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Civilian Casualties and ROE in Afghanistan
Check out blog alumna Erin "Charlie" Simpson mixing it up with Brian Katulis, Jake Shapiro, and Sarah Holewinski (of CIVIC) at the New America Foundation. Shapiro's thesis is really interesting and important: reducing civilian casualties actually reduces U.S. troop casualties as well. So the supposed trade-off involved between strict ROE and risking U.S. casualties isn't a trade-off at all once you bother to look at the data. (I met with LSE's Radha Iyengar before she left for Afghanistan and am excited to see her already kicking some analytical ass.) Update: I have actually really enjoyed this talk and am sorry I missed it live. Katulis makes some good critical points in his ten-minute presentation, and Charlie and Jake then respond to them very intelligently. (Charlie drops Schrödinger's cat on the audience like they all know what the hell she is talking about, which is awesome in and of itself.) Jake's point about where we're getting our intelligence around the one-hour mark is also really important. Update II: "Austin likes the Rangers too much." It is impossible to like the Rangers too much. You're banned from the blog, Charlie. RLTW.
First New Zealand death in
First New Zealand death in Afghanistan. www.stuff.co.nz
How does the ISAF Civilian
How does the ISAF Civilian Casualty Cell label the deaths of the people who are employed as armed security and for ISAF bases, personnel and convoys? How are civilian non-combatants (drivers, interpreters etc) that work for ISAF categorized?
If these various parties to the war are categorized as civilians then the data used is worthless. As of 2008 when the cell was stood up this was the case.
Dragon's Teeth Axiom of
Dragon's Teeth Axiom of Social Network Theory; COIN creates exponentially more terrorist nodes than it eliminates because of influence propagation along both consanguinous and social network connections.
corrollary 1: reducing civilian casualties reduces U.S. troop casualties
props--> Abu Muqawama
bravo!
Condolences, diablotakahe.
Condolences, diablotakahe.my sympathies,
my sympathies, diablotakahe
here you go Exum......maybe you can help redact names.
Bring back memories of
Bring back memories of Monica ..... Hebrew. For sho-
IED video compiled from
IED video compiled from Wikileaks data
See the evolution of the pattern, over the course of the war,
as it slowly builds to a climax.
Quote, 1hr "Taking it as
Quote, 1hr "Taking it as given that pursuing Al Qaeda abroad and in Afghanistan is key to preventing attacks..."
1) What about Hamburg, Germany? Are we using private intelligence contractors to hunt Al Qaeda there, without informing the German government? Didn't the Italy snatch-the-Arab CIA case raise some serious issues with this approach? "Abroad and in Afghanistan" is a rather meaningless phrase, in that context - and 'pursuing' - that could mean anything.
Try instead contemplating shifting the underlying conditions that give rise to support for terrorism (as in forest conditions that promote explosive wildfires, vs. those that don't). Of course, this requires a rethink of the U.S.-Saudi and U.S.-Israeli "special relationships" - they may not be that important as they used to be, though. U.S.-Pakistani and U.S.-India and U.S.-China relationships, under new global conditions, may become far more important.
See Thomas Friedman on the Saudi matter: The Great Double Game - although he misses half the story, that is the Israeli issue, which is what Petraeus alluded to some time ago: US General Petraeus: Israeli Policy Endangers the Lives of American Soldiers. These allies are more like liabilities, most of the time - like your drunken old pal who can't seem to avoid getting in a fight in every bar he goes in.
So, when Netanyahu demolishes Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem or turns a blind eye to illegal land grabs in the West Bank, this aids Al Qaeda and puts U.S. soldiers (and interests) at risk. Likewise, for when the Saudis seem unable to trace the money flowing into and out of their banks, with some of it apparently flowing to Pakistan and hence to radical foreign Taliban. We should be pressuring both countries to reform their systems along more democratic and transparent lines - now, that would cause Al Qaeda to lose support.
2) Here's a related analysis question for you: to what extent are foreign and local Taliban financed by Saudi cash or opium cash? I'd guess local Taliban rely more on opium taxation, while the foreign Taliban use Saudi cash, with some friction between the two groups. The Saudi cash may flow through ex-ISI channels, and there may be some degree of awareness of this in Pakistan, but does the U.S. government really want to follow the cash back to its source and make a big stink about it? Oooh yeah - the original source is U.S. petrodollars - that's funny. We finance the very people who planned and carried out 9/11 via our gasoline purchases from Gulf states!
Ignoring the true source of any money that is reported to come from Pakistan is not good intelligence practice - but it is politically expedient, when the Saudis have so much cash invested on Wall Street.
Good luck getting the wonk patrol to talk about those major issues...
P.S. Here's a note on Wikileaks, via the Washington Post:
The case illustrates the murky world of advocacy-for-hire in Washington, where ideological groups wage stealth messaging campaigns with little disclosure of their funding or possible motives. Such arrangements rarely come to light since most advocacy groups are organized as nonprofits that do not have to disclose details about their donors.
Sure, they were talking about a separate issue... but it applies.
"Afghans expect more because
"Afghans expect more because of our rhetoric"
Then, lets change our rhetoric, how about let's blow that hell hole to kingdom come and build the biggest 7Eleven on the empty lot.
*Charlie is Club Int'l hot. and that Human rights girl a Penthouse Pet in waiting, she should've worn something that showed a bit more.
