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A Better ASG
From the comments I have been reading, one of the main reasons the Afghanistan Study Group's report has disappointed so greatly is because people really want an alternative to the current strategy in Afghanistan and could not find one in the ASG that was grounded in the realities of Afghanistan itself. I started thinking last night, then, about how one could have gone about constructing a more helpful report. As Michael Cohen and Josh Foust both noted, it was really odd that the ASG did not include any notable specialists in military operations or any noted experts on Afghanistan. Guys like Gordan Adams, Robert Pape and Stephen Walt are all really smart, sure, and are giants in the field of security studies. But it's not enough in a report like this to talk about grand strategy, the health of the U.S. budget, or the nature of alliances -- you also have to describe how an alternative strategy might be operationalized on the ground.
So I would have approached this problem a little differently. First, I would have started with the planning assumption that the president had re-thought our presence in Afghanistan and had decided that, in light of budgetary constraints and the health of the armed services, a resource-intensive counterinsurgency strategy was too much of a burden going forward into 2011 and that we needed to adopt a lower-cost, lighter-footprint strategy.
At that point, you don't necessarily need to assemble people who do not agree with the current strategy, and you almost certainly do not want arch-realist theorists or anti-war activists who might be tempted to imagine an Afghanistan that fits their favored theory -- and not Afghanistan as it exists. You just need smart people who either know Afghanistan or understand military operations and could commit to imagining an alternative, given the constraints outlined in the above assumption.
Who would I have included in the team that I would have locked in a room for 72 hours to come up with this alternative strategy? Off the top of my head and excluding all those currently serving in government: Gilles Doronsorro, Joanna Nathan, Austin Long, Steve Biddle, Caroline Wadhams, Thomas Ruttig, Shahmahmood Miakhel and Andrew Wilder with MG (Ret.) Paul Eaton and Amb. Ron Neumann serving as co-chairs of the task force. (And Colin Cookman and Katherine Tiedemann combining to take notes and draft the report.)
My group of external reviewers for whatever report they would have written might have included: Christian Bleuer, Catherine Dale, Josh Foust, Erin Simpson, and Martine van Bijlert with LTG (Ret.) Dave Barno and Amb. Zalmay Khalilzad chairing the "Red Team".
There is a bias here, I admit, toward specialists in military operations and area studies. (Who could have guessed, considering my own biography?) But I think the general absence of these two groups may help explain why the ASG report, in Josh's critique, reads as if "it starts with a conclusion and works backward to develop justifications for it" rather than an honest alternative strategy. I think a team like the one I listed above would have done better.
When Bush was president and
When Bush was president and many people pointed out that the troop levels in Iraq were too low, he replied that if his commanders needed more troops he would get them more troops. This ignores the fact that Rumsfeld had already vetoed troop increases and selected commanders that would hew to this policy. Now you are arguing that the Afghanistan study group shouldn't evaluate whether it is a good idea to continue or not, it should just anticipate what the president wants. Obama is a passive president when it comes to foreign policy, he is doing what the DoD is telling him should be done. So you have this loop where the decision is not taken, the ASG is there to enact whatever is possible given the way the wind is blowing currently. None of the people you are suggesting to take part in the report are going to dissent if the findings are not rosy.
Do you really think that is the best way to form policy?
Cicero, America is a
Cicero, America is a faith-based nation.
Let's not mess up the ideology with facts.
It could lead to all sort of unfortunate outcomes.
Why not the first 30 people
Why not the first 30 people in the US of A phone book?
Really, my team would include the local leaders, plus the Taliban, and maybe a few Al Qaeda. Get down to it, they are the only ones that matter.
Next I would let them all know America is leaving and we are not taking anyone home with us. It is your county, work it out. The whole country has been GPS'ed and if the Americans get one whiff of bad boys gonna do bad things, we are going to nuke your butts to the moon.
We are out of here, it is what you wanted.
Some pretty off-topic
Some pretty off-topic nitpicking (because all, or most, of my posts are short and off-topic these days, verging on drive-bys):
1) Gordon Adams. An expert in security studies? I'm not sure this is grounds for inclusion in "experts in security studies," but did he make the FP Top 25 list. I'd say his forte - and my knowledge of it is in large part due to *your* highlighting his coauthored (or coedited?) volume with Cindy Williams - is too narrow to make him an expert in security studies, at least at the level of Walt or Pape.
