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One of the most misleading ideas in
commentary on modern weapons and warfare is that of the karmic theory of new
weapons technology, particularly with regard to drones. Despite the many legitimate concerns about the legality, morality, and efficacy of targeted killing programs, commentators and analysts all too often engage in threatmongering about unmanned systems proliferation. We see it most often in
articles like this one by
Michael Ignatieff, or this
by Steve Clemons asking ominous questions such as “What Happens When
They Get Drones?” Adam has
noted similar veins of commentary about cyberweapons. These arguments are
doubly aggravating because they misunderstand both the nature of the platforms
they discuss and the logic of strategic behavior in international relations,
leading to a conclusion that cannot distinguish blowback or proliferation from karma, replacing what should be a debate centered on policy and empirical assessment with prophecy centered on instruments and unrealistic hypotheticals.
Many - and not just Clemons or Ignatieff -
have worried about the proliferation of military technologies, and for good reasons. Some advantages are structural, but technological advantages are dynamic and impossible to preserve. In the case of
drones, commentators and analysts have feared a coming “drone arms race” where
someday Americans might face rival fleets of foreign drones, and concerns that
U.S. policies policies of using drones to conduct targeted killings might
somehow result in rival powers unleashing it on us.
But what does the U.S. really have to fear
from Russian or Chinese drones, or a new norm of targeted killing? Whatever it
does, it certainly won’t resemble what we’ve meted out to the rest of the world
in the past decade, contrary to Ignatieff’s and others’ portentous warnings.
I’ll venture a bold prediction here: in our lifetimes, no foreign power will
ever deploy drones in a targeted killing campaign against the United States as
it has employed drones in Pakistan or Yemen. To believe they would first
requires misunderstanding the technology.
Firstly, drones capable of launching armed
attacks from over-the-horizon are not extremely cheap, they are
about as expensive as manned strike craft, as Winslow Wheeler has noted. Why AQ would want
to spend dozens or hundreds of millions of dollars on a drone when they could
furnish a martyr with a Cessna or bring in enormous quantities of operatives,
firearms, or explosives in for the same price is completely beyond me. We’ve
seen the face of the day when “the enemy has drones,” and it’s a nincompoop who
thinks he can collapse the Pentagon with RC planes, not a technothriller antihero.
Secondly, when rival states get drones, they
still won’t be able to conduct a targeted killing
campaign in the U.S. without massively enhancing their conventional power
projection. American drones operate from airbases in-theater, and they’ve never
operated in airspace that wasn’t either cleared of hostile air defenses or
under the control of a government granting tacit acquiescence to the strike
program. The U.S. would have no compunctions shooting down hostile drones or
laying waste to whatever facilities and governments were hosting or commanding
them. In other words, outside of the context of a broader conventional
operation against U.S. forces, it’s difficult to see the logic in another
country launching drone strikes against the U.S.
Even in areas where the geographic and
logistical constraints were conquerable, under what kind of scenario would a
hostile state be able to launch drone strikes against U.S. interests and simply
sit idly by and take it? To prevent America from retaliating would require
destroying its conventional military capability, which means a general war.
Drones do not create impunity. Diplomatic and military power to deter
retaliation or noncompliance create impunity
Nor is there really a sensible reason a
hostile power would need drones to conduct assassinations or bombings
inside the U.S., if they chose that policy. As for the norm of “targeted
killing,” many countries have used assassination as a method of dealing with
enemies of the state - whether they be terrorists, criminals, or even just
dissidents. Targeted killings predated drones, after all, and so have covert
attacks inside U.S. borders. Proxy, terrorist, and criminal groups have already
pioneered technologies and TTPs for killing Americans in foreign borders
without a conventional ground invasion - they’re the ones that al Qaeda, the
IRGC and Qods Force, the Soviet-era intelligence services, and others have been
using for decades.
Other countries have even assassinated
targets on American soil before - Pinochet’s DINA car bombed a Chilean
dissident in Washington, DC, and revolutionary Iran had a counterrevolutionary
activist shot in Bethesda. Why use drones when these simpler and more effective
methods exist? The era of irregular assassinations and bombings against U.S.
interests isn’t coming - it’s come and gone and come again, because drones are
just a means to targeted killing that happened to be convenient for a wealthy
superpower to employ against soft targets in permissive airspace, not the sine qua non of targeted killing itself.
The same conventional, geographical, and
logistical constraints that prevent hostile aircraft from running rampant
across the Western world, and the same prudential considerations that
discourage rival powers from wantonly assassinating American citizens inside
U.S. borders, will prevent drones from doing the same. Russia and China are far
more likely to employ these aircraft against hostile non-state actors rather
than fruitlessly dispatching them against the U.S. or its allies, except as
part of a broader conventional conflict. Drones could proliferate to Russia,
China, Pakistan, Iran, and whatever other states and Americans would never need
to fear Ignatieff’s ludicrous threat of “the same heaven-sent vengeance” it inflicts
upon foreign populations, because no power will ever have the geographical and
strategic superiority the U.S. maintains over weak states and the militants
operating within them.
