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Firepower and Dispersal
Andrew Davies at the Australian
Strategic Policy Institute recently highlighted a fascinating work taking the long view of weapons
technology development.
The argument essentially goes that, as weapon power has increased exponentially
in past millennia, so too has the density of combatants in the field appeared
to decrease substantially. The relationship here is obvious, but also obviously
not one-sided. The increased lethality of weapons raises the risk of
concentrated formations, but additionally, technological advances in logistics,
battlefield mobility and communications enable more dispersed formations as
well.
Take, for example, this report from the
Colombian think-tank CNAI
(Esp.), which, among many, many other things, explains the shift in FARC
tactics in response to Colombia’s use of light attack aircraft such as A-37s
and Super Tucanos. FARC, for much of the late 1990s and early 2000s, was able
to operate in quasi-conventional formations and challenge Colombian forces for
territorial supremacy in a number of provinces, as well as to construct large
encampments. In certain terrain environments, the Colombian military was long
impaired in bringing indirect fires to bear against FARC concentrations.
Contrary to the caricature of irregular war
and COIN that rejects a role for heavy weapons and airpower, Colombia has not
only exploited airpower quite effectively in destroying FARC force
concentrations, but also made significant gains in putting it towards campaigns
of high-value targeting, including (across borders when necessary). FARC,
consequently, was forced to re-disperse its forces and adopt a series of newer
techniques, tactics, and procedures in order to mitigate its vulnerability to Colombian
fires. This all came at relatively insignificant political cost (perhaps
excepting the 2008 Andean crisis), as Colombian public opinion appears to
largely support or at least accept Colombia’s aerial campaign, though there is
much more criticism of Colombia’s use of proxy forces and ambiguous ties with
paramilitaries, or the human rights conduct of Colombian ground troops and
intelligence services.
The pattern of counteracting concentrated
firepower with forms of dispersal, then, demonstrates a significant degree of
continuity between regular and irregular wars. In Kosovo and Iraq, target
governments responded to air power by dispersing and camouflaging their forces
to wage a protracted defense against Western military might. The response of
Serbian Integrated Air Defense System to American air power was in many ways
similar to FARC’s - the dispersal of forces, the decreased reliance on fixed
rather than mobile combat assets, and a focus on attrition and harassment
rather than outright contestation of the battlespace.
In irregular war, the “political” aspects of
the war appear more salient because, in addition to geographic dispersal of the
battlefield, there is also a social dispersal by the irregular force by
adopting ruses and perfidy to disrupt the enemy’s ability to present
concentrated targets. This includes not simply the disguising of combatants as
noncombatants, but the integration of noncombatants more directly into
logistical and other supporting functions - using unarmed noncombatants to courier
information, provide intelligence, transport and procure supplies, et cetera.
For countries obeying modern laws of armed conflict and especially those with
modern liberal norms, dealing with that kind of dispersal requires non-military
means by virtue of the counterinsurgent forces’ own political standards. The
Lieber Code and other customary laws of war which sanctioned summary executions
and reprisal measures through a wide variety of means and a wide spectrum of
persons and properties, were ultimately political measures rather than
reflections of the nature of the conflict per se.
Nevertheless, regularized or conventional
forces frequently blurred these arbitrary lines in the past as counteractions
to hostile combat power. Sherman and Sheridan were contributors to the American
traditions of total conventional war and counterinsurgency both. That the
application of massive conventional force to problems of insurgency does not
simply reflect arbitrary political decisions, but also the military circumstances
that limit the overwhelming application of superior firepower generally. The
most powerful fires are not always the easiest to bring to bear, if geography,
intelligence, and the logistical tail do not permit it easy introduction to the
theater or a leading role in its operations. The sort of limitations that
initially prevented Colombia from making good use of fires in its
counterinsurgency operations also occur in conventional battlefields, albeit
under different circumstances, and the response of dispersal will continue to
frustrate firepower. The dispersal of a combatant in response to superior
firepower can involve a transmutation in organizational form is a reminder
that, in part, the configuration of a foe is, ultimately, a strategic choice bound
by capability, rather than essence.