2) I'd say Pape has the credibility to talk grand strategy, but his primary field of study would probably be *coercion.*
3) I'm inclined to think Walt et al - and I'll emphasize Walt*, because, like Schmedlap vis-a-vis Secretary Gates, I think his brain is so big it's in danger of exploding - operationalize a "Plan B" sufficiently: http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/09/08/a_plan_b_for_afghanistan. But I'll give equal credence, at least right now, to your and Foust's critiques ("hot tranny mess" notwithstanding).
ADTS (not anyone near being near being near an expert in security studies, and not being self-effacing)
* I'd say based on "Taming American Power," that Walt is the one who can lay a greater claim to talking grand strategy.** But I never read the book, never even finished the prepratory articles in Foreign Affairs and Naval War College Review. Like I said, I'm no expert.
** And remember, Walt's also written a book on revolution and war (surprisingly entitled "Revolution and War"). I know you're not trying to pigeonhole him by bringing up his first book, but I thought I'd at least bring it up.
Hey, man (ADTS), you don't
Hey, man (ADTS), you don't have to sell me on Walt. Israel Lobby aside, I have learned a lot from his work. But is he the guy you want weighing in on either Afghanistan or on military operations (vice policy or broader strategic questions)?Don't forget Irshad Manji.
Don't forget Irshad Manji. I saw her on "This Week" with Christianne Amanpour today. You should do a Q and A with her, Ex.
AM (otherwise known as "Hey,
AM (otherwise known as "Hey, man")
I think the question is, can you divorce "Afghanistan or...military operations" from "policy or broader strategic questions?" I think your point is a great one, and exceptionally well-taken, and my initial response is to say, "You're right."
But a point, or two, which I think might be intertwined.
First, the pedantic and lesser one: Walt has never served in the military, or participated in or conducted or planned an operation at any level or echelon, etc. But he has studied wars extensively, I strongly imagine (for, I imagine, "Revolution and War" if nothing else).
Second, and more importantly, and I think this gels with the points made on this board by Publius and COL Gentile on this board, **can one divorce Afghanistan and military operations from policy or broader strategic questions**? To raise an example that just popped into my head, what would Paul Kennedy say in re imperial overstretch?
I think this debate revolves around two foci: who has what expertise, and what expertise is needed?
ADTS
AM (Hey, man): I'd actually
AM (Hey, man):
I'd actually add a third foci. How does one acquire expertise, and how much expertise does one need? Can one acquire sufficient expertise for the task at hand, depending on that task, through books and life experience? I'm thinking about
1) fact-finding commissions
2) the Wise Men (which I recall you saying you liked a lot)
3) Stephen van Evera's "Why States Believe Foolish Ideas"
I'm pushing the argument for the sake of pushing the argument, but could one actually gain perspective via distance?
The opposite argument, I think, would be that of metis, a discussion of which can be found in James Scott's "Seeing Like a State." One cannot acquire knowledge - acquire expertise - absent learning through experience.
ADTS
Silly me. I forgot the ASG
Silly me. I forgot the ASG is, of course, a fact-finding commission.
ADTS
Fact finding? What you do
Fact finding? What you do when you do not have a clue.
Aren't you suppose to be an expert?
Guys it has been nine years and a trillion dollars. Time to fess up.
a) your list is a lot of the
a) your list is a lot of the "same old folks". I'd pay good money to NOT have your friend Gen. Barno be on one of the panels. He's a great guy, but your list really is a lot of the same people who continually write on the subject and their views/biases are well known.
b) Am amazed on your comment on Walt "But is he the guy you want weighing in on either Afghanistan or on military operations (vice policy or broader strategic questions)? "
It says a lot to me that you separate the strategic question of Afghanistan from the tactical/operational problem.
The question is not whether we can win so much, as does our plan, as executed, gain returns for US National Security equal to or greater than the expense? I can't make that ledger work in our current strategy.
That's why someone like Walt is the exact kind of person you want in there. Not to advise on changing the tactics, but the big questions of "why?"
When Gates retires so will
When Gates retires so will America in Afghanistan.
Plan has been made already, DoD spending cuts are already on the table. Afghanistan will not be unified, the north will not be under centralized control. The south will be loosely controlled by the population centers. US will train a police force that will overlook the populated cities and the rest of Afghanistan will do what Afghanistan has done all these years. People that can afford to get out of Afghanistan have left or are planning to leave, that is what all the money going to Dubai from Kabul is about. These people are not investing in their country, game over.
*Talaban will be part of the government.
*Al Qaeda will still be a player as an alternate source of revenue.
*America will dump in foreign aid to prop up the forces they trained to control the population centers, if the central government survives.
*Military involvement will transistion to anti-terrorism at some level.
