Center for a New American Security

You've pinned the tail on the

You've pinned the tail on the wrong donkey. This isn't a problem with the US subsidizing the EU. The US doesn't subsidize the EU. In fact, the US does very little directly with the EU. With NATO, on the other hand, the US has for decades condoned below 2% of GDP defense spending by its NATO allies. As the dominant NATO member, the US thus only has itself to blame for the current disparity in capabilities. Bottom-line: EU does not equal NATO. I realize European studies fall outside your area of expertise, but I'm not sure that's an excuse for not understanding the basics here.

AM: "Hopefully this

AM: "Hopefully this intervention in Libya will convince European leaders to either stop talking so tough regarding military interventions or to re-invest in truly independent military capabilities."

Correct. Though I am hoping for the former rather than latter.

AM: "The NATO coalition over Libya appears to be paying the price for the way in which the United States has subsidized European defense budgets ... especially since the end of the Cold War."

Really, how so? Not sure where the subsidy is exactly. Deciding to spend more than someone else on something is not a subsidy.

AM: "The United States should be happy to continue to subsidize European defense spending, of course, as long as the European states in turn subsidize U.S. health care and education."

Given your above use of the term "subsidy", I assume that if Europe could come up with a health care system that is even more expensive than the US one, then this would count as "subsidizing the US health care budget"?

It strikes me that several

It strikes me that several countries in Europe have been rather smart about their defense budgets and structures in that they have a military that suits their defense and foreign policy strategies. Germany for instance lacks the capability to easily destroy tanks in Libya, and has no real interest in doing so. Just judging by performance and procurement I'm sure that if Gaddafi's army showed up tomorrow on the German-Polish border they would find the Germans have plenty of ways to kill Libyan tanks, but the Germans seem uninterested in anything they can't drive to. Several other countries seem to have capabilities in the same sort of vein.

I think Europe needs to learn two lessons from this:

First, that although the somewhat more adventurous French and British foreign policy dominate international conversation about European policy, the other European nations simply will not follow step. Germany, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey seem to have very little interest in interfering directly with events outside of their immediate region, and so will resist the expense of creating expeditionary capabilities for long-range operations. They won't necessarily oppose humanitarian intervention, but for operations like this, Britain and France are going to have to provide most of the firepower themselves.

Second, I think that Europe as a whole is going to have to sit down and specify the requirements of humanitarian intervention for Europe as a whole. I believe that the European militaries are quite capable of humanitarian intervention, even in Libya, but that they've developed a force that requires presence on the ground. I see some gaps between a philosophy of "We should intervene wherever necessary" and "If it's necessary to intervene, it should be necessary enough for us to do it ourselves". I'm not sure if it's fair to castigate the Europeans for lacking the capability to do a "boot-less" intervention if most of them had no intention of ever running one.

Basically, in my amateurish, febrile opinion, I don't see Europe's inability to stage an intervention of this type so much as a free-rider problem as I see it as a strategic disconnect between EU states. I think most of the blame should then fall on the states pushing for intervention. The "doves" seem to have a military that pretty much fits their minimal requirements, while it's the "hawks" who are trying to push beyond their boundaries. That's a problem of trying to borrow the specialized tools you need from someone who doesn't do what you do.

(Whether or not the "doves" need to take a more hawk-ish role is a whole other question).

Interesting Telegraph story.

Interesting Telegraph story. It is astounding that the pilots are not trained in ground attack when that is such a common mission in Iraq and Afghanistan. What on Earth are they training them to do -- air-to-air combat?

RAF training cuts leave Typhoons idle
The Royal Air Force's most advanced warplanes have been unable to drop bombs on Libyan targets because defence spending cuts mean that pilots are not fully trained, The Telegraph can disclose.
By Thomas Harding, Defence Correspondent 6:00AM BST 13 Apr 2011

The Ministry of Defence announced last week that RAF Typhoons would drop bombs on Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's tanks and other ground targets.

But so far this has not happened, because the planes' pilots are not considered to be properly trained in ground attacks.

In a further embarrassment, laser targeting pods for the Typhoons, which cost £160 million, have been left in packing crates because the RAF has not been able to pay for its pilots to train to use them.

Nato leaders have said that more international military power is needed in Libya, as the rebels struggle to make progress against Gaddafi forces.

Four of the 10 Typhoons based at Gioia del Colle in southern Italy were to be sent on bombing missions until the RAF realised that pilots were not qualified to drop weapons.

RAF commanders, who were "mortified" at the discovery, are rushing to train pilots and fit the Litening pods, which are used in surveillance and navigation, so the Typhoons can carry out ground attacks. The Typhoons, each costing more than £80 million, are the most modern and sophisticated warplanes in the RAF.

A National Audit Office report this year said that only eight of their pilots were trained in ground attack operations.

It has since emerged that pilots were "out of date" on training, having completed their ground attack courses three years ago. RAF insiders said the MoD failed to fund annual refresher courses.

