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How Many Forced Entry Brigades Does One Army Need? (Updated)
Here's a question for the readership as we try and wrap our heads around the proposed cuts to the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. (I'm not smart enough to comment on the proposed cuts to the U.S. Navy and Air Force, respectively. Go here for comments on the former.) I was surprised to read this quote from Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Greg Newbold in the Times concerning the cuts to the USMC's Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle:
“We’ll just pray that we don’t have to go into harm’s way in the next 10 years."
Really? I have to confess that Lt. Gen. Newbold is one of my favorite retired general officers. I got to know him when he was serving on our board of directors and really respect his service, integrity and intellect. But the first thing I thought when reading this was, Holy cow, do we really need more forced entry capabilities?
I did the math in my head while riding on the Metro this morning and counted four brigades in the 82d Airborne, four brigades in the 101st Airborne (Air Assault), one brigade (4th) in the 25th Infantry Division (Airborne) and one brigade in Europe, the 173rd Airborne, in addition to the 75th Ranger Regiment. That's 11 brigade-sized elements capable of conducting forced entry operations in the U.S. Army alone. How many airfields are we going to need to seize? And would we have conducted as many amphibious landings in the Second World War if we had rotary-wing platforms as we do today?
My beloved U.S. Army made it through the proposed cuts in the defense budget relatively unscathed, so maybe I should keep my big mouth shut, but if I were a congressional staffer, the above is one of the questions I would be asking.
Readers, please sound off in the comments section of this post -- especially if my thinking is wrong-headed here.
Update: Some great comments here. Over the Twitter Machine, @ndubaz notes that what I am really talking about is forced entry capable brigades. He is correct. Another commenter wonders if I have lost my sanity: of course these brigades are not interchangeable, right? Again, correct. The 75th Ranger Regiment most obviously differs from the others, as does the 101st Airborne from the 82d Airborne. But I lumped all these brigades in for a reason -- the nuances in capabilities will not stand out to your average congressional staffer in the same way they will to, say, one of the many officers who have served in the 101st, the 82d and the 75th. Finally, Gulliver linked to this must-read piece by (Marines) Bob Work and Frank Hoffman. That piece, though, rests on the assumption that "Retaining the ability to project power and conduct landing operations into hostile territory remains strategically important to American global interests." Needless to say, that's an assumption that even folks to the right (or is it left?) of Andy Bacevich might contest -- especially given other capabilities within the ground forces.
Cancelling this program
Cancelling this program doesn't preclude DOD from developing a similar capability later on down the road. It's impossible to predict the future but I doubt a situation will present itself in the near future that would exhaust our existing capabilities for forced entry using the units above as well as the existing expeditionary capabilties of the Marines. At a time when our forces in Afghanistan need better linguists, and much more of them, along with more HUMINT capabilities, we continue to waste money on big ticket items. We keep spending for success in the next war instead of spending for success in the one we're currently fighting to please constituencies that want jobs.
This has been a troubled program from the beginning and it's a good idea to quit wasting money on it. Kudos to Gates for taking an unpopular stand.
Your post implies that the
Your post implies that the 82nd Airborne, 101st Airborne, 25th ID, 173rd Airborne, and 75th Rangers do the same mission, in the same way, as MEUs and embarked Marines.
Really? I have to confess you're one of my favorite milbloggers. I've been reading you for years, and respect your opinion and analysis. But the first thing I thought when reading this was, Holy cow, he thinks this AND works for Nate Fick?
We should just buy the ZBD-05
We should just buy the ZBD-05 or ZTD-05s from China.
I agree that Rotary Aircraft can do forced entry somewhere and then Amphibs can launch LCACs with regular, cheaper IFVs for much less money than the EFV. All I can see the EFVs being are hanger queens. Do you think the USMC would use them like they did the AAVs in Iraq? The hyper-expensive EFV would get trashed like any other vehicle when hit by a IED. Therefore all its troop-carrying capacity and that 30mm probably wont be put at risk. They will likely spend more money on MRAPs and other such things for wars like the ones we are in now.
