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Egypt Trip Report: Part I
If you've been following my Twitter feed, you'll know I arrived in Cairo a few days ago and will be here for another few days doing some research. I tacked this short visit onto a trip to Europe to help train a unit preparing to deploy to Afghanistan, and I must say it's good to be back in the Arabic-speaking world during what continues to be an exciting time in the region.
This is my first trip back to Egypt since living here for seven months in 2006, and since I am no one's idea of an expert on Egypt and Egyptian politics, I am grateful to my friends here in Cairo for hosting me and providing me with plenty of people to meet with.
The research questions I'll be trying to answer here concern the position in which the Egyptian Army and other security forces now find themselves. I have two broad concerns: one is political, and one is tactical/doctrinal.
Politically, it is correct to note that the Egyptian military has more or less been one with the regime since the 1950s when the Free Officers Revolt replaced the monarchy here. But the military is at the same time in a position it has not been in for 40 years, directly involved with the day-to-day politics and decision-making in Egyptian life. Yezid Sayigh concisely and cogently explained the interests of the Egyptian Army after Mubarak in an op-ed that ran in Financial Times a week before Hosni Mubarak stood down as president. (In the interests of full disclosure, I should note that Yezid is my advisor at King's College, where he is doggedly pushing the submitted thesis of his most wayward student through the arcane bureaucracy of the University of London at the moment -- thanks, Yezid! -- but he is also one of the world's foremost experts on soldier-state relations in the Arabic-speaking world.) I agree with his analysis of the Egyptian military and have further concerns about the seemingly inevitable clash between its interests and the interests of the young revolutionaries on the streets as well as those of everyday Egyptians who have wildly inflated expectations about life after Mubarak.
First, there is a sense you get that many Egyptians honestly feel the only thing standing in between the Egyptian nation and greatness was the sclerotic Mubarak regime. Now that Muabark is gone, the military -- and whatever government that follows -- will naturally struggle to meet those expectations.
Second, the Egyptian people have now witnessed a dramatic display of people power: mass demonstrations effectively removed from power a man who seemed immovably secure in his post just one month ago. The incentives are there for every group of people in Egypt with a grievance (which is to say everyone) to now strike or demonstrate to see, in effect, what they can get. The military is growing increasingly frustrated with these demonstrations and has ordered them to cease. But the incentive structure is all wrong: even if you don't think you'll get anything, why would you not demonstrate right now? The worst case scenario is, you get nothing. But heck, you might get something!
One of the sources of the military's frustration leads to my third concern, which is the fact that even if the people have a valid grievance, there is no real authority to negotiate with at the moment. Egypt needs a transitional government of some sort, but right now, you've got people agitating for higher wages, back pay, and more reforms on the one hand, and a military on the other hand that is not prepared in the least to hear these concerns and act on them.
That all leads to my second broad concern, which is, as I said, more tactical or even doctrinal. The Egyptian military, like most militaries, is configured for major combat operations against the armies of other states -- not for what are, in some ways, stabilization operations on the streets of Egypt itself. And as an American who fought in both Iraq and Afghanistan after the conclusion of "major combat operations," it's possible to feel for the Egyptian Army at the moment.
First, the Egyptian Army is not prepared for and has no doctrine to support stabilization operations. The M1 Abrams tanks you see in downtown Cairo are as useless as the M1 Abrams tanks we had on street corners in Baghdad after the invasion. As we saw during the violence which preceded the fall of Mubarak, they're not exactly the best weapons for crowd control! (We Americans, of course, eventually made good use of those tanks in Iraq, but let's hope and pray things don't get that bad in Egypt.)
Second, we Americans paid -- and are paying -- a heavy price in Iraq and Afghanistan for the way in which the development of competent local police lags behind the development of the Army in both countries. In Cairo, at least, the police are rarely seen these days. The police officers you do see, usually directing traffic, never much respected anyway, have lost their ability to intimidate the people, who now periodically hurl abuse at them and who see themselves as having "defeated" the police during the demonstrations -- and not just in Tahrir Square but all over the countryside, where police stations burned from Upper Egypt to the Delta. But the Army trying to serve the functions of the police in preserving law and order is as awkward here as it is anywhere else. You need local police to preserve order, and though things in Cairo at the moment reflect a kind of good-natured anarchy, things might not stay that way if demonstrations continue and expectations remain unmet. (That having been said, Cairo has always been a city of neighborhoods, and locals in these neighborhoods usually do a damn fine job of preserving order on their own, thank you very much.)
