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If you only read one thing today ...
... read this guest post by David Flynn on Tom's blog. Josh Foust is one of the best and most provocative Afghanistan analysts I know, but Flynn affirms, in his post, why I beg off from passing judgment on operations taking place in Afghanistan from Washington, DC: absent context as well as the ability to ask questions of the actors involved, you're vulnerable to being contradicted by the man in the arena. For all I know, Foust may well be correct in his analysis and criticism. But Flynn's credibility derives from his 20 months spent in the Arghandab over two seperate deployments, and between his testimony and Josh's criticisms, whose are you going to trust?
Bloggers and other researchers based in the United States, the United Kingdom and elsewhere should most definitely be criticizing strategy and asking hard questions about operations, tactics and the assumptions that inform both. But there is a darn good reason why to abstain from judging operations from afar without the requisite amount of documentary evidence or ability to observe operations yourself.
I look forward, though, to what I am sure will be a fun response from Josh.
Update: One question for the readers, though: Did Flynn actually address the central questions posed by Josh's critique? I don't think he did. He's not required to do so, of course, but if he is going to take the time to pen a response for Tom's blog, it would have been interesting to read a response exploring his tactical decision, how he dealt with the trade-offs involved, etc. A serving battalion commander dealing honestly with the hard moral and tactical choices of combat would have been enlightening. Instead, it falls to Kabul-based human rights researcher (and alumna of the St. Tammany Parish schools system) Erica Gaston to do just that:
On the one hand, it’s horrifying to see this level of property destruction, but on the other hand, from a civilian protection standpoint, it’s not great to leave these booby-trapped towns in the state that the Taliban left them. Given the way in which the IEDs and other explosives have been planted (often wired into the walls of houses), defusing them by other means would likely be incredibly risky and not feasible for a very long time. There’s no easy answer.”
The LTC's MO here harkens
The LTC's MO here harkens back to a paper I read a few years back titled "One tribe at a time" by Jim Grant. Empowering local security forces is obviously a fundamental to COIN and nation building; the key here is recognizing which entity should get those resources. Sometimes, national governments such as Afghanistan's aren't the target for training and resources. Either way, cudos to the LTC for his candid yet proffessional response.
Cheers
> But Flynn's credibility
> But Flynn's credibility derives from his 20 months spent in the Arghandab
for precisely the same reasons, most people might say that it's his un-credibility this shows.
Come now Andrew, you really
Come now Andrew, you really cant be saying folks back home should not be passing judgment on operational matters because we the pogues back here lack context?
That is a dangerous, even militaristic prospect. I can hear voices from the past saying the same thing about people in the US judging Calley.
Your post confuses me utterly, you want it both ways; you want to lecture us to defer to the judgment of the man on the ground, but at the same time you say that we should be criticizing too. Well what is it?
You yourself Andrew are conflicted on these matters. I am not. To be sure I appreciate the view of the man on the ground, but I also see the absolute necessity for analysts like Foust (not "pundit" as Flynn meanly quipped about Foust) to continue with their critical eye (and remember, Foust does have on the ground experience in Afghanistan too).
You are inverting Clemenceau: War now is too important to be left up to the politicians [and civilians].
gian
"Flynn's credibility derives
"Flynn's credibility derives from his 20 months spent in the Arghandab over two seperate deployments, and between his testimony and Josh's criticisms, whose are you going to trust? "
Right because the US military never exaggerates success and downplays adversity in Afghanistan . . . if you don't want to trust Josh I disagree but that is certainly you're right. But why you take the word of Flynn (or anyone in the USM) who has every possible reason to present this in the best possible light is beyond me.
"Flynn's credibility derives
"Flynn's credibility derives from his 20 months spent in the Arghandab over two seperate deployments, and between his testimony and Josh's criticisms, whose are you going to trust? "
Right because the US military never exaggerates success and downplays adversity in Afghanistan . . . if you don't want to trust Josh I disagree but that is certainly you're right. But why you take the word of Flynn (or anyone in the USM) who has every possible reason to present this in the best possible light is beyond me.
"Flynn's credibility derives
"Flynn's credibility derives from his 20 months spent in the Arghandab over two seperate deployments, and between his testimony and Josh's criticisms, whose are you going to trust? "
Right because the US military never exaggerates success and downplays adversity in Afghanistan . . . if you don't want to trust Josh I disagree but that is certainly you're right. But why you take the word of Flynn (or anyone in the USM) who has every possible reason to present this in the best possible light is beyond me.
