Abu Muqawama retains its autonomy and the views and beliefs expressed within the blog do not reflect those of CNAS. Abu Muqawama retains the right to delete comments that include words that incite violence; are predatory, hateful, or intended to intimidate or harass; or degrade people on the basis of gender, race, class, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or disability. In summary, don't be a jerk.
Sometimes I wish I were just in the "Pointing Out All the Things Going Wrong in Afghanistan" business. Part of my job responsibilities, though, include being in the solutions business. Accordingly, and to mark the release of the much hyped December review, I posted commentary on Foreign Policy last night outlining five concrete ways in which policy makers, legislators and intelligence officials in Washington, DC can help the war effort in Afghanistan. I am going to cross-post the meat of the recommendations below, though you can view the original here. I tried to get a little creative, though I should point out that all of these suggestions grew in at least in part out of conversations I had with folks in Afghanistan this month. (Per usual, I steal all my best ideas from smarter people.) The views expressed below do not represent the views of ISAF, I should hasten to add, though they probably do represent the views of many frustrated civilian analysts and junior officers doing the heavy lifting in this war.
***
1. Cut Funding for the War
This may seem a bit counterintuitive, to say the least. But right now, the massive amount of money flowing into Kabul is fueling the conflict. In a bizarre way, both the Taliban and the Afghan government currently have an interest in perpetuating this conflict: Both parties are making millions of dollars from the aid and development money saturating the country. These funds are distorting incentives and presenting ample opportunities for kickbacks, bribes, and other forms of corruption. It is little wonder Transparency International rates Afghanistan the world's third most corrupt nation.
The United States and its allies should only spend the money in Afghanistan they can properly manage and oversee. They should also focus on developing ways to spend resources more wisely in Afghanistan. One way to do so -- and here any congressional aides reading this should grab a notebook and pen -- would be to allow aid and development funds not spent in one fiscal year to roll over to the next. Well-constructed aid programs, such as Afghanistan's National Solidarity Program, have trusts established that allow funds not spend in one year to be spent later. But within the U.S. government, that's not the case: Money not spent is lost from year to year.
Military officers, for example, are familiar with the concept of the "SPENDEX," where all ammunition not used in the course of the year is fired -- sometimes wildly -- at the end of a fiscal year, so ammunition allotted for the next year is not cut. The same principle applies to aid -- but instead of wasting bullets, the organizations waste dollars. Rather than face the prospect of reduced development funds in the future, development and military officers are under pressure to spend every penny they are given. But doing so simply feeds the Afghanistan's distorted economy, which only benefits the insurgency and corrupt Afghan officials. We must first fix the perverse incentives in our own system in order to fix those in Afghanistan.
2. Compromise on Combat Enablers
Every day, the president is faced with the difficult task of determining how many resources should be expended on foreign engagements when compared with competing domestic priorities. Obama has decided to implement a soft "cap" on troop numbers in Afghanistan, limiting troops deployed to the number he and the Department of Defense agreed upon in the fall of 2009.
At the same time, however, the president and his team should be flexible enough to support the commanders in eastern and southern Afghanistan with the critical "enablers" they need to be successful tactically. More than anything else, our field commanders need more heavy-lift rotary-wing assets in Afghanistan. With a limited supply of helicopters, it is incredible difficult to operate in the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan. The president should commit more CH-47 helicopters to Afghanistan immediately, even if he has to "trade" David Petraeus an infantry battalion in order to keep the overall number of troops more or less the same. The military also needs more intelligence platforms, including drones and observation blimps. Finally, the development of local security programs like the Afghan Local Police could be sped up if more Special Forces A-Teams were committed to the effort.
3. Reinvent, Don't Replace, the Special Envoy
Trying to replace a diplomatic giant like the late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke is a fool's errand. The president should not even try. But he will still need officials responsible for coordinating U.S. policy between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The comparatively low-key acting Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Frank Ruggiero, should keep Holbrooke's team in place to do just that.