A senior RAF officer said: "The guys are not considered safe to drop live bombs on live targets.

"The Typhoon pilots need to conduct a specific training package on recognising and identifying ground targets and then drop a small number of live bombs using the Litening pod to be considered qualified."

"This needs to be followed by at least annual refresher training. They have not done this since 2008 so the targeting pods are in storage in crates at RAF Coningsby in Lincolnshire."

To allow untrained pilots to drop bombs in Libya would be to risk "friendly fire", the officer said.

Another RAF source said that to train the Typhoon pilots would "cost a small fortune".

The cuts in Typhoon pilot training were ordered by the last government, but the Coalition confirmed the plans in the Strategic Defence and Security Review in October. RAF chiefs told the audit office that to save money, they would not begin training all Typhoon pilots in ground attacks until at least 2014.

The Daily Telegraph disclosed last month that the RAF did not have enough trained Typhoon pilots to cover all of its operations, including Libya.

This newspaper has also reported that an extra £100 million is being made available for defence, with the MoD backtracking on cutting its fleet of Tornado aircraft.

An MoD spokesman said: "We have sufficient Typhoon aircrew with appropriate training for all the systems and weapons to undertake the current tasks."

It turns out Juba the Sniper

It turns out Juba the Sniper is actually a Columbian Hottie from FARC. No wonder we could never catch her...

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/apr/12/libyan-rebelscolombian-f...

Someday someone's going to have to take some grant money and do a study on Ka-Daffy's fetish for killer femme fatales. I'm available and will have all the proper credentials just as soon as the Laser Printer warms up. And yes I have experience in the field.

1. Since Desert Storm, have

1. Since Desert Storm, have collected anecdotes told by exasperated US troops. The anecdotes detail the military failings of our allies.
2. They are not related in the mainstream press and, seldom, in professional publications.
3. We can't hurt the feelings of our allies, can we?
4. May be a sound policy.
5. As a generality, our allies are poorly equipped, poorly trained and lack fighting spirit.
6. If something really has to be done, we best plan on doing it ourselves.
7. American fighting men have repeatedly made this discovery about coalition warfare.
8. See nothing changing -unless we downgrade our own capabilities.
V/R JWest

To expand on a point about

To expand on a point about European aircraft capacity, note that in order to compensate for the economies of scale, the organization has bought pools of certain expensive items, such as AWACS, UAVs (in progress), and heavy airlift (a mix of purchase and lease) that are crewed jointly. In the case of the AWACS, Germany has pulled its crews for the duration of the Libya intervention, which is in keeping with their political position.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48904.htm
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48892.htm?selectedLocale=en
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50106.htm?selectedLocale=en

The United States should be

The United States should be happy to continue to subsidize European defense spending, of course, as long as the European states in turn subsidize U.S. health care and education.

Funny really, because I have actually not spent the whole of the last decade in a cave, and so I can remember the US government not only howling on a regular basis that European nations weren't doing enough to help out the US in its war in Afghanistan, but also getting loudly and hysterically angry with European countries that refused to help out the US in its war in Iraq.

In exchange for the billions of pounds and euros, and the hundreds of soldiers' lives, lost by European nations in their aid to the US since 2001, Europe would now like a few USAF sorties. But apparently that would count as a ridiculous subsidy to Europe's defence.

I heartily agree with the commentator above that "If something really has to be done, we best plan on doing it ourselves". When are you going to start? Because if you don't reckon you need us in Afghanistan, we'd be happy to leave. I hope you've got another 42,000 grunts sitting around somewhere to take up the slack once every non-US nation pulls out of ISAF.

"1. If you need faces in a

"1. If you need faces in a crowd, our allies are fine.
2. On operations, not so much."

That does make one wonder why the US government has been whining constantly for the last decade about not having more support from Europe in Iraq and Afghanistan. Any thoughts?

1. That's not actually an 2.

1. That's not actually an
2. answer to my question, JWest, and I
3. should add that the habit of
4. numbering your
5. sentences is
6. There is NO number six
7. fairly annoying.

I would agree that Europe is

I would agree that Europe is too dependent on the US; especially since there are more and more signs of US exhaustion after a decade of war.

But if the trans-Atlantic alliance is fraying then the armed forces of Europe need to be able to handle Europe's affairs - not those of the US. There are for instance no European interests in Central Asia worth any form of military entanglement so there wouldn't necessarily be more expeditionary capabilities. At least not global ones. There'd still be need for power projection capabilities in the Arctic, Russia's "Near Abroad" and the Mediterranean as well as minor interventions in Africa.

The big shift would come if the US can't be counted on in a confrontation with Russia any more. Then there would need to be a major change back to the heavy mechanized forces that have been out of fashion for a decade or so - as well as a doubling of defence budgets.

@JWest
"3. So far as #6 goes, that's your opinion."
No, it's a Python reference.