Wait, wait, wait. O-5s give
Wait, wait, wait. O-5s give strategic guidance about what civilians can and cannot discuss?
Noted.
There are a lot of unanswered questions. It would be nice LTC Flynn would answer them, instead of critique the very people who defend his actions. For example, does this mean that, henceforth, anyone currently in Afghanistan automatically assumes the moral high ground in any debate about TTPs employed in Afghanistan?
That's a serious question. Just like the dozens of others raised already.
Has anyone asked Foust what
Has anyone asked Foust what decision he would make at Tarok Kolache ?
Have you asked yourself?
I know what I would have done.
Seems the only opinion that really matters in this discussion are the people who lived in Tarok Kolache and they are not here to speak for them selves.
BTW. Good friend of mine was part of Americal in Vietnam. Calley was a fall guy. Like my friend said to me, "It was a war zone, you could be shot for not following an order". I could not pass judgement on Calley unless I lived a week in his boots leading up to the event. That is part of the deal when a country puts a rifle in a young man's hands, you have to take part of the responsibility good or bad. We all pull the trigger in one way or another. It was easy to get confused in Vietnam.
Flynn may know what's he
Flynn may know what's he doing but the chances are considerably less than 50-50. If military senior officers were usually right this and Iraq would have be sorted out years ago. It's the incompetence of the "professional" military that has drawn out these occupations and made them so expensive.
The point isn't credibility.
The point isn't credibility. It's information. How do I know that Mr. Foust has enough information to judge that particular situation effectively?
Maybe he does. Maybe he doesn't. What about this comment to his original post:
- commenter Jack on Registan
So, how am I supposed to judge the situation - not that I am inclined to judge individual episodes like this. It's Monday morning quarter backing and I've never even been in the military! How does a post like that help the likes of me? Someone who wants to be fair and keep track of things. How am I supposed to take the heated rhetoric and back-and-forth?
I don't like to make judgements without information and without the requisite expertise. Yeah, yeah, I know, I know, I complain all the time about Afghanistan strategy. But I make sure to pepper some of those comments with: "I don't really know" or "maybe I'm wrong."
I sort of blew up at Mr. Foust over at Registan and I feel bad about that because it's exactly that sort of thing I don't want on this sort of post. I want explanations. Calm, rational explanations. The gotcha stuff just confuses me. I have no right to complain because I do it too, but, jeez.
He's smarter than this.
Madhu, This keeps coming up
Madhu,
This keeps coming up again and again. We work off the information we have. Paula Broadwell could have started by actually describing what happened. When the officers became involved in these exchanges, they, too, could have started by explaining what actually happened, instead of blowing up in holy outrage that a civilian dared to question their decisions.
As for this Jack character... let's just say his story doesn't mesh up entirely with what officers on previous tours of this part of Arghandab have told me. Including a former POLAD, who recounted a 2008 conversation he had with the elders of Tarok Kolache in which they begged the Americans not to patrol nearby precisely because they did not want to become casualties in a battle between the Taliban and the U.S. So yes, you are correct, there is more to this story—from both ends. Much more. But guess what? If people—we fetid and whiny analyst/pundit/orators—had not raised a stink about the clumsy propaganda that started this whole gory story, we'd never have gotten this additional information.
So yes, as more information emerges we ***should*** be updating our analysis of what took place. That is... analysis. Andrew, I'm a little surprised that you're so quick to praise tactics and operations and so hesitant to critique them. Just as I'm surprised to see you fall back on the experiential bias so quickly. I don't buy that we can only ever evaluate what we see first-hand—if that is the case, then we should disband the entire intelligence community, and a good 80% of all military staffs. It is just a ludicrous standard for comment, I don't know what to say beyond that.
Similarly, it's pretty weak sauce to say that one should be skeptical of field reports, but trusting of the ones we should question. That bird don't hunt, neither.
If I thought the man in the
If I thought the man in the arena had judgement substantially inferior to my own, I wouldn't worry about his contradicting me.
Frankly, the fact that Col. Flynn thought it worthwhile to debate a stateside critic in print marks my estimation of his judgement down quite a bit to begin with. That his response didn't directly address Foust's criticism doesn't raise it back. And his conclusion, as posted on Tom Ricks' FP blog, made me doubt in a big way the judgement of the officers to whom Flynn reports, as Flynn reported himself "cautiously optimistic" that he could attain objectives of the most limited value to the United States.