As far as the regional "super envoy" job that Holbrooke attempted to fill (with mixed success, it must be said), it might be best left to a respected United Nations diplomat -- such as Lakhdar Brahimi, who had earlier successes enlisting the support of Afghanistan's neighbors. State Department officials and CENTCOM commander James Mattis, along with envoys in Kabul and Islamabad, could then be used to properly allocate diplomatic and military resources between the two countries.
In Afghanistan, Ambassador Karl Eikenberry is likely headed home soon. The president and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton should spend more time searching for his replacement than trying to replace Holbrooke. I'm sure Gen. Petraeus would appreciate an attempt to lure former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker out of semi-retirement and back to the region.
4. Find and Pressure Dual Citizens
Analysts regularly note how difficult it is to apply pressure to corrupt Afghan officials and local power brokers. However, many of these officials possess citizenship in countries other than Afghanistan or have children residing in other countries. To my knowledge, no effort has been made to compile a list of these individuals and use the laws of the United States and other Western countries to prosecute corrupt officials outside Afghanistan. U.S. intelligence agencies should busy themselves compiling this list immediately.
There is a precedent for this approach. Mahmood Karzai, brother of the Afghan president and an American citizen, is currently the subject of a federal corruption probe in New York. Western governments can surely build cases against other Afghan political actors judged to be involved with illicit activity -- or at least use the threat of investigations as a source of leverage over them. For many Afghan power brokers and their families, a Western passport is their escape plan from Afghanistan should the country descend into a chaotic civil war. U.S. intelligence services should pressure these power brokers to act responsibly today by endangering their plans for tomorrow.
5. Go Long
Afghans live in fear that the international community will abandon them. Although the Taliban is unpopular, normal Afghans are just trying to survive, waiting to see how this conflict will turn out. Pakistan, meanwhile, is hedging its bets, supporting proxy actors like the Quetta Shura Taliban and Haqqani Network that might counter Indian interests in Kabul after the United States and its allies eventually withdraw. The insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan are one of the two Achilles heels in the NATO strategy, the other being governance in Afghanistan.
One way the United States might counter both Afghan fears as well as Pakistani predictions is by signaling a long-term military commitment to Afghanistan. As the United States and its allies transition from a resource-intensive counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, we should be prepared to leave behind 25,000 to 35,000 special operations forces and trainers beyond 2014. Afghan leaders, including President Hamid Karzai, have long desired a concrete U.S. security commitment to Afghanistan. Such a residual force will both protect U.S. interests in Afghanistan and Central Asia after the departure of the bulk of U.S. and NATO troops, and will also signal to Pakistan that their strategy of employing hard-to-control violent extremist groups poses a larger long-term threat to Pakistan's stability than it does to the government in Kabul.
***
Finally, if you really can't get enough of my commentary on Afghanistan, here I am on the Diane Rehm Show yesterday. I got a little testy when one guest made some statements about the insurgency without backing them up with hard evidence. But looking back, I really should have apologized for being somewhat rude.
I forgot to mention your #1
I forgot to mention your #1 the other day. Great point. I've dealt with it in another arena that sounds counterintuitive. Casualty/death benefits. In Illinois, in addition to all the Federal pays (SGLI, death gratutity etc...) Illinois now gives families an addition 260k or so. It can rip a family apart with all that money coming in, not to mention when you have blended/split families or absent parents jumping in for the cash. There is a thing as too much sometimes.
I hope your idea catches on (which means it probably has no chance). Not just funding the war, but elsewhere across the Fed govt. Ending "spendex" across the Fed govt might not solve the deficit, but it wont' hurt and might very well jump up productivity. Spending money might be the single worst "metric" anyone can have... and we've run the government(s) on that single metric for years.
Andrew, maybe Ive missed it
Andrew, maybe Ive missed it but Im still sort of wanting to hear the parameters of sucess, what constitues a "win". I think cutting out the contractors, and maybe replacing them with some sort of international (dare I say UN?) workforce that doesnt work for profits may be a very freaking good idea, to put it mildly. The trackrecord of the (especially US) companies in the first 7 years was abyssmal. Sometimes capitalism doesnt work.
