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What You Need to Know About the CIA Getting Rolled Up in Lebanon. That, and Larry Munson. (Updated)
As some of you may or may not already know, Hizballah, together with the Lebanese government, has rolled up what is believed to be the vast majority of the assets of the Central Intelligence Agency in Lebanon. Ken Delanian of the Los Angeles Times and Adam Goldman and Matt Apuzzo of the Associated Press have more, but this story has already attracted the attention of the U.S. Congress, which has some questions for the CIA.
I know about as much about clandestine operations and running agents as I do about playing linebacker in the NFL, but I do know a little about Lebanon, and I also know something about what my boss John Nagl likes to refer to as "learning organizations," a concept I believe to be relevant here. I first heard about this story from a journalist over lunch last week, and I'll relate to you what I told him and some of what he told me.
1. As many of you know, Hizballah and Lebanese intelligence have been quite good at rolling up Israeli intelligence assets since 2006. (Contrary to what I would have thought, Israel managed to keep a pretty good human intelligence network alive in Lebanon after its withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000.) Our intelligence assets were vulnerable to the same counter-intelligence methods that did in the Israelis, but we apparently blew off the warnings.
2. Given that negligence, if I am a member of the U.S. Congress, I am going to ask if it is really true that the station chief in Beirut was subsequently promoted within the ranks of the CIA. If told this is in fact true, I am going to ask who, if anyone, is being held accountable.
3. I am also, if I am a member of the U.S. Congress, going to be asking whether or not CIA tradecraft has eroded over the past decade as the agency has chased the bright shiny ball we'll call "drone-strikes-in-Pakistan". (A question that, quite frankly, needed to be asked after the 2009 bombing in Khost.) It's great to have an intelligence agency with a knife in its teeth, but the primary mission of an intelligence organization is to gather and analyze intelligence, not to thwack bad guys. If you fail in that primary mission, questions have to be asked as to why you are failing.
4. The CIA strikes me as an organization that hates having to explain itself and has every bureaucratic reason to avoid doing so. In the same way that the U.S. Army has an institutional interest in convincing policy makers that every general officer is equal to another, the CIA has an interest in convincing outsiders that external evaluation will compromise valuable tactics, techniques and procedures and will endanger operational security. (This is not a good recipe for an organization that learns from its mistakes and solicits external criticism in an effort to be more effective.) All organizations resist criticism, but intelligence organizations resist criticism and then wrap themselves in the cloak of all-important operational security to avoid it. Again, if I am the U.S. Congress, I am going to call bulls***, and I am going to do so in the following way.
- I am going to assemble a high-level panel of retired agency veterans and veterans of other U.S. intelligence and military organizations to assess where, exactly, things went wrong in Lebanon. (I would try to get people like Hank Crumpton and John McLaughlin but might also try to get a real outsider like Mark Allen -- which would drive the agency absolutely crazy and would provoke cries that these kinds of things simply cannot be done. Which might be exactly why they should be done.) I would charge this same panel with asking whether or not tradecraft has eroded across the agency and, if it has, to suggest changes to improve it.
- I would demand the CIA hold people accountable. I would demand, in short, heads. We cannot recruit assets in the Arabic-speaking world when people do not believe we will protect them and that they are vulnerable to a) the methods used by Hizballah and Lebanese intelligence and b) our own poor tradecraft.
Because that's what it really comes down to: poor tradecraft. This is not a matter of some Lebanese Karla lurking out there, out-smarting us. This is our premier intelligence agency getting sloppy, resulting in the death or incarceration of some brave U.S. allies.
UPDATE: Greg Miller has more information in today's Washington Post. Key lines:
CIA veterans familiar with the exposure described the harm as extensive. “It has caused irreparable damage to the agency’s ability to operate in the country,” said a former CIA official with knowledge of the case. The former official attributed the failure to a breakdown in tradecraft. “It is all a result of bad counterintelligence tactics.”
One of my commenters, meanwhile, has some intelligent words in defense of the agency. Check it out.
***
On a completely unrelated note, famed University of Georgia radio announcer Larry Munson died yesterday. I grew up around SEC football and remember my father, a friend of Munson's, introducing me to the great man. ESPN has compiled a list of Munson's greatest calls, several of which came in games against my Volunteers. My own personal favorite has to be Munson's reaction on seeing a new freshman running back by the name of ... Herschel Walker. Bill Bates may have gone on to enjoy a stellar career with the Dallas Cowboys, but listen to Munson as Walker, a freshman, absolutely runs him over. My god, a freshman!
I think I speak for Cousin
I think I speak for Cousin Herschel and the rest of the Bulldog nation when I say rest in peace, Mr. Munson. You were a damn good dawg.
