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Limits to War?
I greatly enjoyed Steven Metz's article on the rise of "invisible wars" in World Politics Review. Why? Well, Metz is way ahead of the giant pack of writers looking to capture the zeitgeist of American strategy because he understands that truly limited wars occur because of limited political objectives rather than simply limited means:
While the United States would like to find and support partners that share its objectives and priorities, it does not rely on finding them. So long as it is able to buy some degree of access to areas that spawn extremists, it can prevent terrorists from developing an effective power-projection capability. After all, that is the objective, even if we sometimes seem to forget it.
Unmanned aerial vehicles, special operations forces, cyber capabilities, and the tactics and operations associated with each are certainly more limited means than large-scale stabilization missions. But they can still serve unlimited political ends. There is a persistent misconception that more modest uses of military and political resources equates to limited war. In reality, one can have quite grand and expensive capabilities tasked towards fairly modest objectives or pursue expansive goals without the resources neccesary to achieve them.
I am, however, unsure of how long the US's current military and strategic concepts will last. First, as Antulio Echevarria wrote in 2002, most new ways of war are in fact "ways of battle." The American way of war--to be more accurate a set of competing ways of war--evolved slowly over a period of multiple centuries. We have had many more ways of battle, most of which tend to have a fairly limited shelf life. Politics--budget and otherwise--tend to change fast and with them the tactical and operational tools and technologies that the US uses to make warfare. Think, for example, how far Afghanistan and Iraq were from the future of small, high-end brushfire wars predicted by many 1990s Transformation enthusiasts. We embarked on our ten year journey in the first place because 3,000 of our citizens were murdered by terrorists operating out of a fortified base area.
Would another 9/11 cause us to throw everything overboard and go back to large-scale stabilization operations? Probably not. There are resource constraints to conducting force projection that we are steadily approaching. We also depend on operational heft and symbolic political importance from allies whose cuts make the worst sequestration scenarios seem tame in comparison. But a cautious lesson can be found in the 1950s nuclear strategy debates. Here, limited means actually increased the potential destructiveness of warfare because the US aimed to make nuclear weapons substitute for expensive conventional local forces. What matters most is not the means but the politics and policy behind them.
As Dan wrote in his post on declaring victory, politicians risk substantial domestic costs if they fail to give sufficient attention to counterterrorism. The public is happy because the violence is, if not exactly invisible, once again relegated to exotic locales in Central Asia and the Horn of Africa. A sense of distance between the US and its opponents has once again been restored, but for good? It's still hard to tell in late July 2012.
How long with this last? I
How long with this last?
I am, however, unsure of how long the US's current military and strategic concepts will last.
That's simple. Until domestic political pressure rises to the point that it needs to change or the international friction overcomes the domestic inertia to keep it up. And by international friction I'm talking anywhere from economic to military consequences. There's no one even remotely close on the latter, and given the world economic picture no one is going mess with the U.S. economy except at their own peril. So in effect its permanent. Enjoy the job security aelkus.
I'm so glad you put response
I'm so glad you put response to 9/11 and strategic nuclear options in the same paragraph. Whatever you were thinking, your heart's in the right place.
yeah. but then, wtf are these
yeah. but then, wtf are these political aims?
Responding to the same quote
Responding to the same quote you cited in your critique...
"A counterextremist strategy based on invisible force largely bypasses this problem. While the United States would like to find and support partners that share its objectives and priorities, it does not rely on finding them. So long as it is able to buy some degree of access to areas that spawn extremists, it can prevent terrorists from developing an effective power-projection capability. After all, that is the objective, even if we sometimes seem to forget it."
-the first thought that came to my mind was, does a counterextremist strategy really bypass this problem? ie. the problem of a state that is unwilling/unable to cooperate to the extent of being a viable partner in a counterinsurgency campaign. Im not advocating that a counterinsurgency approach (without a viable host-state partner) is going to be more effective than a counterextremist approach (again, without [i]asking for or needing[/i] a viable host-state partner), just that by employing counterextremist policy (if im understanding it correctly) will not get rid of the problem of the inept host-state that may do more harm than good. if the state employing the counterextremist policy (say, the US) no longer employs the use of the carrot (military/economic aid), what incentive is there left for the host (say, Karzai Afghanistan) to cooperate at all? Fear of repercussions?