The question we ought to be
The question we ought to be asking is whether "amphibious landing" and "forced entry" are still synonymous, and/or whether they will be synonymous into the future. Bob Work and Frank Hoffman don't think so, and I agree with them. They propose a new lexicon that respects the reality of stand-off weapons and the development of area-denial approaches, substituting "theater entry" and "littoral maneuver" as the evolutionary descendants of "forcible entry" and "amhibious assault." The piece is a must-read on this subject.
To bring it back more directly to what you've written: yeah, there's likely to be a continuing requirement for forced entry, though it's probably not going to be as significant as what it's been in the past, and it's not likely to be as focused on seaborne/amphibious operations as a simple result of the evolution of weapons and tactics. The Marine Corps needs to be thinking bigger about how it fits into an operational reality where faster-moving amphibs that launch from 60 miles out are no more survivable or useful than slow amphibs that launch from 30 miles out, and where the real friction point for landing operations will come with breakout and maneuver from a secure beachhead rather than opposed landing across a narrow front.
What this ought to remind us is that it's useless to talk about force structure and capability requirements without first examining the current and future operating environments to make sure we're finding materiel solutions -- and beyond that, operational concepts and an entire DOTMLPF solution -- that are appropriate for them. Oh yeah, and let's try to guess right, too.
Ex, I'm with Visitor 4.47 on
Ex, I'm with Visitor 4.47 on this one (well, the first sentence anyway :). Still need amphib capability, need to be able to sustain that initial force and shape for follow on forces which requires lots of lift, as in ship sized lift. Also amphib capability is really useful for all sorts of other stuff, not just forcible entry. Plus, if we're fighting urban, littoral it's very handy to be able to make use of that coastline.
That said, I'm not sad to see EFV go. Best SecDef ever.
It's this soldier's duty to
It's this soldier's duty to inform you that you missed the three brigades of the most deployed unit in the Army- 10th Mountain- and its one at Fort Polk.
The issue for cuts is best address when discussing the private intelligence-related contractors involved in theater operations. As an intelligence analyst, it's difficult to adequately express in typed word the disdain many of us actively-serving analysts have for these 'contracted analysts'. Oftentimes, they do nothing but accept paychecks, undermine our own assessments, and grow beards.
Climb to Glory,
Climb to Glory, 10thMountainFire. I am a Polar Bear alumnus myself (Afghanistan '02), but neither the 25th ID or the 10th MTN DIV have the lift capability of the 101st or the airborne capability of the 82d or those other brigades.
With the exception of the Sky
With the exception of the Sky Soldiers, aren't all of those units based in the US?
Are they going to fly all the way to the every far-flung area of unrest where our politicians decide US intervention is necessary? Are they going to orbit the area for weeks and months waiting for the order to execute? Ever heard of Gator Squares or Gator Circles?
I'm not accusing you, Ex, but I'm so sick already of people who say we haven't done an amphib op since Inchon. While it didn't use tracs, the invasion of AFG was an amphibious assault, by definition. And there have been dozens of other amphib ops in the past 20 years. Taking armed men and women from the sea and putting them on foreign soil is a necessary skill for our country, but that doesn't mean it has to look like Tarawa. With a little imagination and a review of the Falklands War I bet you could come up with a few scenarios where, in addition to helos/Ospreys, having amtracs would be handy.
I forgot to include the link
I forgot to include the link to ref "dozens of other amphib ops in the past 20 years":
http://blog.usni.org/2009/05/25/amphibious-operations-1990-1999/
Great work by Galrahn.
I'm not saying we should not
I'm not saying we should not have any amphibious capabilities. Goodness gracious, if that was true, we could just pack up the Marine Corps or incorporate it into the Army. But it's worth asking how much of each capability makes sense given a) scenario planning, b) available resources and c) other military or spending priorities.
