Center for a New American Security

Abu Muq, I feel the need to

Abu Muq,

I feel the need to preface what I am about to say. I have been a long time supporter of you for many years now. I found your work to be intellectually rigorous, open-to-debate, and to generally be some of the best around. Yet none of that can be found in this statement, "In 2008, the situation in Afghanistan may have required large-scale counterinsurgency operations to buy time and space to build up Afghan security forces. (And I argued, in 2009, that it did.)," given that you are now advocating an approach that is diametrically opposed to what you originally put forth. It strikes me that you are conveniently using the recent shift in publicly pronounced Afghan policy to backpedal away from your (in hindsight) rather disastrous wholesale recommendation to fully commit US ground forces to the Afghan Surge and a COIN strategy. Furthermore, can you really stand by the words of yours that I quoted given the events that have taken place? Was the surge to Afghanistan really what the situation in Afghanistan required? What traction have we made (if any) and at what cost in lives and tax payer dollars in an era that demands fiscal austerity?

I thought that Col. Gentile was a one-trick pony for a long time. I often wrote against his ideas. I was wrong. Incredibly wrong. Col. Gentile has steadfastly advocated against a failed Afghan strategy that he knew wouldn't account for our biggest weaknesses: Karzai's government and Pakistan.

I don't see much intellectual honesty here. You are partly responsible for the course the US military took in Afghanistan, and it clearly has not produced the desired strategic results (duh and or hello. Pakistan/Karzai were never held accountable). I am not saying you cannot reverse your opinions on the approach that the US should take in Afghanistan, but rather, I ask that you hold yourself intellectually accountable and that you (unlike last time) realistically assess whether or not the US can deliver on this new mission to create a capable Afghan military that can fend off the Taliban and sustain a functional Afghan state (which I highly doubt).

-Deus Ex

I'm having somewhat the same

I'm having somewhat the same problem as other posters on this thread.

Is the argument that the course advocated by AM in 2009 worked, so therefore we must prepare for transition? Are we required to prepare for transition because this course did not work? Do we prepare for transition now because that is the resolute, mature, and responsible thing to do at the moment, as a commitment to mucking around in Helmand Province was the resolute, mature and responsible thing to do in 2009? Do we just need to prepare for transition and not worry whether the large-scale counterinsurgency operations begun in the 2008-09 period were successful at anything important?

The first proposition seems absurd on its face, though noting that absurdity in the CNAS brief might place one former unsuccessful American combat commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Barno, in the awkward position of remarking on the lack of success produced by Gens. McChrystal and Petraeus, who succeeded him. The second proposition does not seem to be where the CNAS team wants to go either; indeed, the brief notes all manner of success by the American command if not by ISAF as a whole. The United States has won wars in which it achieved fewer successes than it has in Afghanistan over the last ten years.

The fourth proposition doesn't appear consistent with the mission and orientation of CNAS. Chewing over what went right and what did not in Afghanistan could keep the institution occupied for years, after all. There are books in it, and sacrifices to be honored and everything. No, it seems clear that the CNAS team members were sure about the need for an Afghan "surge" and large-scale, American-led counterinsurgency in 2009 because the alternative would have been disaster; they are equally sure about the need to step back from this kind of operation now, but not too fast, for exactly the same reason.

You see my problem. Each member of the CNAS team must surely think of himself as an expert on some key aspects of the Afghan war -- "expert" here having the meaning of someone who knows much more than most other people. Those of us outside the community of experts are forced to wonder if that is an adequate definition, seeing as the experts' knowledge was gained during years of fighting that do not seem to have achieved all that much -- and, crucially, that the experts seem adept at advocating with clarity and vehemence courses of action dramatically at variance with what they urged on the government years ago, and never feel the need to admit they were wrong about anything.

I often shy away from the

I often shy away from the comment boards but the partnership of Afghan and U.S. forces is something that I believe a great deal of people like to armchair QB. My question to all is have you actually lived, ate, trained, fought with Afghan forces? if not, then please refrain from judging a situation from afar. The reality of the situation is that no large plan is applicable to Afghanistan as a whole. What works in one district, may not simply work in the neighboring one. The successful implementation of the COIN strategy is going to be different everywhere and its up to the small unit leaders to carry it out. I've been in one of those small units and I've seen successes and the failures. On my second deployment, beginning August 2009, I was located at Firebase Tycz, Deh Rawood District, Uruzgan province. I was the forward observer for AT-4, Delta Co. 1/508 Parachute Infantry Regiment, 4th BCT, 82nd ABN DIV and our mission was to train and advise the 300+ Afghan National Police in the area. With the blessing and participation of the ANP commander in the area, my platoon developed a 3 day training course in which 20-30 police officers, from one or two checkpoints, would attend and we would cover the basics such as marksmanship, patrolling, first aid, and professional development. In some sense, it was a highly compacted Warrior Leader Course for the Afghan officers. Upon their graduation, my platoon would accompany them to their checkpoint, conduct a patrol, and often stay the night with them. We started this program after being on the ground for just over two months and the whole process of training took about three months.

