Center for a New American Security

Abu Muqawama, Why no henna on

Abu Muqawama,

Why no henna on the beard? Dude, ya need to go native. :-)

On intelligence, can you share your observations of the G2s [chief intelligence officers for us civies] in ANA combat infantry battalions, ANA combat manouver brigades, and ANA Corps?

A common anecdotal observation from many Afghan hands [non Afghans who have spent time there and actual Afghans] is that the Afghan NDS [CIA equivalent for us civies] has long had good intelligence at the granular record, better than anyone else. But the NDS was bad at sharing their intelligence real time with ISAF and ANA Army Staff, and Corps G2s [let alone ANA battalion and brigade G2s.] Has this improved at all? Have the intelligence silos within the ANSF [between different parts of the AUP, ANCOP, ABP, ANA, NDS], within ISAF [each ISAF country's intelligence assets plus different parts of the US government ], and between the ANSF and ISAF improved? If so, how?

Can you share your observations on "combined partnership" "embedded partnering"? On ISAF OMLTs/POMLTs [US versions of which are called ETTs and PTTs for us home gamers?]

One negative observation about Woodward was his failure to push you on granular details. For example, he might have asked you to describe what provinces and districts you visited and to compare and contrast. Obviously ISAF/ANSF are more optimistic in Helmand and Kandahar than they were a year or two ago, but is the same true in provinces where the Taliban are winning?

Afghanistan is in the details. In my view ISAF/ANSF are winning in Helmand, are starting to reverse some Taliban momentum in recent months in Khost; while ISAF/ANSF are losing in Baghlan, Kunar, Nuristan, Logar, Nangarhar. We were losing until a few months ago in Wardak, although Wardak might be stabilizing.

Andrew, you could have elaborated on your answer about why you are confident that ANSF capacity will increase. I would have said that in November, 2008, when Obama was elected:
-the total number of ANP being trained at any given time was one or two thousand. That number is planned to hit 23 thousand ANP being trained at any given time by the end of 2011.
-The Afghan Defense University or ADU had a lot less than a thousand students. Now the ADU is in the process of expanding to 6,500 or so students

The entire ANA only planned to train 1,850 NCOs per year until November, 2009. Now the ANA trains 17 thousand NCOs per year. The Turks alone train 2,700 ANA NCOs a year [900 at any given time for 14 weeks each at the Ghazi Military Training Center], or more than the total number of NCOs the entire ANA planned to train per year until November, 2009.

A few statistics like these help illustrate the depth of change in Afghanistan since November, 2009.

I was also surprised by your answer to Woodward's question about a 400 K strong ANSF. The MoD minister Wardak, ANA Chief of Staff Karimi, senior ANA officers, MoI minister, and senior ANP officers are openly and publicly demanding a 400 K ANSF. There are numerous articles on ISAF's and NTM-A's website where the goal of 400 K ANSF is advocated. This is the GIRoA position, that they are strongly demanding.

It is almost inconceivable that the ANSF can defeat the Taliban over the long run with less than 400 K, unless Pakistani behavior changes. But how likely is that?

ISAF needs to publicly commit itself to funding, training, advising and supporting a 400 K ANSF ASAP. This would do much to improve relations between Karzai and ISAF, which you acknowledge is a problem.

It wouldn't hurt to mention what ANA Chief of Staff Karimi continually repeats. In 1973, during general peace and prosperity, the ANA had over 200 K men under arms and a target of 250 K. The equivalent today of a 600 K ANSF. The Najibullah ANSF was larger in per capita terms [ANA strength/Afghan population] than 400 K ANSF in 2013. The Najibullah AAF [Afghan Air Force] in the 1980s had:
* 90 x interceptor MiG-17 - one regiment of MiG-17s and MiG-19s reported at Mazar-i-Sharif in 1990.[11]
* 45 x interceptor MiG-21 - in 1990, thee squadrons were reported at Bagram Air Base[12]
* 60 x fighter-bomber Su-7, Su-17 Warplane,
* 45 x light bomber Il-28
* 150 x helicopter Mi-8, Mi-24
* 40 or more transports, including the An-26, An-24, and An-2
The 1980s ANA had thousands of armored vehicles.

If the current ANSF hopes to prevail against the Taliban over the long run, and persuade Pakistan to abandon the Taliban, it is going to need similar capabilities.

We need a lot more honesty in our discussions about Afghanistan. If we can't acknowledge something as obvious as that the ANSF needs to be boosted substantially in size, capabilities and quality to win this war; then we are living in Oz and might as well start searching for silver shoes.

Publicly committing to supporting a large and capable ANSF over the long run would do more to improve Afghan perceptions of ISAF, and change Taliban/Pakistani/regional calculations in positive ways than a commitment to keep large numbers of ISAF troops in Afghanistan indefinitely. Not to mention it would cost about 10% as much.

Sorry for the overly long and winding comment.

Good presentation. Quick

Good presentation.

Quick question on the sanctuaries.