Many analysts have, correctly, focused on the importance of the Army going forward. But the reconstitution and development of the police, in my mind, is probably even more important for Egypt's internal security.
So that's the kind of stuff I'm thinking about as I wander around pestering old friends and observing post-Mubarak Egypt. As anyone who follows this blog knows, I'm always more interested in what happens after a conflict or change in regime than in the conflict or regime change itself. Unfortunately for Egypt, I see more -- not less -- internal conflict and instability on the horizon. Let's all hope my initial analysis proves incorrect.
don't forget to research the
don't forget to research the status of the hated state security forces, amnat al-dawlah.
doesn't the abrams have a
doesn't the abrams have a beehive round. perfect for crowd control.
This makes sense from my
This makes sense from my distant distance, and I agree with "American," research state security forces.
But most of all, follow the money, follow the money, follow the money! Get into every possible government record and follow the money!
Even things as conspicuous as those tanks -- which, I remember reading, are mechanical disasters in the first place.
We know that certain American families arranged to divert billions and billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars to Mubarak and friends to buy those U.S. tanks. Who brokered the sales? Were they the same people who happened to be running the government of the United States, for instance? And did they happen to be longtime partners with a whole chain of equally corrupt, arrogant local warmongers?
Of course. There's no doubt that every penny you follow will wind up with the same international cult of family names. Don't wait for phony CIA operations like "Wikileaks" to direct you to red herrings. If you've got even a mousehole opening to get into your government's books, get after the money and you'll find the facts you need.
AM: I'd be curious to hear
AM: I'd be curious to hear your thoughts about how you go about reconstituting the police force without instigating a popular backlash at what would surely be interpreted as a retrenchment of the regime. It seems you'd have to pair it with major concessions, like the cancellation of the Emergency Law and amendment of the Constitution, especially Article 179 which made permanent many of the Emergency Law's provisions. It also seems that the more hated branches of the police, like the Central Security Forces, may never be accepted again.
Thank God, Abu, for American
Thank God, Abu, for American eyes&ears on the ground in Cairo with the backgorund,skill,talent and cajones to tell it like it is!! Bravo&thanks
1) I'm straying out of my
1) I'm straying out of my lane. Riot and crowd control are not areas I have any particular knowledge of.
2) It seems to me that M1 Abrams might be perfect for crowd control. To be flip about a massacre, see http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub623.pdf, the chapter on Tiananmen Square. I think the key variable is not the weapon at hand, but the "hearts and minds" of those who wield them. This too - http://www.lawyersgunsmoneyblog.com/2011/02/the-contingent-moment - is pretty interesting.
3) As another aside, does not Mansoor (P) write, in "Baghdad at Dawn," that the exhaust from the engine of an M1 Abrams is, indeed, another great instrument for crowd control.
4) It seems to me that while the Army can't control every street corner, none ever has, yet militaries have been able to intimidate (maybe more of a police or strictly intelligence function) or quash (perhaps, but not necessarily, a police or strictly intelligence function) many a demonstration which could have had greater consequences if only...There are selection effects - we pay attention to the riots that do have an effect, and claim the military's ineffectiveness, rather than the riots that ultimately do not have an effect, because of the military's effectiveness. (I think that applies to 2) above as well.) The military in Indonesia made the claim about what happened in 1998 Jakarta in re its inability to stop the pogroms that occurred - i.e., it's hard to use soldiers in cities* - yet for a slightly and somewhat skeptical eye, see Theodore Friend, Indonesian Destinies, http://www.amazon.com/Indonesian-Destinies-Theodore-Friend/dp/0674018346....
