Abu Muqawama: Post
Abu Muqawama retains its autonomy and the views and beliefs expressed within the blog do not reflect those of CNAS. Abu Muqawama retains the right to delete comments that include words that incite violence; are predatory, hateful, or intended to intimidate or harass; or degrade people on the basis of gender, race, class, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or disability. In summary, don't be a jerk.
Ordnance Survey: More Slippery Metrics
As Adam recently reminded us to beware bad quantitative measures, it’s important to remember that bad qualitative ones are similarly subversive. To stay on the subject of Sino-American rivalry, note David Axe’s post comparing the J-20’s progress to American frustration with its 5th generation fighter programs. While the reader’s first temptation is to fear for American superiority because China appears to be developing new aircraft faster than America, jet-for-jet comparisons and procurement process envy only tell part of the story. Even when Axe notes that China’s stealth programs have their own problems, I think comparing weapons systems that China isn’t likely to field equivalents to in large numbers leads debate down the wrong track.
States with the best hardware or most technically-impressive defense establishments don’t automatically win. Niall Ferguson, in his Pity of War, pointed out that the Central Powers were more fiscally efficient in inflicting casualties. In World War II, the Allied powers were often technically inferior side. Certainly the German R&D programs had some notable advantages over U.S. equivalents in some fields. The Germans led the way in sophisticated tanks, aircraft, small arms, and rocket and jet technology. But ultimately, logistical and geographic advantages bought the Allied coalitions time that initially technically or tactically superior foes could ill afford to waste.
Similarly, while China’s development of 5th generation fighter technology is certainly concerning, it’s not the prime concern in theater. The more concerning issue is that China might be able to muster a large number of platforms and personnel that are good enough to deny a more limited number of qualitatively superior American and allied equivalents. John Stillion and Scott Perdue made this point, most explicitly on a tactical scale, in “Air Combat Past, Present and Future,” noting sortie generation – with scant mention of J-20s, and even with soft-balled estimates of Chinese A2/AD measures against American local infrastructure – could deliver devastating results as American airmen struggled to overcome distance and inferior numbers.
If America suffers a disappointing result in a conventional war in the near future, it will likely not be because the victor fielded, pound-for-pound, better equipment. It would more likely be that the enemy is able to “get there first and with the most,” and maintain that longer than the U.S. is politically willing to muster additional resources from either geographic redistribution or internal economic extraction. None of this to say that technological superiority or fast R&D don’t necessarily matter, but only to note they only matter to the extent they can leverage advantages or mitigate disadvantages in the broader geographical and logistical framework that allows the arms to be brought to bear.
Worth noting (and I think I
Worth noting (and I think I get this from Overy's 'Why the Allies Won') that in WW2 the German pursuit of technical excellence wound up being a disadvantage - they were constantly expending resources on designing the latest model and retooling to build it - meanwhile the US and especially the Soviet Union had designed 'good enough' tanks and planes, and were busy actually building them.
I would caution drawing too
I would caution drawing too strong an example from the use of technology in World War II. There is to some extent a suggestion that if the Germans had not wasted so much effort on technology that they would have fared better. This is not true. US and Soviet mass were simply overwhelming and there was nothing the Germans could have done to stop that once they crossed a particular line. And that line was the invasion of Russia. Had the Germans satisfied themselves with controlling Europe, their technology did exactly what it was supposed to do...win a quick war against larger forces. The fact that they *chose* to extend the war and to therefore engage the Soviets and the US in a war of attrition negated any technological advantage they had.
So the real question comes down to: do you want a war of maneuver or a war of attrition? If you really believe that China is going to go "all in" for Taiwan or domination of the Straits or whatever goal we might end up fighting with them over, then yes, our technological advantage is not going to do us any good and we will likely lose that fight. But if you believe China is interested in a lightning quick raid to secure Taiwan (or whatever), then our technology may in fact be sufficient to stop them in their tracks, disrupt their momentum, and buy time to figure out another way to end the conflict.
The Chinese are hard to read. And with their economy on the line of a recession, this may come down to the same kind of strategic think we have grown accustom to...not how many lives this will cost but really, how much will it cost in pure economic terms? If they can seize Taiwan in a week, it won't hurt their bottom line that much. Everyone will accept the reality on the ground and will go back to business as usual. If they intend to slug it out, though, it may not be worth it on a purely economic basis.
I'm not saying the Germans
I'm not saying the Germans should've invested less in technology, but I am saying they chose to enter conflicts that, logistically and geographically, made their technological advantages moot. It's hardly the only war where states have acted in such a way. And in re your comments that German technology was good enough to win a "quick war," well, their technological advantages were far less pronounced early on in the war than towards its middle and end.
And I would note that the RAND report I mentioned in the post notes that even in a very short war, China has a strong chance of numerically overwhelming the U.S. and destroying AWACS/other ISR/tankers - even assuming the F-22s kill everything they fire at and the Chinese don't down a single Raptor. At a certain point, quantity has a quality all its own. In essence, it's the U.S. which would have to choose to go "all in" as it decides whether or not to muster more forces in theater to match China's obvious geographic advantage.
What kind of drugs are you
What kind of drugs are you people taking?
It is has been awhile since a Vietnam LRRP asked me that question. I just looked at him and laughed. He was telling me that he disagreed with what I was saying. He had a different perspective on life.
Andy is measuring the length of his dick and Dan is gauging how long he can keep it up. Both of you have not arrived at the discussion. Neither completes the job required fully.
The most important part of the puzzle is the will of the warrior and that of the enemy. It is about what you are willing to do to win the conflict. That includes the will of the taxpayers paying for the war toys which was overlooked in both Vietnam and Afghanistan 1 & 2.
What most people don't get is to avoid a conflict completely. That is why you guys are the problem not the solution, it is because you are preparing to fight a war not to avoid it. Like any other good government employee, "it ain't my department, please step to the next window".
BTW....How is it that AQ has been able to hold off the American Military and Intelligence community? AQ has neither qualitative or quantitative on their side. They are willing to die for their cause.
Then you have this mental genius.
http://www.judicialwatch.org/press-room/press-releases/13421/
and it continues here.
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0512/76637.html
For people like this, it is only about dick length and keeping it up. No other person required.
Lockheed appreciates your
Lockheed appreciates your efforts. But - have you registered as a lobbyist yet?
If you think the lesson of
If you think the lesson of this post was that I'm endorsing buying the most fancy, expensive weapons systems possible, I'm not entirely sure you've seen the point I was trying to make.
The key to victory in the air
The key to victory in the air is not technical superiority of aircraft but robust, well-trained air battle management capabilities. I couldn't care less about new PRC fighters being tested; I'd like to know if they have an equivalent to Red Flag. Until they do, and give themselves a decade or two to get their "sierra" together, they're bush league.
Ralph, in principle I agree
Ralph, in principle I agree but I'd also remember that quantity has a quality all of its own, especially if those tankers get taken down.
But point taken: US has a massive qualitative training and C2 advantage that the PRC simply doesn't have right now. You could, though, say the same about many other matchups in history, particularly Kipling's line about the worth of a British officer education vs. a cheap jezail in Afghanistan.
Exhibit A of Ralph's point is
Exhibit A of Ralph's point is surely RAF Fighter Command in 1940. The weapon that won the Battle of Britain was arguably a telephone, or a telephone exchange. Similarly, the RN suffered enormously in the Falklands for the lack of an AEW aircraft.
Add your comment