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Green-on-Blue
Not to be confused with the Miles Davis song or dearly departed Philly eatery, green-on-blue violence is confounding U.S. commanders in Afghanistan and -- together with the 2,000th U.S. casualty -- has thrust the war back into the headlines here in the United States. I spoke about the killings this morning on public radio and wrote my final column for World Politics Review on the subject.*
These attacks are similar to the epidemic of military suicides in that we can discern an obvious pattern, but it remains difficult to determine what, precisely, is causing the problem. Once you dig deeply into each incident, they begin to seem sui generis -- each prompted by a unique set of circumstances. That makes them arguably more difficult to address than Taliban infiltration, which is a counter-intelligence problem for which we have some precedent. If these attacks instead represent a structural erosion in the relationship between coalition and Afghan forces, that's a lot tougher to fix.
A few things worth noting in addition to what I argued today in my column:
1. The United States may be in its eleventh year in Afghanistan, but a lot of soldiers and officers are fighting Year One. What I mean by that is that many of those serving in Afghanistan may have combat experience in Iraq but are new to Afghanistan. Contrast those folks, few of whom have any linguistic training or real cultural education, with Afghan forces who, in some cases, have been fighting in the same corner of the country for six or seven years. You could see how each could rub the other the wrong way. The Afghan might think the American arrogant and aloof, while the American might see the Afghan as lazy -- when in actuality he's just a little tired for having fought this war, in the same place, watching Americans come and go each year, for the better half of a decade.
2. I have said it before, but I will say it again. A "Green Beret" from the U.S. Army's Special Forces gets over a year of training before he ever steps foot in a foreign country. He receives specialized skills training and both language and cultural education. And he joins a small team that likely has decades of experience already. Contrast that soldier's training and selection process with the one we use for trainers and advisors recruited from the general purpose forces. The training we afford to the former is no guarantee of success. But you can never eliminate risk in war. What you can do is take measures to reduce and mitigate it.
*Also, since I am apparently the only analyst in Washington working this August, I was interviewed for earlier articles on the subject here, here, and here.
UPDATE: In the comments, my cousin -- who served as a combat advisor in Iraq with the U.S. Marine Corps BECAUSE HE EMBARASSED HIS FAMILY BY JOINING THE BLEEPING MARINE CORPS SERIOUSLYHOWCOULDYOU -- points me toward what he wrote a few days ago on his iPhone instead of spending quality time with his grandmother.
Ahem,
Ahem, http://gunpowderandlead.org/2012/08/protecting-advisors/
Did it all from my iPhone at Georgia Nicholson's house too. So there!
I'm not convinced by the
I'm not convinced by the "Green Beret" argument--having participated in Special Forces exercise as a senior civilian role-player, I was taken aback by the almost complete lack of political-cultural common sense among many SFODA personnel. Certainly there were some very bright and thoughtful folks too, but overall it hardly gave me the impression that they were genuinely optimized for interactions with host nation populations, officials, and security forces.
That's a fair assessment,
That's a fair assessment, Visitor 1:44. Also, polling conducted by SOCOM demonstrates SOF personnel are *more* likely to have anti-Muslim prejudices than GPF. Worth keeping in mind.
Well, perhaps that would make
Well, perhaps that would make a good blogpost!
Afghani are tribal and hold
Afghani are tribal and hold grudges - how many G-o-B attacks are retaliation for loss of family & friends?
This always works, at least
This always works, at least for HLS.
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/06/29/border-patrol-union-claims-homeland...
Border Patrol agents in Arizona are blasting their bosses for telling them, along with all other Department of Homeland Security employees, to run and hide if they encounter an "active shooter."
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It's one thing to tell civilian employees to cower under a desk if a gunman starts spraying fire in a confined area, say members of Tucson Local 2544/National Border Patrol Council, but to give armed law enforcement professionals the same advice is downright insulting. The instructions from DHS come in the form of pamphlets and a mandatory computer tutorial.
Exum, you forgot two groups in your discussion. The American people and Congress have been supporting the military from day one, all eleven years of it. They will be paying for it for the next ten years in the monies guaranteed Afghanistan. Our children will be paying for this the rest of their lives. For some, they will never have a chance to exist cause someone's DNA doesn't replicate anymore.
Sir, I returned from a year
Sir,
I returned from a year in Arghandab/Maiwand Districts with the 10th MTN in March. I experienced much of what you discussed in your post and WPR article. We had suspicions, had incidents, and really just got lucky that the deployment ended. We were vulnerable and accepted a lot of risk to meet dictated patrolling guidelines. They always seemed like risks not worth taking, but the bigger picture was bigger than my platoon. I have warned buddies preparing to deploy on the green-on-blue issue in Kandahar Province, on the techniques that worked for me in building trust between the more/less threatening ethnic groups within the ANA, and the out right counter measures that must be taken to protect your guys. I have been shocked that this issue has taken so long to become highly publicized, and discussed by the top commanders. This is not a new trend.