Bro you are as bad a writer
Bro you are as bad a writer as aelkus. Don't quit your day job.
By the way, don't think we didn't notice you Whopper Jr. AKA baby killer handle name there buddy. You are a F - ing sicko. You are a head case and a nut. if you think killing kids in Iraq is ok you better get you head examined.
http://www.strategicstudiesin
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/people.cfm?authorID=735
http://blogs.princeton.edu/paw/AlumniwithPetraeus.jpg
Hey Exum, you didn't tell us you were doing your fellowship with a cute Intelligence Officer!
Is she lining up for Ranger School too?
Perhaps you can give her a few tips? Cheers mate!
Exum, looks like you poked
Exum, looks like you poked your head up judging from the last comment.
dtrombly , I got "it".
How about some video to show "it". Communication is in the presentation.
The A29 Super in action: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0RJxzkhAJIo&feature=related
Infrared footage of fire on FARC targets: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NDKRZ0JAWdM&feature=related
Some old footage of other operations: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Wx00Aq9Vsk
Great fly by on Independence day (How does a small country afford this stuff!!!!): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fxIvq8_KN50
Who can forget this night action: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cr8TcXOUEgA&feature=related
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDnLN1wR2dE&feature=fvwrel
And your reference to the Andean Problem, from the ground level : http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bbf1Zd4oILw
The Super Tucano is not an advance aircraft, the targeting systems and low heat signature are. As you advance from arrows to lasers the graphical analysis goes exponential, then so does the logistical support and budget. The person with arrows can find more in the forest and works with quiet stealth (got a woody?). An army with lasers has a logistics support over a 1,000 miles long (got oil?).
Dispersion to fight a more advanced foe is as old as combat. Why has it taken ten years and trillions of dollars to handle the 9/11 terrorists? Sometimes it becomes more about the economy than the task.
BTW....Government employees have been avoiding (getting)"fire"(ed) since Alexander Hamilton ran the Treasury, they don't do their jobs while hiding in clear sight (there is one sitting on the executive order throne). You should investigate their cloaking device, it is as thin as a sheet of printed paper.
Some texture for the Andean
Some texture for the Andean Problem:
http://defense-technologynews.blogspot.com/2010/02/dtn-news-modest-brazi...
Ecuador is one such customer. The two Super Tucanos that flew into Manta air base late last month were the first delivered on a 24-plane order that President Rafael Correa placed shortly after Colombian armed forces entered Ecuador's airspace in March 2008 to kill a high-ranking FARC rebel leader, Raul Reyes.
Although the $250-million purchase was seen as a reaction to Colombia's violation of its sovereignty, Correa in his weekly television address Feb. 6 said that the aircraft acquisition didn't signal an arms buildup. Rather, he said, the planes were replacing Ecuador's fleet of mostly 30-year-old A-37 Dragonfly aircraft made by Cessna.
which has repercussions
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/03/AR200809...
MANTA, Ecuador -- When U.S. officers stationed in this humid coastal city give reasons they should continue their decade-old airborne surveillance mission, they talk not only about fighting drug runners on the open seas but about the $71 million they've spent to renovate and maintain the city's airport, and the $6.5 million they inject each year into the local economy.
.
But the government of Ecuador has decided, and Washington has apparently agreed, that one of the most important foreign outposts in the United States' war on drugs will close. The 450 U.S. Air Force personnel and contractors stationed at a military base that shares the airport's runway will be leaving next year.
so the discussion continues.
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20091029/156629622.html
Ecuador is one of Russia's key partners in Latin America, trailing only Brazil and Argentina in trade with Moscow. Last year saw a record volume of trade between Russia and Ecuador, totaling $935 million.
Now you know why Hillary Clinton and Putin will never have a Monica moment.
BTW... Where's the AWAC going to live after all this?????