The massive amount of military and developmental aid we give to Pakistan does give us leverage in a sense, but does it provide leverage over the right actors? As you note the Pakistani actors in question (the military, the government and the ISI) are unitary and have unique and probably divergent interests. Does our massive aid give us leverage over the right actors? The right actors probably being the ISI in this case, the presumed host of these sanctuaries. Would threats of aid withdrawal give President Zardari the incentive to act or merely marginalize his position further? What about Gen. Kayani? Is the risk of destabilizing Pakistan further worth the reward? Can sanctuaries by addressed without a larger effort on Kashmir? It would be interesting to here Londonstani's views on this.

It seems from top to bottom every player in the US recognizes this as a key, if not the key, problem facing the US in Afghanistan and it probably warrants its own report. In 'Responsible Transition' it wasn't fleshed out to the proper extent. Perhaps our knowledge of the human geography of Afghanistan has improved markedly over the past 18 months, but it seems our knowledge of the Pakistan human and political geography is missing.

Er, by "those parts" I meant

Er, by "those parts" I meant in the governmental-solutions-industrial-DC complex or whatever.

Also, despite my snarky tone, I have genuine sympathy for the solutions-generators. Genuine sympathy.

Good luck, man.

t, If we want leverage over

t,

If we want leverage over Pakistan, there are many things we can do. We could do what Russia and India have been urging us to do since 2001, fully develop the Northern supply routes. This means donating many billions of dollars to build infrastructure in Northern Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan. Much of the money for this could be donated by India, Russia and China.

We could also spend many billions on building transportation infrastructure connecting China to Afghanistan. China needs this infrastructure to import Copper [from Aynak], Coal, Chromite, Iron and other high weight, high volume, low cost imports from Afghanistan in any case.

The Northern and Chinese supply routes could easily meet Afghanistan's and ISAF's needs. But it would take years to build this infrastructure, and the process needs to start now.

Pakistanis would see that the Pakistani supply line into Afghanistan will be superfluous within a few years, which would give the international community, ISAF, GIRoA leverage over Pakistan now [even before the Northern and Chinese supply lines are fully operational.]

Another way to increase leverage on Pakistan is to surge ANSF size, capacity and quality. One of the reasons Afghans and ANSF personel believe that ISAF purposefully kept the ANSF weak until November, 2009, was because Pakistan demanded this. This remains one of the largest causes of tensions between Karzai/GIRoA/ANSF and ISAF to this day.

Pakistan factions, which sees the ANSF as a potential enemy, are likely to respond by increasing support for the Taliban. But as long as ISAF surges ANSF capacity more than some Pakistani factions surges Taliban/AQ capacity, this is a good trade.

Another thing we could do is to publicly declare that ISAF would welcome Iran, Russia, India and China into NTM-A subject to President Karzai approving it, reaffirming that the choice of inviting them into NTM-A is up to President Karzai alone. This would not allow Karzai to privately spew crazy conspiracy theories that ISAF might be backing the Taliban against him, and would stop Karzai from blaming ISAF for why Russia, India and Iran are not helping the ANSF. The ANSF personal would also stop blaming ISAF for why Iran, Russia, India and China are not helping them.

One immediate consequence of this policy would be many thousands of Indian trainers joining NTM-A under LTG Caldwell's command, in addition to Indians offering billions of dollars in new grants to the ANSF and GIRoA.

Pakistan needs carrots as well. This should include admission into NTM-A.

One of the issues that has angered Pakistanis the most is how President Karzai has repeatedly refused to allow Pakistan to train the ANSF and Afghan civil servants. We should publicly declare that ISAF would welcome Pakistan into into NTM-A subject to President Karzai approving it, reaffirming that the choice of inviting them into NTM-A is up to President Karzai alone. President Karzai probably still does not allow a major Pakistan role. But Pakistanis could blame Karzai for that rather than ISAF.

One potential carrot would be for NTM-A to buy the Afghan Air Force 100 Pakistani manufactured JF-17 light attack 4th Gen fighters with slight multifunction capabilities, conditioned on positive Pakistani behavior related to the Taliban. This would win the GIRoA and ISAF a powerful lobby within Pakistan. 100 JF-17s would cost $3 billion up front, and $10 billion in life cycle costs over 20 years, assuming the Afghans only fly their JF-17s 250 hours a year over 20 years. Probably $15 billion over 20 years in life cycle costs is more realistic if Afghanistan uses their JF-17s for CAS against the Taliban.

This would also save the Pakistani Air Force money over the next few years as they delay their procurement of JF-17 fighters to give the Afghan Air Force first dibs. The Pakistani Air Force plans to buy about 250 JF-17s, or rather use Chinese and American grants for this purpose. In addition to Chinese and American and international tax payers buying Pakistan upgrade kits for 48 F-16A/B Block 15 models [from the Reagan aid package in the 1980s], 12 F-16C, 24 F-16D Block 52+, and 150 Chengdu FC-20 [China's most advanced 4.5 gen fighter or J10B.]