Andrew, A few notes
Andrew,
A few notes concerning your comments:
1. Your statement that the CIA "apparently blew off the (counter-intelligence) warnings" is overly harsh. CI penetrations emanate from multiple vectors - whether from poor trade-craft or an asset that is posing as a double agent - and the problem is augmented when attempting to infiltrate a highly secretive and closed organization such as Hizballah. Rightfully, in a scenario such as this, the maximum amount of defensive CI measures should be implemented in order to thwart the efforts by the hostile intelligence services. Because of the "cloak of security," we will most likely not be privy to the efforts (if any) that were taken to mitigate the CI threat and protect the assets.
(Of note, your use of the term 'tradecraft' is far too constricted...notionally, the CIA's mission is to respond to policy-maker's requirements for information. This involves employing all the mechanisms to fulfill the intelligence process - collection, processing, analysis, dissemination, and feedback. Tradecraft is not limited to just collection; but rather to ensuring each step of the process is performed to meet intelligence requirements).
2. Regrettably, individuals will or have been killed while in the service of their CIA handlers in Lebanon. However, I think that Congressional inquiries are a bit overkill. Remember, these are highly risky operations from the start (this is not the CIA spying on Americans...it is a dangerous foreign intelligence operation). The small, covert, and sometimes cellular nature of organizations that the U.S. intelligence community is attempting to penetrate is a collection nightmare. Recruitment is not as simple as meeting a Soviet diplomat in a bar in Mexico City, appealing to his economic woes, and then giving him the pitch to come work for us. The grim reality is that the cultural and political environment that the CIA finds itself in is a far cry from what is was during the Cold War. Even though the Soviet Union was a closed society, groups such as Hizbollah are much more secretive and closed in comparison, making penetration exceedingly difficult. This does not fully excuse the poor practice of intelligence tradecraft (if this was the actual case), therefore, I cannot disagree with you that someone should be held accountable, but I believe that the matter would be sufficiently handled via internal CIA processes.
3. Finally, if you boss is looking to write a sequel to his book on learning organizations, I suggest that he look no further than the U.S. intelligence community. Like the rest of the national security apparatus, the IC was downsized as a result of the peace dividend following the end of the Cold War (some even questioned the need for a foreign intelligence organization). For the rest of the 90's, indifference to intelligence requirements left the IC to focus on trans-national issues ranging from terrorism to the environment. Following the post-9/11 intelligence spending bonanza, the IC was able to devote adequate funding to revamping organizations, increasing the number of collection assets, hiring top-notch analysts and linguist, and to improve its overall capabilities.
I watched that UT-UGA game.
I watched that UT-UGA game. As I remember it, Walker entered the game as the third team tailback (Dooley didn't like to play freshmen), and ended it as a future Heisman Trophy candidate. Congrats to the Dogs on winning in the SEC East. Unfortunately, there are probably three SEC West teams better than they are.
Visitor One: I get that human
Visitor One: I get that human intelligence is a risky business and that the IC was underfunded post-Cold War, but the LA Times article certainly suggests negligence. For example, Lebanese contacts used cellphones on which they only called their handlers. The article asserts that Israeli spies were caught due to cellphone usage patterns and cites an email where the CIA station chief ignores a warning that the same method could be used to track US contacts.
Great, great comments from
Great, great comments from Visitor 1:05, though I side on this one with Visitor 10:32.
It also behooves one to bear
It also behooves one to bear in mind that even the best security procedures require the cooperation and diligence of the source(s). Alas, counter to all self-interest, this is sometimes not the case.
I wonder if the decline in
I wonder if the decline in tradecraft has anything to do with the exodus of expierenced field agents during/after Pelosi's witch hunt in 2009. A lot of expierenced people quit or retired because of that.
The intelligence community as
The intelligence community as a whole is suffering from a general lack of experience, as a result of the post Cold War draw down. The majority of analysts, on average, have only about 3-5 years of experience under their belts, and there is a significant gap in middle-manager positions. Not sure of the figures for the operations side of the house, but it is reasonable to assume a likely correlation.
I don't think THIS congress
I don't think THIS congress should get involved. Whatever happened or didn't in Lebanon I don't think our elected leaders are able to make good desicions at this time. Maybe after the election, but not now.
I dont mean to lionise
I dont mean to lionise Hizbollah but their counter-intelligence unit really seems really on top of their game. I'm not an expert but i cant think of anything in the annals of espionage that compares with the roll-up of Israeli and US assets over the last couple of years.
In terms of non-state actors* its unprecedented. Nearest historical comparison i could draw would be the actions of the Old IRA against british intelligence in Irish War of Independence, which is dwarfed by this.
* I appreciate that lebanese military intelligence was heavily involved in the israeli spy round up.