Dearest bro, Visitor of
Dearest bro, Visitor of August 18, 2012 - 10:47am
It occurs to me you may not be familiar with the customs of the United States of America - that is fine, let me tell you about the ways of my people. My handle is derived from my name - Daniel Trombly. As is customary, this name was given to me at birth, which, despite my youth, predated the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Evan Wright's 2004 book, or the 2008 HBO series with which you are likely familiar.
While I am sorry for any offense the surname which my father, like his fathers before him, may have caused you, I would recommend in the future that you try not to guess folks' political opinions based on similarities their family names may have to people you saw on television.
Warmest brogards,
Daniel (After President Daniels in 24?) Patrick (After the lead character of Gone Baby Gone?) Trombly (After, as well, another machine gun operator, SPC Lance Twombly from Black Hawk Down?)
Daniel: I have found that
Daniel:
I have found that there is such a thing as blog-stalking. On SWJ a few years ago there was this cat named "Duck" who would regularly attack nearly anything i said. Also, I wrote a teensy little oped piece in the Jerusalem post a few months ago and one cat came up on the comments thread of accusing me (similar to what happened to you here) of using a pseudonym stating that nobody would have an actual name like "gian gentile."
Anyway the only point i would add to your piece is that the reason why Coin seems to have the political aspects come to the fore is because American coin--which essentially is armed nation building--has politics embedded in micro, tactical action of the counterinsurgent force. That is to say when i was a cav squadron commander in west Baghdad in 2006 the daily tactical action of me and my troop often involved overt political acts like trying to establish local governance, alter existing financial institutions, that sort of thing.
The trick of the Coin crowd over the last few years has been to suggest that because the tactical application of American coin involves politics that therefore the Coin crowd were naturally good at the political nature of war, but the two are logically discrete and i would argue that if the American Army in the 80s and 90s didnt get the political nature of war (in a Clausewitzean sense) then the Coin crowd of the new millennium are worse at it.
Dear dtrombly, I am Totally
Dear dtrombly,
I am Totally down with Mr. Davies argument, but if how can one analyze (or cite and critique) a work about battlefield dispersion without mentioning the intellectual antecedents provided by (among others) T.N. Dupuy and James Schneider of "The Empty Battlefield" construct? Davies' infographics are valid and interesting, but highlight the same trend noted decades before.
Perhaps I'm off base, but the omission feels like the national security equivalent of providing a (very valid) proof for the Pythagorean theorem and not mentioning, well, you know . . .
If anyone else can cite earlier works of this trend (earlier than Dupuy and Schneider) I'd be happy to learn about them. I'm not arguing they were the first to note this trend. Davies himself draws on a paper from 2005 for his argument.
Glad to see this work pointed out.
-Q
Read on two Syrian Twitter
Read on two Syrian Twitter accounts today that either Mustard Gas or some kind of choking agent was released on the town of Bab an-Nayrab in Syria today. Can anyone confirm that? Same stated that over a dozen dead and one person had a photo of a tailfin from one of the mortar rounds.
Things are getting much worse.
This article is nothing new.
This article is nothing new. Dispersing on the battlefield is a topic that comes with common sense. There isn't any educated way of putting it. When you're getting your ass handed to you by artillery or aircraft, you disperse. When you are retreating, you would want to disperse. Aside from those situations, there is really no reason to speak of it. If the author is suggesting that our enemy is spreading themselves amongst civilian population to hide from our air force, that is a well known fact. That's what low down cowards do when they don't have the necessary funds or discipline to have a real military. They're thugs that bully innocent people into keeping they're mouths shut while they use them as a shield. And yes, we will fire on a civilian population if it would mean the end of the war. It is a very sad part of war, but unfortunately it is necessary. There has been civilian casualties in just about every war we've had. Although, it's best that we try not to use a canon to kill a mosquito. That's why we have boots on the ground, because we have hearts and we care for people. We don't target innocent people, that's what are enemies do. If you want someone to blame for civilian casualties, point at the sons of bitches that decided to fly planes into buildings.