Building on Joshua's post
Building on Joshua's post about Ex's throwing the e-card (experience card) down on the table, and Ex mildly suggesting for folks to back off and say to themselves, "wo, he is the commander or guy on the ground so therefore he knows."
Anyway if Andrew's dictum of experience were applied in late 19th Century Prussia we would have never heard from one of the most trenchant and important critics of modern military thought, Hans Delbruk, since he never served in uniform, never heard a shot fired in anger, and had not a lick of military experience. More over with this kind of logic the only historians able to write on women's history should be women, because they are the only ones with experience being women; or to write a history of gays in America using this logic the historians themselves would have to be gay. But of course such logic is silly.
Experience matters in military affairs to be sure, but in American democracy we should never allow it to become the oracle since the result would be militarism.
gian
Awwwwww. Bloggers "citing"
Awwwwww.
Bloggers "citing" the law.
so the LTC decided to abandon General Petraeus' orders and the legal restrictions on arming militias and give them weapons and training anyway.
Care to cite the particular restrictions?
And our continued refusal to think beyond six months from now -- starting with General Petraeus demanding unrealistic results by the summer and moving down the chain of command -- is creating bad decisions, inspiring LTCs to break the law and use short cuts to try to eke out progress for a good OER, and, ultimately, ruining any chance of a long-term success in this area.
Well the LTC pretty much demolished Foust's argument of "collective punishment" by detailing the risk to his troops, and the very people who lived there from what was in that village. Maybe Foust should have read his own post --
The village of Tarok Kalache was laden with IEDs and homemade explosives (HME) comprised of 50-gal drums of deadly munitions.
So I'd like to know what law anyone is exactly breaking.
Oh and this.....
I’m really struggling to see how such behavior does not violate Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention—that is, how this behavior is not a war crime, especially given the explicit admission that such behavior is merely for the convenience of the soldier and not any grander strategy or purpose.
Ummmmmm it was a town chock full of BOMBS and was a threat, ie. a target, for the LTC and his troops. A threat not only to the troops but the very people who were living there. And for the response to that threat? Proportionality of response my friend. Never is it taught that you have to get your troops killed just to save someone's house. If they enemy chooses to use it, it's a valid target, the force being proportional to threat. Given the size of the threat, which in this case was likely measured in TONS of explosives. So what is proportional? Well lets go to the 2010 TJAGSA OpLaw Handbook (page 12 for those reading along)
C. Principle of Proportionality. According to the principle of proportionality, the anticipated loss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained.12 Proportionality is not a separate legal standard as such, but provides a means by which military commanders can balance military necessity and unnecessary suffering in circumstances when an attack may cause incidental damage to civilian personnel or property.
1. Incidental Damage. Incidental damage consists of unavoidable and unintentional damage to civilian personnel and property incurred while attacking a military objective. Incidental damage is not a violation of international law. While no LOW treaty defines this concept, its inherent lawfulness is implicit in treaties referencing the concept. As stated above, AP I, art. 51(5) describes indiscriminate attacks as those causing “incidental loss of civilian life . . . excessive . . . to . . . the military advantage anticipated.”
So there you have it. A town chock full of explosives placed by the enemy with no reasonable (read SANE) way of removing them without taking a ton of time and likely a multiple lives. Nothing illegal in the LTC's actions and I would hazard a guess he'd have some real problems above and below him if he hadn't have taken his choice of action. Collective punishment? No. In fact if there is a CRIME here, as any 1st year law student reading this would have realized by now, it was commited by .... drumroll..... THE TALIBAN! (GASP)
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. *note not ratified by the US*
Article 51 Paragraph 2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.
This wasn't Monte Cassino Monastery where we created the problem and the Germans moved in, quite the opposite. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monte_Cassino The enemy in this case created the problem/target not to mention violated "the law".
So with the example of Tarok Kolache "demolished" Mr. Foust, before you want to sling around the words "collective punishment" you might want to cite a few more sources than one random person allegedly interviewed by an online newspaper, because the events detailed clearly do qualify.
But at least I can say one postive thing about Mr. Foust and his legal education.... at least he wasn't dumb enough to drop 250k on law school.
This keeps coming up again
- Joshua Foust
No, you're right. A critical eye is nothing wrong but I have a tendency to react to "tone". I've got to stop reacting to tone, slow down, and pay attention to substance.
Sorry.