Trillions of dollars over a
Trillions of dollars over a ten year span plus a bankrupt economy. The discussion should be about what the US gets in return for the effort spent.
US Sec of State has been country hopping for the past 3.5 years. Every trip there is a financial commitment. Are strings attached? Is there an expectation or check/balance for the taxpayer's resources? NO!!
US has spent money on Libya. Is there any expectation of results? NO!! Gaddafi got murdered on International TV in full few of all the UN lawyers.
US dumped Trillions in to IRAQ.
US dumped and is dumping Trillions into Afghanistan.
Results? NO!!! Afghanistan is free to buy Chinese boots and equipment for its army.
This isn't about war planning, it is about results.
So long as it is able to buy some degree of access to areas that spawn extremists, it can prevent terrorists from developing an effective power-projection capability. After all, that is the objective, even if we sometimes seem to forget it.
duhhhhO, I thought it was about Democracy.
Guess what I am saying
Guess what I am saying this.
Is there a method/plan or is the USG just spending its budget to justify its existence?
Good example is the bureaucracy of the the refugee relocation system. The UN locates the refugee and hands them off to the USG who turns them over to the States with Grants to fund the operation and relocation. Millions of people have been processed.
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/data/state_prg_annual_overview.htm
Its a make work program.
Has the US internalized its illegal immigrant population yet? NO!!!
What IS the method/plan?
in response to 'visitor'
in response to 'visitor' above...
"So long as it is able to buy some degree of access to areas that spawn extremists, it can prevent terrorists from developing an effective power-projection capability. After all, that is the objective, even if we sometimes seem to forget it.
duhhhhO, I thought it was about Democracy."
nope. it (OEF) was about capturing/killing the terrorists who attacked us, and denying them a haven to repeat that attack in the future (toppling Taliban regime). nation building (im going to assume that's what you meant by 'democracy') was a tactic of a counter insurgency campaign--not the end goal of OEF.
Jamie on July 27, 2012 -
Jamie on July 27, 2012 - 7:00pm
Thank you for your comments. I was not linking nation building or COIN to promoting Democracy. My comments are really about asking why the US is spending so much on terrorism and what the taxpayer gets for the effort. In the CONUS an American citizen would have a higher chance of getting broadsided in traffic by some nut texting or talking on their cell phone than being a victim of terrorism.
Metz is drawing a comparison of the Bush and Obama administrations. The US has moved up the learning curve so comparing where we have been to the current strategy is like comparing the horse and buggy to the automobile, both were right for their time. To draw a conclusion that people in the horse and buggy day are stupid cause they did not drive automobiles ignores the learning curve and passage of time. It took time, money, and organization to spin up the CIA and Drones.
The US is radicalizing just as many people today as we did in the Bush administration. Today it is worse because the US has supported two accidental training camps, one in Libya and the other Syria. The weapons that are being supplied in these invisible wars, with a wink and nod, are going to come back and bite the US in the butt.
For all those involved we better hope that the Muslim Brotherhood appreciates the service the US is providing.
Guess I could add Somalia,
Guess I could add Somalia, Mali, Niger, and Yemen to the list of accidental training camps that the US has improved since the Bush administration. Mali catching fire (the coup) after Libya's Arab Spring was not a mishap but a direct result.
The invisible war spreads the contagion. This is not a success, it did create jobs US unemployment would have been much higher without the defense industry.
We know the event that started it (9/11).
Do we know what defines the end? If you walked up and asked that question to anyone in the USG I really don't think they could not give you a straight answer. They are too busy doing their job.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t0EeFqWSHS0
This is how the best, brightest and strongest country in South America treats us...
This is the same country / people who export billions of dollars of illegal drugs (cocaine) into our country every year... and have the Mexican cartels invading our country with their poison and killing our people
They are our friends...???
The other thing is that it
The other thing is that it would be good to hear Exum pipe up here since Metz's excellent piece basically says that long term nation building--or coin--doesnt work, and when we tried to make it work in Iraq and Afghanistan in terms of strategy using resources to achieve a favorable outcome at the least cost in blood and treasure, well we are in the red if not black. And it was people like coin expert Exum who so stridently recommended this bankrupt strategy in Spring of 2009. Go back and watch him on Rachel Maddow and see how giddy he was at the prospect of the savior general McChrystal riding onto the scene to transform his army toward the Exum way of doing Coin. And what has it gotten us? As i said in the New York Times a few much ago, "not much." And even "not much" is a generous statement.