"we could just pack up the
"we could just pack up the Marine Corps or incorporate it into the Army"
Not that anyone has ever suggested anything as silly as that ...
4-31 INF... I was 1-32 INF,
4-31 INF... I was 1-32 INF, 'Chosin'. Glad to meet a fellow Drum vet. I enjoy reading your work. Thanks for sharing it with us all.
In the calculation of
In the calculation of forcible entry, or forced entry capability, the ground element is only one piece. Work and Hoffman's article makes the calculation based on the lift ability at any one time. Currently, for the naval services, that equates 30-33 amphibs in service, which means about 2 MEBs worth of lift (of course that means being able to sortie every ship, whcih can't be done in a timely manner). For the airborne, I think the Air Force can lift about 1-2 BCTs with the aircraft available. While I respect the airmobile capability in the Army, it can only conduct strategic forcible entry if emplaced next to the target area. If I remember correctly, the 101st was the most operationally mobile division in the Army, but strategically, one of the hardest to move from CONUS (with all its helos, etc.).
Feel like I should point out
Feel like I should point out that of the 11 units identified, four are currently in Afghanistan, another mostly is, and three more just got back from there or Iraq within the past 5 months. Also, that the 101st's vaunted lift capacity is totally committed to Afghanistan, where its aviation brigades rotate through like any others.
"Goodness gracious, if that
"Goodness gracious, if that was true, we could just pack up the Marine Corps or incorporate it into the Army."
WTF?
You are starting to sound like Donald Rumsfeld with that stupid "goodness gracious" stuff!
One of the most controversial
One of the most controversial situations / incidents to occur in Pakistan in many years hasn't hit your blog yet AM? What am I speaking about? The arrest / trial of Malik Mumtaz Hussain Qadri... Why haven't you or Londonstani written something on it?
The overwhelming news from the middle east and radical Muslim propaganda on the internet concerning this A-hole turns my stomach... See below...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jn1gWvE17MI
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=raOr5lP3-QE&feature=related
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gOoYo5P4XJ8&feature=related
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IKrRXHjZa7w&feature=related
Obviously, proper vetting for Malik Mumtaz Hussain Qadri did not occur. Who's responsible for this religious radical to carry a firearm and be a bodyguard in Pakistan?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ko1P64bhW0
Brings back memories of
Brings back memories of taking a tour of the EFV program in Woodbridge in 1999. Our instructors touted it as the new way of acquisition and development. The building was set up so that the Marine and their civilian counterpart were in the exact same spot on different floors. They had grand plans for the new gun developed for the EFV and selling it to the USN for use on upcoming platforms.... What a BOONDOGGLE.
How about this? The army concentrates on the BIG strategic fights (anyone with a large convential force) along with FID stuff etc... and the USMC sticks to being the President's Big Stick going from crisis to crisis. That was what I was told a decade ago and it still stands. Just like the world needs ditch diggers too, we need Marines with guns to do the dirty day to day residue of realpoltik.
I'll ask what seems to hew
I'll ask what seems to hew most closely to Gulliver's point:
Is there *any* forcible entry capability within the US military? Within any military, for that matter? Given the state of - dare I say it - the "offense-defense balance," does can a forcible entry be conducted today?
When was the last successful, heavily-contested airdrop? (I'm going to exclude Panama.) Does Operation Market Garden count? Is Inchon the example one wants to cling to (60 years ago?) for successful amphibious operations?
There might be forcible entry-capable units in the US military, but I doubt their ability to execute - or any military's ability to execute - true forcible entries.
My understanding is that the asymmetry between an integrated air defense system and a cargo plane full of paratroopers is such that a successful *contested* airdrop is simply not feasible. Similarly, my understanding is that the asymmetry between an "integrated anti-beach assault system" and a wave of amphibious landing craft is such that a successful *contested* amphibious assault is simply not feasible.
Still, correct me if I am wrong - I may well be, and I am probably (no doubt someone will say "definitely") not staying in my lane on this one. But the amateur military historian in me prompts these assertions, or, at least, questions.
