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Success in Iraq? My View.
What constitutes success or failure in counterinsurgency campaigns is controversial and has sparked much informed (and uninformed) discussion in the policy and academic communities. (It has also generated this priceless article in the Onion.) Yesterday, I posted a quote from David Galula's Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958
Victory is won and pacification ends when most of the counterinsurgent forces can safely be withdrawn, leaving the population to take care of itself with the help of a normal contingent of police and Army forces.
The debate sparked in the comments thread was a good one, and I promised my own thoughts today. First, though, I need to be up front about some qualifications:
1. My thoughts on whether or not the United States was successful in its counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq does not mean I think the 2003 decision to go to war in Iraq was a wise one. Quite the opposite. I think the 2003 decision to go to war in Iraq was a blunder, and counterinsurgency operations were only necessary, in my view, once the Bush Administration and the U.S. and British militaries had badly mismanaged the war from 2003 to 2006.
2. I am critical of U.S. and British military performance in Iraq from 2003 until 2006 (and beyond). This does not mean that I believe all units performed equally poorly. Some units and commanders performed exceptionally well. So if you were yourself a U.S. officer or troop on the ground between 2003 and 2006 -- and I myself served in Iraq in 2003 and 2004 -- do not take my criticism personally. I do, however, believe that the U.S. military began a difficult and bloody learning process in 2003 that started to show some real fruits by 2006 and that the Bush Administration made a number of wise decisions before and after the midterm elections of 2006 that had a positive effect. The U.S. military deserves credit for learning, and the Bush Administration deserves credit for correcting course.
3. U.S. counterinsurgency operations were not -- I repeat, were NOT -- the only variable which led to the dramatic drop in violence in Iraq in 2007. A bloody civil war in 2006 combined with Moqtada al-Sadr's decision to largely keep his forces on the sidelines and a tribal "awakening" all had an effect on the drop in violence, and it is impossible to determine with relative certainty which variables were most important to the drop in violence. So I am not arguing that the surge in U.S. troops was solely responsible for the drop in violence, and I am also not arguing that counterinsurgency as practiced by the U.S. military in Iraq in 2007 is the only appropriate counterinsurgency strategy or could be replicated with ease elsewhere.
4. I have a very limited view of what success in Iraq looks like. A secular democracy, free from violence, in which individual rights and civil liberties are protected by a robust legal system? That would be nice, sure. But nations wage war in their own interests, and my view -- which is perhaps cynical -- is that in 2006, the United States was looking for a way to a) reduce the levels of violence in Iraq in order to b) build up key Iraqi institutions so that we could c) transition to a security force assistance mission and largely depart the country. (This is almost precisely what we are attempting to do in Afghanistan today, with less success.)
Given and based upon those qualifications, I believe the United States (and its allies, Iraqi and international) were successful in Iraq from 2006 onwards in serving U.S. interests. I believe the desired policy outcome of U.S. decision-makers has largely been realized through a combination of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts, actions taken by the Iraqi government and non-state actors, and wise policy decisions made by the Bush and Obama Administrations between 2006 and 2010.
Today, a series of brutal insurgent attacks tore through Iraq, killing scores in some of the worst violence Iraq has seen since the dark days of 2007. And Iraq's political class remains deadlocked, unable to form a government and frustrating its people. Yesterday, though, the number of U.S. troops in Iraq dipped below 50,000 as the United States credibly transitioned to a smaller security force assistance mission. So while Iraq continues to be wracked by violence and suffers from political instability, U.S. interests have been served in the sense that the conflict in Iraq is now an Iraqi conflict that will be largely settled and fought by Iraqi actors. It's a curious, tragic and selfish definition of victory, I know. But it's victory.
This is excellent. Well said.
This is excellent. Well said.
Well did we choose to win
Well did we choose to win Iraq only to lose in Afghanistan?
