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The Special Operationalization of U.S. Foreign Policy
In case you missed it, I wrote a series of columns for World Politics Review on what I see to be a disturbing trend in U.S. foreign policy: the increasing belief that special operations forces are the answer to each and every tricky problem the United States faces. Below, I am providing links to each of my three columns. I think it is clear from the tenor of my columns that I have a lot of admiration for and a little familiarity with U.S. special operations forces, and it is from that position of admiration and familiarity that I worry about their expanding role.
Part I: Special Operations Forces' Expanding Global Role
Part II: Reining in SOCOM's Alarming Ambitions
Part III: Special Forces, or the Danger of Even a Lot of Knowledge
World Politics Review provides access to their content when linked from this blog, but do yourself a favor and buy a subscription anyway to support my work and the work done by all the other World Politics Review contributors.
P.S. My column today is on Egypt. You can read it here.
An enduring trend; blind
An enduring trend; blind faith in diplomacy, does not resolve systemic conflict. Another enduring trend; outsourcing risk, does not resolve systemic conflict either. When:
1. a dispute cannot be resolved diplomatically
2. risk cannot be transferred to a third party,
3. the situation is untenable and
4. conflict resolution is a favored outcome
SOCOM deserves an opportunity to suggest alternative approaches. That said, foreign policy in most liberal democracies is constrained by popular resistance to the use of force as a means to resolve conflict, which is great.
I wonder if you couldn't just
I wonder if you couldn't just as correctly call the problem the "diplomatization of war"? To me, it seems like when we have wanted to achieve a diplomatic objective with military means--find and blow up Iraqi Scuds before they can draw Israel into the gulf war, say--we use the special forces; and when we want to secure some sort of advantage in war with diplomatic means (discover Soviet armor formations in East Germany, for example) then we have used the CIA. All of these activities happen in some sort of grey area between pure diplomacy and pure war. Whether it's the intelligence services or the uniformed special forces who are telling the other what to do, it brings up some worrying questions either way...
Now with regard to the suggestion that the US uses special forces to answer "each and every tricky question" that we face, well I obviously am not the guy to say that this is true or that it isn't. But in the abstract, I have a hard time imagining that we have much alternative in how to address the challenges that are right now most dangerous. Theoretically, if virtually all the most imminent national security threats these days are from Somali pirates, Yemeni tribesmen and other radicals in Pakistan or Mali or wherever, then virtually all of those threats are tricky questions, and virtually all of the solutions will have to involve un-conventional responses.
Pivoting back to the real world, I think many in the foreign policy establishment would argue that the greatest long-term strategic threat we face is from China, and it's clear that the response we have begun to engineer is all at once more formal, more transparent and much lighter on the SF component, not to mention non-kinetic (at least for the time being): the rotation of US Marine formations into Australia, deployment of another carrier to the Pacific, strategic engagement with Viet Nam, Myanmar and the like...
You seem to be concerned at the American people's willing ignorance of the truth in Yemen, which is that what our forces are engaged in there is a full-on war in everything but name: "Good luck...trying to find the formal declaration of war that preceded that campaign." I understand the despair, but if anything all of the actions I listed above (and many more besides) seem intended to make a formal war with a rival great power that much easier both to prosecute and to declare (thanks to the tried&true trip-wire principle).
So Special Forces may be on the ascendant in the eyes of elected legislators (who have the attention span of 435 exceptionally intelligent gnats). But to this outsider, that looks mainly like a product of the latest threat assessments. I don't believe that the special operationalization of foreign policy is strongly indicative of a more insidious, dangerous long-term trend toward greater opacity in the conduct of spec ops and diplomacy.
Exum hard discussion because
Exum hard discussion because as you pointed out there is direct, indirect, and different organizations involved which makes makes it difficult to pigeon hole a solution. The standards that you are asking for reminds me of a comic strip where Dilbert http://www.dilbert.com/ is commenting about an employment posting for a UNIX administrator that requires 100 years of experience for candidate qualification.
Saw this post last night and really had to think about the reply usually my comments are off the cuff. This morning I read this http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Syrias_MaturingInsur... which has to be the most complete explanation of ground conditions in Syria that is available to the public. Not the picture that Clinton draws in her news coverage. For the opposition in Syria to maneuver as they are in mass there has to be a higher level of organization as in Libya when their rebels closed on Tripoli. That organization comes from somewhere special.