So perhaps a man can write
So perhaps a man can write women's history, but a woman who actually lived through a particular period of history being shouted down by the man who wrote his version of it would be pretty silly, wouldn't it? Would the "e-card" have any bearing on that? Or is the "e-card" only irrelevant when it contradicts the opinion of one who does not carry it? When our opinions, generated from afar, are so dear that those who have seen with their own eyes are blithely disregarded, then those dear thoughts may be truly valuable only to the one who clings to them while blindly deflecting any criticism. In the above thread, we have examples of two ways to deal with having the e-card laid on the table. One way is to receive new information and regret its prior lack, celebrating that the distant critique brought forth new information to be considered. Another way is to deride the e-card as quite possibly completely without value, claiming that a critique based totally on principles and such incomplete reporting as is available may be the best of all possible critiques, so therefore personal observation may (perhaps must? be disregarded in the search for true enlightenment. An example of a brilliant critique is raised, an example of a great historian who had "never served in uniform." When personal professional experience clashes with the meme, the meme must hold firm.
For the second time in as many months, Hans Delbruck is raised as having never served in uniform, but he saw combat at Gravelotte and St. Privat, as a soldier, in 1870. But, perhaps if his service is disregarded often enough, that meme will also take on a life of its own.
Zathras Frankly, the fact
Zathras
Frankly, the fact that Col. Flynn thought it worthwhile to debate a stateside critic in print marks my estimation of his judgement down quite a bit to begin with
Doesn't keep Obama from debating his stateside critics.
Flynn was smart enough not to answer the questions, just like any politician would.
Ya'll can talk it up, but the only people's opinion that matters are the folks that got their house blown up.
.........and they get new homes....thank you Uncle Sam.
dude's, It's.over.come.home.
dude's,
It's.over.come.home. They now know they can hit us here, and will soon enuf to raise der volk to such a rage that only Allah knows what will happen.
But I will pass some S2
Phase I CDR: Sir Issac Newton
Phase II CDR: Sir Charles Darwin
I will LOL at anyone who dares guess at Phase III CDR.
Phase IV: Please dude, don't embarrass yourselves.
A note on Joshua Foust's
A note on Joshua Foust's comment in response to Madhu - if he was referring to me in his comment about a POLAD who reported fears of villagers being caught up in attacks due to presence of coalition forces, he got the sentiment correct but a couple of details wrong. The shura actually occurred in 2007, not 2008, and I do not know if any of the elders were from this particular village as the conversation was about the Arghandab District as a whole.
On the comments by Jack at the Registan website in which he claimed that all of the property in this village was owned by absentee landowner who evicted the tenants after being paid by the Taliban - I initially thought this made sense and presumed he was speaking as a member of the Arghandab DST. However, I noticed that the December Stars and Stripes article also cited at Registan has the following quote: "In Tarok Kalacheh, the Army has cleared the rubble and staked out the 13 landowners’ property, creating deeds of ownership that will be registered with the local government. Replacing the buildings and compensating the farmers for their lost revenue from pomegranate sales is going to cost more than $500,000, McGuigan said." This raises a couple of questions: Is Tarok Kalacheh the same place as the Tarok Kolache that is named in the before and after pictures? If so, did it have one absentee landowner or 13 landowners?
I have to take back my
I have to take back my previous comment about the discrepancy between Jack's account and the Stars and Stripes article. I mistakenly thought that Jack had said that there was only one absentee landowner when he in fact said that there were a dozen wealthy and absentee landowners. Therefore both accounts actually match - my fault for not carefully rereading reports before posting.
Joshua Foust is not offering
Joshua Foust is not offering up a meaningful alternative.
With out a meaningful alternative to what happened in Tarok Kolache, Foust is just a loose cannon on the deck.
With out a counter-strategy this debate is a waste of time and bullshit.
Comment by Visitor on January
Comment by Visitor on January 22, 2011 - 5:42am: srsly?
US OUT OF AFGHANISTAN
srsly? and really. US OUT OF
srsly? and really.
US OUT OF AFGHANISTAN is too easy, I think it is time to leave. It is not an option for the people on the ground that have to make decisions like Tarok Kolache.
If Joust wants to contribute he needs to offer solutions to help the guys making the hard choices....
....otherwise he should contact his Congressman.
I contact my Congressman and he has sent a letter to Obama requesting removing troops from Afghanistan. That might help the troops long term, short term constructive advice is more helpful.
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