Oho, what ya think about the new regime in military justice for the original leaker, Bradley Manning? hes not even sentenced, and you torture him? Crazy fcks. Assange is a hero in Europe.
http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2010/12/14/manning/ind...
PS. More drones and SF? The
PS. More drones and SF?
The question Im thinking to that is if the enemy is anywhere close to a breaking point. As far as I can see, they are not. 3 years more of drone-and-SF is, as far as I read what limited indicators I can get, not going to be enough to seriously degrade the enemy capacity. The more leaders you kill in the intervening years, the more bloodfeuds do you occur. If we accept as a fact that Taliban will survive 2014, then we got to adapt and perhaps regroup. Its a shame that you didnt start a serious engineer-division with foreigners recruited (philiphines?) in 2005.
I agree with the third set of
I agree with the third set of recommendations. The second and fourth are interesting; a more helpful reaction to them would have to come from someone with greater specialized knowledge than I have.
The fifth recommendation is all about reassuring Pakistan, or more specifically Pakistan's security services, that America will help enable the indefinite continuation of their idiotic contest with India; "countering Indian interests in Afghanistan" with the aid of the Haqqani gang and those people in Quetta means murdering Indian diplomats and the Afghan civilians and government officials who work with them. While we're reassuring the Pakistanis, their proxy actors will be using an American residual force as a target. No.
The first set of recommendations here has real merit. As I understand it, the battle over whether unused foreign assistance funds should carry over into subsequent fiscal years has been a long one; a Congress careless about most other kinds of spending has been jealous of the leverage yearly appropriations gives it over State and its unpopular foreign aid programs. The handling of aid money spent in Afghanistan is just collateral damage.
However, it's not at all unusual elsewhere in the federal government for appropriated funds to be handled more flexibly. Washington couldn't fund many research projects if it weren't, for one thing. For another, earmarked appropriations frequently involve the relevant federal agency negotiating a grant agreement with a non-federal organization that ends up getting the appropriated money, specifying deliverables, procedures and reporting requirements. These grant agreements are often written to allow expenditure of funds over a multi-year period.
So this can be done. A negotiation with the relevant Appropriations subcommittees in each house of Congress to secure permission to carry over funds and establish some kind of regular oversight regime would be required. The modern Congress does not like to do oversight, and if the Obama administration really wanted to do what AM suggests in this area it could more easily have worked this out while Democrats had large majorities in each house. But, as the World War II admiral said about how to implement his idea of defeating German U-boats by boiling the Atlantic Ocean and forcing them all to the surface: "I have given you the idea; the technical details are up to you."
Exum, 25-35,000 SF and
Exum, 25-35,000 SF and trainers require how many combat and combat service support folks? My estimate is at least 60,000 plus one contractor for every serviceman so how is the cost of your set of proposals different from what is on the ground now? In fact with a lot more CH-47s and Petraeus's tripling of air strikes it could be more expensive. As usual dicking around with tactical issues clouds the strategic problem which is the cost.
The idea that the war was somehow "under- resourced" has always been preposterous. All you needed to do was go to Kabul, Leatherneck, Bagram and Kandahar and look at the hoards of fobbits and air wing upon air wing to know that it was the use of the resources the military had that was the problem and not some stinginess on the part of congress.
Your proposal does nothing to address this.
What about those pop pop
What about those pop pop poppy fields? Isn't it time to seriously break out an "I don't like the drugs (but the drugs like me)" moment?
Scorched earth? Bribe farmers to grow okra or watermelons? Or, instead of outright annihilation of poppy fields, refinement and distribution centers, perhaps these items could be added to Great Satan's arsenal of strategic resources.
Why not? Oil weaponry has been around a while. Commonwealth is not above using energy as a weapon against Europa.
If total control -- or near total control is gained of Afghanistan's poppy fields -- not only would it starve Taleban (and al qaeda) cats of much needed fundage -- these nasty nasty things could be placed on the option table -- like a military option.
It would be way more humane to use the threat of heroin as a strategic resource against certain autocrazies and unfree regimes until -- the poppy - lation of addicts has doubled -- or tripled -- causing the regime to totally break down.
