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Christmas Comes Early for the Obama Administration in Afghanistan
Reading through the 76-point resolution produced by Afghanistan's Loya Jerga, I was struck by how welcome so many of these points will be inside the White House. Afghan leaders, I often think, do not realize how closely Americans pay attention to what they say -- hence the insults Hamid Karzai periodically lobs at his U.S. sponsors, much to the annoyance of U.S. military officers, diplomats and tax-payers. But this administration has been particularly masterful at actually holding Afghan leaders to that which they say they want. That 2014 deadline for transition, for example? The origins of that date were not in President Obama's 1 December 2009 speech to West Point but in President Karzai's second innaugural address earlier that fall. Karzai likely threw that date out there for Afghan consumption -- but it was picked up on by folks in the White House, who essentially held him to it.
In the same way, Afghan leaders have now, in this 76-point resolution, pretty clearly demanded a rapid "Afghanization" of the conflict in Afghanistan. They want Afghans in the lead, now, and U.S. and coalition units subordinate to those Afghans. LTG Dave Barno, Matt Irvine and I are about to argue in a new paper for CNAS that it is wise for the United States and its coalition allies to make the switch from counterinsurgency to security force assistance in 2012 -- while the United States and its allies still have a lot of resources on the ground -- rather than later on, closer to the 2014 transition. So I agree with many of the Loya Jerga's points on merit. Many of the points in the resolution, though, provide the United States and other reluctant coalition allies with a great excuse to precipitously reduce their presence and operations in Afghanistan.
There is a lot of other stuff in this resolution that provides U.S. diplomats with plenty of ammunition in negotiations toward something that looks like a Status of Forces Agreement. The Afghans ask for a lot from the United States -- more military equipment and training, financial and monetary assistance, scholarships, etc. That gives the United States room to ask for a lot in return. Otherwise, the United States can rapidly modify its combat operations against the enemies of the government of Afghanistan -- and can claim it is just carrying out the will of the Afghan people in doing so.
Unfortunately, there are
Unfortunately, there are realities that Karzai and senior officials (both Afghan and U.S.) disregard when speaking of transition. The giant white elephants in the room are the corruption endemic to all levels of the Afghan government and bureaucracy, and the lack of capabilities (both material and operational) of the Afghan Security Forces. Additionally, the will of the Afghan populace (an intangible that is difficult to gauge) is a consideration that is never fully addressed. Will the ANSF truly be prepared to assume primary responsibility for internal security (the realization of capabilities for any viable external security are many years beyond the 2014 transition) in 2012, 2013, or 2014? Personally, I do not think so. Why...
1. The ANSF are facing a Taliban adversary that resembles the mujaheddin of the Soviet-Afghan War. Even with the massive support in the form of equipment and training from their Soviet patrons (following their crossing of the Friendship Bridge), the Afghan military was unable to defeat the freedom-fighters (with the exception of a few victories in and around Jalalabad). The capabilities of the ANSF today pale in comparison to the Afghan military of the 80s.
2. Pakistan. Is it feasible to believe in a successful transition when the Taliban continue to receive external support from the ISI and are afforded safe havens in the FATA and Khyber Paktunkhwa province? Additionally, Pakistan continues to worry about a Indian influences in Afghanistan and the growth of rampant Pashto nationalism that crosses the Durand Line and threatens Islamabad's tenuous hold on control.
Simply put, the prospects for a successful transition and long-term success in Afghanistan (i.e. a capable Afghan government and security force and an Afghanistan that no longer serves as a sanctuary for AQ) are dim...at least by 2014.
Looking forward to reading the paper.
Exum, when you're POTUS there
Exum, when you're POTUS there is a standard. You do not get to the office by not being "particularly masterful" of diplomacy inside or outside CONUS.
Afghanistan's future has little to do with the timing of the US exit, that will happen cause is has to. What has not been said to the American people is the level of support and the price it will cost for the years ahead to keep Karzai's corrupt government and Pakistan in business.
What I would like to see is a more "particularly masterful" display of getting the total US government cost down, not just shifting the spending around budgets that is something any accountant can do. Politicians know how to spend, the ones that can manage expenses get my vote of confidence. I want my investments to really be investments, not just a piece of "particularly masterful" lip service to make an exit look graceful.
Hand it over now. There is
Hand it over now. There is no Taliban in the country better armed, more numerous, or better trained than the ANA. The ANA can handle this, however imperfectly. They just need a sense of urgency - and that will only come from being on their own.
Feel free to take any
Feel free to take any suggestions...
http://troopsincontact.blogspot.com/2011/10/pay-attention.html
I May regret these words 5
I May regret these words 5 years from now. My feeling is that "We will Go Back". Simmering water either cools down or boils again. Julia Hugo Rachel.
@26NOV, 5:48am poster; Great
@26NOV, 5:48am poster;
Great line with lots of real world applicability. However, once a U.S. and NATO withdrawal is complete (2014 or whenever that may be), I do not foresee any return in significant numbers, barring any 9/11 like catastrophe.
My question would be why not
My question would be why not leave the sorting out and stabilization of Afghanistan to the Chinese - and other neighbors ? Begin working toward having for example the the Indians assenting to some limited engagement by the PLA in the FATA - in the context of fighting the Turkimenstani Islamic separatist . The PRC has requested FOBs for the PLA in the tribal regions in Pakistan ,.There are apparently credible reports that parts of the Haqqani network leadership have been involved fomenting violence in Cashgar . Could this not be part of some Grand Bargain? - What would motivate New Delhi to allow the PLA into FATA . Maybe the PRC could agre to stop arming the Naxalites / Maoist in India ?
I mean just sitting here in the cheap seats in Central Texas - its seems very likely to me that no peace will come to the "Stans" unless and until all the neighbors agree to work toward one end - ending the use of " terrorist" networks as strategic tools to go after each other. That is after all what the ISI does with the Haqqanis , and the Chinese do with the Maoist in India. There has to be a way to 'sell ' this Grand Bargain - for example look at how much trade goes on between the Chinese and Indians. As the world matures into a global economy perhaps the profit motive could win out over outdated nationalism and religious vendettas .
better we just get some bases
better we just get some bases in the central asian countries leave afghans to their own devices and bomb when we need to the bad guys. corruption is not going to go away that easily.
"Nationalism and religious
"Nationalism and religious vendettas" - far from outdated. They are thriving in Afganistan and Pakistan and not likely to be easily displaced by economic motivations.
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