ADTS
And so it begins. Step 1:
And so it begins. Step 1: start the propaganda machine and get Fox News to run a story on Gates canceling the Marines amphibious TANK. Because that sounds so much more badass than saying vehicle. In a week it'll have wings and be piloted by a fully trained ninja dolphin and run on potato grease. A green machine for the green machine! Nobody could cancel that!
Not a very good justification
Not a very good justification for a number of army divisions. What exactly are the 25th and 10th Mtn for? They don't have the aircraft to be airborne, the armour to maneuver against even a third second rate enemy or the amphibious skills of the Marines?
I think parachute units long ago lost their tactical usefulness; certainly in the number the US has, and never had strategic use.
Where to cut? Certainly the EEV is overkill. Army light infantry seems to fill a niche that could be done by the USMC or Army airborne units. I'm unsure of why the 75th Ranger Regiment exists beyond tradition and why the 82nd Abn or USMC couldn't be assigned whatever combat missions it has. I reject the notion of Tier One support as being a rationale to keep three Ranger battalions that drain high quality manpower from the main force. I also suspect SF has expanded past the point where many of its team aren't simply replicating what rifle platoons or squads should be able to do. SF should retract and improve the quality o its average member. My sense is that SEALs have out grown their proper role of supporting the fleet and should be limited to operations where salt water can be smelled. Finally it would seem that the need for heavy forces is waning and could be moved more into the reserve/ National Guard sphere.
A much smaller active combat force? Yes and a much smaller active and civilian support force as well. The recently announced "$78 billion cuts"- really tiny reductions in the increase of growth of a part of defence spending while others increase - should be just the start to getting the DOD budget back below $400 billion.
I just reread the update
I just reread the update comments about the ability to project American power with some of the more unique units. One part of the history of the 82nd tells the story of Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. The Clinton Administration was able to persuade the military leaders in Haiti to step down because of the prospect of the 82nd and U.S. Special Operations conducting a forcible entry into the country. Not a single shot was fired and the situation de-escalated. Now that is power projection.
The 101st does no exactly do
The 101st does no exactly do forced entry. It can conduct air assaults, if you use the helicopters, in which case the assumption is someone can stage you wihin about fifty miles of wherever you wantto execute the forced entry. The inspections required to preflight a helicopter after flying it in a USAF aircraft are considerable. If you want to call the 101st force entry, so is every other light IBCT and I think that is a stretch. In mayn ways you can deploy a bradley faster on a C17 than a UH60. Dont have to worry about the bradley taking off and crashing ath the end of the flight.
Remember with the 82nd, if you want a BCT at 18 hours notice, with the lead bn at 2 hour recall, it takes three to get one. Someone is training, someone is doing maintenance.
Two of those airbone BCTs are OCONUS. Which is a plus, as well.
I have no doubt that every
I have no doubt that every last bit of the military (and it's Congressmen) can justify it's existence and the need for additional expensive gear. This is part of the problem and why the latest suggested "cuts" are so piddling.
If anyone hasn't noticed the US military failed in Iraq and is failing in Afghanistan. Certainly arguments that "X" unit is needed because it does "Y" in Afghanistan need to be investigated. My observation is that most US military folks in Afghanistan do nothing to inconvenience the enemy and suck up so much logistics that they are actually harming our effort.
Could someone explain why Rangers etc are needed to conduct night raids on homes? Couldn't normal infantry just as easily attack the wrong house? Are a couple of peasants armed with AKs beyond the capability of the 82nd Abn? If so why?
If SF are so valuable because they have medics who can help locals why are they so busy doing DA? Boredom? Gong hunting?
Seems to me that the question
Seems to me that the question here is and always should be what are the US interests?
Each and every comment is discussing bits and pieces of the whole, that is myopic. What is the future of America? Where will America fight? When are they going to fight? Who are they going to fight?