*China will broker deals with what ever government that exists to harvest the resources that America identified. They will be the guys in white hats.
It is not rocket science. I do not need a panel of egg heads to tell me that.
PS. Any additional plans made at this point is to save face. Personally, part of the reason that America is still in the fight is cause the spending is still a big part of GDP. If the military spending went away and the defense contractors layed off, DoD cut its work force, and the boys came home to no jobs it just would not look good. Granted it is not the only reason. Washington still thinks it is really doing something other than economic stimulus in Afghanistan, but you have to admit the problem is real. Corporate America is a bunch of labor whores, they go where the wages are cheapest. Only reason they care about Americans is because of US of A's consumer spending.
It is time to do some nation building in the US of A. Get your panel of experts to work on that (Hint...Republicans are saying NO cause the Demcrats keep saying MORE, we are going broke. We all pay taxes, we are all in this together ALL of us get a say in how the money is spent. ). If your experts only work on Afghanistan then do not worry, they can spend the next ten years trying to figure out where we went wrong (Really that is simple, we stuck our noses somewhere it should not have been in the first place. When you're the only super power on the block you tend to forget stuff like that cause your also the only bully on the street with more money than sense.)
This is off-topic, though I
This is off-topic, though I very much appreciate Andrew's efforts toward realistic positive alternative ideas in Afghanistan. But I have just read this account - http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/08/war-and-the-city-be-a-man/ - of a soldier-turned-writer's decision to join the Army, and found it both incredibly vivid and at the same time remarkably predictable. I never got all they way to the decision to join, but I thought about it, and these are much like many of the thoughts I was was wrestling with at that time (among others). So when I started reading the comments section (I know, bad idea), I found myself truly surprised to find that so many people seemed to be shocked and appalled that a young man would join his country's military during wartime in part out of desire to test his manhood. Isn't that ust what a lot of men (and boys) over the ages joined up for, in part (in addition to the material benefit, which this writer was also up front about). One person called it an adolescent notion. Um, last time I checked, the military was engaged in court actions to preserve its ability to recruit in the nations public high school: guess what we recruit adolescents into the military, and perhaps turn some of them into men, maybe.
From the amount of shock at these expressions I read in these comments, it struck me that we have more than just a divide between those who have served in this era's wars and those who haven't, but in fact we have a cohort of people who just hae no way to conceive of the most basic human drives and insecurities (and I mean that only as an honest statement, not as criticism) that go into the relationship between man and society that can allow a society to raise ranks of men willing to kill and die for it. There are ideals at play, yes, but there is white hot immediacy of existence too. Or so I would guess - as I said, i never took the leap.
I hope this isn't an unwelcome foray into the personal or too prying but I would be interested to hear from among the community who have served here (thank you, by the way) anyone's comments on whether the motivations for enlistment expressed by this Roy Scranton at the link are at all uncommon, if anyone takes exception to them in any way, and how you react to the kind of clueless attitudes that some of those condemning Mr. Scranton's reasons for choosing to serve in the comments exhibit.
If this off-topic comment is not welcome, I encourage Andrew and will take no offense if he choose not to publish it. Thx all.
Hey AM, I am time poor but
Hey AM, I am time poor but need a book to rea on the way into the Stan. Any recommendations?
Niel, I think you said what
Niel,
I think you said what I was trying to say, albeit more succintly.
ADTS
Niel: Said out of
Niel:
Said out of admiration, not snarkiness.
ADTS
I'm all for regional
I'm all for regional expertise, but doesn't excluding people with a broader perspective lead to different, but just as devastating, problems as excluding regional expertise, which you say the ASG group did? Don't get me wrong, I'm no fan of that report, but the idea of having generalists get together to discuss some specific thing strikes me as something with a long and positive tradition in business and in American strategy - you ideally want a group with both the regional expertise and the generalist chops. . .
Actually, I'll go even
Actually, I'll go even stronger than my previous post and assert (without evidence, obviously), that a ASG report written by a group that excludes generalists would almost inevitably be inferior to one that includes military operations folks, regional expertise folks, *and* generalists. In fact, I'd almost want generalists who have never written about Afghanistan before and have no clear public stake in one position or another to be the types of generalists taking a look at it, along with the regional experts and military operations experts.
I have to say, I rather
I have to say, I rather agree on Gordon Adams not belonging on any Afghanistan/international security expert list. He may really good on budget stuff but security issues? No way.