"The intelligence community
"The intelligence community as a whole is suffering from a general lack of experience, as a result of the post Cold War draw down. The majority of analysts, on average, have only about 3-5 years of experience under their belts, and there is a significant gap in middle-manager positions."
Didn't they get plussed up right after 9/11? There ought to be a LOT of people with nearly 10 years experience.
I think that Coffer Black
I think that Coffer Black took quite a few of the top seasoned operatives with him when he left to set up a private CIA type operation for Blackwater to be used by corporate and government clients. Rather foolishly the U.S. Government established a lucrative market to poach it's most experienced and expensively trained human assets. The CIA may have little choice but to pony up some very big bucks to secure the services of their own former employees as mentors.
Blow back, that oft use term
Blow back, that oft use term for intelligence failures has a place in this conversation. Its crazy to think that in the years since 9/11, when the CIA and other US Intel shops got schwacked by pundits, press corps, politicians and Joe public for having failed to keep abreast of AQ due to a lack in Operational Intelligence intelligence, that they are still failing at the fundamentals.
I get the shiny news things, I get that drone strikes are sexy as hell and I get that the continued joint-ness betwixt CIA/JSOC, but at the cost of basic, really basic field craft. Thais just a poor effort. I'm no spook, but I have, from my comfortable armchair studied them academically, and history is full of bad field craft. Without it we'd rarely hear about what spooks are up to (for we rarely hear about the successful ops). So I wonder just how the CIA can be bested, from the perspective of being a learning organisation, by a non-state actor such as Hizballah.
Visitor on November 21, 2011 - 1:05pm has some very valid points. Well articulated and thought provoking, but the fact remains that the CIA teams in Lebanon failed due to poor trade craft. Fail to get that right and you end up with the most unpleasant of occurrences. What angers me is that the people who suffer the most, and by suffer I mean having your hands tied behind your back with barbed wire while someone takes a blow torch to your genitals, are to be found, many, many, miles away from those responsible for putting them into harms way.
You give the impression that
You give the impression that it was simply our fault. And I am sure that there were many missteps along the way on our side, but another contributing factor is the strength of Hezbollah. Despite the best efforts of many in Washington, our IC still has some good guys left. The terrorists basically run Lebanon and to imply that this was simply a matter of crap ass work is inaccurate.
Maybe CNAS could one day recruit a better "blogger" as the commenters seem to be consistently more knowledgeable and informative than the host?
Bob Baer (former CIA officer)
Bob Baer (former CIA officer) recently said that Hezbollah's counterintelligence capabilities are even better than the KGB's was.
First and foremost RIP Mr.
First and foremost RIP Mr. Munson.
Interesting comments above. I agree with parts of 1 and 2 above with Visitor 1:05 Pm. However, the unwinding of this operation(s) and network was duly noted as a possibility. The one element of surprise, was and WILL BE the strength of strategic and tactical abilities of networks we are just beginning to become familiar with. "Familiar" is not to be confused with familial. This is the crux of our intelligence dilemma. Another footnote is the collaboration of networks; which we were and will be caught off guard by. This is territory, deserving of new tactics, Immediately. JHR
Important to remember is that
Important to remember is that there is an immense amount of pressure from inside the beltway for results from the field. This is felt by all agencies as being squeezed for funding. On the sharp end of the stick this manifests as a willingness to push the envelope and not get into the trap of “paralysis by analysis” or lax tradecraft balanced against tight CI. Also important to remember is that the vast majority of our ops officers as well as DOD HUMINT personnel came up in the last 10 years and have spent a good amount of operational time in IZ/AF were there are different standards of what passes for tradecraft.
1. Most of the comments
1. Most of the comments assume a high level of skill on the part of the intelligence community and an erosion of that skill level that has cost us.
2. Apart from our capabilities at signals intercept and overhead imagery, no one outside the US has any respect for our intelligence organizations.
3. From the days of "Gentlemen don't read other gentlemen's mail" on up to the present, our successes in the human intelligence area have few and strategically insignificant.
4. Our leadership, civilian and military has a nearly unbroken legacy of decisions informed by inadequate or incorrect intelligence.
5. Russian, British, French intel professionals say: "Americans make s****ty spies."
6. Based on the facts, agree.
7. The highly experienced people co-opted into civilian sector organizations are just screwing up in another venue.
8. God speed the hapless Lebanese who were persuaded to trust their handlers. That won't be happening again soon.
V/R JWest
Why in hell should the CIA
Why in hell should the CIA hold anyone accountable for this? NOBODY in the appointed political leadership of the CIA, the NSA or the FBI got fired for 9/11. This despite manifest failures on all levels.
As Voltaire noted it is sometimes necessary to hang an admiral or two. The US hasn't (figuratively of course) hung anyone for an intel cluster-eff in a LONG time.
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