* Some chapters are probably more relevant than others. I leave it to your discretion to determine which is which.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub294.pdf
5) Are there or were there no specialized riot control police in Egypt, or Bahrain, or elsewhere for that matter, who have no force to cause a crowd to disperse and lose its potency, but without too much force to awaken the nascent feelings of their less active compatriots (e.g., use tear gas, not bullets)? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riot_police
6) I have never read Crane Brinton, Anatomy of Revolution, http://www.amazon.com/Anatomy-Revolution-Crane-Brinton/dp/0394700449, *but my sense is that revolutions tend to be long, drawn-out affairs, in the aftermaths of their nominal denouments.* After all, does not Skocpol http://www.amazon.com/States-Social-Revolutions-Comparative-Analysis/dp/... write about *the strengthening of the state following revolution* (perhaps wrongly, as David Laitin, "Post-Soviet Studies," Annual Review of Political Science, (2000) http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.polisci.3.1.117 points out in re post-1989 Russia). And doesn't Stephen Walt write that *revolutionary change often (thought not always) results in bellicosity between revolutionary and other states?* http://www.amazon.com/Revolution-Cornell-Studies-Security-Affairs/dp/080... (perhaps also wrongly, as Michael McFaul, "A Precarious Peace," International Security, 1997 points out about re post-Revolutionary (1989) Russia http://www.jstor.org/pss/2539356.)
7) What we did we just witness in Egypt? Regime change? Coup? Political Revolution? Social Revolution? Some? None? All?
8) Nice post. Have fun.
ADTS
Relooking a your post, your
Relooking a your post, your comment about incentive structures hit me. Arguably, *this is when incentive structures and preferences change,* *to the extent the latter are stable to begin with.* http://www.amazon.com/Unthinkable-Revolution-Iran-Charles-Kurzman/dp/067... I don't want to get into a discussion of constructivism and identity (in the IR sense), but simply to point out that *individuals'/militaries'/institutions'/societies' conceptions of themselves* in the world, or, perhaps more germane, the country, perhaps *change* in times like this. I'm not sure if a rationalist mapping of preferences and situations could provide a more satisfying explanation than another account of how some really brave people - and more people joining them, and soldiers unwilling to shoot those people - caused a regime to collapse (if that's what happened, which is what it looks like to me) in 18 days.
ADTS
I appreciate the effort that
I appreciate the effort that went into a report from the scene in Egypt. I don't mean that comment in a dismissive way, for here in the States the first exposure of many people to Egyptian politics was televised images of crowds in central Cairo within the last month. Anything additional to that is welcome.
It does seem to me, though, that AM's commentary is a little obtuse, coming perilously close to evaluating the situation in Egypt using metrics employed by the American military in Iraq. It lacks perspective in at least three important ways.
First, AM discusses the underdevelopment of non-military security forces as if it were a key, and distinct, problem Egypt had to address. Of the several problems with looking at this subject in that way, the most serious is that most of the Egyptian government is similarly underdeveloped. It is poorly placed to be responsible -- and legitimate, in the sense of being able to make and implement policy based on a popular mandate. The Egyptian army can't do education or economic development, collect taxes or fix the roads, but if it steps back from leadership in the government it has to step all the way back, and civilians have to step up to get these things done. The military may not want to do the first; civilians in Egypt may not be prepared to do the second.
This leads to the second area in which AM's take seems a shallow one. Egypt's situation today is unusual in the Arab world (by reason of the country's size), but not necessarily in the Muslim world. At least three other large, primarily Muslim states have large populations, outsized military establishments deeply enmeshed in both politics and the economy, and underdeveloped means of holding governments accountable for their performance: Iran, Pakistan, and Indonesia. The last of these is doing notably better -- with respect to politics, economic affairs and maintaining its international standing -- than the other two, for some reasons specific to itself and two that would seem to apply anywhere. The first of these is that Indonesia has recognized its security problem has having a great deal to do with developing a government responsive, and responsible, to its own people in fact, not just when it's convenient for the state security services. Pakistan's military, and Iran's, see primarily external security threats, and have oriented themselves accordingly. So has the Egyptian military. This means it will continue to have a claim on national resources that will sit like a dead weight on anything a post-Mubarak government tries to do; threats to that claim will be threats to the government.
The effort Egyptians will have to devote to squaring this circle will be effort they can't devote to solving their country's other big problem, which is its economy. The other reason Indonesia has been doing relatively better politically than Pakistan or Iran is that its economy has been growing rapidly. Iran remains oil-dependent; Pakistan has had periods of strong economic growth, but not relative to the growth of its population. I don't want to overstate the similarities among large, complex societies, but Egypt faces some of the same resource and population pressures as the other three countries. It apparently also has a large number of overeducated, underemployed young people whose economic future will be hard to square with their expectations, Mubarak or no Mubarak.
