every need every time.'
Sage words sir, my biggest concern with the ascendancy of COIN, and I count myself a supported of the doctrine, is that it gets sold as a one stop shop for all the ills of the world. Its not, and we run the risk of overselling its utility.
Certainly since the 80s the majority of the conflicts that the US and its allies have been engaged in have been smaller wars. Gulf War 1 is the exception, but by and large it was smaller conflicts, grubby little street fights here and there.
I see that trend continuing but we must be mindful that we don't retard the ability to fight the next big one , shroud that ever eventuate. I guess its about knowledge retention, not dispersing the knowledge base the moment the conflict end and the teams come home.
How are you going to get 20"
How are you going to get 20" of snow if there's global warming?
"I see that trend continuing
"I see that trend continuing but we must be mindful that we don't retard the ability to fight the next big one , shroud that ever eventuate. I guess its about knowledge retention, not dispersing the knowledge base the moment the conflict end and the teams come home."
Deterrence against area denial strategies is going to be the order of the day in the future (in my humble opinion). If these relatively small deterrent type operations ever go big and hot, we're pretty well hosed. I've been pleased to see CNAS being involved in the AirSea Battle discussion (such as it is). As others have pointed out, large intensity lots of boots on the ground COIN (smaller scale FID is another matter) is on the way out as a commonly used strategy (for the foreseeable future) because of the lesson we have relearned (again), that it costs a lot in blood and treasure. That isn't to say that we shouldn't continue to provide training, thinking, etc. on the subject (although we probably won't...U.S. military has a GREAT track record on retaining institutional knowledge).
However, I can't help but feel like the AirSea Battle discussion is in the same place as COIN was a decade ago. The signs over the past decade have pointed to this as the problem of the future, but more important/attention grabbing issues have obscured this fact. The problem that I see here is twofold. COIN was a predominantly human based doctrine, insofar as it involved troops, on the ground, doing infantry things. A human can be spun up on a new way of thinking (relatively) quickly, once he makes the decision that he needs to do so. Yes, there were technology aspects to the COIN conflicts of the '00s, but they weren't super technical...we were able to go from 0 to 60 on the MRAPs fairly quickly (not as quickly as it should've been, but still quickly.) Contrast this with the fact that AirSea Battle is tech reliant...the air, sea, and cyber domains are reliant on high tech weapons platforms that a) aren't cheap, and (more importantly) b) they have a long lead time. If, in 10 years, we wake up one day and realize that we're facing a severe area denial challenge from someone (not a hot war yet, just them saying that nyah nyah, you can't go here, have fun supporting your allies now and oh by the way we're this close to going hot), we're not going to be able to turn around and produce a super sweet fighter/bomber/destroyer/whatever to deal with the issue in a year...or even 10. When you combine this with the fact while that the COIN folks were able to point to not one, but two hot wars, where American was spending billions of dollars and losing young men and women every day, as justification for why we needed to get our heads out of our asses and start learning this messy war stuff, AirSea Battle by definition is intended to keep things cold...if we go hot, AirSea Battle has already failed miserably. A doctrine intended to keep things cold, with no defined enemy (as opposed to the "Evil Empire"), makes it a helluva lot harder to point to something as reason why we need a particular weapons system, or to adopt a specific doctrine, or whatever.
I think these factors, as well as a well intentioned (but misguided) belief in focusing on the wars today at the expense of ALL else, are the reasons why Gates has really drug his feet on this stuff. Now, before anyone says that the military already spends a kajillion dollars on the very high tech expensive weapons platforms I'm advocating for (and AirSea Battle calls for), it should be pointed out that the U.S. military spends money willy nilly on whatever it feels like when it comes to weapons platforms...a lot of the stuff that we're buying that is ostensibly "high intensity" oriented wouldn't be viewed as particularly useful by the AirSea Battle folks. So what I'm saying is that while it may appear the U.S. military is gearing itself up for the very conflict deterrence AirSea Battle talks about (JSF, DDG-1000, LCS, etc.) this isn't really the case.
Anyway, that was fairly off topic and more than a little rambling, but hopefully it made some sense. I know you've mentioned AirSea Battle a few times here (I think), but I don't recall you ever discussing your thoughts (if any) about it a little more in depth...I'd be very interested in reading that.
Questions I have is..... Are
Questions I have is..... Are Counter-insurgents's victims of political, economic and social forces living in their own region?
JUNE 9, 2010.The Alien in the White House -WSJ
The distance between the president and the people is beginning to be revealed.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870330260457529423163131872...
FYI and
FYI and FWIW
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/09/afghanistan-taliban-us-hamid...
Afghan president 'has lost faith in US ability to defeat Taliban'
So much for COIN being validated.
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