Ok, so victory means that
Ok, so victory means that the US could scale down its forces in Iraq. If that was the case, then the antiwar folks had a victory plan from the get go; namely, leave Iraq. The reason I say this is because your definition of victory is basically being able to leave and let Iraqi actors sort it all out. Isn't that the antiwar crowd's ongoing argument? This leave it to the Iraqis doesn't address long-term politics in the region, and the possibility of Iran as kingmaker, which we are told by interventionists over and over that a powerful Iran is scary, scary. Of course the problem is the assumption that Iran posses an existential threat to the US, which it doesn't. But the US isn't really leaving Iraq.
The Gallula quote is cryptic. What does it mean when it says the population can take care of itself? What is a "normal" police force? There is no clear answer, allowing for maneuverable and rhetorical space to suit an interventionist agenda. What if the population's notion of taking care of themselves isn't in the perceived (often mythical) long-term interest of the counterinsurgents or their allies? Go back and wage war again? Tacitly support a coup? Call one side insurgents and their enemies democrats? The US rhetorical toolbox (which everyone has, but we are the current hegemon) is chock full of such b.s.
I think victory was what some parties within in the US always wanted it to be, an excuse for an ongoing US presence in Mesopotamia., as part of an Iran containment strategy In that regard, the Iraq war was a victory. Not for the American nation, not even for the State (in the long-term), instead it was a limited victory for the Cheney hawks and their neoconservative allies, and those supporters of the Carter doctrine regarding ME oil. The US now has an emotional investment in staying in Iraq. We can't let all those sacrifices be in "vain." Translation, political support for an ongoing presence from both bellicose populists and cowardly and/or venal politicians (think Reid and Pelosi or President Wimpy McSpineless), which combined with real economic and institutional interests (M.I.C) is a formidable force.
@ Visitor 11:11 I'll borrow
@ Visitor 11:11
I'll borrow from Cynic's post regarding post-flood Pakistani "collective punishment," and throw in Scott Sigmund Gartner's "dominant indicators" approach ("Strategic Assessment in War"), all with the caveat that I lack the knowledge to write what I write (nice disclaimer, eh?).
1. Media
Could there be something that draws or drew the media to Iraq rather than Afghanistan? Perhaps the drama of the Thunder Run, OIF I harking back to Desert Storm, and after that, the media chose largely not to leave? Or perhaps the comparatively urbanized Iraq was more conducive to reporting than, say, the Korengal Valley? These are spitball hypotheses, but the organizing principle would be that we "chose" to win in Iraq, but not Afghanistan, because we paid more *attention* to Iraq, because the media paid more attention to Iraq.
2. Dominant Indicators
Decision makers choose certain indicators to focus on (a finite set), and determine how things are going not just based on whether these indicators are declining or accelerating, but whether they're, say, declining at an increasing or decreasing speed. If, say, the dominant indicators for Iraq were declining, and moreover, declining more and more rapidly, then one might choose to pay more *attention* and thus decide, if by nothing other then default, to win the war (I'd say Ricks' and Woodward's interpretations of the causes of the Surge - not that one has to accept the Surge as having "won" the War; just that dominant indicators caused the Surge itself, not the effects of the Surge - support this interpretation).
ADTS
So while Iraq continues to
The same could have been said in any year from 2004 to 2009, had the U.S. largely withdrawn its forces earlier. Indeed, the same could be said about any country wracked by conflict and violence in which the U.S. does not maintain thousands of troops. Worldwide triumph must be upon us.
I love the smell of bullshit
I love the smell of bullshit in the morning. It smells like ... victory.
One can declare success in Iraq only in so far as it's cutting our considerable losses--finally. But that stretches the definition of success to Orwellian levels. By the same definition, we were successful in Vietnam too.
Shall we now discuss victory and success in Afghanistan?
RH
I think, in my humbly
I think, in my humbly uniformed opinion, that we really can't say that Galula's success happens whenever you decide to give up a counterinsurgency campaign, obviously he wouldn't've meant that. Even just looking at the graph above; if the US had left in 2006, Iraq would be an absolute hell-hole. I think that to really talk about success, you have to look at the results and compare those to other possible results. Iraq is a /lot/ better today than a few years ago. And with genocidal 'rape-as-an-instrument-of-government-control' regimes like Hussein's, /are/ things really so much worse off? Everyone talks about regional instability, but realistically, what's Iran going to do, fund their proxies in Iraq? Those proxies would be facing the same nationalists-amoung-the-insurgents that we do. And what would the effect of that be, further separation between the Arabs and Persians, more alienation of Iran? Isn't the isolation of rouge states really in /favour/ of regional stability?