I don't believe we ought to be thinking of internal conflict and instability in a place like Egypt as things that just happen, and certainly not as products of weakened internal security forces. There are other countries today, each having enough in common with Egypt to provide some lessons as to the key problems facing that country after Mubarak, the things that ought to be done, and mistakes that need to be avoided.
I am glad to see someone
I am glad to see someone saying that the people are going to protest so they have to deal with it. Why not let each special interest group have a specific day to protest in Tahrir Square (maybe they should change the name to Protest Square) and voice their grievances with an ageed upon group of leaders. The original protest was about being heard!!! I also wonder how the young conscripted soldiers and the junior officers will deal with all of this. These people are their family and friends. Maybe they should let them speak up and say how they feel about the events. I doubt that they have the allegiance to the old regime like the older senior officers have. This might be a starting point for dialogue with the military. I think that the people might not want the old participants in the military around too much longer. They should speak up now. The lower level officers are probably quite capable of taking up the responsibilities and might be more acceptable for the future of Egypt.
Zathras: First, your post is,
Zathras:
First, your post is, per the usual, impressively comprehensive and incisive. A few thoughts for debate, if you're so inclined, re Indonesia:
First, "Indonesia has been doing relatively better politically than Pakistan or Iran [because] its economy has been growing rapidly." Support for this assertion? (I'm actually a big enough nerd that I actually started to open up the WB website to see the relative statistics, but then said, "Screw it, this is a blog post.")
Second, I'm not sure how responsive Indonesia has been with its security problems. Yes, there was the dissolution of ABRI into TNI, etc, but (1) Indonesia has the same "parallel economy" with regard to yayasans, it appears (vaguely) to me, as Egypt has with its military's parallel economy. The two parallel economies might be qualitatively, and/or quantitatively different, but the presence of both and the persistence of one (i.e., in Indonesia) is interesting. Second, there are the continuing problems Indonesia has had with disciplining Kopassus and Det-88 - to name the most prominent (but certainly not only?) - units since the fall of Suharto. The most recent story or HRW post I saw was of POLRI torturing an OPM activist or member to death. Gory stuff.
Again, great post.
ADTS
See, this is better. Don't
See, this is better. Don't mention domestic politics and the commentariat stays calm.
O/T but good article in the
O/T but good article in the WSJ on Astan and Bing West. Why doesn't DoD and WH for that matter the Press do a better job of explaining our progress? If you as stated take out scores of the cadres, that's winning.
Good stuff.
AU......sometimes the
AU......sometimes the political discussion takes a back seat, grab bag is over AM gave us our 15 seconds.
AM.....Is there any form of government that is below the Mubarak level that is in tact ? In Iraq US did the big FUBAR by getting rid of all of the Ba'ath Party.
Seems to me the faster the people have a chance to be part of the discussion, the faster they will stop the demonstrations.
What is it that the Egyptians want ? Is it realistic ?
Got to find that out to move forward.
Was watching a news program that metioned that the Egyptian military has its fingers in all sorts of business interests. It is like Military, Inc.
This is why Iran relies on
This is why Iran relies on NAJA, its police force, and assorted Basij volunteer auxiliaries. You don't see the Iranians mobilizing the IRGC or Artesh (army), and you don't see the use of AFVs or even AWCVs. And NAJA's orders from Iran's leadershop are to use less lethal means in their antiriot ops and crowd control.
It's a smarter way to go.
This is why I still check on
This is why I still check on this blog once a day.
Great stuff.
I think one of the greater
I think one of the greater observations that we have to keep in mind in regards to the events in Egypt is that whatever happens, the result will not be an isolated event within the country. Instead, precedents (as explained here: http://www.pressdisplay.com/pressdisplay/showlink.aspx?bookmarkid=RIK3MJ...) seem to indicate a very strong impact within the Middle East in general.
Well I hope this little bit is something to also keep in mind.
What boondoggle said. Except
What boondoggle said. Except for me couple of times a week.
I wish you could report on
I wish you could report on the transitional process going on. Especially the arrival of McCain and Lieberman. I find that highly suspect. As well as the way the constitution is being amended. Also has the army been regrouped so that next time there is massive protests (assuming that kind of momentum can be conjured up again) they will crack down on the protesters when ordered?
Any insight on this from anyone would be appreciated.
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