Other potential carrots would be addition economic grants directly to competent state and district governments inside Pakistan for economic development.

Madhudi, part of the problem is that Pakistan is fighting a civil war and it is in all of our interests that some factions in the Pakistani civil war lose. This is why the world as a whole, including India, has to do what we can to facilitate Pakistani economic development, private sector growth and Pakistani civil society. These are the natural enemies of the Taliban inside Pakistan, and the natural constituencies inside Pakistan pushing for better relations with India, Afghanistan, Russia and the West. This is the natural constituency arguing for a free trade, free investment agreement with India . . . which would substantially boost Pakistani economic growth and could save Pakistan in many other ways as well.

Madhudi, know you were being snarky when you said America was dismantling AQ. But more seriously, AQ can't be dismantled without dismantling Sirajuddin Haqqani. The combine he leads seems to include TTP, TNSM, Lashkar e Taiba, Lashkar e Jhanvi, Jaish e Mohammed, IMU, IJU, Osama Bin Laden/Zawahiri.

Lashkar e Jhanvi now seems to be lead by Iiyas Kashmiri [who became famous for leading Brigade 313 against India during the 1990s.] Iiyas Kashmiri also leads Lashkar al Zil, Brigade 313, Brigade 055, Brigade 095, Sipah e Sahaba. It looks like Iiyas Kashmiri was involved with Headley in Mumbai 2008. Iiyas Kashmiri's forces also broke an experienced 1-201 ANA combat infantry battalion in Laghman earlier this year, the first time that an experienced ANA combat infantry battalion has ever been broken since 2001. Some Pakistanis who know a heck of a lot more than me regard Iiyas Kashmiri as a near peer slightly autonomous subordinate to Sirajuddin Haqqani.

It will be extremely difficult for Pakistan to turn on their long time asset and ally Sirajuddin right now. But if there was a free trade, free investment deal with India, if 100 JF-17s were being sold to the Afghan Air Force, if Pakistani civil society [including the Pakistani education system] was strengthened by many billions of dollars in international grants [not only from North America, Europe, Japan, South Korea, Australia and China, but hopefully some from India as well], then there would be a powerful advocacy lobby inside Pakistan demanding that the Pakistani Army take Sirajuddin out.

We all need to think long term about how to strengthen anti Taliban Pakistanis and facilitate them transforming Pakistan into a successful state.

Londonstani, do you have any thoughts, since you understand Pakistan far more than I do. It is even conceivable that you might know Pakistan as well or better than Madhudi. :-) Damage control . . . Madhudi obviously knows a thousand times more than I do.

Londonstani, is there any way to persuade Pakistanis to buy home made JF-17s rather than imported new F16s from the US and JB-10s from China? The JF-17s could be almost entirely funded by international grants and would boost the Pakistani economy unlike Gen 4.5 imports. What earthly reason does Pakistan need for top of the line Block 52 F-16s anyway, except to deliver nuclear bombs far outside Pakistan's borders? Turboprops are much better for CAS than F-16s. JF-17s are more than good enough for Pakistan's needs. China can modify some of them to be nuclear capable.

Cheers for having Cspan

Cheers for having Cspan archive the event. Today I had a look, and listened to Exum's appearance on Diane Rehm. BTW cheers to DR for having Jessica Mathews; Woodward seemed tough & that's good.

The questions I would ask is, What are some realistic scenarios for Afghanistan's economy in 2015, 2010, 2020, 2050? What will be Afghanistan's relationship with China and with India?

To the extent China wishes to challenge the US on the global stage, it's very much in their interest that the US continues to associate itself with an utterly corrupt narco-state and its utterly corrupt nuclear-armed neighbor that is the poster-child for failed democracy, the disputed line between these two states having come about due to the machinations of Western powers and being a locus of US adventurism under Saint Ronald, and blow-back and failure under Shrub.

To the extent India is awakening to the rise of China, it has the potential to offer Afghanistan (and even Pakistan, not to mention Iran, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Vietnam, etc. etc.) the opportunity to become a ground of contention and competition rather than a mere client state.

Fortunately for us all, neither China nor India is overly fond of the sort of political Islamism which expresses itself by suicide bombings against civilian targets.

Even absent the ongoing financial mess as the West refuses to write down massive quantities of bad debt, whether yet privately held or assumed transparently or otherwise by sovereigns, the trend lines have been clear for some time. A US polity running giant deficits in its trade balance, its federal spending, and its state and local spending (add in pension obligations and unwillingness to control health care costs for even more fun) might continue to find the means to dominate global shipping choke-points. But can it assure that the hinterlands of Central Asia harbor no small group, with extensive connections and a half-million dollars to exploit some oh-so-obvious-in-hindsight weakness? We're either going to find others to do it, or find a way to acknowledge that "That's life" and I'd prefer while accepting a bit of the latter we focus on how we can do better about being smart and realistic to maximize the former.