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Offshore Weapons, Onshore Warfare
Up at Information Dissemination, Owen Cote Jr. of MIT has an interesting take on the future of naval warfare. Those interested in the future of US defense strategy should pay attention to these two grafs, from which I quote at length:
The next major change in naval warfare caused by U.S. submarines will likely result from the marriage between the submarine on the one hand, and precision, land attack, tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs) and small, long endurance UAVs on the other.In general, fast weapons and small UAVs would give submarines a capability to find and strike high value, mobile targets ashore. Specifically, in the context of the new Air-Sea Battle strategy, they would enable a submarine-based capability to destroy rather than merely suppress modern, ground-based air defenses, or in the DOD vernacular, DEAD. A submarine-based DEAD capability would close a major capability gap against modern A2/AD networks. The systems that form these networks often seek to use the sanctuary provided by mobility in the cluttered environment ashore as a base from which to launch missile strikes against fixed targets necessary for power projection like air bases, or more ambitiously against ships at sea.
DEAD? I suppose someone had some fun with that one. Of course, Cote observes that air defenses under this scheme are also assumed to be mobile, which presents a set of different problems:
Ever since the failed “SCUD Hunt” of Desert Storm, persistent airborne surveillance has been identified as key to the rapid identification and precise geo-location of mobile targets, as has been a source of precision weapons for attacking those mobile targets in time urgent fashion when they are found. Everything learned during the decade-long war on terror in operations against IEDs and terrorist leaders has amplified that message. This means that persistent airborne surveillance and time urgent weapons will also need to play a central role in defeating the mobile targets that form the heart of an A2/AD network. ... At the heart of any DEAD capability against a modern air defense system is the need to destroy relatively small numbers of expensive, phased array engagement radars. Without them, SAM batteries lack the ability to track targets with the accuracy needed to guide missiles against them. These radars need only emit intermittently during an engagement and can be quickly moved afterward. Thus, traditional radar-homing weapons like HARM will not work because they require a continuous signal to home on, and traditional single-platform, angle-of-arrival (AOA) ELINT techniques cannot provide accuracy sufficient to target coordinate-seeking weapons.
Cote goes on to look at how an alternative ELINT/COMINT technique called Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA). At this point, I fear that my acronym limit has been reached. The point, overall, is something Dan and I have highlighted in the past. These are major conflict capabilities, but will most likely find operational use in humanitarian interventions, offshore counterterrorism operations, and missions in the Persian Gulf. As Robert Caruso observed about the Afloat Foreward Operating Base, naval ships that enable light projection of special operations forces, Marines and allow dominance over onshore battlefields without the need for large infrastructures are indispensible for current American strategy. A DEAD (OK, bad pun) giveaway is the way Iraq and Afghanistan experiences with improvised explosive devices and high-value targeting has influenced the design of counter-shore capabilities for conventional warfare.
When coupled with operational cyber capabilities for missions against state opponents, what you begin to see is the shape of a military building a capability for decisive onshore intervention. Granted, it is important to qualify this (as we have with drones). The US could, with sufficient investment, destroy Syria's air defense system with existing technologies. But even so, the real problem is the postwar situation and regional effects. Weapons do not make war, and the ultimate determinant of US intervention will be the way these innovations mesh (or do not) with policy discussion in Washington.
* * And because I promised ADTS in the comments of my Stuxnet post, a Lana Del Rey link. It's got alligators in a pool and stuff. Make some kind of crackpot analogy to US naval strategy, Internets.
Abu Elkus 1) “The systems
Abu Elkus
1)
“The systems that form these networks often seek to use the sanctuary provided by mobility in the cluttered environment ashore as a base from which to launch missile strikes against fixed targets necessary for power projection like air bases, or more ambitiously against ships at sea. “
That is a lot of words without much punctuation. Just sayin’.
2)
That was very sweet of you to include the link. I was happy to see Abu M continuing to execute a plan for global domination that was conceived in the wilds of East Tennessee, but sad for myself being deprived of his snarkily insightful commentary. You may end being even better, though. Trust me, that is high praise, as I hold Abu M in higher regard than does any other collection of capitalized letters of indeterminated gender trolling the depths of the Interwebs. (And not just because Abu M plays paintball with Hezbollah, although that is certainly part of it – I really do think that is quite cool.)