After that -- 'freedom programs' to unburden survivors and save them from their addiction would be far more humane than possible future encounters with -- o, say "Rock Of The Marne"
Thank you for putting Jessica
Thank you for putting Jessica Matthews in her place.
Sorry but you are in the
Sorry but you are in the "Pointing Out All the Things Going Wrong in Afghanistan" business Exum.
Any solution worth its salt would consider "what could go wrong". The problems that we are pointing out are not new problems, they were known up front. The real questions is why were they ignored ?
I hear and I forget. I see and I remember. I do and I understand. The heck of it is the taxpayer is giving these yo yo's six-figure salaries for this shit. Remember that when you get your PhD and join them Andrew.
Option #1 is not an option. Why? Cause Congress is not going to defund the troops, that is not patriotic. Get serious, no baby kissing Congressman is going to tell the soldier's parents, "I defunded your child at a time of war".
All the rest of the Options are just more of the same circle jerk.
Here an obvious option............
AQ has changed strategy. In the beginning, AQ was in Afghanistan. As US strength grew in Afghanistan, AQ moved in to Pakistan. Pakistan will not let US troops operate within its borders therefore the battle is not longer in Afghanistan. Because AQ's stategy has changed, so should the US stategy. This is an ever changing fight. The US will stand down in Afghanistan to a CT strategy in order to stay vigilant to an AQ reoccurance. AQ is operating in several countries of the world as proven by recent attacks on the US from Yemen and activity seen in Africa and South America. On going CT operations in these area will continue.
How about that. Some times the truth is the best solution. All the money that is being dropped in Afghanistan is from the COIN strategy and the surge. If AQ has morphed, then the battle has changed and the orignal concept of victory changed with it. Every one saves face. Congressman can keep on kissing babies. Obama says "darn AQ" I really wanted to win this one. Miltitary does not have to prove anything cause the enemy ran away to a different country, "darn borders, wish those countries would work more with us".
Meanwhile, it is still open season. The dark side eats money. You can tell that by SOCOM's & CIA's budget (Yup Spendex is alive and well there too and it will never go away cause it is classified).
If they do it right, AQ will be shitting their underwear rather than lighting them up.
PS....PAK news agencies are really talking about the $20 BILLION the CHINESE gave Pakistan. Pakistan is call the Chinese the "best" Pak friend. Good, Pakistan has a new sugar daddy. BYE. BYE.
The press conference by Gates
The press conference by Gates et al. is well worth watching - surprisingly enough, it was a pretty clear assessment. (Imagine what Donny Rumdoodle would have said in their place? "Well, there are unknown unknowns that I don't know about, chuckle chuckle smirk")
http://www.c-span.org/Events/President-Discusses-Afghanistan--Pakistan-Strategy-Review/10737418251-2/
Funny enough, the various other news outlets heavily edited that interview to fit their political agenda (yes, the different corporate news channels all have their own propaganda agenda - FOX vs. MSNBC, etc.) - but CSPAN put up the unedited version. It's pretty hilarious to compare them - it really shows how the corporate spin artists edit this stuff - and only CSPAN shows shots of the reporters asking the questions. MSNBC, FOX, CNN - what a bunch of spinmeisters. How many reporters do they have in Afghanistan, after all? Point proven, case closed. Ignore that garbage.
A few points are in order, tho:
1) Missile defense is a bogus pile of crapola. Spin it left, spin it right - it's technical garbage, not much different from the 'zero-emission coal plant' claims. It'll never work. That entire program should be flushed down the toilet, along with the cyberwarfare program (it's hilarious how WikiFraud has been pushing those neocon agenda points, by the way - does this mean they are tied to the far right MI6 types?). Unfortunately, dirty Congressional slobs like Lieberman are counting on those cash flows - that's why they were put in office, after all - to get those crap deals signed.
2) Don't put the fossil fuel cart in front of the military horse, please - they tried doing that in Iraq in 2004, pushing the production-sharing agreements, and that gave huge PR to the insurgency. The Taliban will do the same if the US State Dept tries to set up bidding deals for a trans-Afgani pipeline, won't they? Don't get greedy, or it WILL blow up in your face again.
3) Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan - that's the critical document, the one everyone should still be reading and rereading. http://www.cnas.org/node/3924
"Based on its integrated intelligence, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines took steps to subvert the Taliban power structure and to strengthen the elders’ traditional one. The battalion commander partnered with the district governor, traveling with him constantly and participating in impromptu meetings with citizens to build their confidence in Afghan and U.S. security. To demonstrate the benefits of working with the Afghan government, the battalion facilitated development projects that addressed grievances identified through coordinated surveys of the populace by Marines and civilian officials. These efforts paid off. The district governor persuaded elders to reconstitute a traditional council featuring locally selected representatives from each sub-district. The council now serves as the primary advisory board to the Afghan government in Nawa. "
Keep that up, and the Taliban will eventually be marginalized and isolated.
Why COIN does not
Why COIN does not work.....
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870407380457602391176793001...
Under the revised tactical directive, which is classified, Special Operations forces are instructed to provide villagers with a list of individuals who have been detained and information about who is holding them. The units will provide receipts to account for any items seized during night operations. Forces will also provide leaders in raided compounds or villages with claim information, enabling civilians caught in the fighting to seek compensation for any damaged property.
You go for the hearts and minds of the people in a foreign country while you piss all over your own.
My government mandated automoble insurance (which I am learning is unconstitutional) will not cover "acts of war". If it did cover "acts of war" all I would get is "compariable replacement" which is another way of saying I am going to either get bondo putty or someone's rusty fender on my bright and shiny new car.
How does FEMA do it? Everyone gets a new house after a flood?
It all depends on what the government wants.
Folks that got offshored in the US before the recession got lip service and still lost their homes. Current unemployed are getting their third unemployment insurance extension. Not sure what the people that applied for HAMP got, guess they got HUMPED.
So this is what FUCKING YOURSELF feels like.
Part of my job
"... for problems I've previously exacerbated."
FIFY.
Your welcome.
Cut Funding for the War This
Cut Funding for the War
This may seem a bit counterintuitive, to say the least. But right now, the massive amount of money flowing into Kabul is fueling the conflict. In a bizarre way, both the Taliban and the Afghan government currently have an interest in perpetuating this conflict: Both parties are making millions of dollars from the aid and development money saturating the country. These funds are distorting incentives and presenting ample opportunities for kickbacks, bribes, and other forms of corruption. It is little wonder Transparency International rates Afghanistan the world's third most corrupt nation.
The United States and its allies should only spend the money in Afghanistan they can properly manage and oversee. They should also focus on developing ways to spend resources more wisely in Afghanistan. One way to do so -- and here any congressional aides reading this should grab a notebook and pen -- would be to allow aid and development funds not spent in one fiscal year to roll over to the next. Well-constructed aid programs, such as Afghanistan's National Solidarity Program, have trusts established that allow funds not spend in one year to be spent later. But within the U.S. government, that's not the case: Money not spent is lost from year to year.
Military officers, for example, are familiar with the concept of the "SPENDEX," where all ammunition not used in the course of the year is fired -- sometimes wildly -- at the end of a fiscal year, so ammunition allotted for the next year is not cut. The same principle applies to aid -- but instead of wasting bullets, the organizations waste dollars. Rather than face the prospect of reduced development funds in the future, development and military officers are under pressure to spend every penny they are given. But doing so simply feeds the Afghanistan's distorted economy, which only benefits the insurgency and corrupt Afghan officials. We must first fix the perverse incentives in our own system in order to fix those in Afghanistan.
Premise #1 De-Bunked. @ what point do we stop beating a dead-horse Mr. Exum? It's been 10 years & the U.S. Mission has achieved nothing. Billions spent, thousands dead, & yet people like you're still beating the drum for a metric that exists only in a U.S. framed concept! It's nuts!!
#2Compromise on Combat Enablers
Every day, the president is faced with the difficult task of determining how many resources should be expended on foreign engagements when compared with competing domestic priorities. Obama has decided to implement a soft "cap" on troop numbers in Afghanistan, limiting troops deployed to the number he and the Department of Defense agreed upon in the fall of 2009.