I mean, I know that lots of people have been worried about nightmare scenarios where Turkey invades Iraq and there's a serious war between them, and the Syrians get involved, etc, or the Iranians invade and attack Israel, etc, but are these things /really/ that realistic, Turkey and Iraq going to all out War? Iran invading a sovereign democratic state, the baathist Iraq, sure the world-system could allow it, but actually invading democratic (such as it is) Iraq?
The graph you post shows a
The graph you post shows a precipitate reduction in "ethno-sectarian" violence on and after August 2007. That was the month that Moqtada agreed a ceasefire - with ISCI/Badr. Was the violence really so "ethno-sectarian"?
. . Sounds like someone is
.
.
Sounds like someone is trying to justify $600 odd million spent. Pats on the back all around.
Getting rid of Sadam was not a bad idea. When we went in our military was looking for a conventional war (it is what they were trained and equiped for...it is what the American public wanted, a Victory ) and ran head-on into a different thing all together. Just hope that the people of Iraq know what has been given them and do something with it.
So $600M on Iraq , working on $400+M on Afghanistan (and still on the learning curve, I would like to add).
How is the Global war on terror these days? Smolia...Yemen...Central Africa....South America?
PS...not beating up our military....that is not the point. The point is, are we doing the right direction? Looking to the future not over my shoulder.
Have we gotten our minds right?......."Cool Hand Luke"...shaken the bush, Boss....."What we got here is a failure to communicate".
You still one way or another
You still one way or another attribute the lowering of violence in Iraq primarily to the Surge of Troops and the notion that the Surge Army was doing something differently than before. Your point that it took the army from 03 to 06 to learn painful and bloody lessons and then finally apply them in a classic Nagl-like learning and adapting paradigm again strongly implies that you place causative power behind the Surge and the effects you think it produced.
But really, look at the numbers in your slide, violence starts to drop off almost as soon as the Surge started, so how can you attribute the Surge and the notion of tactical and operational difference to the lowering violence? Arguably the Surge as it is conceived of now was a waste of time, what did it accomplish? Furthermore it is arguable that things would have turned out the same, the Anbar Awakening would have spread anyway, because of sectarian separation in Baghdad violence would have contributed to drop there and other parts of Iraq even if Casey had stayed in command and even if the additional Surge brigades had never flowed in.
I don’t think Iraqis would share in your notions of "victory" Andrew. And they should since you are an expert of population centric Counterinsurgency and for you the population of the host nation should matter because of course they always MUST be the center of gravity.
If this is victory--read the attacks today as representative of the ongoing civil war in Iraq--and it is an American victory as you say then why didn’t we just leave three years ago and declare victory then? What is the difference?
Nope, you and so many others continue with the fantasy that the Surge was a triumph of arms in Iraq, which we are victorious, or as senior American generals often say that the Surge "saved Iraq from a desperate situation." Huh, from what did we save Iraq from? Certainly not from itself.
gian
While we are doing
While we are doing quotes....one of these might fit in this discussion.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WNOaIGyjqRA&feature=related
Gian, I freely admit
Gian, I freely admit uncertainty about causal relationships and the events that transpired in 2006 and 2007. How can you, by contrast, be sure that certain things did NOT matter? I began this post with qualifications intended to address and defuse what I think are some very good criticisms that you and others have made about the initial post-Surge narrative that emerged in 2007. By contrast, I have seen no evolution in your thinking about what did or did not happen in Iraq in 2006 and 2007. I think you're so tied up in defending your own efforts and those of your unit in 2006 that you've essentially lost the ability to dispassionately consider Iraq and reconsider your own analysis. I have been reading the same Gian Gentile article, over and over again, since 2008. It's both stale and impervious to criticism. It's very similar to the worst writing on counterinsurgency: it's arrogant in terms of what the author can claim to "know" and sticks to its assumptions even when evidence exists that should cause the author to question them.oh come on man give me a
oh come on man give me a break.