There are merits to creating legal
frameworks that clarify the use of targeted
killings, but framing the problem
as controlling the technology is absurd. An arms control framework on drones is
a hollow thing, it protects Americans from weapons our enemies neither need nor
would use in any plausible scenario. Threat assessments from technology
proliferation should be based on plausible scenarios and strategic logic, not
Kantian assumptions of moral equivalence divorced from the context of how the
technology is actually used.
Yesterday I tried to explain
Yesterday I tried to explain this to a co-worker but did not say it as clearly as this. Death is platform agnostic. People have to understand that the effects are what matters, not manner in which they are delivered. Well played. Thanks. Ty at #thekabulcable.
I think there may be some
I think there may be some misfocused debate here. It's not necessarily that people worried about "them" getting drones are worried about attacks on CONUS shy of World War III, but rather that the United States is awfully active and extended elsewhere in the world.
There's a burgeoning hobby world with, effectively, homemade drones out there, with side- and forward-looking broadcast cameras and, sometimes, at least a modicum of cargo weight already. It's not much of a stretch to think AQ or another organization could launch such things against a remote installation, in much the way American bases have a long history of getting hit with mortars and rockets.
No, the Ignatieff article is
No, the Ignatieff article is pretty explicitly saying it's a threat to U.S. citizens, not personnel in the field.
In any case, foreign "battlefield drones" cost more and are harder to employ than suicde operatives, other PB/VBIEDs (inc. IRAMs), mortars, guerrilla attacks, etc. It's not clear that they would provide any new capabilities at a reasonable cost, and that kind of small-scale tactical threat was not what either article I was referring to was speaking of anyway.
In any case, as the Ferdaus piece I linked to should demonstrate, hobby drones are, at best, hand grenades with wings. Anyone frightened of what happens when 'they' get those things needs to get some perspective. You can do a lot more for less money with a person or a car and some basic subterfuge.
Why does your counter
Why does your counter argument to a doomsday scenario have to be equally narrow? Your argument can be applied equally (wrongfully, IMO) to Stingers, yet I believe those pose a significant threat to our interests. The anti-arms control argument is always something about how "they" won't use the weapons against us for xyz reason, so why should we care. You show an ignorance to a major aspect of export/arms control: parity is not judged simply against our own capabilities; it is judged against our interests. What is the implication of the DPRK having drones vis-a-vis the ROK? China vis-a-vis Taiwan? Sudan vis-a-vis South Sudan? AQ vis-a-vis whatever government structure we hope to foster in Yemen, Afghanistan, etc? Iran vis-a-vis Israel? What about Iran and their ability to disrupt the traffic through Hormuz? The implications impact the United States significantly. The tools others use and how they use them against each other has the potential to drag other countries and even regions into conflict, which in turn has a potential to drag us into conflict, disrupt our economic interests, etc.
We seem to find some pretty damn good uses for drones, so why wouldn't anybody else? Of course drones are not the end of us, but there are some important implications that should be considered.
Again, your argument about
Again, your argument about drones being used "against our interests" isn't very convincing. So what if the DPRK has drones, the ROK has an air defense system - if they can shoot down MiGs, they can shoot down drones. Drones don't give DPRK capabilities combat aircraft didn't already give them. So what if China has drones? Again, China has a massive air force, and the ROC has an air defense system. So what if Sudan has drones, Sudan already has an air force, and with South Sudan's inadequate air defense system, it doesn't really make a difference whether Khartoum is operating manned or unmanned aircraft. AQ operating drones against the Yemeni government is a laughable notion, why they would even bother buying them when they could pay off legions of fighters for half the price is beyond me. As for Iran getting drones vis-a-vis Israel, who cares? The Israelis have an excellent air defense and missile defense network, they would make mincemeat of Iranian drones just as they would Iranian aircraft. So what if Iran gets drones in the Hormuz - they would just marginally impact Iran's massive arsenal of missiles, mines, fast boats, diesel subs, etc. In fact, drones would be much easier for our surface vessels sophisticated air defense systems to target than supersonic surface-to-surface missiles, stealthy submarines, or disguised fast boats/trawlers with WBIEDs. Not a single scenario you mention would be radically changed by drones in a way all that distinct from an equivalent purchase of manned aircraft or other platforms.
We find "damn good uses for our drones,"but they're not at all . We use drones in cases where the enemy has no air defense (we didn't send them into Libya until weeks after annihilating their SAM sites) against irregular or non-state threats. As I said in my post, the most likely use for foreign combat drones (except as unmanned alternatives to manned ISR, which is hardly a radical change) will be for hunting down similar kinds of non-state or irregular threats in permissive environments. In other words, if the U.S. decided to ally with say, the Chechens, Uighurs or some other irregular group that, like the Taliban and AQAP, has no real access to air defense, then foreign drone use might be a new danger to our interests. But they're not, and right now there's no plausible scenario where drones present a threat that hostile purchases of manned aircraft would not also herald (in fact, drones would be substantially less threatening in all these cases, as the U.S. and its allies such as the ROC, ROK, Israel, generally have EW that could render remotely piloted aircraft battlefield ineffective). Again, there's way too much emphasis on the technology and not on the capabilities it's actually demonstrated and the roles it actually fills.
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