The Battle of Mogadishu was a turning point for many in the community. It was also a change in publicity of the organizations. Then came a ten year war which only added to the operational capabilities that was punctuated with UBL. The State Department and its list of people embedded in foreign countries many of which are political appointees with staffs hired in a parallel process. Then you have the community in question who are highly motivated individuals with a different job description. What is happening between State and SOCOM is a discussion that has been on going. Don't see it as a turf war it is more about standing behind and supporting operators when they need it the most. Somalia yesterday and today only added to the State and SOCOM discussion. When State wants their people or political supporters rescued they really want SOCOM and their resources to be moved as quickly as possible to protect. All I see is SOCOM asking for permission to have more flexibility in a complex decision making process to let the people know that nobody will be committed to in another Battle of Mogadishu without available resources. The operators do not want to be second guessed by committee like we do to Police in the USofA with citizen advisers. When the community is called on to complete a mission it does not have the option to say no and not completing a mission is not in the DNA of the community.
Going back to the discussion that Joesph Holliday brings what happens on the ground becomes very complex. The USofA has to build the capacity to engage and Collin Powell and many others did not want a COIN conflict. State wants humanitarian conflicts to be pretty without pain. COIN is the right answer but it requires resources which if not available makes you wonder about the people commenting to a COIN battle.
Since State and yourself have questioned SOCOM that begs the question if State has the capabilities it demands. Has the State Department been successful in its direct and indirect operations in Sudan and the Horn of Africa? How often does State serve tea? It really is the pot calling the kettle black.
SOCOM is an asset and any asset is going to try to support its mission. CIA is looking at the future and they are moaning about losing their intelligence capacity as it did in the 90's.
If we do not want SOCOM to break eggs to make omelettes someone in Washington really needs to rethink of what kind of wars they want so badly. Don't give SOCOM a mission that leaves them with the need to have the flexibility to move assets to keep their operators alive !
There is a Japanese business practice where people are trained from the ground up. You start in the mail room before you get to run the company. That way you understand what each job requires along with the humbleness needed, that way when you are CEO you have a unique understanding of the employee in the mail room.
Hillary really needs to strap one on and go out without her protection service and get dirty at the ground level. Let the SOCOM community serve tea for a while (actually they are all pretty good at it ).
Hear that Hillary is going to serve up some tea to Sergei Lavrov in an upcoming summit meeting, lets see how the Russians like her serving technique.
State Department is not doing their job. If there is tea to be served THEY are the ones that need to brush up on the service. State really needs to get rid of its military department and get back to doing diplomacy so SOCOM does not have to clean up where State fails with words.
In other words don't put them in the position unless you support them
Bad day for links sorry. My
Bad day for links sorry. My comment above about the Syria ground discussion.
See if this works http://www.understandingwar.org/report/syrias-maturing-insurgency
Above link should get you to the Executive Summary, there is a link to the PDF under the cover photo for the full publication.
Title and where it came from.....
Syria's Maturing Insurgency
by Joseph Holliday
THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR
Bad spelling day too. From
Bad spelling day too.
From Visitor.... on June 21, 2012 - 12:35pm
COIN is the right answer but it requires resources which if not available makes you wonder about the people commenting to a COIN battle.
Should be "committing to a COIN strategy"
Great articles. However, I
Great articles.
However, I think you should write an article on the "the cult of SF accoutrements and accessories" making note of all the different modes of dress that "set them apart" from the slime of the rank-and-file.
In particular:
1.) The SF beard - worn so as "to blend in" (with all the Kuchi nomads rocking around with their Oakley's and their baseball cap turned backwards)
2.) The SF weapons - The latest and best weapons and equipment which prove their "elite" status on the battlefield.
3.) The SF issued "blurred newspaper face" - where SF operators, owing to their super-secret need for super-secrecy, undergo specialised plastic surgery whereby they become incognito in any media source and cannot then be identified.
4.) The berets, shoulder patches, "elite" insignia - A modern Western retake of tribal warrior branding.
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