I am a historian doing primary historical research. One sees the same sort of myth making with regard to the reasons for the defeat with the Malayan insurgency as one does with Iraq.
What, do you want me to "evolve" my thinking so that comes in line with your tortured explanation of "victory" in Iraq?
Sorry Andrew as I read the evidence as it stands now the Surge in the broader scheme of things was simply not that important, and sadly nor was what happened before from 03 to 06 when you and I were there. Why? Because as Sun Tzu said "tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat." Why cant you get beyond tactics?
I continue to make this argument, which you see as frozen and stale, because I see it as absolutely critical to deconstruct the myth of the Surge with its concomitant theories of causation because it so powerfully affects thinking on Afghanistan today.
So Sorry good AM if you feel this way about my writing you might as well hit delete everytime in the future you see my name associated with a blog posting or published piece.
gian
I have to agree with Mr.
I have to agree with Mr. Hoskins above. Given the qualifications enumerated in the article it would be virtually impossible for us not to be victorious. We were going to leave eventually, and that seems to be the prime criterion for victory according to the author.
Given the U.S. had no, and continues to not have, any national interest in being in Iraq, this statement beggars belief.
So we won, if we move the
So we won, if we move the goal posts. I hate soccer. What are the frigin rules?
How far into deficit did this success cost us? Human lives? Our stature in world affairs? Our leadership? Put me down in the massive failure column under my favorite heading: Good Enough.
Many that blog here seem to
Many that blog here seem to think the ethnic cleansing/Sunni/Shiia divide actually ended after the surge troops arrived.
1. the additional surge troops in fact crimped the freedom of movement for the Sunni insurgent groups as the troops clamped down on specific city districts and villages---this freedom of movement for the insurgents was the main cause that from 2003 through 2006 when many of the BCTs would pressure some of the groups-once pressured they simply used rat runs to move into a totally new areas where there were no or little BCT presence---the same went for the Shiia insurgent groups
2. with the start of the ethnic cleansing by the Shiia militias and with the US forces crimping the movement of the Sunni insurgent groups the Sunni population really was exposed to the full force of the cleansing and were brutually evicted from a number of areas--which then forced the Sunni tribes to realize that no one could protect them thus the 'awakening'.
Had nothing to do with increased US troop presence-this is the way myths start.
While the US military is claiming a slow down in violence the strongest of the Sunni insurgent groups has been rearming and retraining for the day they know will come in a showdown with the Shiia militas, AQI has in fact rearmed and refitted as well thus the current extended bomb attack campaign, and the Shiia milita commanders who lead the ethnic cleansing and then fled to Iran are now quietly back in Baghdad.
Sounds like the internal conflict is about to go into round two-and we definitely will remain on the sidelines as the military really wants to get out and go home.
I would agree with AM to a
I would agree with AM to a point. The US military in Iraq has achieved success in reaching the strategic drivers listed, mainly "a) reduce the levels of violence in Iraq in order to b) build up key Iraqi institutions so that we could c) transition to a security force assistance mission and largely depart the country," each to varying degrees of success, as the Iraq government (a key institution) is showing. Unless it comes with a ticker tape down Pennsylvania Ave, i'd be wary of calling anything victory.
Inherent in Galula's definition of "victory" is an issue of time.
"leaving the population to take care of itself with the help of a normal contingent of police and Army forces"
Quite frankly, there is no way that we can apply this definition to Iraq yet. Until IA and IP can consitently "take care" of the population on their own, with NO third party support, in all areas of the country, an assessment of victory by this definition is in standby mode. Would now be a good point to call for the mandatory "We'll be better able to judge progress in 12 months"?
Your last bit--that victory
Your last bit--that victory is defined by the locals, rather than the intervention force, doing the fighting--is idiotic. Read that paragraph again. Surely you can't mean it the way you said it. For your credibility as an insurgency expert, I suggest you offer some clarification.