My appologies for the rant on
My appologies for the rant on civilian casualties, but it seems to be a modern form of dispersing to hide amungst individuals or buildings that would deterr a large strike. I suppose I should focus more on the topic. My basic response, Airpower and Dispersement - use ground forces and artillery,
On dispersal: "That's what
On dispersal:
"That's what low down cowards do when they don't have the necessary funds or discipline to have a real military"
I beg to disagree. A very large number of countries in the world doesn't have the necessary funds to build a military that would be able to contest the US air dominance in any area. This group of countries includes about every ally the US have. And in a situation where a military commander is facing an overwhelming air campaign, dispersal of forces is the only sane way to continue fighting. The two other alternatives are annihilation or surrender. In fact, you claim that only a person who wilfully allows himself to be annihilated or surrenders would not be a low-down coward. Nice psychology, but it might be counter-productive. It would be much more useful to appreciate the actual nature of the adversary than paint a mockery. At the end of the road, the enemy does not get hurt feelings but you might deceive yourself to believe they are much easier adversary than they truly are.
Coming from a small country called Finland, I spent a of my time in the national service learning how to design and conceal installations. The doctrine was: "Never put a tent or a vehicle closer than 50 meters from another tent or a vehicle. If possible, 100 meters." The potential adversary our country might face would be likely to have overwhelming firepower. No point in making their job any easier.
@ Lurker You are absolutely
@ Lurker
You are absolutely right. It would most definitely not be logical to remain a sitting duck when getting bombarded by aircraft. The "necessary funds" and "real military" was meant for insurgent groups. I was on a rant and got off topic. I should've been more specific, mea culpa. I assure you, I meant no disrespect towards our allies. They have made many sacrifices of their own in support of peace and justice. American forces have experienced insurgents who have purposely dispersed within civilian population to hide from air strikes. And that infuriates me. These people are supposedly protecting their citizens from American democracy because we are evil people. And they do so by drawing fire upon there own people. They call themselves soldiers, they're ***king cowards. However tactically advantageous it may be, you still don't do it to innocent people on purpose. For example, storing bombs in schools. I know that's not an example of dispersing, but you get the gist. Why is article about Columbia anyway? I thought this was a forum for Afghanistan and Pakistan. I didn't see any references about that. Once again, no disrespect.
Dispersal is both a strategy
Dispersal is both a strategy and tactic. The people that scatter live to fight another day.
For AQ it is brilliant and that is why America has not defeated them (other than it makes for pretty good economic stimulus, in a bitched up way it is a win-win for both parties). AQ has taken the concept one further step and have dispersed past borders which causes America to deal with International Law and Foreign relations (it pretty much trashed American-Pakistan relations). It causes America to bleed green (lots and lots of green to stroke the Paks). Something as thin as printed paper is Kevlar for AQ.
Hillary Clinton looks like a one legged paper hanger jumping from country to country trying to keep up. She has writers-cramp from stroking all the checks, most not less than $25M. Recently she was in Mali asking if the government would like a brand new Intelligence Center which is something that has been replicated in other countries. Then again another win-win cause this is tapping the DOD budget for Foreign Aid, Clinton's passion.
The hoot is, judging from this Channel 4 news report, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9qzfW6qntIQ 87 vehicles that were given to the Mali army sourced from American Anti-Terrorism funding were taken by AQ for their own purpose and were used to take control of the Northern-Mali region. Weapons and ammo were secured in Libya when the Mali tribes help defeat Gaddafi. Guess you can say that Clinton provided foreign aid.
This is happening from Mail to Somalia in Africa and America is pouring in the green cash.
Dispersal causes the larger party to waste resources. It is like a horse swatting flies, the flies always win cause the fly does not need the barn, land, or farmer. The horse provides the food and water (or trucks, guns, and ammo).
BTW....Now you know why Clinton will not provide guns to Syria directly, it will make her look bad when she runs again for POTUS. The Mali army knows dispersal all too well. Sounds like Afghanistan, redux. No partner in sight.
You pay for it when you pay your taxes and fill at the petrol pump.
This more fun than Dupuy and
This more fun than Dupuy and Schneider
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Mouse_That_Roared
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p7L7WLFBYR4
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