Since I'm currently reading
Since I'm currently reading about the early Vietnam era, I'm reminded of (then) Lieutenant General Krulak's survey (fact-finding mission) of Vietnam for President Kennedy. As a thought experiment for fun, it probably would not be feasible to conduct such a survey, but if so, what active duty officer (or retired officer other than Barno) would be well-positioned to conduct such a survey?
ADTS
First time poster- Read in
First time poster-
Read in this order:
Taliban by Ahmed Rashid
Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics by Sir Martin Ewans
...and then whatever else you want to read. There is a world of good books out there, you'll get a lot of opinions. Certain people will recommend "This Man's Army," but it's overrated (grin).
I don't know if this blog's
I don't know if this blog's getting dumber or those posting are just idiots.
What is going on here? This
What is going on here? This is a bad day for you Exum. You're pretending as if the ASG is mainstream. No. They are not. These are the leftiest of the lefties: Walt, Cole, Hoh...etc. This is why they wrote this report: "America is always wrong. Kumbaya."
Would anyone have expected any differently from them?
Exum is just pissed because he wasn't allowed to attend the party.
Exum....you problem is that
Exum....you problem is that you tabletoppers still think you can "win".
You can't win.
We just lost in Iraq. We spent a trillion dollars and 5000 soldier lives to make another islamic state where a lot of muslims hate us. Why wouldn't they? We killed one out of every 200 Iraqi citizens in the last seven years.
When muslims are democratically empowered to vote they vote for shariah.
See how Turkey voted yesterday-- the secularists lost.
That is the tragic flaw at the heart of the Bush Doctrine and of COIN-- when muslims are empowered to vote they vote for shariah.
You need to start from the initial condition-- we cannot win in Afghanistan.
It can't be done.
now write the ASG report with the correct initial condition.
it will be much easier.
Perhaps it would help to
Perhaps it would help to have a cognitive anthropologist like Pascal Boyer on the panel.
The GWoT has always been a war on Islam-- and such a war was always doomed to epic failure.
al-Islam is EGT immune to proselytization in situ as a CSS.
what America tried to do, "implant westernstyle democracy" while surgically killing terrorists simply cannot be done.
Killing terrorists makes AT LEAST two terrorists for every one killed (SNT), and there is no substrate to support secular government.
A little applied science might have prevented this whole debacle.
Rabi'a at 9:41 P.M.: "See
Rabi'a at 9:41 P.M.:
"See how Turkey voted yesterday-- the secularists lost."
This is how the West would frame the election. However, it completely ignores Ottoman history. Bosnia, Serbia, Thrace, and the coastal areas of Aegean, Black, and Mediteraenan Seas were always more loyal to the Sultan than the interior and eastern areas of Anatolia. The Sultan regularly had to send punitive expeditions to put down rebellious pashas in the interior and in the east. Also rebellious pashas would regularly raise armies and march on Instanbul to address some real or imagined grievance.
This was the result of a variety of reasons: geography, the Balkans and the coasts were more accessible to Istanbul than the interior and east of Anatolia; there was always political infighting between vezirs who got their start in the youth levy in the Balkans and the vezirs who got their start in the interior or east; the agrarian economy of the interior and east was ruined by punitive taxation to support the wars and building projects of the Sultans; ect.
Certainly the degree of religiousity played a part in all of this. However, the framing of the recent election SOLELY as a contest between nominal Muslims and devout Muslims is western propaganda.
David B. Edwards' "Heroes of
David B. Edwards' "Heroes of the Age" is my favorite, and you used to be able to download it for free. You can *still* download Ashraf Ghani's dissertation for free.Rabi'a from your link at
Rabi'a from your link at 9:41 P.M.:
"Electoral maps on television screens showed a divided country: a secular Eurocentric crescent along the southwestern Aegean and Mediterranean seas largely opposed to the reforms and a pious, populous interior stretching deep into Turkey's east near the borders with Iran, Iraq, Syria and the Caucasus that for the most part backed Erdogan's changes."
Omit the words "secular" and "pious" from the foregoing and the propaganda effect diminishes significantly.
Additionally note the reference to Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the Caucasus. Eastern Anatolia has always been near the what is now called Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the Caucasus. They're not one inch closer or further away than they have always been. Moreover Iraq, Syria, and portions of the Caucasus were for long stretches part of the Ottoman Empire. Eastern Anatolia and these former provinces of the Ottoman Empire were largely able to run their own affairs because any punitive expedition sent by the Sultan to quell any disobediance had to walk to get there. Also these peoples would play the Ottomans off against the Safavids of Iran for their own advantage, even though the Safavids were Shi'a.
None of this is new.
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