A large part of this debate
A large part of this debate has to do with use of the word "victory."
History is rife with ambiguity. The successful carrier war in the Pacific had its roots in all the battleships sunk at Pearl Harbor; the great allied triumph in the Gulf War birthed a festering geopolitical sore in and around Iraq that plagued the United States and other countries for years. It does not follow from this that Pearl Harbor was not a defeat, and the Gulf War not a victory. Nearly every disaster in our history has a bright side somewhere, and many of our most enduring problems are the residue of our greatest triumphs -- but disasters and triumphs are nonetheless distinguishable.
It is precisely because of this that we ought to be very careful about grading on a steep curve with respect to an episode like the Iraq war. Within the American national security community are many people who were deeply engaged in the Iraq war for many years. As well, one of our two political parties vigorously supported its conduct, and publicly despised its critics, for years. It is therefore tempting, for some, to consider the Iraq war by ruling the decision to invade the country in 2003 out of bounds; to ignore completely the costs of the war to the United States; to view the years between 2003 and the end of 2006 -- longer than the period of active combat by American troops in Korea or the European theater of World War II -- as a "learning" period; to credit the administration responsible for the war, and the Army and Marine leadership responsible for fighting it, for having learned painful lessons; and finally to celebrate a subsequent period when events in Iraq took a turn for the better as success.
Temptation exists on this earth to be resisted. Speaking of the Iraq war as AM does here minimizes the hurt feelings, resentment, and even accusations of political bias likely to result from the assignment of blame for one of the larger foreign policy disasters in the modern history of the United States. It represents the path of least resistance: too easy to be right.
The surge, along with the diplomatic efforts of Amb. Crocker and his associates that accompanied it, need to be understood as damage control, and damage control only. There is no question here of "victory." The Navy doesn't hand out medals for damage control to the senior officers of a ship that gets run aground. Yet there are plenty of Americans in and outside the national security community prepared to congratulate the leadership of the administration responsible for the Iraq war, senior officers of the military services, and one another, for the fact that sectarian bloodshed in Iraq in 2007 did not expand beyond the borders of the country and envelope the entire region.
This is a dangerous thing at this time in our history. The United States has a much smaller margin for error than it used to; the fact of error must therefore be confronted squarely. It is both right and necessary that this result in hurt feelings, ruined reputations, and broken friendships -- not to speak of careers ended with something short of a Medal of Freedom or promotion to Chief of Staff of the Army. Many thousands of American soldiers and Marines have had to suffer a lot worse as a result of the Iraq war.
If it is not helpful to or worthy of the country for a soldier to face greater consequences for losing his rifle than a general would for losing a war, it cannot be for a President and military leadership to blunder into a war, get thousands of Americans killed and maimed while pouring hundreds of billions of borrowed dollars into the sand, mortgage the whole foreign policy of the United States to the future of one, mid-sized Arab country -- and then be congratulated at the end for "victory."
A clear-headed response from
A clear-headed response from Zathras.
I basically agree with the
I basically agree with the idea that victory is defined by the host nation and their security forces being responsible for their own well being, but at the same time, by that standard couldn't the Soviets have rightly claimed victory in Afghanistan at the time that they left? Esp in light of the fact that the govt they installed (I forget the name of the Afghan, Barbek?) stayed in power for a couple of years afterward?
Good lord, the violence
Good lord, the violence chart again. How many more years before that thing becomes irrelevant? Honestly, repeatedly saying things are not as bad as they were in 2007 is like telling the victim of a hit-and-run, "You are fine! It's not nearly as bad as three years ago when you were gang raped."
One that chart doesn't show you is whether the Sunni Arabs will wait four years for an election cycle to replace whatever new government forms. These guys fought us to a standstill for several years. You think six months of training through interpreters is going to make them more proficient than the US military? Do we really think the zero sum mentality has left the Iraqi street, elements of the Iraqi military leadership (former Iranian-backed guerrillas), or the political elites that have spend the past six months trying to figure out who won the election.