I don't care if that
I don't care if that Schrödinger's cat is shaved or hairy, I'd lick the shit out of it and get it all wet after I'm through with it, just don't expect me to stay and engage in an academic discussion afterward, I'm just in it for the wet pussy debate.
http://www.3news.co.nz/New-Ze
http://www.3news.co.nz/New-Zealand-mourns-the-death-of-a-soldier/tabid/4...
http://www.thenation.com/arti
http://www.thenation.com/article/38034/wikileaks-baghdad`
1. Am going to be a jerk.
1. Am going to be a jerk. Prepare to cringe.
2. Enjoyed MS. Simpson's presentation greatly.
3. Do not happen to have sound on my computer.
V/R JWest
"reducing civilian
"reducing civilian casualties actually reduces U.S. troop casualties as well."
If we leave the country entirely, then our casualties will be zero, and we will cause zero "civilian" casualties as well. Yaaaay! Everybody will be happy. Will we have won the war? Is it even possible to win the war without killing and dying? Eh, who cares. This is all about being sensitive to people's rights, not winning the war!
"We can't win without
"We can't win without fighting, but we also cannot kill or capture our way to victory. Moreover, if we kill civilians or damage their property in the course of our operations, we will create more enemies than our operations eliminate."
Visitor 11:00am makes a
Visitor 11:00am makes a solid point, I think.
Assuming, though, that we will be staying and continuing to try not to kill civilians for a while, I think it behooves us to remember that, to use Prof. Shapiro's terminology, I imagine that the timeframe over which the average deployed soldier most cares about ROEs affecting his ability to use force is the one concerning particular engagements in which he thinks less restrictive ones would make him safer in that moment. Being more restrained may lessen the number of times he is engaged with fire by the enemy over his deployment, but isn't it an absolute fact of military operational and emotional preparation for war that soldiers prepare to be engaged with the enemy over the course of a deployment - this does not cause stress in the aggregate - what causes stress is having to restrain from using the force he is trained to use to find and destroy the enemy when engagement occurs. I realize this is the heart of COIN, and I am not saying that because this seems to go directly against the grain of the most established though processes and instincts ground into the American soldier, that it isn't nevertheless what is called for in this campaign. But it doesn't seem to me that simply making the statistical argument that if all U.S. forces show due restraint, this ought to result in fewer engagements, which is what is desired actually reckons with the tension that this challenge actually creates for the soldier who must carry it out.
-@MikeDrewWhat (the You-got-nothin-on-Frank Rich-this-week guy)
wow, what's the deal with
wow, what's the deal with trash comments?
Actually, it is a valid
Actually, it is a valid question of methodology. If the reduction in civilian casualties was caused by reduction in the operational profile, then it's not surprising that the troops casualty rate is also reduced through the same period. As long as troops stay at base, they don't kill anyone and remain safe. Did the research discount that effect and how?
1) A working PDF of the
1) A working PDF of the paper Dr. Shapiro presents can be found at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16152.pdf?new_window=1 If nothing else, you can at least see the graph of adult males casualties by ISAF that the inset blocked in the video. The ISAF apparently runs over more male civilians then it shells or bombs.
2) Charlie is hotter then I remember. I should have been nicer.
Here's some real
Here's some real news!
http://amfix.blogs.cnn.com/2010/08/04/reports-grenade-lobbed-at-iranian-...
"we also cannot kill or
"we also cannot kill or capture our way to victory"
Um, yes we can. That's the history of counterinsurgency from 1815 to 1939 in a nutshell.
Well, this isn't 1815 to
Well, this isn't 1815 to 1939, now is it, genius?
"Well, this isn't 1815 to
"Well, this isn't 1815 to 1939, now is it, genius?"
And that's why we must ignore the lessons of that period as if they never existed, and we have nothing to learn from them? Because human beings at that time were so utterly different from human beings today that today's Afghans will not respond to the same set of incentives and disincentives that were successfully applied numerous times around the world back then?
Ignoring the lessons of the past is the opposite of being a genius.
visitor 11 This is all about
visitor 11
This is all about being sensitive to people's rights, not winning the war!
but the war is unwinnable.
Keep drinking your
Keep drinking your Kool-aid... You are Deez.... I'd like to tea-bag you.
Was Ms Simpson about to step
Was Ms Simpson about to step out on a night mission in a bamboo patch? Christ, even that retarded hippy peace-nick chick was better dressed. And, someone needs to tell Jake not to leer at his co-discussant's cleavage as she speaks--Joes comport better everyday downrange in the face of way hotter KBR chicks. Since when have Ivy Leaugue products been so divoraced from breeding?
The real issue here is why
The real issue here is why has it taken so long to do what is really a fairly basic analysis (though well done). 9 years of war and only a year of data and a few months of analysis? A trillion dollar war machine and it can't afford a few good analysts?
Back in WW2 operations research scientists monitored and analysed just about everything, providing a knowledge feedback loop to the 'powers that be' on what worked and what didn't (not aways listened to of course, as in the case of 'strategic bombing', but at least it was available and a lot was listened to and used, to inestimable benefit).
The other sad thing is the polarisation of the NGOs, like the Red Cross they have to be neutral. From a daily tactical point of view this may seem incorrect, but from a strategic viewpoint NGO neutrality and evenhandedness provides a huge benefit, not the least to the civilians. Boyd's winning the moral fight comes to mind in this case.
At a very basic level, when a local sees NGO people risking themeselves to improve ordinary people's lives then it makes it that much harder to just dismiss all westerners as a bunch of murdering thugs. If the Taliban had a quarter of a brain then they'd guarantee (the genuine) NGO workers protection and pick up all the associated propaganda benefits. We may be dunderheads, but sometimes the other side is even stupider.
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