When will the Coin experts--military and civilian--answer for what they have wrought?
It's good enough. Keeping the
It's good enough.
Keeping the "evildoers" at a distance and in fear of killer drones and special operations (and relentless multilateral intelligence activities) forces forces them to expend more resources and energy on security rather than on planning and executing disruptive terrorist actions. The X factor is our ability to leave Afghanistan as a somewhat viable state with power-balanced ethnic/warlord factions willing to support a weak central government and an army able to keep the Taliban to the margins. Can this be done by 2014? Wish I knew....
Ex, You ask if another 9-11
Ex,
You ask if another 9-11 would cause us to go back to large scale stabilization efforts. I would argue that the plan after 9-11 was not to do a large scale stabilization effort. The reason we went to a large scale stabilization effort was, uh, what again exactly? There was no linkage of strategy to what we were doing in AFG or IZ. The whole point of going into IZ was something hazy about WMD. No WMD were found. 8 years later we finally left. We're still running around AFG, and why? Because there never was a strategy to confront terrorists.
This is where I completely agree with Gian. COIN has not proven to the be an answer. I think the analogy Gian uses is that COIN fits a "Good War" narrative and not really any of the conditions on the ground. A much smaller but robust CT strategy executed by drones and special operations forces is a much, much more effective way to combat terrorist forces. And yet, we still while away our time in AFG while our GOs and think tankers talk about how the AFGs will be "placed in the lead" in order to "legitimize the GIRoA." Give me a break.
Andrew: You finish rightly so
Andrew:
You finish rightly so with a statement to Exum, "give me a break." Or perhaps better than a "break" would be an answer from him (and others who supported a fully resourced, comprehensive coin campaign in 2009) as to why they recommended it in 2009 and than an acknowledgment that it has been an abject strategic failure. In academe if one has an abrupt interpretive change of stance on a certain matter, usually a scholar will explain why: perhaps new primary sources, or new arguments. But with the Coin proponents all that we get is a reinvention beyond coin into something else.
Like i said in my first post when will the Coin experts--civilian and military--answer for what they have wrought?
All, Andrew Exum did not
All,
Andrew Exum did not post this entry. This is Adam Elkus---"aelkus." See here: http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2012/05/you-cant-win-anything-kids...
Second, the more general point I was trying to make is that theory of victory matters more necessarily than the means. We probably aren't going to see more large stabilization in the near-future, but I'm not sure the overall theory of victory will stay as limited as it necessarily seems to be now. We also tend to enjoy ways of warfare rather than ways of war, and it remains to be seen whether all of the op-eds being written about cyber, drones, and sof as a new way of war will last as the politics change.
Although I suppose it would
Although I suppose it would be more confusing if I started to use my old posting name A.E.....
Adam: I knew it was you who
Adam:
I knew it was you who wrote the post, but reading what Metz had to say in WPR and his argument that basically nation building coin has not worked made me think and post on Exum's contribution to recommending doing that very thing.
gian
Unfortunately the
Unfortunately the accumulation of a large debt is sinonmous with any war. However, some would say that we are not really at war. Within two months, from October '01 to December '01, U.S. Special Operations Forces (CIA) and the Northern Alliance, consistant with U.S. air superiority, were able to oust the majority of major al-qaeda and taliban leaders out of Afghanistan and into Pakistan. Two months and we didn't even have our full military. Our mistake was stopping! You never stop when you have the enemy on their heels, that's when you push the hardest. President Bush's policy at that time was that it would not distinguish between terrorist organizations and nations or governments that harbored them. That policy was violated within two months at the hieght of our efforts. Why? Our current situation is the result of allowing our enemies to rebuild. There have been many specualtive articles regarding how Pakistan supported al-qaeda and the taliban. bin landen was killed there! That sounds to me like a country harboring terrorists. If we want this to end, we must push the way we did at the begining. We have two choices; we can invade pakistan and risk even more debt and more lives, or bring our troops back home and focus on defense and risk being attacked on our homeland. Either way, we cannot maintain the position we are in.
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