If this is victory, I hope never to witness a defeat.
What are we going to do (the
What are we going to do (the US forces remaining in Iraq that is and our political leaders) when the Shia Government says enough is enough, we have tried this reconciliation American style deal and it doesn’t work so now it is time once and for all to crush our enemies? Then what do we do once this starts, support them in the crushing of AQI which would entail crushing the larger sunni resistance and parts of the Sunni population as well?
What a mess, what a mess, and most so for the Iraqi people and the handful of American troopers left in the place. This is why even trying to formulate a tortured argument that the United States is victorious in Iraq is farcical.
The further down the road Iraq travels toward the thawing of its ongoing civil war and increased levels of violence the more ridiculous any kind of claims (be it tactical, operational or whatever) that the Surge was a success becomes.
The Counterinsurgency narrative will be shattered by events on the ground. After World War II some wag asked Churchill what was the most difficult thing for him to control and manage during the War. His answer, “events my young man, events.”
gian
The US withdrawal from Iraq
The US withdrawal from Iraq has gone well but it's not a victory. It's simply damage limitation. The quicker the remaining troops and all of their civilian colleagues can get out the better. Ditto for Afghanistan.
The expense of keeping a modern army in the field is the threat to us. Any damage to our "interests" pale in comparison to the self inflicted damage a large scale expedition does.
Perhaps a more useful
Perhaps a more useful exercise would be an analysis of Bacevich's criticism of COIN in "Washington Rules".
Gray and Record's works might be read as criticisms based on the lack of necessary prerequisites. We're not successful but could if we could fix certain things.
Bacevich's seems to be a fundamental attack on the catechism of COIN itself. It's a false religion.
AM: "So while Iraq continues
AM: "So while Iraq continues to be wracked by violence and suffers from political instability,..."
More relevant would be to recognize that the populace suffers corrupt and incompetent administration such that investment is low and prospects are poor.
Metric: FDI flows, private investment as share of GDP (minus security-related), expatriated oil money, comparisons of development and standard of living between Kurdistan and non-Kurd Iraq
AM: "... U.S. interests have been served in the sense that the conflict in Iraq is now an Iraqi conflict that will be largely settled and fought by Iraqi actors."
Nope. Iraq will continue to be a regional problem; outside meddling by state and nonstate actors will be chronic; and Iraqis themselves will unceasingly question which outside interests their local antagonists serve or betray.
Metric: Civil & cross-border conflict costs in lives lost and expenditures required, oil exports (only real US interest)
AM: "It's a curious, tragic and selfish definition of victory, I know. But it's victory."
Nope. It's failure, but a curiously open-ended failure as there seems no limit to the American blood and treasure that will continue to be poured into the sand, as our opponents so ardently desire.
Metric: True costs of airspace dominance, contractors, US forces, non-mil USG personnel etc.
BTW I don't intend to discredit American military who managed to muddle through thus far, or pretend that I know what's really happening in Iraq.
This is a true "original
This is a true "original sin" situation. We should never have invaded Iraq -- it was a colossal strategic error -- and getting out as best we can is the best we can do. What will happen next is not up to us, and I fear for our residual troop contingent.
Iraq was always a 25 to 50
Iraq was always a 25 to 50 year project. Depending on your point of view, the current withdrawal can be described as either an orderly, dignified retreat or a strategic redeployment. Personally I do not believe it is the former, even though it can fairly be described as such. We will continue to dominate all Iraqi airspace and the remaining troops, whether regular military or state department emplyees, will be on a combat footing ready to go at a minutes notice. As to the future, regardless of which party is in power in Washington, troop levels will be increased as the political leadership deems necessary with little or no concern for domestic public opinion.