No body has a crystal ball and America has growing limited capabilities. We have enough nuke power to handle just about any attack. You could draw the line there, but reality sets in.
Gates gave up $78B in cuts over FIVE YEARS. That is about $16B/YR! The real story was that the defense contractor stock did not drop!
Then the next day Gates asked for $120B ! You give me 120B, I give you 16B back.....Bernie Madoff would be proud!
Congress is cutting their operating budget by 5%. Whooo Hoooo. A Congressman gets about $1.5M /yr to operate their operations (multiply that by 550 odd individuals !). That does not include their $170,000 odd/yr salary!
http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/97-1011.pdf Think the raises are more than the cost of living ! Congress should be service not a salary.
Sixteen BILLION in the DOD budget is chump change, they are not even trying to cut the budget !
Someone needs to do their job that they get so well paid to do and decide what the US military should look like (ie...capabilities) then make a realistic road map to get there complete with realistic spending.
What we normally get is a shot gun approach. Cover everything so it looks good on paper. Paying for it sucks.
US GDP can not expand expodentially for ever. Government is long on drama and short on meaningful planning. You would think that well educated people could do better with college degrees. Sometimes you have to say NO. These countries we are helping have nieghbors that can afford to take care of business (purchased gasoline lately?). It is time other countries dig deep. How many jobs have US workers given up to the Asian Rim? That job loss comes back as health care costs in an employer based health care system. Do the math, less workers, premiums skyrocket.
I would like to know how much the CIA is giving up in its budget.
This concept of being the world's cop and cavalry need to end. Yeah, we are suppose to the the good guys. The Marshall plan was about getting people back on their feet. A dependence has set into the worlds thinking. When do we stop pouring money into the world?
Sounds like 10th Mountain /
Sounds like 10th Mountain / US Army has got some big problems at the top of their chain of command.
Hope they keep this sicko locked up for life.
http://www.watertowndailytimes.com/article/20101223/NEWS03/312239958
How many forced entry
How many forced entry brigades does one Army need?
The answer lies in the desired ability to project force over the horizon to seize key terrain in order to deliver decisive combat power anywhere in the world. The United States Armed Forces must have the ability to seize airfields, beaches, ports in order to mass combat power to achieve decisive victory. Of course, the transition from major combat operations to stability operations (OIF, 2004) is difficult. Notwithstanding, the ability of American Military Forces to conduct forced entry operations is a platform to project American Military power.
National security is distinctly linked with the US ability to reach across the globe to conduct military operations. The number of forced entry units can change, but the capability to seize a foothold, beach head, air head are critical to the projection of that force. The simple fact that we, the US, can conduct these types of operations validates the military aspect of our national power. The Airborne, Marine, and Ranger capabilities are enduring.
Second, the number of units designated with forced entry capability should, at a minimum, be redundant. The capability to conduct two airborne operations, two amphibious landings, two invasions. The military necessity of having two of each capability is a blinding flash of the obvious. The disciplined application of these capabilities is impressive, but inherently dangerous. Should a forced entry force become disabled, another force must be available to replace it and conduct the mission.
Third, the required number of forced entry capable units that the US would need is tied directly to goals set out in the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and the Quadrennial Defense Reviews.
In the age of Lean Six Sigma, budget cuts, and do everything devices, caution the politician or military leader that designs one formation to do it all. Knowledge, experience, and best practices are kept at the organizational level. Forced entry operations are difficult even for the experienced units. Directing the military to create a force with such a broad focus is a bad idea. The forced entry units are already multi-role, multi-functional and used in support of current operations. Marines, Paratroopers, and Rangers are all conducting missions inside and outside of their primary mission set. However, upon return to home station, re-certification of mission critical skills is conducted to maintain American forced entry capability.
Limiting forced entry capability, by shortchanging strategic military forces, is a prelude to offering advantage to another country. The cost of maintaining our current set is far less than spending to rebuild our national interests abroad.
Ex- I still have those teeth!
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