My buddies are preparing to head over as members of SFAT teams attached to ANA Battalion sized elements. Even with the "guardian angels" the troop restrictions on their deployments will not provide a reliable QRF to these teams whose closest thing to a trigger puller is an 11A LT w/ no combat experience. I regrettably foresee this strategy as very dangerous and leading to a catastrophe. These guys are not ODA teams who as a previous comment mentioned are flawed themselves, but are accustomed to surviving in isolated locations with hostile locals. They are a collection of officers and NCOs from different backgrounds who have never done something like this and may be under resourced. Do we just wish them luck or try to avoid this strategy?
Know this doesn't help solve
Know this doesn't help solve the problem.
Exum, don't you think it is odd to to be talking about training issues in the eleventh year of conflict?
If you ask me, someone is chumming the water for an agenda (another strategy?) and covering some brass. There are people on the payroll (that make six figure retirements) that have had responsibility in this conflict longer than one year. It is not about Bush's Foreign Policy anymore.
Training more soldiers in your concept of what is right will not help if the Afghans are not willing to run their country.
I too find it strange that
I too find it strange that these issues are being addressed at such a late time. Cultural education should always be part of the training, regardless of what stage we are in, no exceptions. It is entirely up to the brass how our military gets trained, and I believe it is obvious what their message is. I've had the plessure of speaking with several returning veterans, and for the most part, I was told that the differences within the Afghan tribes are causing US casualties to occur. Many of them are biased on several issues and simply cannot be trusted. The same guy giving you information could very well turn around and tell insurgents what direction you are headed. Most of the civilians are uneducated and have been raised based on different principles throughout the country. One also has to consider that this country has seen war for decades, and not just 11 years. The U.S. occupation is only a blink of an eye for the elders. And between burning Qur'ans and mass murdering 16 civilians, I can see why they would not trust us. For example, how would you feel about people burning the American flag? I don't know about anyone else's feelings, but I certainly wouldn't help such an individual in anyway, shape or form. Yes, we are definitely in need of a cultural education.
I realize that are primary
I realize that are primary mission in Afghanistan is to keep insurgents on their heels, however, we must also realize that we are working on the side to unite a country that has been divided for many, many years. I'm actually surprised that we haven't had more green-on-blue casualties.
USA502 on August 23, 2012 -
USA502 on August 23, 2012 - 3:49am
Burning the American flag is legal in all 50 States and its territories. The Democrats made it so. It is called free speech. When I grew up you only burned our flag when it was desecrated or worn. Need I say more?
Back to Afghanistan, everything that you point out is true and was known before the war even started. It was known before most of the people involved were born. This is not a surprise or special knowledge.
Someone better sit down and think through HOW our military is to be used, THEN decide WHAT they will need to learn. It is the "HOW the military will be used" that is lacking. What I am saying is a TOP down approach that encompasses both the American people's desires and considers the budget of doing so. That requires the people with the six-figure retirements to earn them, it is why the American people pay them way more than most earn.
BTW.....
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/08/21/dempsey-disappointed-by-anti-...
The United States' top military official criticized a group of former military and intelligence operatives for its aggressive campaign against President Obama, telling Fox News that he is "disappointed" by such political activity, which he called "not useful."
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The group of former CIA agents, Navy SEALs and other military members recently released a long-form political ad blasting Obama for security leaks on his watch, as well as suggesting he has taken too much credit for the SEALs raid in Pakistan that killed Usama bin Laden.
How many times have the American people heard POTUS speak as a "father". Any Politician does the same by speaking as an "individual". It is all about speaking around the law. If the Democrats let Americans burn their flags to speak well, then let the people that earn the right say their minds.
USA502 on August 23, 2012 -
USA502 on August 23, 2012 - 3:49am
Least not forget that America was in Afghanistan in the 1950's building damns and improving infrastructure as part of the Eisenhower administration. "Atoms for Peace" was the seed for both Iran and Pakistan's nuclear programs. In the 1980's America was shoulder-to-shoulder with the Mujahedin. America has been dealing with the Paks for a long time. Many of American consumer products are made in what Obama calls the "region". The people of the same countries are invited to study in America's best Universities, the are recruited by Americans to study at American expense.
That is in the record.
You can go to Eisenhower's or Reagan's Presidential museums which are supported by the American tax payer. If there is a computer in a USG office, the information is a web search away.