Reidar Visser's latest piece
Reidar Visser's latest piece is out and relevant to the discussion (though the view is appropriately from inside Iraq).
http://historiae.org/governance.asp
It includes the following - which remains one of the major questions hanging over this sorry business:
"One cannot fail to get the impression that either US policy is grossly contradictive, or there is an unspoken underlying policy of détente with Iran in Iraq, at the expense of the governance of that country and its citizens. Had Washington truly put Iraqi interests first, it would instead have aimed to draw a wedge between the two Shiite-led alliances by having one inside government and the other on the outside, thereby allowing the one in government to develop a more lasting bond with the other main forces in Iraqi politics, without being susceptible to cheap tricks like the de-Baathification revival that brought Iraqi politics to a standstill earlier this year.
Sadly, despite the public finger-pointing, this has been the case since at least 2002 and perhaps even earlier.
That's not victory, it's
That's not victory, it's retreat.
The fat lady has not yet
The fat lady has not yet sung. Call me a cynic, but right now I'd lay odds that 5-10 years from now Iraq will be either a military dictatorship (with the person at the top being someone who is unknown today) or a Shiite-run theocracy. While I agree the benchmark for American success in Iraq can't be whether that country looks like Switzerland, if it ends up looking a lot like Iraq under Saddam Hussein a reasonable person should concede that the project has failed.
While there was no one American mistake in Iraq, the one which stands out right now is American over reliance upon the cadre of exiles and rebels who now make up almost the entire government. Insurgencies end when the population feels as though they "own" their country. A lot of counterinsurgency theory gets hung up in this search for another outcome (as if British tactics thwarted the counterinsurgency in Malaya--independence was just a detail).
For those who are still skeptical: how much do you know about the history of Cuba between Teddy's charge up San Juan Hill and Batista? Those interested in the long-term future of Iraq should read up on this (largely forgotten) period. Iraqis will be dealing with these issues for decades, possibly even generations, well after we've moved on.
"if it ends up looking a lot
"if it ends up looking a lot like Iraq under Saddam Hussein a reasonable person should concede that the project has failed."
Huh? I would call that a success, especially compared to other plausible alternatives (i.e., not including the "looking like Switzerland" alternative). I'd be fine if an SOB runs the place so long as he is our SOB or at least doesn't tread on our toes too much.
So this is what unvarnished
So this is what unvarnished cynicism looks like.
Victory? Unlikely, under any definition, ever.
"is that in 2006, the United
"is that in 2006, the United States was looking for a way to a) reduce the levels of violence in Iraq in order to b) build up key Iraqi institutions so that we could c) transition to a security force assistance mission and largely depart the country. (This is almost precisely what we are attempting to do in Afghanistan today, with less success.)"
Your definition of success is a tautology. You point to the evidence of success as the fact that we are drawing down, but our leaders possessed the freedom of choice to draw down at any time they wanted to, regardless of what was happening in Iraq. The conditions of your a) and b) are genuinely irrelevant to our capacity for c) except in terms of political constraints that were entirely voluntary in nature. You don't specify what conditions are necessary for a withdrawal to *not* be considered victory - and a good thing, because I'm not sure we're meeting them.
What you're left with is that 'success' equals a tick downward in violence and the absence of revolution, serving as a justificatory trigger for withdrawal - but as you may see in Afghanistan - you can easily withdraw without these things. more importantly, it's not clear that these things possess any genuine strategic value to the US. While they might be sorta-good for the host nation population, it's not clear that the ensuing decade of weaker violence is a net gain from a possible shorter, sharper period, possibly ending in a sharper drop.
So what we're left with is victory via bugging out. It's not clear to me what would, in this case, constitute failure.
Of course, this makes a certain degree of sense - if the war was useless, by leaving we serve strategic interests that we frankly can't serve by being there, no matter what we're doing there.
However, again, once you're here, the surge itself becomes a pointless, flowery gesture. America would have been perfectly fine pulling out without it in 2005. Iraqis would have suffered, but they're suffering anyway. As you've mentioned yourself, the civil war would have probably burned itself out regardless of our behavior.
The only thing I can see that we've gained is a continuing ability to be buddies with some of the Iraqi government. The value of this asset is not clear to me.
What the surge was, was a prestige and bureaucratic victory inside the US centers of power. Oh, there are some marginal tactical or operational gains vs. future threats from our bases in Iraqi territory, etc. They weren't worth the money and the lives.