The success my platoon encountered was a product of several factors coming together. The local commander, Omar, was one that was respected by all of us. From the brand new PV2s, to the Platoon Sergeant and PL, we knew that he was a trustworthy and capable ally. He was not overly domineering but his presence commanded respect. The same was to be said of the Quick Reaction Force that traveled with us on every mission. Myself and my fellow paratroopers grew to regard these officers as colleagues and friends and developed a brotherhood with each other. I can say, without a shadow of a doubt, that they saved my life and the lives of several other paratroopers on no less than two separate occasions by identifying IEDs that we either initially missed or had not seen yet.

In regards to the local commander, he was widely respected by not only the military forces in the area, but by the people as well. No matter where we went, any dispute could be settled by a few calming words from him. He was not afraid to let go of a local commander if he was incompetent and was diplomatic enough to transfer a checkpoint of officers to the higher HQ when they were suspected of playing both sides of the fence. A great deal of credit goes to the Special Forces ODAs that had laid stake in that area for almost seven years. They had very quietly, but effectively, identified Omar and had made him a part of their guard force, all the while assisting him in his development as an effective commander. I cannot speak to his development, as I was not there, but ODA team members who had been to that base before had nothing but more praise for him.

The point I am trying to get across is that what I experienced can be viewed as a success story on the micro level. Perhaps we fell into a good situation and all we did was smooth some of the rough edges; I don't know. What I do know is that Deh Rawood was in good hands when we arrived and remained that way when left. To this day, it is a very rare occasion on which I find any sort of write up about significant activity in the Uruzgan Province. However, the strategy that was used there, most importantly developing the capabilities of the local commander, seemed to work. I'm not saying that you are going to be this successful everywhere, but the general idea of developing a strong local commander, one who will effectively lead a fair and balanced force, is a general principal that most can subscribe to.

I have been on the other side of the coin (no pun intended) as well. In Spring 2010, my unit was part of the build up to establish the ring of security around Kandahar City. Again, we were paired with members of the Afghan National Civil Order Police to patrol and conduct vehicle checkpoints along Highway One. My time with them was significantly less compared to the ANP in Uruzgan but to me, the general attitude of the leadership seemed to be disinterested and overly entitled. The local commander seemed to think that we should be catering to his every want and need and the spirit of cooperation and coherence that we experienced before was not there, at least the commander level. At the lower NCO level and below, we got along fine with the patrol officers. They were with us to help fill sandbags and endured the long days and nights on the VCPs right along with us. Had we been there longer, we might have developed the same relationship with them as we had in Uruzgan. Getting back to the ANCOP higher command at our checkpoint, it seemed to me the commander had friends in high places and was simply put there instead of being brought along, step by step.

I realize the length of this response may automatically turn some away, but the on the ground experiences need to get out there. What Mr. Exum writes about in his last paragraph is something we were carrying out two years ago. It has been a development process, but the in case of Deh Rawood, that development has worked. I also agree with Major Wilkinson in that a professional advisor corps (similar to what my platoon carried out) is a key factor in the future of Afghanistan. We took on a project that had no working infrastructure whatsoever. It is through the labor and sacrifice of all of the armed services that we have come this far. Whether you agree with it or not, we have made monumental steps towards making the security situation better but, like the development of a good leader and NCO, it is not something that will come overnight.

Kyle, Thanks for commenting!

Kyle,

Thanks for commenting! I encourage you to continue challenging those opinions you disagree with both in the professional and digital environments. I would discourage you from thinking that experience gives you better insight though. Insight and discernment come from reflection and an understanding of the bigger picture. We engage others with our opinions to refine our ideas and improve our communication skills. As my experience does not make my opinions any more valid than yours, I would like my opinions and ideas to speak for themselves.