At the same time, however, the president and his team should be flexible enough to support the commanders in eastern and southern Afghanistan with the critical "enablers" they need to be successful tactically. More than anything else, our field commanders need more heavy-lift rotary-wing assets in Afghanistan. With a limited supply of helicopters, it is incredible difficult to operate in the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan. The president should commit more CH-47 helicopters to Afghanistan immediately, even if he has to "trade" David Petraeus an infantry battalion in order to keep the overall number of troops more or less the same. The military also needs more intelligence platforms, including drones and observation blimps. Finally, the development of local security programs like the Afghan Local Police could be sped up if more Special Forces A-Teams were committed to the effort.
Premise # 2 De-Bunked. The enablers that should be cut are you Mr. Exum! You cater to sustaining the war effort in Afghanistan because you have staked your lofty reputation on this conflict. It's nothing more than flattering power in order to obtain/maintain position/favor!
#3Reinvent, Don't Replace, the Special Envoy
Trying to replace a diplomatic giant like the late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke is a fool's errand. The president should not even try. But he will still need officials responsible for coordinating U.S. policy between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The comparatively low-key acting Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Frank Ruggiero, should keep Holbrooke's team in place to do just that.
As far as the regional "super envoy" job that Holbrooke attempted to fill (with mixed success, it must be said), it might be best left to a respected United Nations diplomat -- such as Lakhdar Brahimi, who had earlier successes enlisting the support of Afghanistan's neighbors. State Department officials and CENTCOM commander James Mattis, along with envoys in Kabul and Islamabad, could then be used to properly allocate diplomatic and military resources between the two countries.
In Afghanistan, Ambassador Karl Eikenberry is likely headed home soon. The president and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton should spend more time searching for his replacement than trying to replace Holbrooke. I'm sure Gen. Petraeus would appreciate an attempt to lure former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker out of semi-retirement and back to the region.
Premise# 3 De-Bunked. By all means lets re-assemble that winning team from Iraq David Petraeus & Ryan Crocker for Afghanistan. That's it, that's my response! This is the team that bumbled around Iraq re-constituted for a go in Afghanistan!!!
#4Find and Pressure Dual Citizens
Analysts regularly note how difficult it is to apply pressure to corrupt Afghan officials and local power brokers. However, many of these officials possess citizenship in countries other than Afghanistan or have children residing in other countries. To my knowledge, no effort has been made to compile a list of these individuals and use the laws of the United States and other Western countries to prosecute corrupt officials outside Afghanistan. U.S. intelligence agencies should busy themselves compiling this list immediately.
There is a precedent for this approach. Mahmood Karzai, brother of the Afghan president and an American citizen, is currently the subject of a federal corruption probe in New York. Western governments can surely build cases against other Afghan political actors judged to be involved with illicit activity -- or at least use the threat of investigations as a source of leverage over them. For many Afghan power brokers and their families, a Western passport is their escape plan from Afghanistan should the country descend into a chaotic civil war. U.S. intelligence services should pressure these power brokers to act responsibly today by endangering their plans for tomorrow.
Premise#4 De-Bunked. This would only work for the U.S created Karzai Central Government. They're only one of many tribes, gangs through out Afghanistan. So, assume we use your plan? How does that work for the other factions in Afghanistan? It doesn't, you lose leverage outside of the Karzai Central Government. Hell, we put Karzai in power & now you want threaten prosecution? How bout we prosecute idiots such as yourself who support this war effort which in turn is a confirmation of Karzai?
#55. Go Long
Afghans live in fear that the international community will abandon them. Although the Taliban is unpopular, normal Afghans are just trying to survive, waiting to see how this conflict will turn out. Pakistan, meanwhile, is hedging its bets, supporting proxy actors like the Quetta Shura Taliban and Haqqani Network that might counter Indian interests in Kabul after the United States and its allies eventually withdraw. The insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan are one of the two Achilles heels in the NATO strategy, the other being governance in Afghanistan.