Failure in Afghanistan - My
Failure in Afghanistan - My view of the newspaper today! F***king waste of taxpayers money....someone should go to prison.
http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/08/26/afghanistan-hamid-karzai-aide-in...
Even according to this
Even according to this narrow definition of victory, this argument is still problematic. Are we really leaving Iraq? That's a difficult claim to make with just under 50,000 troops remaining, a colossal embassy housing a mini shadow army, loads of contracts with U.S.-based defense companies, and Odierno leaving the door open for another large-scale intervention. It is a distortion of all reality to suggest that Iraqi security forces are ready to take the lead. According to the latest Brookings index, only about 50 battalions (or a quarter of the army) were capable of planning and executing counterinsurgency ops on their own.
And this doesn't even begin to take stock of the disaster that is that Iraqi's access to basic resources--such as electricity, potable water, and sanitation. A recent UN report shows that 53% of Iraqis are now living in slums. To ignore such dismal realities is, as Gian pointed out, to ignore the population factor that is at the center of counterinsurgency doctrine. It is also to ignore the human cost and human dimension of war. Call me a bleeding heart, but I never understand conversations about Iraq or any conflict that suggest we should take the suffering associated with war for granted. Especially in this case when, for the millions of Iraqis living in slums and without a government, it's not clear what they were suffering for.
Finally, what's the point of declaring Iraq a victory? To justify the strategy in Afghanistan? To save face? To convince ourselves that deaths were not in vain? All of these motivations are self-serving.
Even according to this
Even according to this extremely narrow definition of victory, this argument is problematic. Are we really leaving Iraq? That's a difficult claim to support given the 50,000 remaining troops, a mini shadow army attached to the embassy, loads of colossal contracts with U.S.-based defense companies, and Odierno leaving the window open for a quick redeployment in the near future. It is a distortion of all reality to suggest that the Iraqi security forces are ready to take the lead. According to the latest Brookings index, less than a quarter of Iraqi battalions were capable of planning and executing COIN ops on their own.
And this assessment doesn't even take into account the dismal living conditions of millions in Iraq. According to a recent UN report, 53% of Iraqis live in slums--where they have poor access to basic resources such as electricity, potable water, and sanitation. To leave the Iraqi people out of the assessment is, as Gian suggests, to leave out a key element of COIN doctrine. It is also to leave out the human cost and human dimension of war. Call me a bleeding heart, but I never fail to be baffled by discussions of Iraq and Afghanistan that assume we should just take for granted the suffering of war, especially in this case, where, in the eyes of many Iraqis, it isn't clear what they were suffering for.
Finally, what's the point of declaring victory in Iraq? Is it to justify the war in Afghanistan? To save face? Or to convince ourselves that deaths were not in vain? All of these are self-serving in my view.
Here's one way of looking at
Here's one way of looking at it.
http://www.xtranormal.com/watch/7011707/
here´s my five cents: 1 - a
here´s my five cents: 1 - a definition is a set of properties. 2 - different sets of properties may go by the same name, creating ambiguity; victory being one such case ("pyrrhic victory"). 3 - victory with AM/galula here requires two properties: i - most of the coin forces can be safely withdrawn, and ii - at the same time, the population can be left to take care of itself with the help of a normal contingent of security forces. 4 - the case for iraq is arguable because of (3.ii), in the sense of a metrics problem, but probably close. 5 - it is not known whether the set of properties AM/galula gave here do match with the definition of victory used by decisionmakers in 2003; it is also not known, from the context, whether Galula in his quote aims for victory in a broader strategic rather than a more narrowly tactical sense.
We chose our drawdown dates
We chose our drawdown dates (August 2010 and December 2011) irrespective of "success" in Iraq, however that is or will be defined, irrespective of how ready their security forces are to protect their citizens, irrespective of a political solution (much less a process) that addresses the many issues that drive violence and keep the country unable to provide basic services, become stable, or a positive element in the region.
The policy is not designed to achieve any "success" other than fulfilling a campaign promise. It has nothing to do with iraq persay.
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