How did American leadership get so fucking stupid???????????
Hey Exum, Will you try and
Hey Exum,
Will you try and get an appointment at the Pentagon in 2016 when Cuomo runs?
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mobileweb/2012/08/22/university-of-colorad...
One of my favorite quotes
One of my favorite quotes about Afghans is short and to the point, and unfortunately I can't remember the original author at the moment, but there is definite truth in it. It goes something like, "Afghans, after centuries of warfare and attempts at conquering, are masters at self-preservation. Afghans are masters at the art of knowing when to change sides." This, combined with the obvious cultural disconnects which we know cause the majority of green-on-blue (GoB) attacks, I think gives us a framework for understanding why these are not only happening, but increasing.
Cultural insensitivities can incite GoB violence, check. Many of them are primarily driven by this, and yes, cultural training will help alleviate this. But we are likely (are...?) seeing more attacks that are actually driven by individuals with connections to the TB. Why is this? Not only increased small unit and SOF partnering (many of the attacks this year have been on special ops forces), but also because of an increasingly uncertain outcome for Afghan individuals living in contested regions, who suddenly see the drawdown and feel as if their bid for success (working with Coalition Forces) is no longer looking so successful. The Taliban know how COIN is waged and understand that the populace is your center of gravity. They aren't successful just because of governance campaigns, but also because of intimidation. They know they will be the continuing power brokers as we pull tens of thousands of troops out, which gives them the leverage they need to weigh on individuals who only joined ANSF because it, at the time, seemed to be the unit in power (or the unit that paid). As the drawdown continues, I'd be willing to wager that we see more and more co-option of ANSF, particularly at the local level (local police forces, not ANA), and consequently more GoB, as the perceived power centers shift.
Interesting. Didn't we have
Interesting. Didn't we have folks "visiting" Afghanistan before 9/11?
Are they going to bring it home? Where is home? Radicalizing effect?
Sometimes we make our own problems though facilitation.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/24/us-syria-jihadists-idUSBRE87N0...
(Reuters) - Talal Mohammad is a long way from Tennessee, and he's out of his depth.
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In an olive grove a few miles from the frontlines of Aleppo, he's at a loss to explain to a battle-hardened bunch of Syrian rebels what exactly this prosperous, U.S.-trained Saudi dentist is doing there - and what he can offer to their cause.
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"Why have you come?" asked one of his new comrades, sharply, as they shared a traditional evening meal, the iftar to break the Ramadan fast, in the twilight of a makeshift training camp.
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"Don't get us wrong," the man adds quickly, anxious to show due respect to a guest at this solemn ritual of shared faith in Islam. "We appreciate your solidarity. But if you'd brought us money and weapons, that would have been much better."
Visitor on August 24, 2012 -
Visitor on August 24, 2012 - 8:34am
Talking about cultural training why didn't Talal Mohammad from Tennessee join the US ARMY?
Sometimes the trees get in the way of the forest.
The British were in
The British were in Afghanistan during the 19th Century as players in The Great Game, the diplomacy, espionage, and proxy wars intended to protect India, the crown jewel of the empire, from Russian encroachment. They learned early to exploit tribal factionalism and the custom of paying “annuities” in exchange for cooperation. Cooperation was the primary resource of the country then, as it is now. Conditions deteriorated in 1842, leading to an opportunity for Afghans to teach the British about another cultural theme: treachery.
Mohammad Akbar Khan led a force that surrounded and outnumbered the 4,500 British and Indian troops by a ratio of seven to one; the British also were protecting 12,000 civilian camp followers, including three dozen British wives and children. Akbar used emissaries to negotiate a deal with Sir William Mcnaughton, civilian head of the British mission to Afghanistan, and then sent another message offering more favorable terms for the British withdrawal if Macnaughton would meet with him in person. Macnaughton and two political advisors rode out the next day to the location overlooking the Kabul River specified by Akbar, only 600 yards away, but out of sight from the poorly fortified British position. Akbar insisted that the delegation dismount and join him on the carpets that had been spread on the snow-covered ground so they could talk. Within a few minutes, Akbar yelled to his followers to seize the men. Macnaughton was dragged away and hacked to death immediately and his body parts displayed in the Kabul bazaar; the other two were taken alive, but the guards could not resist butchering one of them.
Mohammad Akbar Khan feared a reprisal, but none came, so he offered the British safe passage out of Afghanistan in exchange for all but six of their artillery pieces; he specifically guaranteed they would be protected from hostile tribes along the way. All 16,500 British soldiers and civilians departed their encampment at first light on 6 January 1843. Only one among them made it to Jalalabad alive one week later. The carnage and treachery were monumental.