Your comment about "through the labor and sacrifice of all the armed services that we have come this far" is exactly right. I am lamenting the fact that this entire castle was built on sand. The efforts of Omar and the other men of character you have trained and served with will disappear if the U.S. military completely leaves.While these men demonstrate effort and strive to provide security for their people, it all relies on you and your men standing next to them. It all depends on someone working with the leaders at levels above you, using persuasion and carrots and sticks, to keep the ball rolling forward.

I hope my opinion does not indict the peoples of Afghanistan or their cultures. The bureaucracy fails us often and we are the closest thing to experts on them.

If we exit completely, the social and political structure will start to assert itself upon the ANSF. The adversaries of Afghanistan will insert their will as well. To revert to your analogy of the young NCO, we are leaving them in a situation where their good intentions and effort will not be enough. My hope is we find a way to keep some people there.

"Immediately identify a cadre

"Immediately identify a cadre of officers and noncommissioned officers to serve as embedded combat advisors in
Afghanistan through 2014 and beyond." (p. 6 of the new policy paper).
. . .

Sounds like Bing West's latest book "The Wrong War." Perhaps you guys should have listened more closely to him and other critics of COIN?

"Do not try to do too much

"Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is." T E Lawrence

Barno and Exum seem to be carrying Lawrence's insight further and applying it in some detail to Afghanistan.

Those objecting to the transition seem, to me, to be arguing from an assumption that Americans must do these jobs as they're the only competent adults "in the room." Of course, by our lights, we are. When the Afghans take over, it's not going to look the way we do it. It will look all wrong. We need to keep reminding ourselves that it's their country, and that the only sustainable option is for them to do it.

So, Ex, you got your PhD? Congratulations.

Curious, isn't it, that the

Curious, isn't it, that the Haqqani network is not classified as a 'terrorist organization' by the U.S., while Hezbollah's military wing is. From Dec 8 FP

"We are continuing to review whether to designate the entire [Haqqani] organization," State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland told reporters in September, only days after then Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen testified to Congress that the group was directly responsible for a deadly Sept. 13 attack on the U.S. embassy and NATO headquarters in Kabul that left nine dead and 23 injured."

The reason is that the U.S. cannot legally negotiate with designated terrorist groups, which is something that the U.S. wants to do with Haqqani - perhaps to buy them off (see also Taliban-U.S. negotiations in the spring/summer of 2001). See Hillary Clinton, Oct 23

As far as what the carrot is, that's geostrategic and economic - establishing Afghanistan as an American protectorate, opening up a pipeline route to export oil and gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Indian ocean ports and to Pakistani and Indian power plants - a long-standing goal of U.S. policy in the region ever since the breakup of the Soviet Union and the signing of oil leases in landlocked Central Asia by U.S. corporations. This "New Silk Road" agenda is now the #1 policy goal of the U.S., and military troops are there to back it up. Again, take Hillary Clinton at her words:

The pipeline that we think is a great idea from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan to Pakistan to India that would bring natural gas - now, it's a geographic and security challenge to build such a pipeline. But are we serious about it? Are we willing to explore it? That's the kind of discussion we're going to have, and the blueprint for Afghanistan fits into that.

Of course, Condoleeza Rice would have said the same thing, right?

Now, can the U.S. military work with Afghan forces in order to push this agenda through? Will the Haqqani network happily sign on to a cooperative effort with the forces they've been fighting for years? Will Pakistan refuse to cut a deal with Iran, regarding the alternative gas pipeline (IPI) that the U.S. is so opposed to?

Looks like another wet imperial dream, with little basis in reality and zero chance for success. A black hole for U.S. dollars and lives is all it'll end up as.

The alternative, rational approach is obvious: an accelerated exit strategy that involves India as much as it does Pakistan. Those are the main regional actors - put it in their lap, and get out now.

Do you remember Exum, when we

Do you remember Exum, when we talked about bricolage?
In Japan and Germany there were quasi secular structures that could be re-used and adapted.
None of that existed in Iraq and A-stan, because all the governmental structures were islamic.
Like I pointed out to you a year ago, the US could have bricolaged the tribal and village leadership, left the islamic in jurists in place and retained the islamic structures of the governments.
But COIN attempted to replace the existing islamic substrate with secular structures, or what i like to call missionary democracy.
And "mission change" in A-stan?
You betcha.
The mission is now to GTFO out while saving as much face as we can, and to (hopefully) avoid further destabilizing Zardaris government next door.