3)
I downloaded “Blue Jeans” just now from iTunes for a whopping $1.29. While – once more – I really appreciate the customer service you displayed – you may yet turn this joint around – I thought the video was only “Meh.” Was there any plot or meaningful to the visuals, or was it as senseless as the lyrics (even if the overall sound is good)? Why did the guy with the tats stick his fingers in Lana Del Rey’s mouth? (And did doing so render the video not suitable for children, or am I just squeamish and uptight?)
4)
If the US were fighting an Iraq headed by Saddam Hussein in 2012, if it/he were to launch SCUDs at Israel from the western desert, would the US and its allies be able to perform better than in 1991, either in terms of hunting SCUDs with ground SOF, using aviation ISR , placing Patriots in Israel, etc.?
5)
Does the US really have “a capability for decisive onshore intervention,” especially with an all volunteer force? I think one could make a pretty compelling case for boots on the ground in Syria at this point – securing WMDs, preventing spillover or contagion, curbing atrocity – but doubt it will happen, in part precisely because onshore intervention would probably be protracted and tentative rather than decisive.
Thanks again – once more, very sweet.
Best
ADTS
The Lana video was weird, but
The Lana video was weird, but I was feeling a kind of late-80s mid-90s vibe there. Kind of reminds me of this video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UAOxCqSxRD0
It is hard to judge the scenario in (4) because we have to also decide whether Saddam's capabilities remained static or improved, and that involves making a political calculation about how long sanctions would have held out minus US intervention. Plus, the intervention itself was part of how the US developed and tested the doctrine and capabilities for what I linked in. Without it, the US might have had a far different threat focus.
As for (5), we know the US excels at applying decisive force. But decisive force is not enough to achieve strategic decision, as we learned in 2003 and after 2001. It's an old problem--look at the Prussians after the capture of Napoleon III in 1871.
Abu Elkus Regarding 4), fair
Abu Elkus
Regarding 4), fair point.
If you care to opine, assume that this is a 2012 in which there was no prior conflict between the US and Iraq (in other words, no Desert Storm or Iraqi Freedom); Saddam Hussein is a tepid ally or at worst a neutral; and Iraqi military capabilities between the end of the Iran-Iraq War and the 2012 have either been stagnant, or increased linearly, whereas US military capabilities have increased exponentially. In other words, the Iraqi Order of Battle is either the same as it was in 1991 or somewhat improved (say, two or three times what it was), the US military is its present self.
Could such an adversary present the same challenge to the US in 2012 that Saddam presented in 1991 - in other words, launch SCUDs at an ally without the US being able to do much? From a strictly military perspective (I know), could the US handle the threat in a way it could not 20-plus years ago?
I will check out the video later and report back - thanks once more.
Best
ADTS
Abu Elkus I got around to
Abu Elkus
I got around to viewing Isaac, "Wicked Games." I hadn't thought ot the parallels to that Del Rey, "Blue Jeans" video, but they are there - shot in black and white, starring only a man and a woman, and tense or in mourning about what love is - nice call. To be honest, when I saw a video with an 80s vibe referenced, my thoughts turned to Def Leppard, "Pour Some Sugar On Me," or Warrant, "Cherry Pie" - I miss hair metal.
Best
ADTS
Just a couple of comments: 1)
Just a couple of comments:
1) DEAD/SEAD (Destruction/Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) are terms that have been around for over 30 years, but they get little visibility in CT/COIN environments. And in a modern environment, you're only going to be able to conduct SEAD initially, simply from an asset availability perspective. The actual destruction of modern air defense gear, operated by a competent crew that is intent on surviving on the battlefield, is quite difficult.
2) Not sure what DoD acronym list the author got A2/AD, but I believe the correct term is IADS, Integrated Air Defense System.
3) "At the heart of any DEAD capability against a modern air defense system is the need to destroy relatively small numbers of expensive, phased array engagement radars. Without them, SAM batteries lack the ability to track targets with the accuracy needed to guide missiles against them."
That last sentence is categorically false! The author needs to relook our experience in the Balkans in the 90's...the Navy and Air Force both lost planes, as did the Brits, French and Spanish. Once we had bombed the crap out of their EW radars, the enemy still demonstrated the ability to broadcast air raid tipper info to tactical batteries in the field, much to the chagrin of planners.
And lastly I will simply throw out that as the technology and interconnectedness of all of the pieces of a modern IADS increase, so does it's susceptibility to non-kinetic counter-measures...i.e. Syria's IADS when the Israelis bombed their nuke reactor site.
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