Trickery and cleverness are themes in many cultures, and in some, the theme has led to a tradition of instrumental treachery. For example, the Yanamamo tribe of Venezuela has a custom of inviting neighboring villagers to a celebration and then drugging and murdering the men and stealing their women. They are apparently good at operational security, because villages occasionally accept Yanamamo invitations to what anthropologist Napoleon Chagnon called, “treacherous feasts.” However, the British experienced repeated examples of Pashtun treachery, including the butchering of their leader, and then trusted Akbar’s promise of safe passage, despite their experiences.
Instrumental treachery is still a fundamental theme in the dominant culture of Afghanistan, manifestations of which include the assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani, Taliban infiltrating police units and then drugging and murdering comrades, and countless examples of betrayal large and small. It is the cultural element that enables an Afghan to turn on his benefactors, switch sides during a battle, and sell his temporary allegiance without encountering obstacles of conscience. It is a different culture and we should expect greater and greater expression of this theme as the perception and reality of ISAF presence in Afghanistan diminishes.
Exums you wrote, " American
Exums you wrote, " American might see the Afghan as lazy -- when in actuality he's just a little tired for having fought this war, in the same place, watching Americans come and go each year, for the better half of a decade."
that's being awfully generous. The ANA guys are turds. They REALLY are lazy. It maddens me when think tankers and senior leaders make excuse after excuse for these guys. The most fundamental problem with Afghanistan is that it is run by Afghans. There is no hope for that country because their leaders are absolutely and irrevocably incompetent and corrupt leading to corruption, incompetence, and cowardice throughout the whole rotten GIRoA.
We need to withdraw. Drone strikes, special ops, and CT. Everything else is just a waste of time.
I wish I had been counting
I wish I had been counting the number of times you referenced SF as the 'standard'. It really removes your objectivity.
I'm in agreement with visitor 1:44.
Oh, and in my multiple deployments to both Iraq and Afghanistan in various staff and command positions, I never once worked with an ODA/AOB from 5th Group.
......so much for those language skills and cultural training.
Your WPR column talks about
Your WPR column talks about the patience of American voters when the violence against our troops comes from "the very Afghans they were sent to help".
But they weren't sent to help Afghans. They were sent to defeat a small core of Al Qaeda and the portion of the Taliban that abetted them; and to ensure that those people were never able to mount an attack outside of Afghanistan again.
if their mission had been anything else, they would never do many of the things they do. Night raids would've been off the table a decade ago. Supporting Karzai after he stole the 09 election wouldn't have happened. Military missions must be measured by actions, not words. Nothing about what we've done there suggests that helping Afghans was anywhere near the top of our agenda. Perpetuating this myth of "help" along with the weird insinuation of ingratitude leads to unjustified American anger and misunderstanding.
Afghans lazy? Corrupt? Ever
Afghans lazy? Corrupt? Ever wondered why? Ever had any normal relations with Afghans, without uniforms, guns, bulletproof vests and the rest of the intimidating Rambo attire?
I've worked there for the past 10 years -no 6 months or 1 yr rotation, so I know how hard working and committed they usually are, and I've been able to witness changes.
10 years ago extremely poor but dignified village kids would smile at you but never ask for anything.
Until our 'liberating' armies passed through there, handing out alms in order to buy the 'hearts & minds' of their parents and to save their own skins.
Now the village kids have learned English: 'give me dollar'.
Ever wondered why they ask for dollars and not Afghani, their own currency? Because the corruptors are Americans and all those other english speaking armies.
Don't ever claim that we went there to 'help'. The US went for primitive vengence, in need of a scapegoat for 9/11. To get a foothold in Central Asia, from where to militarily dominate the region.
To occupy a defenceless country and turn it into one huge private military camp. To make fortunes on (para)military contracts.
To get a hold of Afghanistan natural resources, precious minerals. Another fiasco incidentally (in addition to the military one), as China for one is rapidly beating them to it.
Who cares that no Afghans had ever participated in any terrorist attacks in the US, Europe or anywhere else for that matter, someone had to pay. Someone so defenceless, that there would be no risk of retaliation.
Don't compound those felonies by expecting its victims to express gratitude (!) for having been attacked, pacified, in fact gang-raped by nearly 50 different NATO countries, all in the name of 'democracy'.
Don't accuse Afghans of all the evils under the sun to cover your own sins committed in that country.
Maybe it's time the US got a taste of what it's like to be invaded and occupied by a foreign country?
Maybe that would show its government and population what that is like and teach them some basic respect for other -nominally sovereign- nations? Nothing else seems to do the trick.
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