One way the United States might counter both Afghan fears as well as Pakistani predictions is by signaling a long-term military commitment to Afghanistan. As the United States and its allies transition from a resource-intensive counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, we should be prepared to leave behind 25,000 to 35,000 special operations forces and trainers beyond 2014. Afghan leaders, including President Hamid Karzai, have long desired a concrete U.S. security commitment to Afghanistan. Such a residual force will both protect U.S. interests in Afghanistan and Central Asia after the departure of the bulk of U.S. and NATO troops, and will also signal to Pakistan that their strategy of employing hard-to-control violent extremist groups poses a larger long-term threat to Pakistan's stability than it does to the government in Kabul.
Premise # 5 De-Bunked. In the previous premise you want to prosecute players in Afghanistan & in this said premise you want to continue propping up the Karzai Government?! Wow!! Is it Go Long, Go Along, or Go Home Mr. Exum?? You can't both prop up & prosecute a President thrust upon the Afghan People by the U.S.of A.
“… here I am on the Diane
“… here I am on the Diane Rehm Show yesterday [12-15-10]. I got a little testy when one guest made some statements about the insurgency without backing them up with hard evidence. …”
@AM, I missed hearing your appearance on the Diane Rhem NPR show Wednesday. However, I did speak briefly with Bob Woodward on Monday’s NPR Talk of the Nation.
First, I asked Woodward about the backstory to Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s firing, referring to the two meetings held May 6 and 11th (pp. 352, 354 of “Obama’s Wars”) during which McChrystal received a “strike one” and “strike two.” Unfortunately, Woodward provided no juicy details about what was discussed during these meetings just a month before McChrystal was fired.
Second, I asked Woodward to comment on how Gen. McChrystal’s key role in the Army’s cover-up of Pat Tillman’s friendly-fire death has been whitewashed by the Washington establishment. Bob Woodward responded,"...of course, McChrystal was in the chain of command, … But he was not the hands-on person making that decision."
“Not the “hands on“ person! Really? Unfortunately, I called up on the fly and hadn’t prepared my questions. Here’s the question I should have asked Bob Woodward when I had the chance:
. . .
In your book, “Obama’s Wars” (p.154), you wrote that Gen. McChrystal had merely "... signed off on the Silver Star recommendation that suggested Tillman had been killed by the enemy ..."
However, Jon Krakauer in his book, "Where Men Win Glory" (pp. 334 – 347 paperback edition), described how Gen. McChrystal personally "administered the medal recommendation process" with a false narrative that "was painstakingly written to create the impression Pat Tillman was killed by enemy fire" and directly supervised the Ranger RGT commanders who altered the two Silver Star witness statements. The Silver Star recommendation was "fraudulent" by "any objective measure."
But instead of merely having "signed off" on a piece of paper that landed on his desk, Gen. McChrystal had "orchestrate[d] what can only be described as a broad conspiracy to conceal Tillman's fratricide ..." [Note: Krakauer's account was based largely on sworn testimony by Gen. McChrystal, COL Nixon, LTC Kauzlarich, and LTC Bailey obtained by FOIA].
And Mary Tillman, In response to President Obama’s May 2009 nomination of Gen. McChrystal as Afghan war commander, wrote in her book, “Boots on the Ground by Dusk”: “Not only is he [McChrystal] lying about the circumstances surrounding Pat’s death, … he is proposing false language for the Silver Star narrative.”
Mr. Woodard, were you ignorant of the facts of McChrystal's role in the Tillman case, did your your high-level sources deceive you, or were you doing your part to whitewash Gen. McChrystal’s central role in the cover-up of Pat Tillman friendly-fire death?
. . .
@AM, my final question for Woodward applies equally to you. On your blog, you’ve contributed to the whitewash of McChrystal, “made some statements … without backing them up with hard evidence,” and written a biased WP review of Krakauer's book [see “He Who Shall Not Be Fact-Checked” in the post “The [Untold] Tillman Story” at http://www.feralfirefighter.blogspot.com].
P.S. You forgot to mention in your previous post about “Obama’s Wars” that Bob Woodward put your blog at the top of his list of “helpful” blogs (p. 419). Your modesty is commendable.
Add your comment